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Burma Issues Annual Report, 1992; p (r)



Subject: Burma Issues Annual Report, 1992; Part 5 of 5


BURMA ISSUES 1992 REPORT: Part 5 of 5
 ................

The Burmese Prostitution Industry in Thailand
     On the 10th of July, 1992, Thai vice police raided a brothel
in the port-city of Ranong, freeing 33 Burmese women who had been
held as virtual prisoners there, some for nearly 3 years. Three of
the women were recovering from a severe beating they had received
at the hands of their flesh-trading bosses as punishment for a
recent escape attempt. The three had been mercilessly whipped with
coat hanger wire, until they had fainted from the pain. Another
woman reported to the police that she had been forced to entertain
sex customers only three days after giving birth.  
     After a period of detention in Bangkok, many of the women were
returned home to Burma via boat. One of that group, named Hlaing
Myint, eventually arrived back to her family in Rangoon. Only 6
hours after her return, 3 plain-clothes policeman showed up at her
house, and asked her to accompany them to the police station "for
a short while". Instead of a brief visit, however, she was
subjected to interrogation by Slorc intelligence officers for the
next three days. They repeatedly accused her of being involved with
the resistance movement along the Thai-Burma border. She was beaten
frequently, especially around the head, subjected to water torture,
and deprived of food and water. The torturers also re-broke her
injured hand, which had undergone a recent operation as the result
of a traffic accident. They continued to accuse her of connections
to Burmese student dissidents and the KNU, although she had never
been involved in any resistance activity. She had spent nearly all
her time in Thailand imprisoned in a brothel, whatever her
political leanings might have been. Her father came to visit her
after two days, paying the guards 2000 kyats for the "privilege" of
seeing her. After observing her condition he made a deal with the
guards, agreeing to pay 10,000 more kyats to the police if they
would release her within 3 more days. She was released after 5 days
of extrajudicial arrest and interrogation, an unfortunate but
common reality for many Burmese citizens under Slorc martial law.
Soon thereafter, however, she was informed by a friend who worked
for the police that an order for her re-arrest had been issued by
a local Slorc magistrate.  Her family decided she needed to leave
Burma immediately. After paying another 2000 kyats worth of bribes,
for travel papers, an ID card, safe passage on an airplane under a
false name, and access to a boat heading back to Ranong, Thailand
- the unpleasant site of her previous prostitution experience - she
found herself on her own, and back in Thailand again, a political
refugee this time around. (Burmese Women's Project report) 
     Ma Thrader is another Burmese woman who found herself    
trapped into prostitution in Thailand. While visiting in Ranong,
and looking for work which could not be found on her side of the
border, a friend of her sister's told her she would arrange for her
to get a good job in the city. She was taken by the woman to a
house, where she was then left for several days. When the woman
returned she was accompanied by pimps who forcibly took Ma Thrader
away - to her new home in a brothel. For several days she was
beaten, injected with unknown drugs, and threatened with a pistol
to her head by the brothel thugs until she finally agreed to begin
servicing clients with sex. The occasional, arbitrary money she was
given for her work was all spent on food and snacks inside the
brothel, since she was not allowed to go outside. She was beaten
one time when they discovered she was trying to save her money,
rather than spending it on the brothel's own food. Eventually, her
brothel was raided by the Thai police, but the boat that was to
carry them back to Victoria Point (Kawthoung) in nearby Burma was
hi-jacked by her former brothel masters, who had followed on a boat
of their own. After bribing the Thai immigration guards, they
herded the women at gun-point back to Ranong - and their former
lives of enforced prostitution - temporarily housing over 200 of
them in a large warehouse to avoid further police raids. (BP,
13/9/92)
     "Toe Toe", is a young ethnic woman of mixed Karen/Mon
background who fled to Thailand to avoid capture and rape at the
hands of advancing Slorc troops in her home area, a region racked
by the brutal civil war being waged between the Burmese Army and
ethnic nationality insurgents. After spending several months in a
refugee camp along the Thai border, she traveled to Bangkok, where
she was soon arrested by police as an illegal immigrant. After 15
days in custody, she was repatriated to Kawthoung, Burma, where she
was then detained by the Burmese police, who demanded a 1500 kyat
fee for her release. Having no money, she simply waited in
detention, until a Burmese woman came along and bailed her, and
several other women, out of jail, promising them good-paying jobs
in nearby Ranong, Thailand.  In this increasingly familiar
scenario, Toe Toe soon found herself imprisoned in a brothel, and
forced at gun point to have sex with strangers. She received no
money for her work, and remained trapped in sex slavery until her
brothel was raided by Thai police, and she was taken away again.
(B.U.R.M.A. Newsletter, August 1992)  Unlike these three women, the
large majority of Burmese enslaved in the sex trade are never
"rescued" by the Thai police. But we only learn of the stories of
those rare few who are. In fact, many Thai police and government
officials are directly involved in protecting and facilitating the
flesh trade for their own personal profit, or, at the very least,
allow for its continued, unhindered operation. 
     The three brief, individual stories sketched above highlight
some of the broader forces dictating the often miserable terms of
life for thousands of Burmese woman who are sucked into Thailand's
booming flesh trade every year. High unemployment and a
disintegrating economy inside Burma push many woman to seek
opportunities across the border in Thailand. But the economic
options available for these women upon arrival are very limited,
and often translate into a career in prostitution. Others,
particularly ethnic nationalities from Burma's mountainous jungle
regions, flee into Thailand to escape the brutal counter-insurgency
campaigns of the Burmese Army.  These refugees from civil war are
susceptible to easy manipulation by smooth-talking flesh-dealers,
who often exploit their rural naivete and desperate situation for
their own advantage. Many more are lured and tricked into
prostitution by brothel field agents inside Burma, who make
commissions ranging from US$100-600 for recruiting/deceiving women
with offers of good-paying jobs across the border. (Cultural
Survival Quarterly, Fall 1992)  Upon returning to their home
villages in Burma, many of these young women are too ashamed to
speak out about their often traumatic experiences as prostitutes in
Thailand, and instead emphasize only the bright lights and modern
conveniences of Thai cities to their family and friends. Other
village women, seeing the fancy clothing and jewelry former
prostitutes often bring back with them, are drawn to the dream of
easy money in free-wheeling Thailand, especially when contrasted
with their own bleak economic prospects in Burma. The code of
silence and shame prevents them from ever hearing the whole story
about life in Thailand, until it is too late.  Many Burmese
prostitutes are too disgraced to ever return home, however, and
continue to support their families by staying on and working in
Thailand's sex trade for years, sending what money they save back
home to Burma.  Reportably, a small minority of young girls are
even sold to brothel agents by their impoverished parents for
several thousand baht. But whatever the forces pushing or pulling
them into Thailand, more and more young Burmese women are finding
themselves in a situation dictated by economic necessity. Too many
are being trapped into the extensive Thai brothel network, the one
business sector providing them with available opportunities. Sadly,
this insatiable demand for labor can supply only jobs that are at
best exploitative and degrading, and at worst, a modern form of
slavery and bondage for both Thai and Burmese women.  This
"slavery" is facing more and more public outrage in Thailand as
Thai activists become bolder in their confrontation of the powers
behind the exploitation.  The new Thai government, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai has also declared war on
the sex business, especially any "business" which exploits
children.  This gives hope that the future may see some positive
changes.
     Yet at the present, despite efforts by several Thai women's
groups, Burmese women entering Thailand have virtually no chance
for legal protection. Local Thai police, who theoretically could
offer some protection, are often personally involved in trafficking
women themselves, in conjunction with the brothels. In most cases,
brothel owners, recruitment agents, and pimps treat Burmese women
even more inhumanely than their Thai workers. Furthermore, Burmese
prostitutes are more likely than Thai to 1) have been forced or
tricked into the flesh trade, and 2) work in prison-like
conditions, for little or no pay, with no access to the outside
world, while residing 24 hours a day in the same cramped, bed-sized
room.  As far as compensation, even volunteer prostitutes often see
60-80% of their earnings taken by middle-men, pimps and owners,
while unwilling sex "slaves" are often given nothing (TN 16/7/92)). 
As illegal immigrants, Burmese women have less access to medical
treatment, AIDS education, or condom distribution. This is a big
problem in Ranong, Thailand, the heart of the Burmese prostitution
industry, with an estimated 5000 women involved in the sex trade. 
Most of the  clients serviced by Burmese prostitutes in Ranong are
Burmese fishermen or economic refugees, who are often illiterate,
and have little access to, or awareness of, AIDS education or the
practice of using condoms. 

Aids and Prostitution
     And it is this AIDS plague that most ominously threatens the
precarious situation of many Burmese prostitutes. Burma expert
Bertil Lintner reports of a university study on prostitutes and
AIDS in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where there are over 10,000 ethnic
Shan women from Burma working in the flesh trade. The study found
that 72% of prostitutes charging 30-50 baht for their services were
HIV positive, compared to 30% of those charging 50-100 baht, and
only 16% for those over 100 baht in price. Shockingly however, for
those in the industry for over 1 year, the rate rose to 70%,
regardless of price bracket or average volume of customers serviced
per night. (FEER, 20/2/92)  In the port town of Ranong, Thailand,
it is not uncommon for 100% of the Burmese women freed in a police
brothel raid to test positive for HIV. This was the case for 25
Burmese women apprehended in a raid on 19/6/91, 15 more hill tribe
woman released over June and July 1992, and 37 other women
repatriated from Ranong on 25/7/92. (Burmese Women's Project
report)
     Knowledge of AIDS is virtually non-existent among many women
coming from Burma. Even a relatively up-market prostitute
interviewed by Lintner in Chiang Mai declared, "I've never heard of
anyone here getting AIDS. I think somebody is just trying to scare
us". (FEER, 20/2/92)  Often brothel owners will approach their
workers after they have become infected, offer them a few hundred
baht, and tell them it's time to go home and visit their families
in Burma. 
     And it is these returning prostitutes who are accelerating the
spread of AIDS throughout Burma at an alarming rate. The Slorc
government admitted to some 74,000 HIV cases last year, but WHO
estimates would put the figure closer to 100,000, putting Burma at
the top of its list for the AIDS crisis in Asia. The combination of
returning, infected prostitutes from Thailand, with a UN estimated
160,000 intravenous drug addicts inside Burma, and a growing, often
teen-age, prostitute population domestically within Burma, has
created a volatile mix of social problems which threatens Burma,
and its bordering neighbors, with an out-of-control AIDS epidemic
in a few short years. Already a serious health crisis has erupted
in the "AIDS Route" to China's nearby Yunnan Province, which
borders Burma's opium-producing Shan State, and serves as a major
conduit for heroin smuggled out of the region. The convergence of 
1) free-flowing narcotics and a resultant growing addict
population, using and sharing dirty needles, with 2) cheap
prostitutes, at 3) a major trading hub, with highly mobile
entrepreneurs constantly flowing back and forth from other regions,
all combines to create an ideal environment for the spread of AIDS.
Unfortunately, these conditions exist alongside each other at other
major Burmese border cross-points with Thailand, India, and
Bangladesh.  Burma lacks the funds, expertise, health network,
educational means, and political will power to handle a
full-fledged AIDS crisis. When these medical infrastructural
problems are added to Burma's present international position as the
#1 supplier of heroin worldwide, and its regional role as a major
labor pool for brothel recruitment to Thailand, the multiplier
effect indicates a social/medical nightmare on the horizon for
Burma.  The country will probably be the weakest link in any
attempts to clamp down on AIDS in Asia before the plague escalates
further.

AIDS and Repatriation
     It is this very fear of an AIDS disaster which has led to
repeated reports that the Slorc government may be eliminating
HIV-infected women who return from Thailand, by injecting them with
fatal doses of cyanide. Edith Mirante in a recent edition of Burma
Affairs magazine writes that "persistent reports have arisen
regarding Slorc police or military personnel executing people with
AIDS who have been forcibly repatriated by Thailand to Burma"
(Burma Affairs, 15/4/92). On April 1, 1992, Thai Police Colonel
Bancha Jaruseet issued a public statement declaring that Burmese
women freed from brothels would no longer be deported. He made this
statement after receiving a report that 25 women freed from a
Ranong brothel on 19/6/92, and subsequently deported back to Burma,
had all been injected with cyanide by Slorc officials when it was
discovered they had HIV (TN, 2/4/92).  Later it was reported that
only 3 of the 25 were unaccounted for after returning to Burma. The
deportations have not stopped, however, as another group of 97
women were repatriated a few months later. Allegedly, after being
tested for HIV at an isolated detention center inside Burma, 65
were allowed to return to their families, after they produced a fee
ranging from US$100-300, while 32 others, who had tested positive,
were taken away, their fate unknown. (Burma Women's Project report)
Another 37 HIV-infected Burmese women who were repatriated from
Ranong on 9/7/92, were sentenced to 3 years in prison by Slorc upon
their return, for illegally leaving Burma, and 2 more years for
involvement in prostitution (the normal sentence for illegal
emigration is only 3 months). (TN, 25/7/92)  The Thai policy
continues to be one of giving Slorc the benefit of the doubt, as
expressed by Mrs. Saisuree, the former representative for the Prime
Minister's office handling the Burmese prostitute issue.  "I have
no doubt of their {repatriated Burmese women} safety. The Burmese
government has guaranteed their safety", Mrs. Saisuree asserted,
labeling alleged charges of cyanide injections as "uncollaborated
rumors". (TN, 20/8/92) 
     This mixture of prostitution, Burmese economic refugees,
repatriation, and AIDS represents some of the unexpected
consequences stemming from a minor, localized version of Thailand's
broader policy of supportive, profit-driven "constructive
engagement" with Slorc's Burma. This collusion can be most clearly
seen in the oft-mentioned port town of Ranong, along Thailand's
southern-most border with Burma. Ranong is the seafood capital of
Thailand, generating over 150 million baht a day for the Thai
economy, and serving as the primary source for most of Thailand's
domestic seafood retailers, as well as its lucrative export markets
abroad. This major sector of the Thai economy is almost totally
dependent on Burmese labor, and resource-rich Burmese waters.  Over
100,000 illegally-employed Burmese work on the hundreds of Thai
fishing trawlers which exploit the fragile marine ecosystems along
international waters from Burma to India. Thousands more Burmese
are employed on Thai construction projects and in local factories,
meeting Ranong's serious labor shortage needs. According to the
Ranong governor, "the shortage of labor is the most serious problem
in Ranong ... no one wants to work here from our own Thai
provinces", thus making Burmese immigrants invaluable to the area's
economic growth. (TN, 13/9/92)  
     The sex trade is an essential component of Ranong's economic
structure, and growing pressure to clean up their act from Bangkok
worries many local Thai businessmen.  "We'd rather lose face than
see the city's economy go under", admitted one local entrepreneur,
in reference to the essential dynamic of the flesh trade for
successful local business. Since Thai prostitutes are reluctant to
service the hordes of Burmese fishermen in port on any given day,
thousands of Burmese women have been brought in, often through
deception and force, to keep the trade booming. 
     Today, anywhere from 80 to 90% of prostitutes in Ranong's
brothels are Burmese women. Many local Ranong officials find recent
police crackdowns on brothels by the national Crime Suppression
Division police to be cynical political ploys. "Any time that
forces outside Ranong - the CSD police, for example - want to put
on a public display of their efficiency, all they have to do is
come down and "rescue" some Burmese prostitutes and march them out
for a press conference in Bangkok", claims one high-ranking Ranong
official. (TN, 13/9/92)
     Ranong's chief police inspector, Col. Sudchai Yanrat, concurs
declaring, "Burmese prostitution is a link in a chain of problems
arising from trade with Burma. To actively weed out illegal
immigrants and foreign prostitutes would be easy work for police
workers, but such a campaign would ruin the fragile economy of
Ranong, which depends heavily on Burmese laborers." (TN, 13/9/92)
     The deeply entrenched, debilitating economic, social, medical,
moral, psychological, and political quagmires resulting from the
growing use of Burmese women in the Thai sex trade are reflective
of broader problems in Thai-Burmese relations, and their respective
internal societies. These problems reveal yet more of the sick and
rotting fruits being borne from Thailand's accommodating
"constructive engagement" policy towards the Slorc regime. But more
than this, they represent one of the saddest by-products of the
economic disintegration and social breakdown being inflicted upon
Burma by its own self-interested and distorted military rulers.
     In a broader sense, there seems to be a sickness eating away
at the core of modern societies, a sickness that feeds off of
worshiping money and power, and prioritizing economic growth and
political control above basic human decency and respect for human
rights. Until the Slorc is prepared to focus on meeting its own
peoples' economic needs, rather than amassing weapons to keep them
cowering in fear and bondage, the flow of Burmese labor to Thailand
and beyond will continue unabated. And that flow will continue to
be mainly sucked into Thailand's brothel networks until the world's
societies are prepared to order their economies on a higher,
human-based principle that uses a variety of "quality-of-life"
measuring sticks for prosperity and growth, beyond solely the
numerical "bottom line" of profit margin.  The future of thousands
of young Burmese girls depends on Slorc leaders, Thai leaders and
the international community in general cleaning up their dirty act.

LOOKING AHEAD TO 1993
What Lies Ahead
     The road ahead for Burma is a rough one.  The 1993 dry season
will be an active one with Slorc troops committed to destroying all
opposition groups in the border areas.  Slorc is trying hard to
convince Thailand to seal the borders between Thailand and the
ethnic minority areas such as the Karen, Mon and Karenni so that
these groups will finally be defeated through a lack of arms and
supplies.  These military campaigns will produce a growing number
of external refugees as well as hundreds of thousands more
internally displaced persons.  If the border is actually closed,
assistance to internally displaced persons could become impossible,
and the fate of refugees fleeing across the border into Thailand
would rest on whether or not Thai authorities would allow them to
stay.  
     It is very doubtful that Slorc will actually be able to take
Karen strongholds such as Wankha and Mannerplaw.  However, should
they manage to do this, they will not have, as yet, completely
conquered the opposition.  The jungles are big and difficult to
move through.  The Karen, and other ethnic forces can simply adopt
guerilla tactics and continue their struggle from bases deep inside
the jungle.
     Slorc has been using younger troops in their
counter-insurgency campaigns.  Many of Slorc's soldiers who have
been captured or killed are young teenagers with very little
training.  Almost all of them have little or no education.  By
keeping the local economy in such bad shape, Slorc will assure
itself of a continual flow of new recruits as the army is about the
only job these young men can get which will help them care for
their families.  For this reason, there is doubt that the economy
in the country will improve over the next few years, especially the
economic standards of the poor class, despite the "good intentions"
of foreign companies like Pepsi, Total, Daewoo etc, who continue to
invest with the military junta.
     International pressure against Slorc will probably grow, but
Slorc has been carrying out an aggressive international public
relations campaign to try to gain time.  They have released some
political prisoners, opened their doors a little wider to
international investments, opened universities, and have promised
to hold a national assembly early in January of 1993.  This public
relations campaign will continue, but if concrete results can not
be seen, it will not much affect most of the international
community.
     However, Asean countries and probably China will continue to
play an active role in defending Burma.  The only hope is that
Thailand will be pressured enough to finally alter its constructive
engagement policy towards Burma.  Should they do this, other Asean
countries would follow, and Slorc would become more isolated. 
However, with the kinds of investments Thai companies are making in
Burma, a change in Thai policy seems distant.  Even the Electricity
Generating Authority of Thailand, a government organization, is
planning to invest in either hydroelectric dams along the Salween
River, or in a gas pipe line through the Tenesserim Division for
electric generating plants to be built in Kanchanaburi Province of
western Thailand.  Either project will cement Thailand's
relationship with Slorc even more strongly.
     China will continue to supply arms freely to  Burma unless
sufficient  international pressure can be  brought on them to pull
back.   This could  possibly be  brought about  by  an aggressive 
campaign  to urge the United Nations        Security Council to
consider an arms embargo against Burma.  
     There are possibilities that President-elect Clinton of the US
will apply pressure on China to make some important changes
regarding human rights within their own country which might also
encourage China to limit their military support to Burma, but there
is some doubt that he will be able to carry this out with much
success unless the American public strongly encourages him to do
so.  Clinton's possible emphasis on human rights may put some
pressure on Thailand to look more closely at its Burma policy, but
economic interests of a few power brokers in Thailand will prevent
much from changing.
     The opposition groups continue playing a very crucial role in
the struggle, but due to the fact that they are not totally
unified, their power is not focused as much as it could be yet. 
The new draft constitution being prepared by the Democratic
Alliance of Burma (DAB) and the National Coalition Government of
the Union of Burma (NCGUB) is gaining international support, and as
such has become a threat to the Slorc.  However, the constitution
is not well understood by the grassroots, and this could be a very
serious weakness in the future.  
     A federal state system has also been proposed by the
opposition groups as a way of creating a new future for the
country, but there are people who still fear that a federal state
system will destroy the union.  This fear is due to a
misunderstanding of the meaning of a federal state system caused by
several decades of miseducation carried out by the military regime. 

The National Convention
     One of the key issues to watch in 1993 will be the National
Convention to be held around January 9.  It will get a lot of
international attention, and many countries, especially Asean, will
use this national convention to try to prove the success of their
policy of constructive engagement.  However, the convention will be
mainly attended by Slorc people, or people whom Slorc can
manipulate.  The voices of the opposition will not be allowed. 
Slorc stated this clearly in their preparation meetings for the
convention held on July 27 of this year.  "It would be unnatural to
invite persons who have no confidence in the Convention to attend
it.  If the armed terrorists are truly serious of attending the
National Convention they ought to abandon the line of armed
struggle.  They will have to return to the legal fold after
abandoning armed struggle.  After their return to the legal fold,
they, like other members of the public will be able to attend the
National Convention by obtaining suitable number of delegates.  It
is quite clear that the armed terrorists in the jungle today have
no other way to attend the National Convention except the one I
have just explained." (Maj-Gen Myo Nyunt, Chairman of the Steering
Committee)
     The purpose of the National Convention is to draw together
ideas for a new constitution for the country.   Following this
convention, the elected members of the parliament (those not in
prison or in exile) will write the constitution which must then be
accepted by Slorc and finally passed by a national referendum. 
Since September 1988, the country has been without a constitution,
ruled only by military decree.  "The State Law and Order
Restoration Council (Tatmadaw or military) is not an organization
that observes any constitution;  it is an organization that is
governing the nation by Martial Law.  It is common knowledge that
the State Law and Order Restoration Council is governing the nation
as a military government and that it is a government that has been
accepted as such by the United Nations and the respective nations
of the world." (The State Law and Order Restoration Council
Declaration No 1/90, July 27, 1990)
     Following the 1988 uprising and the September military coup
which followed, the political struggle in the urban centers became
closely and actively linked to the armed struggle along the
borders.  This not only strengthened the struggle and brought it
into the international spot light, but it also brought many
thousands of urban people into a working relationship with the
ethnic minority armed groups who had been carrying out their 
struggle in isolation for more than 40 years.  The National
Convention is an attempt by Slorc to once again separate these two
aspects of the struggle.  This could come about in the following
ways:
     1)  The national convention will first of all focus
international attention away from the borders and back into the
urban centers and the political struggle taking place in the
convention.  Slorc will have more freedom then to carry out
military campaigns along the border with less international
criticism.
     2)  Secondly, the holding of a National Convention and the
drawing up of a constitution will result in a new election.  A
civilian government will probably be elected, but one which the
Slorc can hold control over.  The political tensions in the urban
areas will relax and Slorc will be able to concentrate more of its
military forces in the border area. 
     3)  Slorc will probably at this time offer amnesty to all
those who fled to the border since 1988.  Sick with malaria, and
tired of the long struggle, some of these people may return to the
"fold", thus further separating the urban political struggle from
the border armed struggle.
     4)  Slorc will then tell the world that, since there is now a
civilian government and democratic reforms are coming about, the
ethnic forces along the border have no reason to continue their
struggle.  The border struggle will be further isolated.
     5)  An elected "civilian" government will also lead to more
international recognition for Burma as many countries are more
interested in the act of an election than in the actual existence
of human rights and democratic principles.  Western countries tend
to relate more easily to urban political struggles, and an
election, even one organized by a dictator, will probably get more
attention than an on-going rural struggle for land and cultural
rights.
     6)  Slorc will continue its program to eliminate the ethnic
minority groups.  There is little chance that they (Slorc) will
agree to any political negotiations with them.  "Since the State
Law and Order Restoration Council is not a political government, it
has no reason at all to negotiate by political means with any armed
insurgent organization."  (Slorc Declaration No 1/90)  A civilian
government, under the thumb of the military, will have little
opportunity to change this policy.
     In conclusion, any constitution which grows out of this
convention will not guarantee democracy for the country or human
rights for the people.  This convention can never bring an end to
the civil war because it can not deal with the root causes of that
civil war in the absence of full participation of all opposition
groups.  And so the war will continue for the millions of ethnic
minority people who live outside the vision of the world's eye, and
who have already suffered for more than 40 years.
     Even though the Slorc strategy could temporarily pacify the
urban centers, the discontent with the military's heavy-handed
control over the people would continue, and would eventually erupt
into another bloody uprising.  This potential violence could be
avoided by making full use of the momentum which still exists now
to bring about the changes the Burmese people want.  Any solutions
which simply cover over the pain and anger the people feel will
eventually lead to more severe suffering.

A Strategy for 1993
Some Thoughts About Strategy
Without a clear and comprehensive strategy, based on strong and
logical analysis, a struggle for national liberation has a small
chance for success.  Such a strategy must be developed by those
struggling for national liberation themselves, based on their own
national history and experience.  The strategy must also control
what kinds of actions support groups carry out and the timing for
such actions.  The initiative must be with those struggling for
national liberation, and the support groups must have enough
respect for them to listen and take their cues from the struggle
itself.  Failure for such a strategy to be developed and followed
by all leads to confusion and lots of time and energy wasted on
actions which may be ineffective at best and counterproductive at
worst.  
     The national liberation movement must work out a strategy
based on a clear understanding of the weaknesses and tactics of the
opposition, as well as on the strengths and potentials of the
struggle itself.  They may gain valuable information from the
experience and expertise of the support groups, but they must know
how to use that information effectively to develop a winning
strategy.  Their strategy must coordinate and organize the various
international support groups who can, by creative nonviolent
actions in their own countries, help open up space for effective
liberating actions.  The less effective these international support
groups struggle in their own countries, the more violent the
struggle will tend to become.  In one sense, the amount of violence
encountered in the struggle is directly related to the way the
support groups carry out (or fail to carry out) the blocking
actions. 
     The struggle must be able to identify the weak points of the
opposition, know who provides assistance and defense for the
opposition, and organize the support groups to block at those
points so that forward progress can be made.
     In the case of Burma, the support to Slorc consists of ASEAN
(constructive engagement), China (weapons), international
investments, UN (UNDP programs, the UN seat etc), political and
military support, etc.  For the national liberation movement of
Burma to succeed, effective blocking actions must be taken by
international support groups against these Slorc defenses.  The
slower this kind of action is, the more violent and bloody the
struggle becomes.

What Needs to be Done?
     1.  The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy
     First of all, the national liberation movement must design a
comprehensive strategy which covers the border areas, the inside
underground and above ground opposition, as well as all
international support groups both government and non-government. 
This strategy must encompass all importantly significant areas such
as economic (economic sanctions, boycotts etc.) political (UN, NAM,
ASEAN etc), human rights (grassroots documentation, flow of
information, publications etc), cultural (protection of ethnic
cultures, languages, traditions etc), social (root causes of ethnic
conflicts which have lasted for more than 45 years, religious
differences, etc.), military, nonviolent, etc.  The strategy must
link all of these areas together and be designed in such a way that
they compliment each other rather than compete or come in conflict. 
At the same time, the national liberation movement must set up a
list of priority actions and time frames.  For the strategy to be
successful, it must be built around the history, culture,
experience and world perspective of the people of Burma rather than
rely too much on international input.
     A successful strategy must provide all the various Burmese
groups a positive and effective role to play which would all help
focus attention and pressure on a common priority.  At the same
time it must focus and coordinate all international groups which
want to support the struggle in order to gain the most power from
this support.
     2.  UN Embargo
     The priority for 1993 must be to push for an arms embargo and
economic sanctions by the UN against Burma.  Slorc is trying to
focus attention on their National Convention and trying to isolate
the border opposition groups (cutting off all arms and supplies). 
If they accomplish this, they will more easily be able to crush the
ethnic minority forces along the border.  A UN arms embargo would
prevent them from doing this, and would put tremendous pressure on
them to negotiate with the opposition groups.   An arms embargo and
economic sanctions by the UN would also put pressure on Asean
nations to reassess their policies towards Burma.  For an arms
embargo to be achieved, campaigns must be launched around the world
to urge the UN Security Council to take action on Burma.  It is in
the Security Council that such decisions can be made.
     A strong precedent has already been set by a special UN
rapporteur, Professor Yozo Yokota of Japan, who visited Burma on
December 7 of this year.  His report strongly criticized the
Slorc's record on human rights, and indicated that he was not
allowed to freely meet the people he needed to meet, such as Aung
San Suu Kyi and other prominent political prisoners.  With this
kind of report coming from the UN itself, pressure on the UN to
take action against the military junta is more likely to bear
positive fruit.
     3.  Pressure on ASEAN and China
     The second priority is to increase pressure on Asean and China
to end their policies of "constructive engagement" with Slorc. 
More efforts must be made to build up local action groups within
the Asean countries to carry out this work.  Asean-based groups
should first concentrate on translating and sharing information
prepared by Burma opposition groups, and on organizing campaigns to
change national policies relating to Burma.  Dissemination of
information is of primary urgency.  People take action when they
become informed.  National campaigns on Burma can not be organized
if sufficient time and effort have not been put on raising public
awareness of the issues.  The lack of effective Asean-based
campaigns suggests a lack of public awareness.  By translating
information already being prepared by the Burma movement gives the
people of Burma a voice, and that is one of the most empowering and
democratizing contributions Asean groups can give the Burma
national liberation movement at this time.
     4.  Assistance in Documentation
     Opposition groups along the border have a difficult time
collecting relevant information on companies investing in Burma.
Support groups around the world need to help by identifying
companies from their countries investing in Burma (names of
companies investing in Burma can be found in Foreign Investments In
Burma produced by B.U.R.M.A., or in Burma Alert produced in Canada
by Harn Yawnghwe) and doing research on them.  This information is
very important for forming strategies to put economic pressure on
the Slorc.
     5)  Cautious International Involvement
     International support groups must be cautious not to involve
themselves in a way which will encourage the split between the
urban (political) struggle and the border armed struggle which the
Slorc is trying to initiate.  Despite the position many support
groups have against armed struggle, they should be careful not to
create an "either/or" atmosphere.  This will prolong the violence,
and perhaps even make it worse. 
     6)  Economic Needs of the Oppressed
     The world now seems left with only one economic system to work
with.  The "end" of socialism has limited us to capitalism or some
form there of.  New economic structures need to be developed to
give people more choice.
     There is a strong possibility that the poor and oppressed in
a society may have the wisdom needed to suggest some of these new
economic structures and forms.  We have to learn to trust the
oppressed and to listen to them.  Perhaps they can build something
better if given a chance, but we must give them the space and take
the risk of allowing them to do it.
     7)  Grassroots Documentation
     Effective human rights documentation and education can and
should be done by the grassroots.  Not only are they better aware
of the abuses being carried out against themselves, but when they
do their own documentation, they are also empowered which is an
extremely important step in the democratization process.
     Human rights knowledge and documentation tools should be given
to the oppressed in a simple way which they can understand and make
use of and which are based, not on theory, but on the actually
documentation experience within Burma.  This basically rules out
large, money-intensive training programs which are beyond the reach
of the oppressed and outside their world experience. 
     8)  A Comprehensive International Nonviolent Strategy
     A more comprehensive international strategy for nonviolent
struggle should be mapped out which does not emphasize the training
of the oppressed for nonviolent action, but rather challenges the
international community to give the proper kind of supportive
action which will help provide more working space for the
oppressed.  It should be recognized that the oppressed do not
naturally tend towards violence, but use it when they feel they
have no options left.  Effective supportive actions such as
economic sanctions, political campaigns, etc., can provide them
with more nonviolent action opportunities.  Furthermore, the more
the oppressed are trained in nonviolence, the more academic
nonviolence may become. The best nonviolent teacher is a good
example.
     9)  Study of Economic Development Trends Regionally
     Regionally, a more serious study of economic development
trends should be made and action groups all over Asia encouraged to
take this issue more seriously.  Uncontrolled economic growth can
not happen without a large portion of the society suffering. 
Thailand is enjoying such economic growth at the moment at the
expense of Burma and its Indochina neighbors.  In this situation,
human rights can at most be discussed academically.
     10)  Action Needed Without Delay
     From actions carried out by the military junta as reflected
briefly in this report, the trends in Burma seem dangerously
similar to those of the Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol
Pot.  The educated people are being dismissed from their positions
or forced to comply totally with Slorc demands,  Thousands are
leaving the country for reasons of safety or for the hope of a
better future.  Education institutions are now without sufficient
and well-trained teaching staff, so the quality of education is
rapidly declining even more, and the type of education offered is
that only acceptable by Slorc.
     People, especially the rural poor, are used by Slorc as slaves
to build roads, rail lines and other infrastructure.  This
infrastructure is designed to provide faster and more efficient
access by the Slorc military into ethnic areas where campaigns to
eliminate the ethnic minorities continue.
     Hundreds of thousands of people have already fled Burma to
seek safety in neighboring countries.  As the military attacks by
Slorc continue, the numbers are expected to increase, creating
tremendous suffering for these refugees, and heavy burdens for the
neighboring countries which must provide sanctuary as well as food,
clothing and medical help.
     The world waited too long to intervene on behalf of the people
of Cambodia.  Somalia also is a haunting example which can not be
taken away from the eyes of the international community.  The "wait
and see" attitude, and the policy of "constructive engagement"
provide no hope for the oppressed who are struggling for survival.
     Effective action at the level of the UN now might mean that
Burma does not have to sink as low as Cambodia and Somalia. 
Actions for positive solutions taken early can mean more hope for
success and less suffering.  
     The world must wake up now and seriously do something about
Burma before it becomes necessary for the UN to launch a massive
campaign to save lives which, simply stated, might come about too
late.
     It is our hope that the information contained in this report,
and the suggestions for action made here will help lead to peace,
justice and full human rights for all the people of Burma.


Burma Issues
PO Box 1076, Silom Post Office
Bangkok 10504 Thailand

phone: 662 234 6674



Burma Issues (formerly Burma Rights Movement for Action,          
B.U.R.M.A.) is a Bangkok-based non-governmental organization that
monitors events in Burma with a focus on human rights, ethnic
minorities and the ongoing civil war.