1st February –
ALTSEAN Burma
Published September
2001
____________________________________________________
CONTENTS
Introduction 2
Democracy 3
Dialogue, Calls for Caution
Thai-Burma Relations 6
Armed Conflict, Border Trade,
Blockade, Drugs, Espionage, Making Amends
Military Consolidation 11
Myanmar Armed Forces Day, Military
Strength, Power Struggle
Economic Situation 14
SPDC Reports, Industries of Interest, Non-SPDC Reports,
Inflation,
Currency Exchange, Free Market & Private Enterprise,
Border Trade,
International Trade & Tourism,
Thailand, Japan & Baluchaung
Drugs 22
Heroin, Methamphetamines, SPDC: a
main player?, UWSA,
Health 28
Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, Japan’s
Role
Human Rights 32
Forced labour, Taxation, Responses to the ILO Call for
Sanctions,
Procurement Policy, Land Confiscation, Torture, Freedom of
Information,
Political Prisoners, Human rights Training,
UN Special expert on human rights
situation in
Women 43
Rape, Women from Burma in 2nd
Countries, Health
Children 46
Health, Child Soldiers, Trafficking
Ethnic & Religious Relations 48
Peace v. Armed Conflict, Kachin
Coup, Religious Relations, Chinese
Forced Relocation & IDPs 52
Refugees & Migrant Workers 55
Bangladesh, Guam, Malaysia, India,
Thailand, Repatriated Refugees
Chronology 61
Bibliography 65
INTRODUCTION
Talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC are
officially continuing but there is a loud silence surrounding these talks.
Ethnic nationalities have not been invited to join talks to discuss national
reconciliation and the veil of secrecy remains intact.
Meanwhile, the military continues to expand and
casualties of armed groups and civilian human rights abuses continue. Relations
with Thailand have reached an all time low with the drugs trade being a
particularly visible point of contention. The economy continues to weaken with
the currency falling and inflation rising. The regular person’s spending power
remains low, often below subsistence levels.
Religious tensions have escalated to dramatic heights
with numerous anti-Muslim race riots; some argue the regime provoke these
tensions. Health and education systems remain inadequate and the country is
still waiting for effective steps to be taken against the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Children are becoming increasingly vulnerable in an environment of fear and
increasing family fragmentation and/or destruction. Many children are used as
fodder for the regime’s political needs. The SPDC continues to display its
ignorance of gender issues and women’s rights continue to be abused. Reports of
abuse of women in second countries continue to make headlines but rarely
receive much attention.
The UN Commission on Human Rights has recognised that “the systematic violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights by the Government of Myanmar have had a significant effect on the health and welfare of the people of Myanmar.”[1] The SPDC’s systematic discrimination and autocratic rule impede upon the well-being of Burmese citizens, and force many to hide in the jungles and/or flee to neighbouring countries. The situation for migrant workers and refugees has not improved, and the plight of trafficked persons has been highlighted, in particular by the UN Commissioner for Human Rights.
Japan’s
resumption of ODA programmes, has alarmed many Burma groups and communities. It
appears this aid is to reward the regime for its supposed ‘steps towards
democracy’, but the people of Burma are still waiting. Still waiting for
democracy and national reconciliation. Still waiting for a release from poverty
and Least Developed Country status. Still waiting for a strong health system
and policy that can help develop effective measures concerning HIV/AIDS and
other transmittable diseases. Still waiting for an independent and widespread
education system. Still waiting for an end to all kinds of human rights abuses.
Still waiting for peace and safety.
DEMOCRACY
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Dialogue
The bulk of the discussions between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi have been conducted by General Khin Nyunt's deputy chief in the Department of Defence Security and Intelligence, Major-General Kyaw Win.
Razali Ismail was able to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi twice in January, but has been unable to enter Burma since then. His February visit was postponed, again in March and then in April. While the SPDC say that Razali has agreed to postpone his contact, other sources report that Razali was actually refused by the SPDC, possibly as result of his attempts to include ethnic nationality leaders in the talks.[2]
On the 1st March, US Secretary Powell met with Razali to discuss the situation in Burma. It was later reported that Powell considered the talks to be moving forward, and stated that the US was willing to help in anyway it could. A US official had met with Aung San Suu Kyi in February.
While there has been some speculation of power sharing talks and discussion of a time framework for a transitional administration,[3] reports suggest that democracy may have some conditions. It is thought that the SPDC will want to secure immunity for their crimes, and assurance that Aung San Suu Kyi will not lead the country herself.[4] While the talks may be encouraging they are surrounded by secrecy, and speculation is just that, speculation. Borje Ljunggren, the official head of an EU delegation to Rangoon on 29–31 January, described the dialogue between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi as “fragile” and at the stage of “confidence building”.
Calls for caution
A
meeting of non-Burman ethnic and democracy forces opposing military-rule in
Burma (6-7 March) addressed some serious concerns regarding the talks:
[While] full confidence in Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi’s integrity and her commitment to the establishment of a truly
democratic political system in Burma [is reaffirmed, we note] that United Nations General Assembly
resolutions affirm that the best means of promoting national reconciliation and
the full and early restoration of democracy in Burma is a Tripartite Dialogue -
the SPDC, democracy forces led by Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi, and true representatives of the non-Burman ethnic peoples.[5]
This demand
is viewed by many, including various national leaders and the UNCHR, to be the
most urgent and was reiterated at the International Strategy Meeting (ISM) on
Burma (17-19 March). “They welcomed the
talks, but want them transformed into a genuine dialogue, with the SPDC, the
NLD and ethnic nationalities.”[6]
The ISM statement declared that, “Only
through this tripartite dialogue can real peace be brought to Burma in the form
of a democratic federal union based on principles of equality and human
rights.”[7]
Six ethnic armed groups
who have signed cease-fire agreements (Shan State Peace Council, New Mon State
Party, Karenni People's Liberation Front, Shan People's Liberation Front, Kayan
New State Party and Palong State Liberation Party) sent a joint letter to Khin
Nyunt on 27th March, demanding inclusion in the talks.[8]
If any kind of agreement is reached between Aung San Suu Kyi and the
generals, it may potentially be a cause of contention as the multiple and
diverse voices of Burma will not have been heard.[9]
There are
other legitimate concerns regarding the SPDC’s commitment to the talks
including the fact that previous talks have failed to make headway. Although
the current talks were initiated in October 2000, they were not made public to
the international community - not the Burmese - until January, and only referred
to by the regime on 27th March, Armed Forces Day, otherwise known as
Resistance Day. A senior official remarked that talks with Aung San Suu Kyi
were going well, but stressed that steps
towards democracy must be taken cautiously. It appears the only attraction
of democracy to the SPDC is that democratic countries can achieve economic
development.[10]
Furthermore, there was no mention of the talks between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi in the regime’s presentation to the UN Economic and Social Council in March. The only reference to Aung San Suu Kyi was:
It is also a known fact that Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi is also initiating and takes part in political activities of her party
within the boundaries of prescribed regulations and her personal safety.[11]
This
does not show any real commitment to the talks and excuses Aung San Suu Kyi’s
house arrest and limited political activities. The presentation instead focused
upon the National Convention, which the regime “firmly believes […] is the only political process suitable for
Myanmar”.[12]
The National Convention has become increasingly undermined over the years
with members unable to freely express their opinions.
The
presentation specifically stated, “Attempts
from the outside to set the pace and influence direction for Myanmar would not
only hinder the process of democratisation but also prove to be
counterproductive.”[13]
Such pre-emptive judgement cannot be helpful and the statement seems to merely
serve as a warning to the international community and pro-democracy activists.
Although some positive signs appear to be emerging from the talks - NLD members are hopeful that they will be allowed to reopen township offices and reinstall NLD signboards soon,[14] and some prisoners have been released, there are important points to bear in mind. Of the political prisoners released, many had already served their sentences, which they should not have been subject to in the first place. Only a small period of political prisoners have been released in this period: Htike, Maung Maung Oo, Moe Myat Thu and Tin Than Oo were all released in March.[15]
The UNHRC remains concerned about intimidation and persecution of the political opposition and their relatives. As of mid-April, Amnesty International released details of 458 prisoners, of 1,850 political prisoners in Burma.[16] A prominent ethnic leader who worked closely with Aung San Suu Kyi, Mr. Gin Kam Lian, Secretary General of the Zomi National Congress, was arrested on 19th March for unknown reasons[01]. Political activity, as higlighted, remains highly restricted and arrests continue for ‘subversive’ activities.
In an
environment where freedoms of expression, assembly and opinion remain severely
restricted,[17] genuine
dialogue cannot occur. Aung San Suu Kyi, many NLD members and other political
actors remain hostages under house, prison or ‘guesthouse’ arrest, and
arbitrary arrests and harsh detentions prevent many “from exercising their legitimate political rights.”[18]
It is for reasons such as these that Ljunggren stressed that the EU will not contemplate removing sanctions until there are “concrete measures leading to national reconciliation, democracy and the respect of human rights”.[19]
Some suspect
the SPDC is only making a token effort to buy reprieve from sanctions and
diplomatic pressure, including the resolution of the ILO. [see p32-38]
To show its sincerity, demands are being made for the SPDC
to:
w
release
thousands more political prisoners
w
establish
freedom for political parties to operate
w
end
hostilities against ethnic groups, forced labour and other human rights abuses
w
establish a
timeframe for the achievement of national reconciliation and civilian democracy
w
release the
substance of the talks to the public as soon as possible.
THAI-BURMA RELATIONS
* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
Relations between Thailand and Burma have taken a turn for the worse, both in military and civilian contexts. There has been enraged controversy over ‘revised’ history in various textbooks and films, while Burmese authorities have ordered Thai style Buddha images be removed from public view since March[02]. Meanwhile, armed conflict has intensified. Tensions have markedly increased along the Thai-Burma border where security is frustrated by drug trafficking, refugee migrations, unclear demarcation of borders, cross-border trade issues and armed conflict.
Armed Conflict
On 11th February SPDC soldiers attacked positions held by the Shan at Tachilek, just across from Mae Sai in Chiang Rai, Thailand. Fighting spilt over into Mae Sai, and military shells landed on Thai soil, killing 2 people and forcing others to evacuate. Thai army spokesman, Somkuan Sangpataranet, said Thai troops fought a gun battle with about 200 SPDC soldiers who intruded onto Thai soil, in the nearby Mae Fah Luang district, while chasing the Shan rebels. Seven Thai soldiers and 8 civilians were reportedly injured. Reportedly, about 200 Burmese soldiers who overtook a Thai paramilitary base at Ban Pang Noon, Mae Fah Luang district, tried to launch an attack on the Shan State Army (SSA) from Thai soil. On the same day, Burmese troops captured 19 Thai soldiers (later rescued by a Thai unit) while other troops fired automatic rifles at a Thai army helicopter on a supply mission flight over Mae Ai.[20] Additional soldiers were mobilised on both sides of the border.
Some consider that it may have been an intentional attack on Thailand, spurred by recent allegations that the Thai army is providing military support to the Shan and other ethnic armies fighting for independence from Rangoon. A number of Burmese soldiers, as well as soldiers from the United Wa State Army (UWSA), have recently been killed in joint operations of the Thai and SSA.[21] Thailand stress however that they only open fire when fighting crosses into their territory, and do not provoke the Burmese.
Thai Media coverage of the clashes between the SSA and Burmese military troops reveled in sensationalism. Photographs were taken of the SSA attacking a Burmese camp, infuriating Thai defence minister, Chavalit,[22] although some remark that his comments have not helped ease the situation either.[23] As predicted, the SPDC loudly criticised Thai newspaper reports as publishing fabrications and untruths.[24]
This was not
an isolated incident, there have been numerous other armed conflicts, not only
with the Shan but also with the KNU[03].
Reports of conflict have continued throughout the 3 month period, as recently
as the 27th April, with Burmese troops firing artillery shells into Thai
territory. Such conflicts on 21st and 22nd April
were alleged to involve both Shan insurgents and Thai troops. Moreover, reports
in Thai newspapers on 23rd April told of how 150,000-200,000
stimulant tablets had been seized from Tatmadaw troops by a rebel group. These
reports were vehemently denied by the SPDC,[25]
but it is clear that drug money plays a large role in power relations and
conflicts, particularly in border areas.
|
Analysts
at the Far Economic Eastern Review have suggested 2 motives for the
increasing attacks near, and sometimes in, Thailand. The first is that the
SPDC are testing
the resolve of the new Thai government, while the second is that conflict is
sparked by an internal power struggle and the need for something to divert
attention and unite the Burmese military.[26]
[see p13-14] Border Trade As a result of the fighting in February, the
friendship bridge between Tachilek and Mae-Sai was closed by Thailand, bringing all border trade to
halt. Although the Thai side opened on 12 March 2001,[27]
the Burmese side remained closed at the end of April, seemingly in an attempt
to teach Thailand that it cannot treat Burma as a “subordinate state”[28] and dictate whether borders are open or closed. |
The Kawthaung District BDSC
(Border Development Supervisory Committee) closed the Kawthaung-Ranong border
on 31st March and border crossing was only allowed to specified
personnel. It is unknown why the Burmese unilaterally closed border trade, but
it is suspected that it is further revenge against the Thai authorities. As Burmese workers in Ranong do not possess
borderpasses, they had to pay Bt300
to cross the border by boat. Traders on both sides of the border are
feeling the pressure, with reports that many on the Thai side have been forced
to close their businesses.[29]
Blockade
The Thai government blocked a major shipment of lignite
power generation equipment travelling to Burma on 20th April.
Thaksin would not let the goods from China cross the Thai-Burma border,
apparently in response to closures of the Burmese side of the border.[30]
Of concern to the Thaksin
government are statements that the plant is partially owned by the Wa. “As long as the UWSA remains directly
involved in the production of ya ba, it’s totally unlikely we will give them
our assistance or co-operation on any matter,” the PM said.[31]
In a similar vein, a Thai general has called for Thailand to stop selling
electricity to Burma as he claims it supplies power to drug factories.[32]
There are also concerns among local Thai residents of pollution from the
receiving power plant that is located close to the border.
Drugs
One of
Thailand’s biggest security problems is considered to be that of drugs, and in
this matter the country experiences frequent conflict with Burma. Thai drug suppression
agencies estimate the number of methamphetamine stimulant tablets flowing into
Thailand this year will leap to 800 million from 500 million last year.[33]
While reports tell of the SPDC, the KNU and Shan groups of seizing drugs, it
must be noted that all of these groups are simultaneously accused of having
links with the drug trade[04].
The tension
and fear surrounding this issue has been highlighted and further strained by
the explosion on the 3rd March of a Thai airlines passenger plane
that was due to carry PM Thaksin. Thai reports suggested
a link with drugs coming from Burma, while the Burmese authorities strongly
denied this accusation and charged Thailand with fuelled bad feeling and “attempting to increase tensions between the
two countries or to even totally disrupt them.”[34]
A Thai Third Army Region commander, at the Regional Border Committee (RBC) meeting in early April, stated a desire to forge closer ties with the Burmese junta. In a move that reiterates this endeavour, the new Foreign Ministry speaks of following the “Asian way” of non-interference, in contrast to the previous government which was tough on human rights issues[05]. However, while junta leaders may believe relations with the Thaksin government may be easier than with the previous government,[35] Thaksin is proving to have a tough line on drug eradication that is a constant thorn in the junta’s side. Accordingly, when Foreign Minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, met his Burmese deputy counterpart in April, he stressed the need for further discussion of a trilateral agreement between Burma, China and Thailand on drug suppression[06]. Reportedly, Burma has specifically agreed to help Thailand in crackdowns on amphetamine producing plants and cross-border trafficking.[36]
The reality
of Burma’s agreement remains to be proven,[37]
especially as other
reports claim that “Whereas the Thai side
was proposing the resolution of drugs, Wa and border demarcation issues, the
Burmese were counter-demanding that their forces be allowed to move across the
border to attack Shan State Army's positions.”[38]
The Wa population along the Thai border is said to be growing daily: from just over 3,000 to
over 10,000 in the past year.[39] The Burmese authorities
seem convinced they can do no wrong in the drugs game. Their support of Wa migration
is not up for discussion. Rather, in their words, “Thailand has resorted to scapegoating and pushing responsibility to
the other party rather than cooperation in a manner of shared responsibility.”[40]
Espionage
There has been an increasing presence of Burmese military intelligence in Thailand, much to the alarm of the Burmese community in this second country, but also the Thai authorities who have accordingly tightened security.[41] It is estimated that there are hundreds of spies who take on many undercover identities. Unease is so great that over 200 Burmese Buddhist monks in Mae Hong Son were suspected of being spies for the regime. In February and March of this year, around 40 Burmese people were detained by Thai authorities for their suspected involvement in espionage.[42]
Making Amends
At
the end of March, the Thai army announced plans to build a pier on a Tak river
and invest in a Burmese coal mine, in what was described by the Defence
Minister as an effort to restore relations with the Burmese authorities.[43]
However, tensions between Thailand and its neighbour continue; the sparks - and
shells - continue to fly.
MILITARY
CONSOLIDATION
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Myanmar Armed Forces Day
![Text Box: Many gifts of medicine, food, and drink that are being donated indicate the solidarity that exists between the people and the Armed Forces […] It is the only institution that the people of Myanmar can rely on in their time of need.
- Myanmar Perspectives (February, March 2001)](STILL_WAITING_files/image004.gif)
March 27th commemorated the 56th
anniversary of the ‘Myanmar Armed Forces Day’, “the day the Myanmar Armed Forces become a full-fledged fighting
force,” according to the junta. Non-regime aligned individuals prefer to
refer to the 27th March as Resistance Day to commemorate the
uprising against the Japanese invasion. At the ceremony, the SPDC praised the
military for its discipline and altruism. Previously, the SPDC has commented it
does not have control over individual soldiers, and this is why rape occurs,
villagers possessions are looted, forced labour cannot be stopped immediately
and other human rights abuses occur.
Burmese activists commemorated Resistance Day in a
somewhat different fashion. A Chin man from Burma, Peter Hee
Man, and about 20 other activists gate-crashed a SPDC embassy party in Malaysia
and stripped off to reveal T-shirts bearing the image of Aung San Suu Kyi. Peter
and 3 Malaysians were arrested, the Malaysians released the next day. Following
Mr Hee Man’s release, he was immediately re-arrested for being an illegal
immigrant. Currently held in a detention centre in Malaysia, authorities are
threatening to deport him to the
Thai-Malaysian border. Activists have urged the Malaysian government not to
deport him to the border as they fear this may ultimately mean forced
repatriation to Burma. It is asked that Mr Hee Man is allowed to stay in
Malaysia until his UNHCR application, already submitted, is processed.[44]
Military Strength
Building upon its artillery purchased from countries such as China and Singapore, the regime entered talks with Russia in February to discuss building a nuclear reactor in Burma, what Russia calls a promising partner in Asia and the Pacific region.[45] Meanwhile, India has become increasingly concerned about Chinese support for upgrading Burma’s facilities, in particular electronic listening posts along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. In order that it may too be involved, India is now supplying non-lethal military equipment such as uniform and combat gear.[46]
The military continues to grow in size, with the army now being approximately 500,000 strong; one of the largest in the world. The military therefore has a strong presence throughout the country, despite not being engaged in external war, and ceasefire agreements being established with some armed opposition groups.
The Coastal Military
Command conducted military training for members of Township’s State Peace and
Development Council (Red Cross Association, Fire Fighter Department, Union
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and other military backed forces)
from March 1st-April 31st. At least 400 people from 10
townships within Tenasserim Division have been taught how to handle, maintain
and use small arms. There is speculation that these people will be developed as
a reserve force. The cost of this training was recuperated by extorting
50,000-100,000 kyat from local
businesses such as hotels, rice mills and fisheries. Individual businessmen
were also targeted and had to pay 7,000 - 20,000 Kyat.[47]
Numerous
reports suggest that soldiers themselves often live in a climate of fear. Many
are forced to join, either physically by military commanders or by the
desperateness of their situation. Interviews with former soldiers have revealed
many devious tactics used by the military to get new recruits.
[I]
went to the Bayinnaung festival in Rangoon with my friends.
[…] Five or six police came to me. […] They asked me if I had brought my
nationality card [identity cards which are supposed to be carried by all
Burmese, but often left at home]. […] I told them I hadn’t brought my student
card. They didn’t like that. They put handcuffs on me and took me to their
station. […] They told me they had arrested me because they suspected me of
doing something or hiding in the dark [this accusation is often used by Burmese
police and is so sweeping that almost anyone can be arrested for it just by
being out after dark].
- The next day he was sent to
become a soldier (source: KHRG (March 2001:9,10))
Many, upon arrest, are given the choice of going to prison or joining the army. The army is often considered the better option, but the choice indicates both the military’s desperate measures to get new recruits, and the status of new soldiers. Upon joining, they are made to do menial work and receive insufficient rations and salary, with salaries sometimes unpaid completely. Their daily activities, including contact with their families, is strictly regulated, with beatings and other punishments common if they disobey, under-perform or ask questions.
While soldiers are taught to follow orders and use weapons, they are given no training in political or human rights, how to deal with civilian populations or different ethnic nationalities. As the military control the soldiers reading material, there is not an option to learn about such topics even if they wish to. Interviews with soldiers indicate that they do not have much idea what is happening in Burma, including who the enemy is supposed to be, let alone international news and perspectives.[48]
Married soldiers become increasingly dissatisfied as they are sent away so often that they rarely get time to spend with their families. Soldiers are rarely given leave anymore as so many have deserted under this pretence. With no money or food while their husbands are away, women become easy targets of abuse for officers. At some army camps, women are required to attend women soldiers’ training that many resent.[49]
According to the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG),
“Most rank and file soldiers hate their situation but can see no way to escape
it. Seeing no way out, some commit suicide.
The desertion rate in the Army is soaring, but the penalty can be harsh
if caught; often it is death.”[50] Attempted deserters
are punished severely when caught. Their
food is of an even poorer quality than usual, they are beaten by both officers
and recruits, and many are physically bound to prevent them attempting to
escape again. International Crisis Group estimates that due to poor morale the
rate of desertions is so high that the real size of the army must be under 50%
of SPDC figures. James Mawdsley, the British activist who spent 14 months in a
Burmese prison, has said that 80% of his fellow prisoners were deserters.[51]
Power Struggle
Not
only is unity amongst rank and file soldiers uncertain, but apparently so is
solidarity among leading members of the SPDC. An army helicopter, carrying
about a dozen officials, crashed on February 19th killing Secretary
2, Lt. Gen. Tin Oo, and two Cabinet ministers. Initially, the SPDC blamed
anti-government dissidents whom Tin Oo had launched numerous tirades against,
but later said it was a result of mechanical failure.[52]
Rebel groups however have a different theory, that the plane was bombed as a
result of an internal power struggle.[53]
Even if this theory is not true, it indicates a crack in the regime’s unity and
possibly its power in the long-term.
ECONOMIC
SITUATION
* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
SPDC reports
According to
the SPDC, “Myanmar’s economy has
registered a healthy average growth rate of around 6.6 percent in current
five-year plan for 1996-1997 to 2000-2001. […] A growth rate of slightly over
10 percent has been registered in the current year 2000-2001.”[54] Official statements further assert that Burma
is currently experiencing an average annual GDP
growth rate
of 12%. In April, Khin Nyunt claimed that the trade deficit had
been slashed by 73%, from a deficit of US$1.054 billion in 1999/2000 to US$285
million in 2000/01. He stated that this dramatic deficit decline was due to a
large increase in exports from US$910 million to US$1.237 billion during the
period.[55]
Khin Nyunt’s optimism
seems rather tenuous however, as the CSO – the official statistical
agency of the SPDC - has valued the trade deficit for the same period at US$1.048 billion, a
far cry from US$285 million. Exports reportedly increased by 28.94%, amounting
to US$1.519 billion, while imports were valued at a substantially higher level
of US$2.567 billion, a 6.51% increase.[56]
Industries of Interest
Paddy production is officially expected to increase
from 17.09 million tons in 1998/1999 to 20.7 million tons in 2000/2001. Official reports claim this will further
increase to 23 million tons with utilisation of more arable land. Figures show rice exports at 122,700 tons for
the first 10 months of 2000, 98.5% higher than the same period in 1999.[57]
The fear is that increased rice yields will be exported rather than used to
feed the many hungry stomachs in Burma.
A sector that is booming and may partially explain the increase in exports is the garment industry. Four hundred garment factories have been set up in the past 2 years,[58] and reports of the first factory producing men’s suits were made in mid-April. This factory alone will reportedly produce 720,000 units of clothing in 2002 and 1,200,000 in 2003, all for export.[59] Garments exports to the US have doubled to about US$400 million in the calendar year 2000 although official figures do not report garments as a major export industry. Chief export industries are identified as timber,[60] fishery products, pulses and beans. The omission of textiles in this category suggests that in-depth research needs to be done in this area.[61]
Non-SPDC
reports
It is important to note that SPDC statements of economic optimism are out of line with evidence and more sober perceptions. The Asia Development Bank’s (ADB) Asian Development Outlook for 2001 report, released in April, described economic growth as sluggish and warned that it will remain so unless necessary changes are made. Not known for its critical stance, the ADB again delivered, albeit in its euphemistic language, a highly critical assessment of SPDC’s economic management.[62]
The ADB
stated that comprehensive and consistent structural economic reforms must be
made and there must be additional mobilisation of domestic and external
resources. One of the key reforms suggested was to
change the official exchange rate of 6 kyat
per US$1 (a
rate which has remained constant for 3 decades) to a more realistic one
reflective of market forces, so that the exchange market is not so highly
distorted.[63]
Inflation
Inflation has risen dramatically, partly as a result of the crumbling of Burma’s foreign currency reserves. According to the ADB, at the end of March 2000 “the country’s gross foreign exchange reserves were only about US$240million - less than two months of exports.”[64] Burma’s foreign exchange reserves have remained critically low for the last 8 years, but the situation has approached meltdown as a result of a recent decision by the regime to bribe its officer class.
In January this year military officers started to receive half of their pay in the form of FECs. FECs can be used to buy imported goods only sold for foreign currency, or (more riskily) as foreign exchange deposits in a limited number of banks. This move is seen as an attempt to buy off disgruntled sections of the military by giving them a hedge both against inflation and the catastrophically low foreign exchange value of the Kyat. This move will not likely succeed, given the very low levels of Burma’s foreign reserves, and will hence compound upon an already ailing economy.
To gain immediate credit before the ADB and Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
annual meetings (11 May and 14-20 May respectively), so that the regime can apply for resumption of loans, the junta has purchased dollars - further intensifying
inflation.
Currency
Exchange
The kyat has dropped to new lows and many businesses are suffering. In April 2001, the value of the kyat had fallen from around 350 to 600
per US$1
since the beginning of the year, meaning civil servant salaries have
effectively halved. The exchange rate has been gradually falling since the military seized
power in 1988,
when 70 kyat was valued at US$1[07]. Many Burma observers believe that the root of this currency crisis is a result of international sanctions and on-going Thai-Burma border clashes and
closures.
The decline in the value of the currency coupled with limited foreign reserves is impacting upon the value of FEC’s[cl8]. The value of FECs is critically dependent on confidence that the regime has sufficient foreign currency and has not employed the printing press. However, reports tell of Rangoon being awash with FECs as a result of an active printing press and attempts to offload FECs for US$ or gold.
Amidst speculation that FECs are to be abolished, due to the discrepancy between issue and reserve-backing, U Than Lwin, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Myanmar, has said “FECs are fully backed by the Central Bank against the acquisition of US dollars, and even if they were to be withdrawn, the bank would hand out the greenback equivalent.”[65] This despite the fact that since late 2000 they have been worth between 20-35% less than the US$ in kyat exchange rates. In order to compensate for the lesser value of FECs, some restaurants have a 15% surcharge for bills paid in FECs rather than US$.[66]
Free Market & Private Enterprise
The regime claims that there is a market-oriented economy in Myanmar which fully encourages the private sector. According to Minister David Abel of the junta's investment commission, 52 state-owned companies or business operations from 18 ministries will be privatised to promote investment confidence. It is not clear what businesses will be put up for tender but from the first batch in February, it seems they are the older and smaller businesses.[67]
Analysis by a Washington-based think tank, Cato Institute, has described Burma as the least
economically free country out of 123 countries in the year 2001.[68] The ongoing case of Singaporean Win Win
Nu with the SPDC, regarding the Mandalay brewery, highlights the regime’s lack
of commitment to market forces and private enterprise. The brewery, which
became highly profitable under Win Win Nu’s
direction, was overtaken by the SPDC because, in Win Win
Nu’s words, the success was “an easy
target for greedy soldiers and bureaucrats.”[69]
Border
trade
Thailand reported that during the first 10 months of last year, total trade with Burma rose 25.73% to Bt6.35 billion compared with Bt4.72 billion in the same period of 1999. Burma was the major cross-border trading partner with more than 3 times the value of trade with Lao and China combined. This increase resulted from increased demand of vegetable and palm oils, electrical appliances, cars, motorcycles and spare parts, truck tyres, apparel and other miscellaneous products purchased by the Burmese regime.[70]
Increases in
cross border trade are unlikely to occur in the near future due to border
closures resulting from conflict in border areas, particularly around Mae Sai.
Although Thailand
reopened the Mae Sai checkpoint just before the Songkran festival (with a ban
on passage of cargoes to Burma remaining [see
p8-9]), the Tachilek checkpoint on the Burmese side remained closed at the
end of April.
After fighting broke out between Thai and Burmese troops on
the northern border in February, the SPDC banned all Thai goods and closed border-bridges, although an SPDC White
Paper has recognised border-trade as crucial whilst international trade sanctions remain. Thai-Burma trade has dropped by 70 percent,
as of end April, with exports plummeting to Bt100 million a month from Bt400
million. SPDC attempts to replace Thai goods with Chinese
produce were unsuccessful and border-trade with China was adversely affected by
the low value of the kyat[cl9].
Rangoon has
furthermore launched a campaign against Thai goods making ‘No Thai goods’ signs
a common sight. The campaign started after Thailand barred exports of rice,
medicine, fuel and cars to Burma. There have been reports of arrests and
prosecutions of those found to have continued selling Thai goods, while their
goods were seized and burnt. This sharp decrease in trade volume is cause for
concern for Thai traders, many of whom fear Rangoon might demonetise
the kyat, as in 1987.[71] Many on the Burmese side
of the Thai-Burma border face supply shortages.
International trade & tourism
Despite Khin Nyunt’s touting of ‘Myanmar’ as a tourist destination, and plans for the building of a third international airport, official statistics show tourism has declined by 9.3% to 234,900 people in 2000. Furthermore, of these, 49% entered Burma through land border points.[72] It is unclear if all of these visitors should be classified as tourists as they are generally defined as overnight stayers. Many of these may be traders or crossing the border for other reasons. Even if they were tourists, their visits would have been very short, as usually only day passes are issued at border crossings.
The European Union has upheld trade and aid sanctions, and will continue to do so until they see what they define as ‘real progress’ in the talks with Aung San Suu Kyi and the process of national reconciliation and democracy. European General Affairs Council has clarified that Burma will not join the other 48 LDCs in enjoying tariff and quota-free access to the EU market, due to human rights violations[cl10].
Things are not so certain in the USA where Secretary of State, Republican Colin Powell, has urged “Congress to stop for a while. […] Stop, look and listen before you impose a sanction.”[73] Powell has said he plans to review all sanctions to determine whether they should be removed. Many observers hope that the US will feel that sanctions have begun to show desired results and will maintain them until, what many consider, a more appropriate time.
While
many countries and organisations, including some in the USA, are indicating
they will impose import restraints on Burmese produce, particularly textiles,[74] [for further discussion see p35-37] there
remain countries that are engaging in trade with the regime.
Malaysia
is eager to sell its car, the Proton, in Burma as soon as possible and with
preferential trading arrangements[011]. It remains to be seen whether the authorities will
alter their current policy and allow Malaysian cars to be sold. As of March, Malaysia has invested US$587
million in 25 projects in Burma, making Malaysia the 4th largest
foreign investor after Singapore, Britain and Thailand. Bilateral trade
accounts for 6.54% of Burma’s total foreign trade, and looking at figures for
the first 10 months in 2000, has increased 24.7% from the same period in 1999.[75]
It appears that Malaysia will continue trade, so long as it is profitable.
[see p11-12 for discussion of military
trade]
Thai Defence Minister has
said he will push for development in Burma in a hope that it will alleviate
some of Burma’s poverty which will in turn help solve problems such as drug
trafficking and illegal migration. In what Chavalit calls “cross border
development”, Thailand has already committed Bt10 billion into a dam project on the Salween River, in Burma.[76]
There are further plans, with
Such interest in
Japan &
Baluchaung
Many diplomats
and observers have criticised the Japanese government as acting prematurely,
arguing that the talks have offered no tangible movements towards fundamental
human rights progress, national reconciliation and the establishment of
civilian democracy. Dr. Sein Win, prime minister of the National Coalition
Government, said, “Any form of aid and
relaxation of international pressure at this time can only do more harm than
good to the fragile state of the talks in Burma.”[78]
What some
observers find particularly alarming is that both the UN and the
While
The Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP) have urged 
benefit to the local population who have never received electricity from the
power plant. The KNPP argues that villagers relocated because of the project will only encounter further
problems including “forced labor and more
land mines.”[82]
Mekong Watch (
w
There is
insufficient water supply in the area. Water flow to the power plant will be prioritised and farmers will not be allowed to irrigate
fields, as in 1998.
w
Giving of
‘grants’ contradicts the ODA charter that advocates ‘self-help’ efforts.
w
There is no
ceasefire between KNPP and SPDC; hence the power station may be attacked by armed
groups, as in 1988 and 1996.
w
There are no
clear indicators regarding how the size of the grant was determined.
w
Risk of forced
labour orders is considered to be very high.
w
According to
World Commission on Dams report (November 2000), outstanding social problems
should be examined and a process for reparations established. These
recommendations have not been followed.
w
Concerns grant
will benefit military more than general public and hospitals.
w
Timing is
inappropriate as process of genuine national reconciliation has yet to begin.
The grant could hinder this process.
DRUGS
* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
Heroin
The street price of
heroin in
Figure 1: Opium Production in
compared to 4,395
hectares (10,987 acres) in 2000.[84]
The regime claims to have seized 2.28 tons of narcotic drugs, including
1.52 tons of opium, 158.68 kilogrammes of heroin, 590
kilogrammes of marijuana and 26.6 million tablets of
methamphetamines.[85]
These public
seizures are
however meagre amounts when compared to the total drug production, and even
smaller if US estimates of drug production are considered more realistic. [see Figure 1] Furthermore, many
observers claim that the decrease is due to adverse weather conditions rather
than concerted regime efforts.
A
recent US US
Methamphetamines
Meanwhile, methamphetamine (ya ba) production in
The regime
claims over 26 million
tablets were seized in 2000 and 4 million tablets were seized in the first 3
months of 2001. Again, this is only a fraction of total production. An
estimated 800 million to 1 billion were produced last year, with about 200
million waiting to be smuggled across the Thai-Burma border.[88]
While 5 people were sentenced to death for
trafficking in 2000 and other tough sentences have been served this year,[89] druglords and larger traffickers remain untouched. Most
individuals identified as dealers have connections with the UWSA and frequently
move locations to stay with the Wa in order to avoid arrest.[90] Of 2 large drug seizures
by the Thai army recently, the traffickers in both cases are suspected to
belong to the rebel Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), in connection with
the
Figure 2: Methamphetamine production in Burma
Burmese production of methamphetamine
pills is divided among 5 armed groups, according to anti-narcotics
officials. The UWSA is believed to
account for 60%, the Chinese-Kokang 20%, a splinter group of former opium
warlord Khun Sa’s Mong Tai army, together with the
Chinese Haw, account for 10 - 15%, while the remnants of the Communist Party of
Burma is responsible for the remaining 5%.[91]
UWSA.[92]
Meanwhile, the
SPDC claims Shan rebels are the main drug traffickers in the region[014].
Neighbouring countries
have experienced frustration with the regime’s lack of commitment to dealing
effectively with the region’s drug problem, in particular
SPDC: a main player?
The Central
Committee for Drug Abuse Control provoked tension by declaring in March that
Thai media reports of
At the end of March the SPDC announced that they had “abundant information” proving a list of Thai politicians were involved in drug trafficking. Wattanachai also claimed that the Thai “Office of Narcotics Control Board has a list of them, more than 10”, and was asked to provide Thaksin with a list of those involved.[96] As a media report has highlighted, a question of concern is why the regime have had this information for years and not used it. Surely if they were intent on fighting the drugs problem, this information would have been released earlier[015].
At the Regional Border Committee
meeting in April, the junta promised to cooperate with
There are reliable and persistent indicators of the regime’s
involvement and abetting behaviour in all aspects of the drug trade,[100]
with drug money being laundered through the bank system.[101]
The British press has exposed the SPDC’s protection of multi-millionaire (in
pounds sterling) of Lo Hsing Han, dubbed ‘Burma US Rangoon Asia World
racket also runs a supermarket chain, Burma
United Wa State Army (UWSA)
Experts
assert cease-fire agreements are a major factor in cultivation growth and trafficking[019],
as groups such as the 20,000 strong UWSA are given a high level of autonomy
over their business affairs and the like. Burmese troops cannot even enter Wa
territory without permission from the UWSA.[103]
The UWSA, reportedly aligned with
The UN International Drug
Control Program (UNDCP) however, has expressed support of the Wa leadership’s
anti-narcotics drive, and lauded Rangoons’ “real efforts” in addressing the
drugs problem.[105]
The body has been working with the Wa since 1996, aiming to eradicate poppy
cultivation by 2005 by initiating crop substitution programmes in return
introducing a water supply, health care and forms of community development. The
UNDCP is of the view that the hindrances to Rangoon’s anti-drug policies are
limited resources and the lack of ‘influence’ the regime have on opiate
producing ethnic minorities in remote areas.
Some analysts consider
the UNDCP to be misguided and naive, and it appears the
Despite continued reports
of Wa involvement in the drugs trade, the UNDCP plans to continue with its project,
with funds of US$600,000 for the coming year (instead of a previous US$15
million, and unable to commit anything for next year). The UN body is looking
for new sponsors, such as
Shan State
There is
rising tension in
In early April, a Thai
television crew filmed Shan rebels destroying poppies, reportedly planted by
the Wa. The event was part of the SSA’s 3 year old anti-drug campaign which has
claimed to have destroyed and seized drugs, sometimes handing them over to Thai
authorities in order to embarrass the SPDC.[110]
There has been increased tension between
However, there are some
important glitches in the SSA’s drug record. A US State Department annual
report issued on 1st March named SSA leader, Col. Yawd Serk, as a
leading Burmese drug trafficker. Furthermore, sources within the SSA have said
that while the group does not engage in drug dealing, it benefits by taxing the
movement of narcotics in its area.[112]
As drugs move, the SSA get richer.
As
is clear, drugs money and power is often vested in powerful and armed
individuals and groups, meaning that any attempts to destroy the drugs trade
will meet serious and potentially dangerous resistance. The only way the explosion of the drug trade,
domestic drug abuse and the various concurrent problems can be effectively
addressed, is by establishing a peaceful and pluralist democratic environment
within which mismanagement of the economy and social services can be addressed
and a system of accountability can become enshrined.
HEALTH
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
According to official statements, the health sector receives priority in terms of government budget allocation, making the ministry of health one of the largest recipients of budgetary funds.[113] Trust funds have apparently been established in 398 hospitals which gave free medical care to about 550,000 ‘poor and needy’ patients in 2000.[114]
Despite
government initiatives and reforms however, thousands of people remain without
access to basic healthcare and the issue is far more urgent than the regime
indicates. By asserting authorities are
not worried of future population growth up to 100 million as there are “vast expanses of vacant land”[115], the
regime exhibits a severe lack of comprehension. With the country struggling to
provide the most basic of services now, it is implausible to assert there will
be no problem with a population almost double the current size. Cynics may argue that the overriding reason
why the regime is not worried is because such a high population will place
Tuberculosis
(TB)
TB is one of
The health ministry
launched the first month long TB Control campaign on 24th
March. The campaign is alleged to reach
every village and township in
HIV/AIDS
Prevalence rates of
HIV/AIDS infection in
Sharing
needles remains to be an important mode of transmission. Reports tell of
prospective buyers ‘self-testing’ heroin, and consequently sharing needles with
traders.[118]
Injecting drug users (IDUs) will almost definitely continue to share needles
while it remains illegal to carry a needle without a permit. Although a
disposable needle factory (owned by SPDC individuals) opened in
Humanitarian organisations inside
In order to
prevent HIV transmission, Khin Nyunt advocates restricting the movement of
young women to ensure they do not enter the sex industry, either domestically
or across the border. He also calls for
increased “control [of] drug addicts” and
the establishment of centres specifically for AIDS patients.[122] All 3 strategies oppose policies drawn up by
the Health Ministry and evidence concerning the demographics of HIV. Khin
Nyunt’s identification and labelling of ‘bad’ bodies
will not solve
Significant
change needs to occur if the HIV epidemic is to become manageable:
w
Authorities must
acknowledge the true scale of HIV infection and address it effectively.
w
The large, and
burgeoning, underground sex industry in
w
Punitive
action must be taken against military personnel engaged in trafficking,
particularly of women and children, for sexual exploitation.[125]
w
Unaccountable
yielding of power resulting in human rights abuses must stop.
w
w
Forced
relocation programmes must be halted and participation of community groups
encouraged across the board. Authorities must recognise that high levels of
displacement and migration severely disable communities in establishing
reactions and responses to epidemics.
w
The growing
incidence of HIV/AIDS will have a long-term effect on the development of
Japan’s Role
The Japanese
government continues to offer grants for ‘humanitarian aid’, feeling
increasingly affirmed by what it considers positive changes in the political
situation in
w
23rd
February
Agreement was signed for a grant of $5.8 million to
improve health services for women and children.
This grant covers the 3rd phase of the ‘Improvement of
Maternal and Child Health Care Services’ project, coordinated by
w 26th February
Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) sent 6 doctors and medical technicians to
w 29th March
Japanese government announced grants for 2 health-related projects under its official development assistance (ODA) programme.
¬
drinking water supply in rural
¬ improvement
of medical equipment for the
In short, the
Japanese government is offering rewards to the junta for entering into talks
with Aung San Suu Kyi. Many governments and other observers feel such rewards
are premature, and argue that
HUMAN
RIGHTS
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
![Text Box: The soldiers are the masters, they could do whatever they want [...] That’s their prerogative.
- Chin refugee (Project Maje)](STILL_WAITING_files/image009.gif)
While not a party to the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
regime claims to be “most effectively
protecting and promoting fundamental human rights”.[130]
However, persistent and reliable reports illustrate increasingly widespread
human rights abuses, including extra-judicial killings[131]
and rape [see ‘Women’, p43-46]. There
is no redress for such violations as there is wide disrespect for the rule of
law and no independent judiciary to punish such.
Forced Labour[132]
![Text Box: Among the traditional customs endeavoured in Myanmar since time immemorial and which is still in practice is the contribution of labour […in] village community works. [Labourers] look fresh and happy with full of mirth and laughter and in festive mood. They do not look at all unhappy; nor do they show signs of being forced to work against their will […] The government does not practise or condone the use of forced labour.
-Union of Myanmar to UN office (21 March 2001)](STILL_WAITING_files/image010.gif)
Non[cl24]-Burman populations “continue to be targets of repression and suffer a wide range of human
rights violations, but the most common abuse is forced labour.”[133] Despite the October 2000 SPDC legal order[134]
and the ILO implementation of Article 33, forced labour orders continue to be
issued on a regular basis, in some areas daily.
Civilians are forced to construct roads and buildings, tend army crops
maintain army camps, serve as human minesweepers, unarmed sentries, military
porters and messengers.[135] As areas come under military control
with the establishment of ceasefires, construction and ‘development’ projects
are initiated,[136]
often with increased requisitioning of forced labour. ‘Development’ projects
are politically governed, and must benefit the military in some way; they will
not proceed if they are seen to aid opposition groups in the slightest.
Numerous
reports of extensive use of forced labour were provided to the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) Governing Body Meeting in March 2001, and have also been
reported by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.[137]
Based on International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reports
alone, an estimated 80,000 people, from only 4 districts in Karen State, were
forced to perform labour between November 2000 and January 2001.
Figure 1: Some reports of forced labour[138]
|
Forced
labour order area |
Description |
Comments |
|
Chin State |
clear forest & plant tea |
Jul
- Oct, Nov 2000 |
|
Tachilek, Shan State |
military
portering |
Thai-Burma
conflict, February 2000 |
|
Kya Inn Seikyi township, Mon State |
build
brick factory for local military unit |
|
|
Ye to Tavoy, Mon State |
road repairs |
Less
than in the past |
|
Southern Ye
township, Mon State |
military portering |
LIB No.299, Three Pagoda Pass
area, December 2000 |
|
Molamein, Mon State |
road infrastructure |
Child
labourers (paid K150 day), taxes k15,000 per
household |
|
Kyaikmayaw - Kyunywa, Mon State |
road infrastructure |
|
|
Tavoy District |
portering & road
infrastructure |
January 2001 |
|
Theyetchaung Township, Tavoy district,
Tenasserim Division |
military
portering |
2
March 2001, 1 porter per family, 2 day walk |
|
Tenasserim division, Mergui district |
military portering |
1,277
persons for over 1 month, at least 10,000 porters monthly |
|
Kawkarie & Pa-an townships, Karen
State |
grow
food for the military |
|
|
Yandan gas pipeline area |
military
portering |
26
Feb 2001, 359 villagers |
|
Karen State |
road
infrastructure |
Roads
often washed out in rainy season[139]
|
The
legal order is clearly not sufficiently enforced and indicates its
implementation was merely to avoid international criticism. The 1997
instruction of military self-reliance saw an increase in the use of forced
labour. Tatmadaw crops and projects, some for personal profit, are generally
manned by low ranking soldiers and civilian forced labourers.
Any concerted efforts to reduce forced labour may have serious implications for
loyalty in the Tatmadaw towards the central military authorities as forced
labour has become central to the businesses of military officers. Any
restrictions on their ability to order forced labour would curtail their
capacity to amass wealth[025].
The ICFTU report also indicated SPDC authorities were
using numerous methods to cover up the use of forced labour:
…issuing orders for villagers to attend
meetings at the army camp, where they were requisitioned for forced labour
[...]; issuing undated, unsigned and unstamped orders; demanding that written
orders were returned to the issuing army personnel; using civilian authorities
to requisition labour on behalf of the miliary; arbitrarily arresting young
healthy persons, who after a few days in prison would be sent to works as
porters for the military, dressed in army uniforms.[140]
Since the order was passed there has been an increase in the use of convict labour. It is unclear whether there has been a corresponding decrease in civilian forced labour, or merely if the overall demands on the population has increased. The KHRG believes the latter to be the case,[141] with escalating SPDC abuses - particularly increasing forced labour orders, forcing many families to flee Burma.[142]
The ILO will again discuss forced labour in Burma at
a special sitting in June.
Taxation
Children under 16 years old continue to be used as forced labourers, sometimes ‘bought’ with revenue raises by arbitrary ‘taxation’ which many pay to avoid forced labour.[143] ‘Taxation’ has many forms including money, food, condiments, alcohol, firewood and clothing; furthermore theft and looting are not uncommon[026]. Due to the systematic and heavy nature of ‘taxation’, forced labour is eventually supplied as individuals and communities cannot indefinitely afford taxation demands.
Several reports from Mon State, for example Paung township, suggest ‘taxation’ has increased since the legal order regarding forced labour was issued.[144] There are no regulations governing collections and it appears taxation offers large opportunities for corruption. Insufficient funds from central government coupled with orders for ‘development’[145] ensures systematic and high levels of taxation in the forseeable future.
Responses to
the ILO Call For Sanctions
ICFTU
The ICFTU, representing 156 million members around the world, are currently building a database of multinational companies with business interests in Burma. Use of this database is part of a global plan of action working towards implementation of the June 2000 ILO resolution.
ICFTU Plan of Action:
w
seek improved
coordination of UN specialised agencies and programs to ensure they do not aid
or abet forced labour
w
increase
pressure on international financial agencies with the same aim
w
lobby EU to
increase existing sanctions
w
initiate
discussions with companies maintaining business relations with Burma to
encourage them to withdraw trade and investments
w
if companies
persist in dubious relations, expose them publicly and subject them to union-driven
consumer pressure and boycotts
w
expand and
strengthen workers’ shareholder action against companies trading with or
operating in Burma.
United Nations
(UN)
Both
the UNHCR and the UNDP deny any of their programs in Burma are associated with,
or benefit from, forced labour. Meanwhile, forced labour in Burma was not
included on the ECOSOC annual session agenda following lobbying from SPDC, and
member countries including Pakistan, Syria, China and Cuba.[146]
The ILO has requested the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to include
the ILO sanctions on the agenda in its annual session in July.
United States (US)
On the last day of office, the Clinton Administration, in a letter to the ILO, stated “that in the absence of significant and measurable progress, ILO Members, including the United States, should be prepared to consider additional measures, including trade sanctions.” Bipartisan legislation, specifically referring to the ILO, has been introduced in the Senate to ban all Myanmar imports into the USA, and the US annual report on global human rights detailed human rights abuses, including forced labour.[147] However, the newly elected government are more cautious of sanctions [see p18] and is unwilling to undertake further action while the SPDC is engaged in discussions with the NLD.
On March 5th it was ruled that the 2 cases brought against Unocal could proceed in California State Court. Unocal had attempted to charges of slavery, unfair business practices and other violations of law removed from the court.[148]
European Union
(EU)
The EU
reported it is prepared to implement further measures should Burmese
authorities fail to make what they consider necessary progress. It is not
specified what these further measures might be. The EU’s resolution presented to the UN Human Rights
Commission criticized continued human rights abuses by the military government
and demanded freedom of movement for opposition leaders[027]. Despite these
statements of good intentions, the ICFTU Conference (28 February - 1
March) expressed concern that the EU appeared reluctant to strengthen its
sanctions against the regime.
Italian
Ministries of Labour and Foreign affairs intend to investigate Italian
investment in
Other
The majority of government responses to the ILO,
including
SPDC Response
In
a letter to the ILO in February, SPDC’s Minister of Labour, General Tin Ngwe, implicitly acknowledged the existence of forced
labour and said that
SPDC strategy to
deal with potential sanctions imposed by ILO members[029]:
w
Downgrade
relations with ILO from ministerial to ambassadorial level.
w
Continue
attending ILO meetings to prevent Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB) -
one of SPDC’s strongest critics - from filling any empty seats.
w
Send
“explanatory” missions to
w
Extend border
trade in case international port workers refuse to handle Burmese exports.
w
Tranship exports, particularly rice and beans, via
w
Lobby the 54 member
nations of ECOSOC to prevent ILO sanctions and forced labour in
w
“Spread the
message” that sanctions are result of anti-government propaganda and will cause
unemployment and suffering. Encourage
workers to sign letters addressed to ILO, opposing sanctions due to subsequent
hardships.[154]
Procurement
Policy
Paddy
procurement continues at prices 2 to 3 times lower than the market price,
clearly causing much hardship for farmers. Paddy procurement teams are now
providing advance payments and forcing farmers to sign contracts for future
sales at prices dramatically lower than the market value. Effectively, farmers
become indebted. Failure to provide the designated quota of paddy, or money
equivalent to the market price, often
leads to detention of villagers and village headmen.[155]
Sources from
Farmers may
well receive less than the procurement price, even though this itself is way
below the market price. In a report from
There is also procurement of beans at prices 2 to 3 times less than the market price in Pegu Division. During the first 3 months of the year, authorities altered the market by halting private sector bean activities.[158]
Land Confiscation
Confiscation
of land has occurred with construction of a gas-pipeline from Tanesserim Division via
Another incident of land
confiscation in
Torture
A report released in March describes various forms of
torture the regime inflict upon people.
A former policeman confirms that civilians do not have trials when arrested,
instead they are tortured for arbitrary time periods.[161]
A pastor tells of how his head was covered with a plastic bag in order to
suffocate him, of how he was stripped naked so that mosquitoes could bite him
and forced to kneel on sharp rocks while shackled.[162]
Freedom of Information
Internet, email and satellites
Although it appears the regime is allowing email
access to increase, it must be remembered that this luxury, as with satellite
dishes (cable television)[163], is only allowed to selected individuals such as
tourists at some guest houses. Neither is there access to the Internet, only to
a constructed ‘Intranet’. The ‘Intranet’ is a network which only allows users
access to about 20 - 30 pre-approved websites. The costs of subscribing to an
email account, $3 per hour for online time and a $60 annual fee, are paid to
the Myanmar Post and Telecommunications agency. This body owns
Writers, journalism
and the media
A February report from
the Muslim Information Center of Burma tells of an author being arrested in
December last year for allowing his writing to ‘contain the sense of politics’.
Saya U Tin Maung had written an Islamic religious book based on an ancient
Muslim warrior, Khalid bin Walid.[165]
Although unwelcome, such a report is not surprising. The regime has long been
accused of violent discrimination of Muslims, in particular the Rohingya, who
have no citizenship rights and are barred from continuing government education
after the primary level. The regime’s programme of information control is
extreme and clearly politically self-motivated.
There are 4 state-run
newspapers published in
Khin Nyunt maintains “press
freedom” is protected to an “appropriate degree”, boasting that over 100
private periodicals and increasing numbers of private journals have been
permitted for publication.[166]
All articles, foreign and domestic, must submit to strict licensing
requirements and be submitted to the official Press Scrutiny Board for
approval.
An
exasperating factor is the absence of policies and guidelines concerning what
is, and is not, acceptable. One thing is clear however, politics is a definite
no-no[030].
It is for this reason that foreign magazines are also subject to strict
censorship, and explains why some copies of the Far Eastern Economic Review can
be found, while others cannot.[167]
Another point of contention is that censors are inexperienced in their field,
and often “don’t have a clue about the
subjects […] so they are always suspicious.”[168] Such
suspicion means that censorship reaches ridiculous extremes in
Any news reports against the ‘national well-being’, will invite punishment; perhaps closure, arrest, who knows? In January, the NLD reported that a 70-year-old man was sentenced to 2 years in prison for listening to a Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcast. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) documented 8 cases of Burmese journalists imprisoned for their work as of mid-March, but believe many more are also held.[170]
The United Nations cultural organisation, UNESCO, awarded its annual World Press Freedom Prize to jailed journalist U Win Tin, to honour him for making an outstanding contribution in defending and promoting freedom of the press. He will also, along with San San Nweh, receive the Golden Pen of Freedom award in June[031]. U Win Tin was incarcerated in 1989 on charges of belonging to the banned Communist Party. Moved to hospital in 1997, he remains incarcerated despite UNESCO reports saying he is seriously ill. His sentence is until 2008, and early release will only be granted if he renounces all political activities; he continually refuses to do so[032].
Political Prisoners
As of mid-April, Amnesty
International released details of 458 prisoners, of 1,850 political prisoners
in
There have not been reports of any improvement in prison conditions. On the contrary, there were alarming reports in early February of political prisoners being forced to build a new jail in the remote far north of the country. It will be hard for the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit these prisoners, due to the remote location.[173]
Human Rights Training
The talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and the regime seem to have animated faith in the regime. While the Japanese government are giving grants, and the Australian government continue their human rights training, Premier Oil (UK) also held a human rights seminar in mid-February. On the other hand, maybe Premier feel guilty and are trying to counteract for investing in a country whose government continues to perpetrate human rights violations. Reports seem to indicate that the latter is highly likely, that and the fact that it may win Premier more profitable contracts in the future.[174]
All
this human rights talk does not seem to be making much of an impression in
United Nations Special expert on the human rights situation
in Myanmar
In early February,
Brazilian politics professor, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, was appointed United
Nations special expert on the human rights situation in
Pinheiro’s
1st visit to
WOMEN
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Violence against women
continues to be perpetrated by the military.
Violence is perpetrated against women specifically because of their
gender and is often gender specific, and again because of the ethnicity. All
non-Burman women fear violence, and Rohingya women probably experience the
worst abuses. Experience and fear of violence is a major push factor in female
migration from
A different
picture is of course painted by the regime and their sidekicks. Professor May May Yi,
Vice Chair of the government-sponsored Myanmar National Committee for Women’s
Affairs (MNCWA) claims that women’s equality is recognized in
Rape
Rape continues to be a
major problem for women, and there is rarely any redress. A report tells of a
14 year old Shan girl who was gang raped for 3 nights by SPDC troops. The girl
was gathering vegetables with her father and brother when they were seized and
the 2 men killed. Villagers buried the bodies but “[n]o-one dared to do anything more than this, for fear of further
abuses.” Similarly, when a 19 year old Lahu woman was raped at gun point by
a soldier, the village headman’s complaint to the authorities came to no avail
other than receiving an officers condolences.[179]
Amnesty International
investigations in 1999 and 2000 found that rape was reported in all armed conflicts. Such systematic use
indicates that rape is used as an act of subjugation, terror and revenge
against entire communities. Such violence reinstates women as the most
vulnerable and disenfranchised target in the community; their status being
valued only as one of property[034].
Women from Burma
Trafficking
The Burmese Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement received a delegation of Southeast Asia Region Human Trafficking Elimination ASEAN-Australia Project Identification Mission. Prof Daw May May Yi and Dr Daw Khin Win Shwe were invited and called upon at the Women’s Development Centre on 9th March. The only details reported of the meetings were that the delegation visited the costume jewellery and Burmese handicraft centres, show room, weaving loom, and the Youth Training Centre.[180]
In the
absence of a proper report on the delegation, it does not appear that any
substantial progress was made on the subject of human trafficking, an issue of
particular concern to women. Just before the meeting, the UN Human rights
monitor highlighted the regime’s lack of co-operation with a region-wide UN
project to combat trafficking in women and children, and condemned them for
ignoring the reasons and effects.[181] [see p47]
Thousands of Burmese women are trafficked into second countries, and forced to work long hours under harsh conditions, almost always for a meagre wage and often under systems of bonded labour. It is hard for women to escape as they have no legal rights in second countries and traffickers often confiscate their identification papers.
Burmese women
who are classified as illegal migrants, whether trafficked or not, are targets
of sexual abuse and exploitation at anytime, anywhere and by anyone, as they
have no legal protection and therefore cannot ask for help easily. Making them
even more vulnerable is the fact that many Burmese women in
NGO groups
such as EMPOWER foundation, provide support for Burmese women by providing
regular workshops providing HIV education in local languages.[182]
Some Burmese women also take high risks to cross the border and travel into
Sex Workers
Many women enter the sex industry as a result of trafficking, while others exercise what some call ‘choice’. Compounding upon already harsh conditions, many women are forced to have abortions and undergo HIV tests. The costs are then added onto the women’s tab along with daily living costs - often exorbitant. Such cummulative costs ensure that women are bonded to the brothel owners through debt.
There are frequent
raids on brothels, some organised by the owners so they can raise the women’s
debt further, and others more independent.
In a single raid in February, 33 teenage girls aged 15-17 were arrested
on charges of prostitution. Four of these women admitted to being Burmese.[183]
Girls and women are frequently found by police chained or tied to prevent their
escape, and are released only to be incarcerated and deported back to
Upon return
it is reported that many women face human rights abuses such as forced labour
or confinement in an HIV camp.[184]
A high proportion of deportees are therefore picked up by other traffickers
rather than return to the life they fled in
Health
Women’s health is given paricularly
low priority in
Women
are the most vulnerable to HIV infection in
Women working in the Thai sex industry are often forced to engage in
extremely high risk practices. As Thai sex workers are increasingly working for
themselves, women from
CHILDREN
* Improving
R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Health
As one of the most vulnerable groups within society,
children have suffered the most from the insecurities in their mismanaged
country. Inadequacies in healthcare facilities are starkly evident when we look
at demographic and disease statistics.
Due to a severe lack of health
facilities, a Chin woman estimates that 95% of babies have jaundice, and that
the infant mortality rate exceeds 10%.[187]
Children continue to suffer from preventable illnesses as they lack basic
medicines. Furthermore, they are also the victims of diseases that strike
adults as they can loose their parents.
A Chin Pastor refugee has
recently estimated as many as 10,000 orphans in Chin State
Child Soldiers
The military regime continues to violate
children’s rights by ordering forced labour,[189] forced
relocation and encouraging - and forcing - the conscription of child soldiers.
Stories continue to be told of children forced into joining the army, either
through arrests or other forms of coercion. Although the official age of
enlistment is 18, as many as 30% are child soldiers,[190]
some apparently as young as 9 years old.
Boys as young as 14 can be
‘officially conscripted’ into the army by being placed into training centres
for a military style education and political training. Known as the ‘Ye Nyunt
Youth’ they must declare themselves Buddhists and learn how to be a ‘real
Burmese’. Most of these recruits are orphans and street children or captured
from enemies or abandoned villages. All in all, reports suggest
Children are often forced into the military, with
whole villages or sections of towns being ordered to ‘give’ a number of boys to
the army or face heavy fines. There are some who volunteer as this is often the
only job opportunity for poor people. Some hope that becoming a soldier may
improve their situation; the boy’s family may be exempt from forced labour,
arrests, beatings and torture.
Wages are often underpaid and beatings are frequent,
food and medicine is inadequate, depression is common, leave is rarely granted
and most are granted little or no contact with their families. Although these
conditions are true for most new recruits, they are particularly severe for
children who are extremely vulnerable.
Boy soldiers are often reportedly forced by officers to consume alcohol and/or drugs such as amphetamines or ‘myin say’ (a powerful combination of amphetamines, caffeine and opiates) to make them mindless or aggressive in battle. The tragedy of children killed or wounded during the conflict, traumatised by eye-witnessing atrocities, and even participating in these abuses themselves, therefore continues.
Trafficking
UN human
rights monitor condemned the regime in March for ignoring the plight of
trafficked children. Brokers take children from
ETHNIC
& RELIGIOUS RELATIONS
* Improving * Stagnant
R Deteriorating
Peace versus
armed conflict
According to the SPDC, one of the foremost national
tasks is “to maintain peace and
tranquility throughout the country”, which they state prevails between
Burmese people and the 135 national races.[193]
However, the regime does not appreciate the diversity within its borders. Take an
event in mid-March, for example, when military authorities at a northern border
district issued an order prohibiting the Shan celebration of the Leun-hsi (4th
Lunar Month or Tabaung in Burmese). Soldiers strictly controlled the events, “ensur[ing] that the people went only to the
festivities organized by junta officials […] In the past the local
people had often ignored the
military-supported concerts.”[194]
The SPDC renders those who consider Burma
In reality, several armed
groups are still engaged in actively fighting the military regime. The Shan
State Army (SSA) are still engaged in armed hostilities, and the Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP) had a ceasefire for only a few months in 1995
before resuming fighting. The SPDC started its annual dry-season military
campaign in
In all its talk of peace
it is not surprising the regime does not mention military attacks and human
rights abuses that make many ceasefires products of fear rather than
reconciliation. In areas where supposed ‘peace’ has been established by
ceasefires, such as in
Kachin Coup
A faction of young Kachin
officers, led by Brig-Gen Tujai, took control of the Kachin Independence Army’s headquarters on 20th
February and detained President General Zau Mai,[197]
instrumental in brokering a cease-fire agreement with the SLORC, and other
leaders. The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) denied the coup had
occurred, and issued a statement of an emergency replacement of the President
due to illness.[198]
Brig-Gen Lamong Tu Jai, previously Deputy General Secretary of the KIO, became
the new leader.[199]
A long-term sergeant, Brig-Gen Tu Jai’s replacement of General Zau Mai in 2
other key positions - President of the Independence Council and chief of staff
of the Kachin Independence Army - highlights the conflation of political and
military power.
Although the objective is
unknown, there are apparently a number of reasons for the coup. As the
following quote illustrates, there was dissatisfaction concerning the
cease-fire agreement and Zau Mai’s political and business relationships.
In addition to his dubious connection with
On a positive note, since
the ceasefire religious freedom has increased while forced labour and other human
rights abuses have decreased. In addition, in 1998 the KIO officially opened an
office in the capital, Myitkyina, which holds the potential for greater
civilian political knowledge and input.[036]
Religious Relations
Ninety
percent of
Christianity
A
recent report clearly illustrates the suppression of Christianity and Animism
and the propagation of (the regime’s distorted view of) Buddhism. The military
decide upon the terms and details of Christian gatherings, often prevent people
from attending worship and hymn practice, and order the relocation of church
cemeteries.
A Chin Pastor tells of his
arrest for organising a harvest festival, how the military systematically
destroy crosses and churches replacing them with pagodas, and how alcohol shops
have opened near churches. Threatened with arrest for building a church, he
fled Burma Burma
Islam
Persecution
of Muslims continues with widespread and serious attacks on Rohingya in Sittwe,
Up to 800 people were killed
in Sittwe, and over 2,000 injured, with a shortage of medical facilities
in government hospitals leaving thousands of casualties unattended. Several
hundred remained missing, mostly students of
Reports
stated the religious violence spread to other townships in
Following the religious violence,
SPDC authorities evicted over 3,500 Muslim Rohingya from Akyab, Sittwe, claiming they were
Bengalis, trouble-makers and rioters. They were forcibly sent to Buthidaung
and
The official
‘legal’ response to the riot was to sentence 7 Arakanese political activists,
allegedly involved in ‘inciting the riots’, to heavy jail-terms of 7 to 12
years. Three
of those sentenced, U Tha Tun Aung, U San Shwe Oo and U Lone Chaw, were
previously imprisoned for 8-9 years for their participation in the 1988 uprising[037]. Their involvement in
both events seems contrived to some.
Chinese
Tensions
continue to exist, particularly in
FORCED
RELOCATION & IDPs
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
As part of its campaign against the Karen
National Liberation Army (KNLA) which began in 1997, the SPDC continue to
attack and relocate villages in northern Papun district, Karen State, and east
Nyaunglebin district, Pegu Division,[210]
according to the ‘4-cuts campaign’. This campaign relocates - internally
displaces - villagers in an attempt to eliminate potential support and aid for
ethnic-nationality armed forces. Relocation sites on the western plains of
Nyaunglebin District are accordingly expanding and multiplying.[211]
Figure 1: Forced relocation sites in
Nyaunglebin
Forced relocation site
|
Number of villages
|
Number
of IDPs (min.) |
|
Kyawt Naga |
5 |
1,000 |
|
Kwin Seit |
8 |
1,500 |
|
May |
5 |
500 |
|
Win Maung |
10 |
2,000 |
Loo Thaw township [see Figure 2], north of a newly constructed road, is a ‘black area’
where SPDC troops shoot to kill, and villagers and internally displaced peoples
(IDPs) continue to face extreme and multi-faceted hardship. Relocation
sites are fenced and patrolled, and forced labour is often demanded. Such harsh conditions and abuse mean that many IDPs
attempt to escape.
To restrict movement in
Some do manage to flee and many have resettled in Yae
Mu Plaw, placing intense
pressure on the already strained land and natural resources. Since November
2000, over 2,000 IDPs have fled from Nyauglebin (Kleer Lwee Htoo)
district into Western
Muthraw due to SPDC attacks, forced labor and relocation
operations. On 30 January 2001, a further 200 IDPs from Htee
Bla and Saw Tha Kee came
into Muthraw district, and since then over 2,000 villagers from Shwegyin Township,
Nyaunglebin Distict, have fled into areas around the Bilin River, Papun
District, where they now live in the hill fields in hiding. The Karen Human Rights
Group (KHRG) estimates up to 50,000 IDPs in these districts. IDPs have also fled from Htee Maw Kway Hta,
Law Moo Der, Htee Ler Pah Hta,
They Ko Ser Der, Mee Tha Nang Der, Saw Roko, Lo Khee and Kyaw Pla Kee villages.[212]
Figure 2: Karen State
Although people continue to flee to Papun District, the
situation there is also worsening. Communities live in constant fear of SPDC
columns and flee into the hills whenever there is news of troops being nearby.
It is hard to sustain reasonable living
conditions, and the small rice harvest that was achieved around Bilin River
Compounding upon food
shortages, human rights abuses and insecurity, IDPs also suffer from increased isolation and
high mortality rates due to lack of sanitation and medicines. Such harsh living
conditions force many to flee
REFUGEES
AND MIGRANT WORKERS
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
![Text Box: We are aware that our neighbouring country is hosting Myanmar's so-called refugees in temporary shelters on the eastern borders; the activities of armed groups who remained underground for decades and who took refuge in the border areas hindered development of the country. […Burma] never hosts the enemies of any neighbouring country.
- Khin Nyunt, 14 December 2000](STILL_WAITING_files/image015.gif)
The Minister of Immigration
and Population, U Saw Tun, said at the meeting that ‘irregular migration’ would
not pose problems if countries mutually respected each other’s sovereignty and
legal systems. The problem is of course that the regime has overridden the will
of the people by refusing to allow a democratically elected parliament to
convene, and thus many consider that the SPDC has no legal mandate to govern. Also,
the legal system in
SPDC argue that to improve
understanding of migration in the region, information must be shared through
inter-governmental cooperation and collaboration.[215]
When considered alongside reports of high numbers of Burmese intelligence in
In the junta’s mind, the
reason for migration from
It must be noted that
development projects are frequently excuses for the practice of forced labour,
and the benefit levels accrued by local populations are contentious.
Furthermore, the practices of forcible relocation and displacement are not
questioned despite the fact that according to international standards many such
population movements in
The exodus of Rohingya has
not ceased over the last 2 decades, despite repatriation programmes, nor will
it until extreme human rights abuses of the Rohingya in
Despite massive repatriation programmes, there
remain an estimated 22,000 Rohingya refugees in 2 camps in Cox’s
As the common story of illegal migrants goes, they
often work for extremely low pay in very harsh conditions, some akin to
slavery. Immigration raids haunt them and many serve prison sentences for not
having the appropriate papers. Cox’s Bazar camps have
proven to be extremely dangerous places, particularly for women as they provide
ideal recruiting grounds for traffickers running the route to
Racial
tensions are rising in
The body in the best position to take positive action is the UNHCR, but
they have repeatedly offered sub-standard assistance. Their assessments do not
focus on the human rights abuses suffered in
Guam
Burmese were able to enter Guam due to a visa-waiver
policy that attracts people to the island. Currently, over 800 peoples, mainly
Kachin and Chin elites due to the high cost of this route, are in Guam awaiting
the process of their asylum claims.[222]
The education level of this population is higher than that found in many
refugee populations, with doctors, academics, student activists, NGO workers
and pastors among the group, as well as an elected Member of Parliament and a
former Army/Police Colonel. According to a March report, most are political
activists, actively resisting the regime.[223]
Due to the high influx of Burmese, Burma was revoked from the visa-waiver programme in January 2001. It is a long wait for claims to be processed and adjudicated as there are only 2 lawyers working for the US Immigration and Naturalization Service. It is worth noting that 95% of claims which have been processed so far have been granted asylum in the USA. In the interim, a Protestant and Catholic coalition provide refugees with food, shelter, clothing and other assistance. “They live in terribly cramped conditions and wait for months to have their claims adjudicated.”[224]
In mid January an ecumenical group composed of
various church refugee groups, including the Chin Freedom Coalition, arrived in
Guam to advocate the release of 39 Chin asylum seekers who face persecution in
Burma, partly due to their Christian faith. The 39 were detained by the US
Department of Corrections upon their arrival in Guam.
In late April the US Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement announced it will soon arrive in Guam to assist Chin Christians who have fled Burma in processing refugee claims.[038] The team will also conduct health screening for communicable diseases and assist local church and charity groups in providing assistance.[225]
Malaysia
Malaysia is cracking down on illegal immigrants with increased numbers of police raids. During one such raid on 11th February, a Burmese woman drowned after falling into an abandoned mining pool while fleeing.[226]
India
Over 4,000 Christian Nagas have fled persecution and
human rights abuses seeking refuge in India, mainly Manipur
and Nagaland. Nagas from Burma cross the border is
small numbers daily to escape forced labour and military campaigns by the SPDC.
Whilst receiving no support from international humanitarian organizations,
Nagas in India take work on farms and receive some support from local Church
organizations. [227]
Fifty-four Burmese fishermen who have been incarcerated in Calcutta for about 2 years were due to be released and deported to Burma on 6th April. They should have been released from prison in 1999 and hence are entitled to compensation for illegal incarceration, according to a petition filed by an Indian activist. It is also stated that in May 1998 they were brutally beaten by jail guards and that some are now HIV positive and AIDS patients.[228]
Refugees
There are 11 camps along the Thai-Burma border, housing approximately 140,000 refugees. Refugees continue to arrive, most of non-Burman nationality, fleeing military offensives against autonomy-seeking groups, demands for forced labour and military portering. In mid-January, at least 13 families from Hlaing Bwe township fled their village and walked a day and a half across the mountains to cross into Thailand.[229]
There are reports that the number of Shan people
crossing into Thailand has increased due to the transmigration of the Wa into
Shan State. A senior Thai army officer, said the "Third Army had
been watching the influx of Shan civilians into the country. As many as 300,000 have crossed into Thailand
and about 120,000 more are expected to arrive this year."[230] There are at present no refugee camps in Thailand for
Shan people.
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, expressed concern in February about the living conditions of Burmese refugees living in camps along the Thai border, both publicly and to the Thai Prime Minister. Her comment follows last year’s comments by Sadako Ogata (UNHCR) who condemned the camps as highly overcrowded and with poor sanitation.