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US States Dept. Human Rights Report



Subject: US States Dept. Human Rights Report, Burma (2/2)

> 	id SAA14924; Wed, 9 Feb 1994 18:17:37 -0800
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> 	id AA26983; Wed, 9 Feb 94 18:09:25 PST
> Date: Wed, 9 Feb 94 18:09:25 PST
> From: tun@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Coban Tun)
> Message-Id: <9402100209.AA26983@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: soc.culture.burma.usenet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: US State Dept. Human Rights Report, Burma (2/2)
> Cc: absdf@xxxxxxxxxxx, beker@xxxxxxxxxx, burma@xxxxxxxxxx,
>         michael_gold@xxxxxxxxxx
> 
>             .
>             .
>             .
> in processing cases and appeals, and poor training and 
> unprofessional behavior on the part of some court officers.
> 
> Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public 
> trial and to be represented by a defense attorney, are 
> generally respected by civilian judges.  Judges are appointed 
> by the Supreme Court with the approval of the SLORC (which also 
> names justices to the Supreme Court).  At present, judges must 
> be at least law officers with legal training.  Defense 
> attorneys are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses, 
> but their primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to 
> obtain the shorest possible sentence for their clients.  Cases, 
> almost all political, which are tried in courtooms in prison 
> compounds are not open to the public.  In such cases, while 
> defendants may have access to a defense attorney, counsel 
> appears to serve no purpose other than to provide moral 
> support.  Reliable reports indicate that in political cases due 
> process is largely ignored and verdicts manipulated.
> 
> 
>      f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
>          Correspondence
> 
> The State continued to intrude extensively into the lives of 
> private citizens during 1993.  Forced entry and warrantless, 
> unannounced searches of private homes were often conducted.  
> Through its extensive intelligence network, the Government 
> closely monitored the travel, whereabouts, and activities of 
> many Burmese, particularly those known to be politically 
> active.  Security personnel selectively monitored private 
> correspondence and telephone calls.  Contacts or communications 
> involving foreigners were subject to especially intense 
> scrutiny, and government employees were required to obtain 
> advance permission before meeting with foreigners.  Despite 
> some efforts by the Government to improve its image by meeting 
> in October with the head of the British Broadcasting 
> Corporation Far Eastern Service, official propaganda continued 
> in 1993 to take aim at various foreign news services, and 
> private citizens were generally unable to subscribe directly to 
> foreign publications.  Two international newsmagazines were 
> distributed through official channels and were available to the 
> public at large, but censors occasionally banned issues or 
> deleted articles criticizing local conditions or reporting 
> opposition activities.  Foreign radio broadcasts remained a 
> prime source of information for the people and even for the 
> military, despite the Government's hostility to this news 
> source.  The authorities sought to register the growing number 
> of television satellite receivers but appeared ready to 
> tolerate their use.  Some foreign journalists, including 
> television crews, continued to be granted access to the 
> country, but their movements and contacts were closely 
> monitored.
> 
> In its most intensive and egregious infringement of privacy 
> rights, the Government continued its program of forced 
> resettlement, involving an estimated half-million urban 
> residents throughout Burma since 1989.  While most of those 
> forced to move were described as "squatters," some people had 
> been living in and paying rent on their former home sites for 
> many years and had constructed permanent houses.  The 
> Government has made people move, almost totally at their own 
> expense, to "new towns" which are far from their previous 
> residences.  "New  town" occupants often live on former rice 
> paddy land, subject to flooding in the rainy season, without 
> adequate transportation, medical facilities, shelter, or 
> sanitation.  In 1993 conditions at some resettlement sites 
> improved, but, according to international observers, such 
> improvements were often unable to keep pace with the rate of 
> new arrivals.  Some outside experts accept the Government's 
> explanation that the resettlement program serves legitimate 
> long-term urban planning objectives, but they do not endorse 
> the forceful methods used to move people.
> 
>      g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian 
>          Law in Internal Conflicts
> 
> The Burmese Army has battled diverse insurgencies for more than 
> four decades in conflicts that have resulted in widespread 
> human rights violations, including mistreatment and killing of 
> prisoners, rape, neglect of the sick and wounded, impressment 
> of civilians for porter duty, and indiscriminate attacks on 
> civilians.  While the Government was responsible for the bulk 
> of these abuses (the Burmese armed forces nearly doubled the 
> number of combat units since 1988), insurgent groups have also 
> violated humanitarian principles.  Insurgent groups, such as 
> the Karen, Mon, and Karenni, continued to engage in small-scale 
> fighting, mostly in remote areas, to try to gain greater 
> autonomy from the dominant ethnic Burman majority.  Some 
> receive limited outside support from private international 
> humanitarian and religious organizations.  The Shan United Army 
> (SUA) also claims to be fighting for greater autonomy but 
> engages primarily in drug trafficking.  Several former 
> insurgent groups with which the Government now has cease-fire 
> accommodations likewise are important narcotics trafficking 
> organizations.  The continued suspension of large-scale 
> military offensives against insurgents in Karen state and 
> elsewhere, together with ongoing government efforts to reach a 
> peace accord with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), sharply 
> reduced the level of fighting during 1993.
> 
> In 1993 the use of forced porterage continued, with attendant 
> casualties.  Most of these deaths, roughly estimated to be in 
> the hundreds, were from disease and overwork, though reports of 
> mistreatment and rape were also common.  The Burmese military 
> also continued to use corvee labor and prison labor in combat 
> areas.  There were unconfirmed reports, for example, that on at 
> least two occasions a combined total of as many as 700 inmates 
> from a prison near Rangoon were taken to work as porters in 
> eastern Burma.  Credible reports from multiple sources 
> indicated that porters have carried ammunition, supplies, and 
> the wounded under the harshest conditions.  Other well-placed 
> sources also note that they are subject to hostile fire as well 
> as maltreatment at the hands of Burmese soldiers.  When porters 
> are wounded, ill, or unable to continue their work, some have 
> been reportedly left unattended to die.  At the end of their 
> service, survivors often have had to find their own means to 
> return home.  It was also credibly reported that some members 
> of the military used sham threats of impressment to extort 
> money from villagers.
> 
> Forced rural resettlement displaced ethnic minority villagers 
> in Karen and Kayah states and contributed to an increase of 
> about 6,000 Burmese in camps on the Thai side of the border.  
> Local sources reported some amelioration of conditions 
> following the completion of the railroad to Loikaw for Catholic 
> villagers in Kayah State who had been resettled in March 1992, 
> and that many returned to their original homes.  Reports from 
> Karen State suggest rural relocation schemes continued to play 
> a key role in the Government's counterinsurgency strategy.
> 
> Despite this evidence that the Burmese authorities were not 
> prepared fully to implement their obligations under the Geneva 
> Conventions, in April and November the Government for the first 
> time permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross 
> (ICRC) to conduct two short seminars on humanitarian law for 
> groups of military officers.
> 
> Antigovernment groups were responsible for violence causing 
> civilian and military deaths, including reported killings of 
> civilians during attacks on villages and ambushes or mining of 
> transportation routes.  In two separate incidents in February 
> and March, over 100 confirmed civilian deaths resulted from 
> military conflicts involving the narcotics-trafficking Shan 
> United Army.  Credible reports indicate Karenni insurgents 
> executed at least eight captured Burmese soldiers, and civilian 
> deaths in a transport train blown up by a land mine were 
> attributed to Mon activists.  Additionally, reliable multiple 
> sources indicated that Karen insurgents resorted to forced 
> labor for porterage and impressed youths into military service.
> 
> Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
> 
>      a.  Freedom of Speech and Press
> 
> Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press 
> persisted throughout 1993.  Although the degree of enforcement 
> varied, the Government generally continued to demonstrate 
> little tolerance for opposing views or criticism.  Private 
> citizens remained reluctant to express opinions for fear of 
> government informers.  The U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) 
> Special Rapporteur deplored the "pervasive atmosphere of fear 
> and repression" in Burma in his report adopted by the UNHRC in 
> March.  The Government exercised strict censorship of all news 
> and publications produced in the country.
> 
> Nevertheless, private magazines found it possible to publish 
> articles on once taboo economic subjects, and some former 
> political prisoners were allowed to publish on nonsensitive 
> topics.  The government-controlled press and broadcast services 
> continued to publish some limited criticism and satire in 
> 1993.  The Government adopted a tolerant approach toward the 
> increasing activities of the United States Information Service 
> in Rangoon, permitting it to distribute publications and 
> organize discussions which treated themes involving human 
> rights and fundamental freedoms.  The authorities' actions in 
> attempting to register private satellites dishes and impose 
> fines on the many Burmese who had set up unauthorized satellite 
> television receivers slowed the spread of access to uncensored 
> television news and other programming from abroad.  No seizures 
> of satellite receivers, however, were reported in 1993.
> 
> The Government made heavy use of its monopoly of television and 
> radio to pursue its political policies and, with the exception 
> of coverage of some aspects of the national convention, did not 
> accord air time to opposing views.  The same was true of all 
> newspapers--two national dailies in Burmese and one in English, 
> as well as daily papers published by the Rangoon city 
> government and the Central (Mandalay area) Military Command.  A 
> revamping and renaming of the country's main daily in April 
> resulted in increased publication of locally edited 
> international wire service news, but that paper, as well as 
> other newspapers, remained staunchly official organs, with 
> military officials appointing editors and vetting editorials.  
> Especially for domestic news, journalists had to hew to strict 
> publishing and broadcast guidelines.  All forms of 
> media--domestic and imported books and periodicals, stage 
> plays, motion pictures, and musical recordings--were officially 
> controlled and censored.  Persons working in these fields 
> admitted to exercising self-censorship lest they run afoul of 
> the authorities.
> 
> University teachers and professors remained subject to the same 
> restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and 
> publications as other government employees.  These included 
> warnings against criticism of the Government; instructions not 
> to discuss politics while at work; and strictures against 
> joining or supporting political parties, engaging in political 
> activity, and meeting foreign officials.  While all teachers 
> remained subject to dismissal for political disloyalty, some 
> left the profession voluntarily to escape the political 
> pressure.
> 
> The universities, closed for several years after the 1988 
> disturbances, were open for most of 1993.  However, they were 
> closed from December 1992 until mid-February in what many 
> believe was a move to avoid student demonstrations during the 
> startup of the politically sensitive national convention.  
> Meanwhile, on the main campus of Rangoon University, fences 
> built around the various faculties prior to the university's 
> reopening remained in place, reportedly to help control 
> potential student unrest.  In a move also widely believed 
> intended primarily to disperse and isolate students, a fifth 
> national university opened outside Rangoon in November.
> 
>      b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
> 
> The Government does not respect the right to freedom of 
> peaceful assembly.  A prohibition on outdoor assemblies of more 
> than five people was unevenly enforced, but political 
> demonstrations were strictly banned.
> 
> Political parties were required to request permission from the 
> authorities even to hold internal meetings of their own 
> membership.  The military's intimidation generally served to 
> discourage public expressions of antigovernment sentiments.  In 
> the few reported instances of unauthorized political activity, 
> security forces generally intervened swiftly to detain or 
> imprison participants in unauthorized meetings and to halt 
> distribution of antigovernment leaflets.  The authorities 
> reportedly were quick to deploy a large-scale force in Mandalay 
> in September when a spontaneous demonstration unexpectedly took 
> on political overtones.
> 
> The right of association existed only for those organizations, 
> including trade associations and professional bodies, permitted 
> by law and duly registered with the Government.  Moreover, the 
> Government severely restricted the activities of even these 
> organizations.  Ten political parties remained formally legal 
> at the end of 1993--down from 75 at the beginning of 1992--but 
> they were virtually paralyzed through arrests, intimidation, 
> and surveillance.  In February the authorities permitted a 
> large private funeral to be organized for the wife of one-time 
> oppositionist and former Prime Minister U Nu.  While the 
> Government denied visas to two sons living abroad, it permitted 
> a daughter active in the Burmese opposition in India to attend.
> 
> 
>      c.  Freedom of Religion
> 
> Freedom of religion is provided for in law.  Despite the 
> privileged position of Buddhists in government service, this 
> right is widely observed in practice although there have been 
> human rights abuses against some believers.  Buddhist pagodas, 
> Muslim mosques, and Christian churches operate openly with 
> minimal interference, at least in those areas of central Burma 
> accessible to independent observers.  Christians, Muslims, and 
> animists are particularly numerous among minority ethnic 
> groups.  While generally allowing these groups to practice 
> freely, security services monitor the activities of religious 
> communities.  The Government requires all religious 
> organizations to register and subjects religious publications 
> to the same control and censorship imposed on secular ones.  
> Restrictions on unauthorized religious groups remained in 
> force, and the military continued to monitor activities in and 
> around Buddhist monasteries and pagodas.  The SLORC has been 
> largely successful in halting political activism among the 
> Buddhist clergy.
> 
> Religious groups can and did establish links with 
> coreligionists in other countries, although such links were 
> reportedly monitored by the Government.  The Catholic Church, 
> for example, maintained ties to the Vatican.  While foreign 
> religious representatives were usually allowed only to obtain 
> visas for short stays, in some cases they were permitted to 
> preach to Burmese congregations.  Though permanent missionary 
> establishments have not been permitted since the 1960's, some 
> foreign Catholic nuns and at least one priest continued to 
> reside upcountry, most working in homes for the aged.
> 
> As part of its large-scale "urban development" program in 
> recent years, the Government has taken control of several 
> Christian and Muslim properties throughout Burma, including 
> cemeteries.  On the other hand, school authorities in Rangoon 
> eventually exempted Muslim students from bowing to their 
> teachers, when those students complained the action resembled a 
> practice used in Buddhist worship.
> 
>      d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign 
>          Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
> 
> Although Burmese citizens have the legal right to live anywhere 
> in the country, both urban and rural residents have been 
> subject to arbitrary relocation.  Except for limitations in 
> areas of insurgent activity, Burmese citizens could travel 
> freely within the country but had to inform local authorities 
> of their temporary place of residence.  People staying 
> overnight with friends or relatives within their home cities or 
> villages were also required to report this to the authorities.
> 
> People who failed to report either guests or intentions to stay 
> overnight to the authorities were theoretically subject to a 
> jail term, and arrests were occasionally made.  Noncitizen 
> residents, including ethnic Indians and Chinese born in Burma 
> who hold foreigners' registration cards, had to obtain prior 
> permission to travel.
> 
> Though travel strictures continued to ease, the Government 
> maintained controls on departure from the country.  While the 
> authorities simplified certain requirements for obtaining a 
> passport, other requirements plus bureaucratic procedures and 
> corruption still presented formidable hurdles.  Those traveling 
> abroad to work, however, encountered fewer difficulties, 
> particularly as Burmese authorities sought to increase hard 
> currency earnings from the taxes they impose on such persons' 
> earnings.  Emigrants, by contrast, were required to reimburse 
> the Government for "educational expenses" before receiving exit 
> permission and were severely limited in what they could take 
> with them.
> 
> Burmese citizens who left legally were generally allowed to 
> return to visit relatives, and those wishing to extend their 
> stays found it easier to obtain permission to do so.  Even some 
> who had stayed abroad illegally and acquired foreign 
> citizenship found it easier to return to visit or do business.  
> In a move widely believed to be intended to encourage wealthy 
> older overseas Burmese to retire in Burma, the Government 
> announced in May that Burmese abroad would have 2 years to 
> reapply for citizenship lost through naturalization in another 
> country.  At about the same time, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
> announced that Burmese abroad holding expired travel documents 
> could obtain new passports or an extension of their old ones.
> 
> Obtaining these benefits, however, remained subject to 
> government approval on a case-by-case basis.  Moreover, some 
> Burmese living abroad, particularly those who had traveled or 
> remained abroad illegally, continued to fear subjecting 
> themselves to potential punitive action by Burmese authorities 
> if they should return to Burma.  By September, 14 persons had 
> been allowed to resettle in Burma, and another 14 had had their 
> Burmese passports extended or replaced.
> 
> 
> In 1993 foreigners were allowed into the country in increasing 
> numbers on an individual, rather than only on a tour group, 
> basis.  The authorities also took several steps to liberalize 
> travel for foreigners within Burma, though large areas of the 
> country remained off limits on security grounds.  Tourist and 
> family visit visas are routinely granted for 2 to 4 weeks, and 
> can be extended on a case-by-case basis.  However, select 
> foreigners, such as human rights advocates and political 
> figures, continued to be denied entry visas unless traveling 
> under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the Government.  A 
> private voluntary organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres/
> Holland, is now operating in Burma and has foreign personnel 
> assigned to Rangoon on a permanent basis.
> 
> In April 1992, following the flight into Bangladesh of an 
> estimated 265,000 Muslims from Arakan State in order to escape 
> military repression, the Governments of Bangladesh and Burma 
> signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for the 
> voluntary repatriation of the refugees.  However, Burma, unlike 
> Bangladesh, did not accept a role for UNHCR in the repatriation 
> process at that time.  In the absence of an adequate 
> international monitoring presence in Burma, most Rohingyas were 
> reluctant to return to Arakan.  After a private visit by High 
> Commissioner Sadako Ogata to Burma in late July and subsequent 
> talks between the Burmese authorities and UNHCR representatives,
> the Government of Burma signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
> with the UNHCR in November which provides that the UNHCR will 
> have a presence in Arakan State and will have access to all 
> returnees.  The agreement is intended to cover the monitoring 
> and administration of the return to Burma in safety and dignity 
> of about 200,000 Rohingyas who remain in refugee camps in 
> Bangladesh.  Of those who fled between late 1991 and mid-1992, 
> some 50,000 were repatriated to Burma in 1993.
> 
> Foreign refugees or displaced persons may not resettle or seek 
> safe haven in Burma.  The Government treats people claiming to 
> be refugees as illegal immigrants and expels or imprisons them.
> 
> Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of Citizens 
>            to Change Their Government
> 
> Burma is governed solely by the military, and the Burmese 
> people do not have the right or the ability peacefully to 
> change their government.  Since 1988 active duty military 
> officers have occupied many important positions throughout the 
> bureaucracy, particularly at the policymaking level.  Despite 
> the appointment of several civilians to the Cabinet in 1992, 
> military or recently retired military officers have continued 
> to occupy most cabinet-level positions, numerous director 
> general and subordinate posts, and key positions once held by 
> technocrats in the economic ministries.
> 
> In the 1990 election the NLD and associated parties achieved an 
> overwhelming victory.  The SLORC subsequently set aside the 
> results and disqualified, detained, arrested, or drove into 
> exile many successful candidates, including most of the NLD 
> leadership.  By the end of 1993, 174 of the 485 deputies 
> elected had either been disqualified, resigned under pressure, 
> gone into exile, been detained, or died.  At least 46 
> successful candidates from the election or prominent NLD 
> activists were serving prison sentences.  In 1992 the SLORC 
> held discussions with selected representatives of the few 
> political parties which had not been banned outright, with a 
> view to staging a national convention to write a new 
> constitution without the participation of most leading members 
> of the democratic opposition.  The national convention finally 
> opened on January 9 and continued intermittently throughout the 
> year until September 16, when it finally adjourned until the 
> following January.  Of the approximately 700 delegates 
> attending, only about 150 held mandates from the 1990 
> elections.  Members of six of the eight interest groups 
> represented were selected by the SLORC.  Using these groups as 
> a majority, the Government forced through its own rules, its 
> own agenda, and finally its own principles for a new 
> constitution, guaranteeing continued military control of the 
> Government.  During an intermediate stage, representatives of 
> the NLD and minority groups were able to put forward some 
> proposals clearly at odds with government preferences.  But the 
> authorities carefully controlled the level of visible 
> opposition by censoring presentations, declaring unwelcome 
> documents off-limits to the public, forbidding discussion from 
> the floor, and intimidating individual delegates behind the 
> scenes.  There has been no genuine public discussion of the 
> process that will be used to arrive at a new constitution.
> 
> One NLD victor in the 1990 election and national convention 
> delegate, Dr. Aung Khin Sint, was convicted and sentenced to 20 
> years' imprisonment for distributing opposition literature to 
> his fellow delegates.  
> 
> In some regions where government forces exercise limited or no 
> control, including in cases where the Government has reached an 
> accommodation with former insurgent groups, indigenous 
> populations have considerable autonomy in running their own 
> political and economic affairs.  Even in government-controlled 
> areas, they generally retain their social and cultural 
> institutions.
> 
> Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
>            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations 
>            of Human Rights
> 
> No internal human rights organizations are allowed to exist.  
> The Government continued to oppose outside scrutiny of its 
> human rights record but permitted somewhat greater access in 
> 1993 for some journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and 
> foreign government officials wishing to examine the country's 
> human rights situation.  Burmese authorities allowed UNHRC 
> Special Rapporteur Professor Yokota to conduct another 
> fact-finding mission in the country in November 1993.
> 
> In 1991, 1992, and again in 1993, the U.N. General Assembly 
> (UNGA) adopted increasingly strong resolutions urging the 
> Burmese Government to end human rights abuses and undertake 
> genuine democratic reform.  The 1993 UNGA resolution called on 
> the Government to release unconditionally Aung San Suu Kyi and 
> other detained political leaders and to respect the expressed 
> will of the Burmese people by implementing the results of the 
> 1990 elections.
> 
> The UNHRC Special Rapporteur appointed in March 1992, Professor 
> Yozo Yokota, visited Burma in December 1992 and presented his 
> report in February 1993.  He returned to Burma in November 1993 
> to fulfill his mandate as Special Rapporteur.  The report 
> offered a harsh catalog of human rights abuses in Burma and 
> called for far-reaching remedial action.  In later reviewing 
> the report, the UNHRC took special aim at the refusal of 
> Burmese authorities to accord Dr. Yokota the "full and 
> unreserved cooperation" and access to persons of his choice 
> that had been conditions of his mission.  The Government, for 
> its part, disputed the Special Rapporteur's mandate and 
> rejected many of his findings.
> 
> Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, 
>            Disability, Language, or Social Status
> 
>      Women
> 
> Women in Burma in general have traditionally enjoyed a high 
> status, exercising most of the same basic rights as men and 
> taking an active role in business.  Consistent with traditional 
> culture, they keep their own names after marriage and often 
> control family finances.  However, participation of women 
> remained low in the minuscule industrial sector and in the 
> bureaucracy; a few professions, such as forestry and geology, 
> are entirely barred to women.  Women do not consistently 
> receive equal pay for equal work.  There continued to be no 
> women's rights organizations in Burma or government agency 
> specifically devoted to safeguarding women's interests.
> 
> There was no nationwide pattern of violence directed 
> specifically against women.  However, reliable reports 
> continued to indicate that many Burmese women and children in 
> the border areas were forced or lured into serving as 
> prostitutes in Thailand by criminals and criminal 
> organizations.  Recruitment of these women generally occurred 
> in remote areas where Burmese officials were unable to prevent 
> the practice.  In 1993, impressment, including of women, for 
> military porterage duties continued, with attendant casualties.
> 
> Although Burmese culturally view rape with great abhorrence, in 
> 1993 there continued to be a consistent pattern of reports 
> alleging rapes of ethnic minority women in border areas by 
> Burmese soldiers.
> 
>      Children
> 
> In mid-July the Government issued a law stipulating children's 
> rights and containing provisions covering their protection and 
> custody, education, employment, and judicial treatment.  
> Burmese authorities also adopted in September a "National 
> Program of Action" for the survival, protection, and 
> development of the country's children.  By year's end it 
> remained unclear whether the Government intended to give the 
> program the political impetus needed to ensure the 
> interministerial cooperation and resource allocation required 
> to make it a success.
> 
> Government and UNICEF figures indicated the plight of children 
> to be worse than was earlier realized.  Infant mortality is 
> high (94 per 1000); 37 percent of children under 3 are severely 
> or moderately malnourished; 31 percent of children aged 5 
> through 14 suffer from iodine deficiency; only 62 percent of 
> children enroll in primary school; and only 25 percent of 
> children complete the prescribed 5-year course.
> 
> 
>      National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
> 
> Burma's numerous ethnic minorities, which have their own 
> distinct cultures and languages, have been underrepresented in 
> the Government and largely excluded from the military 
> leadership.  Despite recently increased government investment 
> in the border areas in road, hospital, and school construction, 
> economic development among minorities continued to lag and many 
> still live at the subsistence level.
> 
> Since only people who can prove long familial links to Burma 
> are accorded full citizenship, some people not of ethnic 
> Burmese ancestry, primarily Indians and Chinese, continued to 
> be denied full citizenship and to be excluded from government 
> positions.  Individuals without full citizenship are also 
> barred from certain advanced university programs in medicine 
> and technological fields and are often the object of 
> prejudice.  However, Indian and Chinese minorities continued to 
> play an important role in the economy--a situation resented by 
> many Burmans.
> 
> In Arakan State, some Rohingyas, who in general do not enjoy 
> full citizenship, have also have been denied national identity 
> cards.  Though a limited number of outside observers were able 
> to visit Arakan State, albeit on a government-controlled basis, 
> credible reports continued to emerge of discrimination and 
> travel restrictions for Muslims in the area.  The 
> well-documented human rights abuses which precipitated the 
> original Rohingya exodus, however, appeared to have largely 
> subsided.  At the same time, claims that Buddhists from 
> elsewhere in Arakan State were being resettled nearer the 
> border in previously Muslim areas were reliably confirmed.
> 
> Multiple, reliable sources indicated that the military 
> occasionally required minority populations in the border 
> regions to provide without compensation vehicles, equipment, 
> and lodging for soldiers.
> 
>      Religious Minorities
> 
> The SLORC continued to associate itself closely with the 
> majority Buddhist religion, giving wide publicity to the 
> participation by its members in various Buddhist rites and 
> ceremonies.  While this reportedly was a cause of concern among 
> some members of other religions, the Government in fact 
> continued to permit members of the major non-Buddhist faiths to 
> practice their religion.  Religious organizations, however, 
> remained subject to registration and censorship controls 
> applicable to the entire population.  Restrictions on Muslims 
> in Arakan State appear to be result primarily from their lack 
> of full citizenship and to discrimination on ethnic grounds.
> 
>      People with Disabilities
> 
> Official assistance to persons with disabilities is extremely 
> limited.  There is no law mandating accessibility to government 
> facilities for those with disabilities.  A small number benefit 
> from the services of the Mary Chapman School for the Deaf in 
> Rangoon, which recently began receiving government patronage, 
> or from modest religious-associated assistance programs funded 
> through private donations.  Most disabled persons, however, 
> must rely on traditional family structures to provide for their 
> welfare, and many become destitute.  The principal exception is 
> disabled members of the military, who receive medical 
> attention, rehabilitation, and financial assistance, though 
> most veterans receive such benefits only for a few years after 
> discharge.  Reliable reports indicate that high-ranking 
> officers receive better treatment than the rank and file.  
> Since 1986 Burmese authorities have permitted representatives 
> of the ICRC to work in Burma to upgrade provision of orthopedic 
> prostheses.  Because of both landmines and train-related 
> accidents, Burma has one of the highest rates of amputees in 
> the world.
> 
> Section 6  Worker Rights
> 
>      a.  The Right of Association
> 
> In 1993 there continued to be no right of association among 
> workers in Burma.  Workers were not free to form or join trade 
> unions of their own choosing, and leaders of unofficial labor 
> associations, such as youth organizer Nay Lin of the Federation 
> of Trade Unions of Burma, were subject to arrest.  A new labor 
> law was promised in connection with the drafting of a new 
> constitution, but it is doubtful the document will ensure the 
> right of workers to organize freely.  At a minimum, any trade 
> unions which might form are expected to be firmly under 
> government control.  Workers are not permitted to strike, and 
> there were no reported instances in 1993 of attempts to do so.
> 
> In July 1989, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility 
> for trade concessions under the Generalized System of 
> Preferences program, pending steps to afford its labor force 
> internationally recognized worker rights.  In 1990 the U.S. 
> Government declined a formal request to reconsider the 
> suspension.
> 
> In June 1993, the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
> Conference cited Burma in a "special paragraph", its strongest 
> form of censure, for its longstanding failure to take "the 
> necessary measures in legislation and practice to guarantee to 
> all workers and all employers without any distinction and 
> without prior authorization the right to organize even outside 
> the existing trade union structure should they so wish."
> 
>      b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
> 
> Workers continued not to have the right to organize and bargain 
> collectively.  Government arbitration boards, which once 
> theoretically provided a means for airing labor disputes, were 
> abolished in 1988.  The Government unilaterally sets wages in 
> the public sector.  In the private sector, wages are set by 
> market forces.  In a job-scarce economy, this means employers 
> determine wage levels.  The Government pressures joint ventures 
> not to pay salaries greater than those of ministers or other 
> high-level employees.  Joint ventures circumvent this via 
> supplemental pay, including remuneration paid in foreign 
> exchange certificates, as well as through incentive and 
> overtime pay and other fringe benefits.  Foreign firms 
> generally set wages near those of the domestic private sector 
> but follow the practice of joint ventures in awarding 
> supplemental wages and benefits.  
> 
> No special export processing zones exist.
> 
>      c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
> 
> Burma's legal code does not prohibit forced labor.  The 
> military routinely employed corvee labor on its myriad building 
> projects and, according to credible reports, officials accepted 
> bribes to excuse some people from work.  Forced labor was used 
> in constructing the railroad line opened in 1993 to Loikaw, 
> capital of Burma's Kayah State.
> 
> The Burmese Army has for decades impressed civilian males to 
> serve as porters.  According to reliable reports, in 1993 the 
> army continued to abduct youths off the streets, chiefly in 
> minority areas but also in some urban areas of central Burma.  
> Women were also occasionally impressed as porters, cooks, and 
> laundresses for soldiers in frontline areas, according to 
> credible reports.  Military authorities commonly permitted 
> conscripts and their families to pay them money in lieu of 
> porter duty.
> 
> In June a Burmese diplomat in Singapore organized the 
> confinement and forced return to Burma of a group of 11 Burmese 
> seamen transiting Singapore en route from Australia to Thailand 
> after the men prevailed in a wage dispute with the help of the 
> International Transport Federation.  All remained free in 1993 
> but are unable to regain employment abroad.
> 
>      d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children
> 
> Children aged 13 to 15 may work 4 hours a day.  The "Child Law" 
> of July 14, 1993, governs most matters concerning children 
> under the age of 16.  It gives each such child the right to 
> "engage in work in accordance with law and its own volition."  
> To date, the "law" referred to includes both the Factories Act 
> of 1951 and the Children Pledging of Labor Act, this latter 
> being an Indian law from 1933 still on the books.  In theory, 
> the penalty for employers disregarding this regulation was 2 
> years in prison, but there were no reports of any prosecutions 
> in 1993 for illegally employing children, despite the fact 
> that, in cities, working children were highly visible.  They 
> were hired at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of 
> work, and economic pressure forced them to work not only for 
> their survival but also to support their families.  Burmese law 
> requires children to attend school through the fourth standard, 
> usually reached between the ages of 12 and 15.  The Department 
> of Basic Education estimated, however, that 38 percent of 
> children aged 5 to 9 never enroll in school.  Of those who do, 
> less than 30 percent complete the fourth grade.  Two-thirds of 
> Burma's primary schoolchildren, principally in rural areas, 
> leave school for economic reasons.  In the higher grades, the 
> drop-out rate for girls is double that for boys.
> 
>      e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work
> 
> Depressed economic conditions and lack of attention by 
> government authorities continued to dictate substandard 
> conditions for workers.  The Law on Fundamental Workers Rights 
> of 1964 and the Factories Act of 1951 regulate working 
> conditions.  There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-hour 
> workweek for employees in the public sector and a 6-day, 
> 44-hour workweek for private and parastatal sector employees, 
> with overtime paid for additional work.  Workers have 21 paid 
> holidays a year.  
> 
> 
> Only government employees are protected by minimum wage 
> provisions.  The minimum wage was raised in March to $3 per day 
> (20 kyats) at the official exchange rate, but less than $0.20 
> at the unofficial, free market rate.  The Government raised 
> wages for public employees by 25 percent in March, but pay in 
> the state sector remained far below the amount needed to 
> provide a decent standard of living or counter the practice of 
> taking bribes.  The actual average wage rate for casual 
> laborers in Rangoon was about twice the official minimum.  
> Wages continued to lag far behind inflation.  
> 
> To protect health and safety at workplaces, there are numerous 
> regulations pertaining to room size, ventilation, fire hazards, 
> and the availability of latrines and drinking water.  In 
> practice, these were seldom enforced, particularly in the 
> private sector. (###)
> 
>