[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

US State Dept. Human Rights Report,



Subject: US State Dept. Human Rights Report, Burma (1/2)

                             BURMA

Burma is ruled by a highly authoritarian, military regime that has been 
condemned for its serious human rights abuses.  Heading the latest version 
of a military dictatorship that has presided over the country with an 
unyielding grip for more than three decades is the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC), which took power in September 1988 after harshly 
suppressing massive prodemocracy demonstrations.  Longtime dictator General Ne 
Win, whose policies had pushed Burma to the margins of the international 
community and driven the country into a deep economic decline, resigned 
shortly before SLORC's emergence.  Nevertheless, he continued to wield the 
power behind the scenes.  

The SLORC, headed by the armed forces commander and composed of senior 
military officers, permitted a relatively free election in 1990.  However, it 
failed to honor the results--which were an overwhelming rejection of military 
rule--or to cede power to the victorious party headed by prodemocracy movement 
leaders.  Instead, the SLORC attacked the coalition of winning political 
parties through detentions, house arrests, and intimidation.

Since General Than Shwe became Chief of State in April 1992, the SLORC has 
taken some modest steps to lessen its harsh rule, including reopening the 
universities and releasing over 2,000 political prisoners.  In January 1993, 
the SLORC inaugurated a national convention to begin work on a new constitution.
However, SLORC officials stage-managed the proceedings and overrode even limited
opposition, interrogating and harassing delegates who attempted to deviate from
the regime's position, and even sentenced one prodemocracy delegate to 20 years
in prison for distributing information critical of the convention proceedings.
It seems clear that the SLORC's domination of the convention, which has no 
mandate from the people, is to ensure adoption of a constitutional blueprint 
effectively guaranteeing the military's continued hold on power.

The Government reinforces its rule via a pervasive security apparatus led by 
the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) and the National 
Intelligence Bureau (NIB).  Control is buttressed by restrictions on contact 
with foreigners; surveillance of government employees and private citizens; and
arrests, detentions, harassment, intimidation, and mistreatment of political 
activists.  The Government justifies its security measures as necessary to 
maintain order and national unity, although several longstanding insurgent 
groups have reached accommodations with the SLORC in recent years and the 
others pose little threat to major population centers.

Burma is primarily an agricultural country, although it also has substantial 
mineral, fishing, and timber resources.  After Ne Win's 26-year rule reduced 
southeast Asia's richest land to a U.N.-designated "least developed country," 
the SLORC abandoned the "Burmese Way to Socialism" in 1988, opening up the 
economy to permit private sector expansion and attract investment and badly 
needed foreign exchange, which has resulted in a limited improvement in the 
economy. The Government has hindered development o f the private sector, 
however, by failing to address fundamental problems:  restrictions on private 
commerce; constantly changing rules and regulations; overcentralized decision 
making; a bloated bureaucracy; a greatly overvalued currency; poor civilian 
infrastructure; and grossly disproportionate military spending.

There was no marked increase in the level of human rights abuses in 1993, in 
large measure because the SLORC had already been so successful in intimidating 
the Burmese people.  At the same time, Burmese authorities took only limited 
steps to correct longs tanding, serious human rights violations.  The 
Government's use of forced labor--especially as porters for the army--as well 
as forced resettlement of civilians continued, causing hundreds of deaths due 
to disease, harsh treatment, and overwork.  Five hundred or more Burmese 
remained in prison for political reasons, including more than 40 par-
liamentarians elected in 1990; approximately 200,000 Rohingyas (Burmese 
Muslims from Arakan State) remained in refugee camps in Bangladesh; a few 
thousand students an d dissidents continued as exiles in Thailand; and roughly 
71,000 Burmese live in ethnic minority camps in Thailand near the Burma border.

Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest, her fifth year of 
detention by the SLORC, without being charged or having access to legal 
proceedings.  The SLORC persisted in denying basic freedom of speech and 
assembly, and arbitrary intrusions into private life remained pervasive. In 
a closed trial, in October, the regime sentenced 12 dissidents, including one 
of the delegates to the National Convention, to 20 years in prison for 
distributing anti-SLORC information.

The SLORC ignored a comprehensive resolution on Burma adopted by consensus in 
1993 at the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) calling for an end to human 
rights violations in Burma, the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and 
all other political pr isoners, and the implementation of the 1990 elections.

On the positive side, the SLORC commuted all death sentences handed down since 
it took power; released over 700 persons believed to be political prisoners; 
permitted the first-ever meetings between political prisoners and foreign 
visitors; and allowed additional family visits to Aung San Suu Kyi. 
Over 50,000 Rohingyas returned to Arakan State in 1993, and the Government 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November with the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) providing for a presence in Arakan State 
to monitor the repatriation and reintegration of Rohingyas from Bangladesh.

Nonetheless, on balance, in view of the persistent abuses by the SLORC, 
including its use of forced labor, its wholesale denial of basic political 
rights, and blatant manipulation of the national convention, Burma must 
continue to be judged a serious violator of international human rights norms.
The expressions of deep concern by the international community about the human 
rights situation in Burma in successive resolutions adopted since 1991 by the 
UNHCR and the U.N. General Assembly have failed thus far to have an 
appreciable impact on the SLORC's behavior.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Although secret, extrajudicial killings reportedly were carried out in recent 
years, there were no such reports in 1993.  As in the past, credible sources 
reported many deaths among those impressed for forced labor projects and 
porterage.

There were no confirmed incidents of summary executions of civilians in 1993.
In late February, U Win Ko, a deputy-elect of the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) and finance minister in the opposition National Coalition 
Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), was murdered in Kunming, China. 
Burmese authorities have denied any involvement, and independent sources 
suggest other parties were responsible.  U Hla Pe, who served as the NCGUB's 
Minister of Education and Health and Minister of Information, was murdered in 
Bangkok in mid-June.  There is, however, no evidence as to the perpetrators.

     b.  Disappearance

The number of disappearances in 1993 was probably little changed from the 
previous year, but accurate estimates are impossible since the Government will 
not provide information on these cases.  Family and friends assume that those 
who have disappeared are under detention or have died in jail.  Family members 
can generally determine that relatives have been arrested, but the process of 
obtaining information can take a long time.  Some who disappeared were later 
reported as arrested.  Others may have dropped out of sight or quietly 
attempted to leave the country for fear of arrest.

Authorities rarely responded to inquiries from families concerning the 
whereabouts and welfare of disappeared or jailed relatives.  The few replies 
routinely consisted of only general statements that such people were arrested 
for violations of existing laws.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Fragmentary evidence documents that mistreatment of political detainees 
continued to take place in Burmese prisons and detention centers operated by 
the security services.  There has been a decline in the number of detentions, 
during which the worst abuse reportedly occurs.  Political detainees are held 
incommunicado, with family or lawyers unable to visit during what can be a 
protracted pretrial period.  The most common forms of maltreatment during this 
period were sleep and food deprivation coupled with round-the-clock 
interrogation.

In recent years, severe beatings and forcing prisoners to squat or assume 
unnatural positions for lengthy periods have also been reported, and 
techniques designed to intimidate and disorient prisoners prior to 
interrogation have been routine.  Such practices as electrical shocks to the 
genitals, suffocation, and cigarette burns have also been reported in the past,
but there were no confirmed reports of these practices in 1993.

During 1993 there were no reports alleging torture of convicted political 
prisoners or deaths linked to the conditions of their imprisonment.  Khin 
Maung Myint of the leftist People's Progressive Party (PPP) died in prison 
in 1993, apparently of natural causes after repeated stays in a prison medical 
facility despite his family's request for his transfer to a civilian hospital.
Interviews by U.S. citizens and Congressional visitors on private travel with 
SLORC-selected prisoners at Insein prison near Rangoon indicate an overly 
harsh prison regimen, i.e., little exercise, no reading or writing materials 
for many if not most prisoners, poor nutrition, years of solitary confinement 
for some, and illness induced by sleeping on concrete cell floors.  Student
leader Min Ko Naing, who met with two visiting American Congressmen at Insein 
Prison in August, displayed the effects of serious physical and psychological 
abuse.  A few prominent prisoners, such as former NLD Chairmen Tin Oo and Kyi 
Maung, were provided limited reading material and bungalow accommodations.  
Those interviewed acknowledged receiving medicine as well as supplemental food 
brought by their families during 15-minute visits permitted every 2 weeks.

The Government continued to bar the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from visiting detainees or convicted prisoners of any kind.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Arbitrary arrest and detention are practiced routinely by the SLORC.  
Throughout the year at least scores of political activists were detained for 
low-level political protests, such as handing out opposition flyers, painting 
political graffiti, or shouting opposition slogans.  Some detentions coincided 
with the startup of sessions of the national convention or with various 
political anniversaries.  Shortly after the January 9 launching of the 
national convention, for example, the authorities announced the arrest of 
23 activists including Nay Lin, a youth organizer for the Federation of Trade 
Unions of Burma, who allegedly painted graffiti on a Rangoon wharf.  Some 
students were picked up for staging a brief demonstration on June 7 at a 
suburban campus of Rangoon University.  Several NLD members, including at 
least one successful candidate in the 1990 election, were detained after 
taking part in a wreath-laying ceremony at Aung San's tomb.  Between June and 
August, the authorities also arrested 12 persons, in cluding the writer Ma Thida
and the successful NLD candidate and delegate to the national convention, 
Dr. Aung Khin Sint, for distributing opposition literature.  In what was 
widely recognized as a warning to others, all were convicted in mid-October 
and given harsh 20-year prison sentences.

While most detainees were members of political parties or engaged in overtly 
political activities, businessmen and other private citizens were also subject 
to arbitrary detention, particularly as the increase in private economic 
activity in 1993 led to additional scrutiny of businesses by security forces.

The military again extended the house arrest of former NLD General Secretary 
and Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.  The decision was taken under the 
provisions of the Law to Safeguard the State from the Dangers of Subversive 
Elements--also the basis for her initial year of house arrest which began in 
1989. As amended in August 1991, the law authorizes 1-year extensions of 
arbitrary detention without charge or trial for up to 5 years.  Aung San Suu 
Kyi has never been formally charged.  The authorities have offered her an 
opportunity to substitute foreign exile for her current house arrest, but she 
declined to leave the country.  The military Government again allowed her 
husband and two sons to visit her in 1993.  The authorities refused a 
proposed vi sit by a group of fellow Nobel Laureates seeking her release.

There is no provision in Burmese law for judicial determination of the legality
of detention.  Bail may be granted by civilian courts in some circumstances. 
The number of political detainees not sentenced by year's end was impossible 
to determine accurately.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

Throughout 1993 the Government continued to rule by decree and was not bound 
by any constitutional provisions guaranteeing fair public trials or any other 
rights.  Until abolished in September 1992, military tribunals exercised 
jurisdiction over all cases involving defiance of orders issued by the SLORC 
or local commanders.  These tribunals could mete out only three sentences--the 
death penalty, life imprisonment, 3 years or more imprisonment with 
labor--regardless of existing laws.  On January 1, however , a government 
decree codified an existing moratorium on capital punishment by commuting all 
previous SLORC-imposed death sentences to life imprisonment.  It also capped 
all other prison terms at 10 years for anyone convicted during the SLORC era.

After denying for years that it held any political prisoners, in April 1992, 
the Government announced its intention to free those persons "detained 
politically" who did not represent a threat to state security.  Between that 
time and the end of 1993, the SLORC announced the release of more than 
2,000 persons, although fewer than 200 were publicly identified.  The failure 
to identify most released persons invites suspicions about whether they were 
actually political prisoners, but opposition activists believe this was 
generally the case.  Reliable sources indicate that some of those released 
in 1993 were monks imprisoned for participating in 1988 prodemocracy rallies 
and a 1990 boycott action, including prominent Rangoon Abbot Thu Mingala; 
prodemocracy businessman Ye Htoon; and numerous Karens and others suspected 
of supporting the 1991 Irrawaddy Delta insurgency.

The 1992 decree also implicitly acknowledged that political prisoners had been 
held not only in Rangoon's Insein Prison but also in over 20 upcountry locations
--many of which were still believed to hold some political prisoners at the end
of 1993.  The remaining political prisoners included former military officers 
Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, both of whom had served as chairmen of the NLD, 
comedian Zargana, student leader Min Ko Naing, and lawyer U Nay Min.  

Since September 1992, civil courts have handled civil and criminal cases, as 
well as political trials.  Civilian courts have reportedly become fairer in 
handling nonpolitical cases since 1988, but remain plagued by corruption, 
inordinate delays in process ing cases and appeals, and poor training and 
unprofessional behavior on the part of some court officers.