OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION:
THE STATE AND POLITICAL SOLDIERS IN
INTRODUCTION: SOLDIERS OR POLITICIANS?
Political Soldiers in Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia
The purpose of this study which I have undertaken of the phenomenon of military intervention in three Southeast Asian countries -- Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand -- is to examine, one, what happens to the military, its leaders, and especial-ly to the state and society when the military intervenes and decides to stay and to re-organize the state? And two, how the political outcomes resulting from military intervention and its reorganization of politics in such states, which are not identical, can be explained?
phenomenon of soldiers’ intervention in politics and the business of the state
is not a very exceptional one in most of the
Indonesia, and Thailand, the men on horseback --to borrow the title of Samuel Finer’s classic study
-- have been active, even dominant, in politics and the state for decades: from
1932 in the case of Thailand, and from the late 1950s in Burma and
Indonesia. In the last two, the armed
forces were from the onset as much political as military forces. They had their roots in politics, coming into
existence during World War II as nationalist "armies"; they were made
up of politicized (and needless to say, ambitious) young men mobilized by Japan
during World War II. The militaries subsequently mythologized
their role in the "independence struggle" and now see themselves as
creator-guardians of the state and "nation". After independence --
soldiers in the three countries have not merely dabbled in politics. They have been highly visible, often dominant
actors, frequently displaying a reluctance to leave the management of national
affairs to civilians. There is
a need to investigate the military in more depth in a way that acknowledges it
as a prominent political force. This
study, then, will examine the patterns of domination established by the
military, its role in consolidating an authoritarian relationship between state
and society, and the problems that have confronted the military as rulers,
politicians, and state managers. I hope
to present a different perspective on soldiers’ political involvement in
My aim is to situate the phenomenon of military intervention within a wider theoretical context. There have been many studies of military intervention, focusing on the military's motivation, opportunity, and modus operandi at the time of the coup d'etat. More recently, the focus of research has shifted to investigating civil-military relations as the key variable. Likewise, a considerable amount has been written in recent years about the "back-to-the-barracks" phenomenon. My interest, however, and the focus of this enquiry, is the question of what happens to the military and the state when the military leaders decide to stay in power and re-shape the state. How do these regimes consolidate and retain power? What are their goals and methods? What are their advantages and disadvantages? Why do the soldiers stay on in polit-ics? What kind of "new" states are created? Do they -- the military and the "new" states -- change over time? If so, how do they evolve?
I agree with the
more perceptive analysts of the military intervention phenom-enon,
such as Samuel Finer, Harold Crouch, and Christopher Clapham,
who maintain that the political orders established by the military -- that is,
military-authoritarian regimes and states -- are not identical, although they
are based primarily on, or are supported by, the armed forces, and are, in many
aspects, fairly similar. This
being the case, I believe that an examination of quite long-lived
military-authoritarian regimes post-dating the military’s capture of the state,
can yield useful theoretical insights into variations in these regimes with
respect to the strategies of rule, the nature of the state and its goals, the
extent of military participation or domination, and the military’s own degree
of subordination to its chief and/or a military strongman-ruler.
Since the study is oriented toward making theoretical sense of military-authoritarianism and its effects on politics and society, much of the research is based on the interpretation and analysis of the very substantial body of scholarship on soldiers and "military regimes" in
The Third World Military: A View of Soldiers in Mufti
Through their close and protracted involvement in politics, soldiers in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand – along with many other Third World countries – have brought about far-reaching changes. In the process, they themselves have also been changed. As armed politicians, state managers, and rulers, they are firmly ensconced in the structures of power; they have become prominent political actors. As rulers and politicians, I contend that they have shaped political and socio-economic land-scapes, often decisively. They have also been pivotal in determining the character of state-society relations -- more precisely, relations among state actors, and between rulers and ruled in the countries under study -- in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand where, as stated, they have established quite durable military-authoritarian regimes.
It would be conceptually inaccurate in such cases to view soldiers simply as armed, professional state servants. Rather than military interventions into politics being limited forays, undertaken with specific aims, these interventions have in some cases, been quite open-ended in fact. Hence, the approach that views the military as intervening temporarily to "clean up the mess" made by civilian politicians does not always apply. The open-ended presence of soldiers in politics in some states cannot be reconciled with the implied assumption that these same soldiers will return to the barracks once specific objectives are attained.
largely as a result of Latin American experiences, a "return to the
barracks" literature has developed, attempting to explain the "whens" and "hows"
of military disengagement from politics. A few of the postulated preconditions
include: the professionalization of
"praetorian" armed forces; a higher degree of political
institutionalization; the emergence of strong civilian alternatives (and the
concomitant ability of civilian politicians to defuse the military’s fear of
popular vengeance); the lessening of the kind of threats that trigger coups;
mounting or lessening economic problems; dissension within the military; an
institutional disposition to withdraw; external pressures; and so on. Up to a point, these theories offer useful
generalizations about political soldiers and politics. However, as Robin Luckham
notes, military disengagement is often viewed as a kind of "intervention
in reverse," assuming that the conditions favouring
military disengagement are simply the reverse of those that triggered coups in
the first place. In this sense, the literature tends to
concentrate on pinpointing conditions for withdrawal and is appropriate when
the military either seeks to return power to civilian rule, or does not harbour any goals for re-fashioning the state. It is not so appropriate, however, for
investigating cases where the military leadership retains power and seeks to
change the way the state functions.
Harold Crouch’s observation on the long presence of the military in politics in
In investigating military intervention,
scholars have explained the phenomenon as stemming from a number of factors. As summed up by Crouch, they are, (a) the values and orientation of many Third
World soldiers, which hold that participation in politics is not
"abnormal", but is a "national" or
"revolutionary" duty; (b) the
military's corporate interests, which includes a sufficient budget allocation,
appropriate housing, satisfactory pay, and so on; (c) the personal interests of senior officers
in gaining the government's patronage network;
(d) socio-economic conditions, especially in countries with a very low
level of economic development; and (e)
the failure of civilian governments to satisfy the expectations of the middle
class and its demand for rapid economic growth, and their failure to govern
effectively and preserve stability -- which involve repressing communists or
other subversives. The widely argued
view that blames the failures of civilian governments for military takeovers
seems, to Crouch, "an excessively narrow view". He suggests that it is more useful to see
military intervention as arising from a "total situation" rather than
"the deficiencies of a particular group".
In this respect, it might be useful to be mindful of the very different kind of politics that transpire in the
In such "free for all" political struggles involving all groups or leaders in society, and even, or especially, those within the state sphere or government, for advantage, or more importantly, for dominance and power, soldiers are likely to be the most successful because they largely control the instruments of force, as Clapham notes. The struggle for power will invariably involve, I believe (as does Clapham), a contest for control of the state, since in a praetorian context, the state is the pivotal prize. In instances where the military is involved in political struggle, the prize -- the state itself -- will likely be won by the one who controls the armed forces of the state: the military strongman. Hence it is a mistake not to recognize the military as a potential political instrument of the military officer who commands the armed forces when it steps onto the political stage to take control of the state and impose its control and to re-fashion state-society relations.
Guardians of the Nation: Masters and Servants of the State
This study considers the military in politics from a somewhat different perspective. Central to it are three factors which, I argue, are crucial to the appreciation of the military as an interventionist political force. The first is the claim, commonly heard from soldiers in
The second factor is that, with rare exceptions like
The third factor is that the military is a force upon which the authority of new or weak governments may depend heavily. The very existence of the state, in its territorial-political aspect, is often dependent on the military’s coercive function, on its role as a "protector" and in containing or repressing (often with external assist-ance) "communist" and "secessionist" rebels, or repelling or detering foreign aggress-ion. Taken together, these factors mean that
The unique, structural position of the military as an armed body that is integral to the state and the nation, reinforced by its role as a "protector", and the military officers' self-image as the selfless, dedicated national guardians, has resulted in the defining, legitimizing, and rationalizing of the military's corporate interests in a way that makes it, Nordlinger argues, almost indistinguishable from that of the nation. The military's close self-identification with the nation, as J. Samuel Fitch points out, was further boosted when the cold war intensified. There occurred a redefinition of its role in
With the military in many
Military Intervention and the Re-Configuration of Politics and the State
Military intervention is a multi-dimensional, complex, and heterogeneous phenomenon -- made more so by differences in the underlying historical, geograph-ical, cultural, and socioeconomic settings. But there is a common feature. Political soldiers tend not to be predisposed to upholding a democratic order which allows for conflicts among groups, interests, and institutions. Democratic politics, which are "open" to societal interest groups and forces, are viewed as disorderly and harmful to the nation and national unity by soldiers, as noted by Gerald Heeger. I argue that soldiers tend to prefer a political order that is congruent with their vision of how pol-itics and society (or the "nation") are to be managed: that is, an authoritarian one. Thus we often have, in cases where the military intrude into politics and decides to remain on the political stage, a reconfiguration of state-society relations by the milit-ary's chief-and-ruler.
The vision of politics that informs the
military’s actions as builders and manag-ers of the state
is embodied in what Manuel Garreton calls
"national security" ideology. In this ideology, state and nation are seen
as forming a single living organism; they are "larger" or higher
entities that stand above individuals (who are viewed as "subordinate
concept of "national unity" plays a key role. It is
conceived of by the military as the absence of conflict and dissent. Opposition to the state, the government
(especially one backed or dominated by the military), and the armed forces --
all of which from this perspective embody the nation's destiny and goals -- is
viewed as damaging to national unity and as something that must be prevented or
ideal form of governance for soldiers is -- as Garreton
notes -- an authoritarian state order managed, protected, and guaranteed by the
military. The military deems itself the
"bulwark of the nation" and the bastion that stands above social
divisions, the group best qualified to define and defend the national interest,
and guarantee the nation's unity, and more importantly, its historic
continuity. After capturing the state, I argue that the
military -- more specifically, the military leader who becomes the ruler of the
state -- will either seek to return power to civilians quickly or, in line with
the national security ideology and associated statist
orientation, will stay to establish a non-democratic, authoritarian type
At this juncture, it is important to, one, heed Finer's observation which in effect states that it is difficult to make a hard distinction between civilian and military regimes as the latter tend to shade off by degrees into civilian authoritarian regimes. And two, it is important to be aware of the heterogeneity and range of what have been labelled "authoritarian" regimes. As Linz indicates, they are found in a variety of forms, in a wide range of economic, social, and cultural environments -- in Europe during the interwar years (1920s to the 1930s), in many post-independence "new" Third World states, and in the post-Stalin Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (until the late 1980s).
Authoritarian regimes, which include military-authoritarian regimes, are to varying degrees non-democratic (or not very democratic). But, importantly, they are also different from, and at the same time share some elements and traits in common with, traditional absolute monarchical, or similar types, and to totalitarian regimes. Owing to a complex mix of elements, military-authoritarian regimes are not easily confined within neat categories: some may be very undemocratic, while a few may even be semi-democratic.
In one dimension, military-authoritarian regimes can be characterized by features found in what Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski calls an "autocracy". A cardinal characteristic is the concentration of decision-making at the apex of the official hierarchy possessing "the highest power over citizens." There is an absence of other authorities who have "have sufficient power to compel the law-breaking rulers to submit to the law." Needless to say, also absent is a genuine opposition, a free press (except in rare cases, as for example, in
There is a strong emphasis, as David Beetham notes, on discipline and order, and an arbitrary and unaccountable style to the exercise of power. Importantly, military rulers will, through the employment of the military as a political instrument, reassert the authority of government (or the state) over society by removing the freedom of organized groups to pursue their interests independently of the state or its officials; impose "unity" by removing the political avenues for competition and conflict; and attempt to restore confidence in the ability and integrity of government by removing independent means for monitoring its actions. The military resolves the problems of democratic politics by abolishing politics altogether and immunizing "the state from the problems of society by elevating the state above society". In this regard, the military -- as the wielders of the legitimate means of coercion -- constitut-es the most important building block of authoritarianism. Its importance lies in its usefulness to ruling strongmen as a political instrument in making the state more autonomous and cohesive by excluding and de-politicizing the ruled, and also in intimidating the civilian bureaucracy and non-state elites, making them more easily co-opted, pliant, and loyal.
On another dimension, however, authoritarian regimes are distinctively marked by what
Another feature is that although political power does not devolve to the citizens and the rulers are not accountable to them, rulers might still be responsive to them. They will respond through sanctioned participating groups, such as the government's party, political parties that are not banned (but heavily restrained), state-sponsored associations (or corporatist-like, interest-representing bodies or "functional" groups), interest groups (cultural, economic, semi-political) tolerated by the state, and various "representative" and legislative assemblies (but controlled or manipulated by the executive). Further, in authoritarian regimes, there is usually found a constant proc-ess of co-optation of leaders which constitutes a mechanism by which different sect-ors or institutions become participants in the system. And there is in consequence a certain heterogeneity of elites, composed of some co-opted professional politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats, military men, religious leaders, and local notables, and even, in some cases, activists (such as former student leaders, trade unionists, peasant leaders, and so forth).
It is also important to bear in mind that we are dealing with states and regimes situated in the
The overall effect of limited pluralism and patrimonialism on authoritarian regimes is that the state, significant power-holders, and key officials are, in one dimension, quite highly autonomous from society, but are, in another dimension -- quite paradoxically -- not autonomous. They respond in a paternalistic or patrimonial manner to particularistic, private, informal demands or preferences of some groups and segments in society.
The Military, the Strongman, and the Consolidation of Authoritarianism
The changing role of the military once an authoritarian order is established is of theoretical interest. I argue that for the military to intervene successfully in politics, and importantly, for it to remain and dominate and, furthermore, to re-fashion the state-society order according to its preferences, it must first achieve a considerable degree of cohesion. As Clapham maintains, when there is no dominant leader, it is all the more likely that the military will not be able to stay on for long -- even if it intervenes -- and will likely hand over power to a new civilian government (although it might intervene again later). Cohesion is achieved when there emerges a military leader who is able to unite all military factions, or alternatively, eliminate rivals or troublesome subordinates.
Thus, after the military intervenes and captures the state, a person accepted by the important military factions as the leader, and who is primarily responsible for bringing the military onto the political center-stage, becomes the head of the military authoritarian state. However, all too often this person is given the standard label of being the "military dictator" or head of a "military junta" or "personal ruler". Person-al rulers are given much prominence in accounts of military and other authoritarian regimes. However, the label conceals significant differences between military strongmen; and the characteristics, goals, ambitions, power, and force of will of individual military strongmen are often not clearly delineated.
The relation between the military personal ruler and his military power base is not static nor uniform. I argue that it is a complex, dynamic, often shifting one. The relationships will vary among military-authoritarian regimes. To elaborate upon the general trend: as the military strongman proceeds to consolidate the authoritarian order and his dominance within it, he will tend to gain more personal power and authority. The military, which serves the successful strongman-ruler as a political instrument, will become subordinated to some extent to the man who is its chief and also the state ruler.
In many cases, the more the military ruler wants to transform the state to obtain greater legitimacy, or to transform himself into a leader-ruler of the nation as a whole, and not just of a segment, the more likely it is that he will want to "resign" from the military and present a civilian face. Being a "civilian" will invariably change his relationship with the military over time, as he increasingly seems less a military man. And as a relatively simple military regime evolves, or is transformed by the ruler into a more complex, sophisticated authoritarian order, the military’s position will also change in a number of ways. A new set of institutions and actors may emerge: the presidential or "palace" staff; a ruling or governmental party; a new hierarchy of representative-legislative bodies; a more professional (or professional-looking) bureaucracy, and so on. While still serving as the primary power base of the ruler, the military will, in such cases, be confronted with, and constrained by, other powerful players emerging from the new institutions, as well as favoured ministers; useful and influential techno-bureaucrats and advisors; and money-making clients and cronies of the president, his family, and kin group.
In other cases, however, the military's position may remain as dominant as it was in the early years of the regime. It will remain, next to the strongman-ruler, the most dominant force, and it will prevent non-military elites from gaining a hold over the levers of power. In still other cases, only the top brass will figure prominently in politics: soldiers, including most officers, will "return to the barracks" after their chief’s seizure of power.
In polities where power is concentrated
in the hands of one key leader, his ability to manipulate and control
subordinate leaders and factions within the ruling circle is crucial. Such a ruler -- the strongman-ruler in
military regimes -- will often work to maintain the balance of power via the
politics of factionalism, especially within the armed forces – the essential
pillar of his support, but also a potentially dangerous one. To this end, he may carry out frequent purges
or transfers; restruct-ure the chain of command or
operational procedures; promote hard-core loyalists into top positions; sow
distrust and rivalry among top generals, among services, and even among loyal
aides; or create special surveillance units to spy on the officer corps. He may reward military men with positions as
governmental politicians and party bosses, representatives, legislators,
"czars" of administrative and economic empires, ambass-adors,
and so on. In all these ways, the
strongman-ruler works to dilute the officer corps’ cohesion and render it
incapable of moving politically against him.
At the same time, soldiers gain a vital stake in defending both the ruler and his authoritarian order. In long-lived, stabilized authoritarian states, soldiers are socializ-ed into their roles as defenders of the personal ruler and also come to appreciate that it is in their own best interest to do so. The person and role of the ruler are "mystified" -- identified with order, the state, nation, and the national interest. As the man at the centre of things, he becomes the only one capable of maintaining overall cohesion and balance against the back-drop of opaque, convoluted "palace politics" that tend to characterize military-authoritarian governance.
"mature" military-authoritarian states, the successful
strongman-ruler tends to gain greater power vis-à-vis the military but, as
noted, politics in such states is by no means static. With the passage of time,
as authoritarianism becomes routinized, interaction
between the military as an institution, the ruler, and other powerful state
factions grows more complex.
Owing to the complexity of politics in military-authoritarian regimes, they will, as Finer indicates, exhibit as much diversity among themselves as civilian regimes. As Finer suggests, "military regimes" can be distinguished from one another through a classification system based on measurements along spectrums of different dimensions.
There are three measurements relevant to this study. First is a spectrum based on the extent of military penetration of the civil bureaucracy and the military's role in policy-making. The extent of military penetration as located along a spectrum is an indicator of the degree of authoritarianism being exercised in a state. The greater the penetration, the more authoritarian the state is likely to be; likewise, the smaller the penetration, the less authoritarian the state is likely to be.
Second is a spectrum based on the autonomy of the regime vis-à-vis political parties and legislatures. In this spectrum there are four broad focal points: (a) milit-ary regimes where legislatures and parties are suppressed; (b) regimes which hold elections but refuse to acknowledge negative results and prohibit the elected legislat-ure from convening; (c) legislatures and parties that exist as "simple ancillaries or appurtenances," that are quite autonomous vis-à-vis society; and (d) regimes with legislatures and parties that function democratically following competitive elections and are relatively free of military or state control. Again, (a) and (b) can be seen on the spectrum as most authoritarian; (c) as less authoritarian; and (d) as least authorit-arian for this dimension.
A third spectrum, related to (and inferred from) the second, is based on the autonomy and responsiveness of the state to society. There are three broad focal points here: (a) regimes with high autonomy that are not responsive to societal demands or aspirations; (b) regimes with relatively high autonomy, and yet are somewhat responsive; and (c) regimes that are relatively autonomous, and quite responsive to society. Likewise, (a) can be seen on the spectrum as most authorit-arian, (b) as less authoritarian, and (c) as least authoritarian in this dimension.
The spectrums mentioned above are broad categorizations representing certain dimension of regimes which can be identified and placed along a spectrum according to the criteria mentioned. The measurements of these spectrums are not mathematic-ally quantifiable, but neither are they simply intuitive. There will be a body of empirical evidence presented in the case studies to justify the measurements.
Spectrums allow for shades of difference to be noted. Many military regimes will fit in between the broad focal points described. For example, there may be military regimes that allow "limited autonomy" for parties and legislatures, and therefore would be placed somewhere between (c) and (d) on the spectrum , as depicted above. Also, spectrums allow changes -- and directions -- over time to be noted, by placements on the spectrum of regimes of the same country in different, important, years. This is useful for a country like
The importance of placing the regimes of
In this chapter, I have examined the conceptual framework underlying the phenomenon of political soldiers and their relations with the state. I have looked at the relationship between the personal ruler and the military, the nature of military-authoritarian orders and the military’s role within them, and the changes (notably in the military’s role and relative influence or autonomy) that occur in "mature" military-authoritarian regimes. The intent of this thesis is to examine military-authoritarian regimes in a way that draws out the wide variations in the way these regimes are organized and how the military is situated within them.
In the next chapter, I will consider the broader concepts and assumptions related to the military in power. In particular, I will focus on theories of the state, state autonomy, and state-society interaction. I will conclude by stating the main arguments of this dissertation.
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INTRODUCTION: SOLDIERS OR POLITICIANS?
 It is with great reservations that I use the
 Charles Kennedy and David Louscher,
"Civil-Military Interaction: Data in Search of a Theory", in Charles
Kennedy and David J. Louscher, eds., Civil-Military
 It should be noted that in both
 Although the claim is partially valid in the
Indonesian case, it should be stressed that the independ-ence
"war" also involved political and diplomatic struggles. A similar
claim by soldiers in
 Soldiers defended the new power-holders
against challengers and those who rejected, or wished to change, the boundaries
of the new states. Almost all "national" boundaries in the
 It would be rash to say that military intervention
is a thing of the past in
 This phrase is borrowed from Eric A.Nordlinger's influential article on military intervention, where he discusses and refutes the "military-as-modernizer" argument. See Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States", American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970), pp. 1131-1148. A few notable examples that view soldiers as "modernizers", are: Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization", in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-90; Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade", in World Politics (April 1959), pp. 339-340; John J. Johnson, The Military and Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs Presidents (New York: Praeger, 1964); Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); and Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America", American Political Science Review 60 (September 1966), pp. 616-626; P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961).
 See Samuel E.Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Karbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasant and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Mod-ernizing Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 281-304 (281 and 301 esp.); Harold Crouch, "The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 287-317 (esp., p.287, 314-315); Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 149.
 The "cleaning up the mess" explanation is the standard justification of coup-makers. It has been quite effective in legitimating coups externally, especially those which took place in the 1960s. Such a claim is today less effective, because more is now known about military rule.
 Works on military withdrawals are numerous. They include: Samuel E. Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and Theory of Military Withdrawal from the Seats of Power", Third World Quarterly, 7(1) January 1985, pp. 16-30; Claude E. Welch Jr., No Farewell To Arms (Boulder: Westview, 1989), esp., Ch.2, pp. 9-29; Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Random House, 1957); Talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal From Politics (Mass: Ballinger, 1987), esp., pp. xii, 80-89, 91-95, 99-102,209, 212; Paul Cammack and Philip O’Brien, Generals in Retreat (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1985).
 The similarity between the "back to the barracks" and "democratization" literature is interesting. The military figures prominently in both. For examples, see Constantine Danopoulos "Intervention and Withdrawal: Notes and Perspectives", in Constantine P. Danopoulos, ed., From Military to Civilian Rule (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-18; and D. Ethier, "Introduction: Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators", in Diane Ethier, ed., Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 3-21.
 Robin Luckham,
"Introduction: The Military, the Developmental State and Social Forces in
 Crouch, "The Military and Politics".
 Ibid., p. 311.
 The term "post-coup" is in
parentheses because authoritarian states established by soldiers need not
always result from coups. For example, in 1958, Ne Win took over as head of the
caretaker government of
 Crouch, "The Military and Politics", p. 315. Also, Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Macro-political Theory, Vol.3 (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 175-411 (esp., p. 284).
 For example, see Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 66-71, and Eric A.Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp. 65-71.
 For excellent works essential to the understanding of Third World politics, see Gerald A. Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974); Robert H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, Jr., Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler’s Imperatives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order; The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Clapham, Third World Politics.
 See Claude, E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civilian-Military Relations (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1974), esp. pp. 34-80, 235-62. See also a special issue on civil-military relations in Pacific Focus, Vol. IV, No.2 (Fall 1982). Among the articles in the issue, see Chung-in Moon, "Democratization, National Security Politics and Civil-Military Relations: Some Theoretical Issues and the South Korean Case", (pp. 3-22), and J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security and Democracy: Lessons from the Latin American Experience" (pp. 99-147).
 Amos Perlmutter,
"Civil-Military Relations in Socialist Authoritarian and
"Civil-Military Relations", p. 318. The difference between a
professional military force and a politicized one is highlighted by the recent
disbanding of a Canadian Airborne regiment by a civilian government over
 Samuel P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 192-198.
 Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security".
 Ibid., p. 107.
 See Odetola, T.O. Odetola, Military Regimes and Development, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 182-84., and Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, p. 18.
 Robin Luckham, "Introduction, etc.," in Viberto Selochan, ed., The Military, the State, pp. 30-31.
 See Odetola, Military
Regimes and Development, pp. 182-84., and Feit, The
Armed Bureaucrats, p. 18. Except in rare cases such as Prem
 For a discussion of the military’s strong distrust of politics, and its special dislike of the politics of diverse groups with conflicting interests, see also Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 109-112.
 Manuel Antonio Garreton, The Chilean Political Process (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 68-83. Although the definition of the ideology of "national security" is derived from a discussion of soldiers in
 Ibid., p. 69.
 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
 Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", p. 281.
 Ibid., pp. 179, 264-265.
 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1965), pp. 3-14. The authors’ use of the term "autocracy" and objection to the term "authoritarian" seems problematic, however. They say that it "rather misleading to speak of autocratic regimes as ‘authoritarian’" (pp. 9-10), because they define authority as residing in both power and legitimacy. They therefore assert that a constitutional democracy may be highly authorit-arian -- even more than an autocracy. Nonetheless, I will employ the commonly-accepted term "authoritarian regime", to denote not very democratic or dictatorial regimes, rather than "autocracy" or "autocracies", the terms used by the authors.
 Ibid., p. 8.
 Ibid., pp. 4, 8-9. However, the term "law and order" is a favoured slogan of coup-makers and authoritarian regimes, and is often used to justify repression. It is also effective in placating external audiences, since the fear of anarchy is universal. However, the term "law and order" poses a grave problem when the judiciary is not autonomous, and law itself is subject to "the rule of men" as opposed to it being impartially and equally applied.
 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 4-5, 9.
 See David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillian, 1991), p. 232.
 Ibid., pp. 228-236.
 Ibid., p.266.
 Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and
 Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule", pp. 575-579 (on patrimonialism in Suharto's New Order state).
 The phenomenon that O’Donnell points to in the Latin
American context is applicable to most
 The concept of personal rule is also well established
in academia, especially in the context of
 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 117.
 Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", p. 281.
 Ibid., pp. 301-302.
 Ibid. For a discussion on the military, the bureaucracy, and supreme decision-making power, see pp. 297-301.
 The phrase, "simple ancillaries and appurtenances" is Finer's. Ibid., p. 301. For a brief discussion on military regimes and parties and legislatures, see , pp. 287-291.