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US States Dept. Human Rights Report
- Subject: US States Dept. Human Rights Report
- From: tun@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 09 Feb 1994 19:41:00
Subject: US States Dept. Human Rights Report, Burma (2/2)
> id SAA14924; Wed, 9 Feb 1994 18:17:37 -0800
> Received: by quark.sfsu.edu (4.1/SMI-4.0.1)
> id AA26983; Wed, 9 Feb 94 18:09:25 PST
> Date: Wed, 9 Feb 94 18:09:25 PST
> From: tun@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Coban Tun)
> Message-Id: <9402100209.AA26983@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: soc.culture.burma.usenet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: US State Dept. Human Rights Report, Burma (2/2)
> Cc: absdf@xxxxxxxxxxx, beker@xxxxxxxxxx, burma@xxxxxxxxxx,
> michael_gold@xxxxxxxxxx
>
> .
> .
> .
> in processing cases and appeals, and poor training and
> unprofessional behavior on the part of some court officers.
>
> Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public
> trial and to be represented by a defense attorney, are
> generally respected by civilian judges. Judges are appointed
> by the Supreme Court with the approval of the SLORC (which also
> names justices to the Supreme Court). At present, judges must
> be at least law officers with legal training. Defense
> attorneys are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses,
> but their primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to
> obtain the shorest possible sentence for their clients. Cases,
> almost all political, which are tried in courtooms in prison
> compounds are not open to the public. In such cases, while
> defendants may have access to a defense attorney, counsel
> appears to serve no purpose other than to provide moral
> support. Reliable reports indicate that in political cases due
> process is largely ignored and verdicts manipulated.
>
>
> f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
> Correspondence
>
> The State continued to intrude extensively into the lives of
> private citizens during 1993. Forced entry and warrantless,
> unannounced searches of private homes were often conducted.
> Through its extensive intelligence network, the Government
> closely monitored the travel, whereabouts, and activities of
> many Burmese, particularly those known to be politically
> active. Security personnel selectively monitored private
> correspondence and telephone calls. Contacts or communications
> involving foreigners were subject to especially intense
> scrutiny, and government employees were required to obtain
> advance permission before meeting with foreigners. Despite
> some efforts by the Government to improve its image by meeting
> in October with the head of the British Broadcasting
> Corporation Far Eastern Service, official propaganda continued
> in 1993 to take aim at various foreign news services, and
> private citizens were generally unable to subscribe directly to
> foreign publications. Two international newsmagazines were
> distributed through official channels and were available to the
> public at large, but censors occasionally banned issues or
> deleted articles criticizing local conditions or reporting
> opposition activities. Foreign radio broadcasts remained a
> prime source of information for the people and even for the
> military, despite the Government's hostility to this news
> source. The authorities sought to register the growing number
> of television satellite receivers but appeared ready to
> tolerate their use. Some foreign journalists, including
> television crews, continued to be granted access to the
> country, but their movements and contacts were closely
> monitored.
>
> In its most intensive and egregious infringement of privacy
> rights, the Government continued its program of forced
> resettlement, involving an estimated half-million urban
> residents throughout Burma since 1989. While most of those
> forced to move were described as "squatters," some people had
> been living in and paying rent on their former home sites for
> many years and had constructed permanent houses. The
> Government has made people move, almost totally at their own
> expense, to "new towns" which are far from their previous
> residences. "New town" occupants often live on former rice
> paddy land, subject to flooding in the rainy season, without
> adequate transportation, medical facilities, shelter, or
> sanitation. In 1993 conditions at some resettlement sites
> improved, but, according to international observers, such
> improvements were often unable to keep pace with the rate of
> new arrivals. Some outside experts accept the Government's
> explanation that the resettlement program serves legitimate
> long-term urban planning objectives, but they do not endorse
> the forceful methods used to move people.
>
> g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
> Law in Internal Conflicts
>
> The Burmese Army has battled diverse insurgencies for more than
> four decades in conflicts that have resulted in widespread
> human rights violations, including mistreatment and killing of
> prisoners, rape, neglect of the sick and wounded, impressment
> of civilians for porter duty, and indiscriminate attacks on
> civilians. While the Government was responsible for the bulk
> of these abuses (the Burmese armed forces nearly doubled the
> number of combat units since 1988), insurgent groups have also
> violated humanitarian principles. Insurgent groups, such as
> the Karen, Mon, and Karenni, continued to engage in small-scale
> fighting, mostly in remote areas, to try to gain greater
> autonomy from the dominant ethnic Burman majority. Some
> receive limited outside support from private international
> humanitarian and religious organizations. The Shan United Army
> (SUA) also claims to be fighting for greater autonomy but
> engages primarily in drug trafficking. Several former
> insurgent groups with which the Government now has cease-fire
> accommodations likewise are important narcotics trafficking
> organizations. The continued suspension of large-scale
> military offensives against insurgents in Karen state and
> elsewhere, together with ongoing government efforts to reach a
> peace accord with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), sharply
> reduced the level of fighting during 1993.
>
> In 1993 the use of forced porterage continued, with attendant
> casualties. Most of these deaths, roughly estimated to be in
> the hundreds, were from disease and overwork, though reports of
> mistreatment and rape were also common. The Burmese military
> also continued to use corvee labor and prison labor in combat
> areas. There were unconfirmed reports, for example, that on at
> least two occasions a combined total of as many as 700 inmates
> from a prison near Rangoon were taken to work as porters in
> eastern Burma. Credible reports from multiple sources
> indicated that porters have carried ammunition, supplies, and
> the wounded under the harshest conditions. Other well-placed
> sources also note that they are subject to hostile fire as well
> as maltreatment at the hands of Burmese soldiers. When porters
> are wounded, ill, or unable to continue their work, some have
> been reportedly left unattended to die. At the end of their
> service, survivors often have had to find their own means to
> return home. It was also credibly reported that some members
> of the military used sham threats of impressment to extort
> money from villagers.
>
> Forced rural resettlement displaced ethnic minority villagers
> in Karen and Kayah states and contributed to an increase of
> about 6,000 Burmese in camps on the Thai side of the border.
> Local sources reported some amelioration of conditions
> following the completion of the railroad to Loikaw for Catholic
> villagers in Kayah State who had been resettled in March 1992,
> and that many returned to their original homes. Reports from
> Karen State suggest rural relocation schemes continued to play
> a key role in the Government's counterinsurgency strategy.
>
> Despite this evidence that the Burmese authorities were not
> prepared fully to implement their obligations under the Geneva
> Conventions, in April and November the Government for the first
> time permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross
> (ICRC) to conduct two short seminars on humanitarian law for
> groups of military officers.
>
> Antigovernment groups were responsible for violence causing
> civilian and military deaths, including reported killings of
> civilians during attacks on villages and ambushes or mining of
> transportation routes. In two separate incidents in February
> and March, over 100 confirmed civilian deaths resulted from
> military conflicts involving the narcotics-trafficking Shan
> United Army. Credible reports indicate Karenni insurgents
> executed at least eight captured Burmese soldiers, and civilian
> deaths in a transport train blown up by a land mine were
> attributed to Mon activists. Additionally, reliable multiple
> sources indicated that Karen insurgents resorted to forced
> labor for porterage and impressed youths into military service.
>
> Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
>
> a. Freedom of Speech and Press
>
> Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press
> persisted throughout 1993. Although the degree of enforcement
> varied, the Government generally continued to demonstrate
> little tolerance for opposing views or criticism. Private
> citizens remained reluctant to express opinions for fear of
> government informers. The U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC)
> Special Rapporteur deplored the "pervasive atmosphere of fear
> and repression" in Burma in his report adopted by the UNHRC in
> March. The Government exercised strict censorship of all news
> and publications produced in the country.
>
> Nevertheless, private magazines found it possible to publish
> articles on once taboo economic subjects, and some former
> political prisoners were allowed to publish on nonsensitive
> topics. The government-controlled press and broadcast services
> continued to publish some limited criticism and satire in
> 1993. The Government adopted a tolerant approach toward the
> increasing activities of the United States Information Service
> in Rangoon, permitting it to distribute publications and
> organize discussions which treated themes involving human
> rights and fundamental freedoms. The authorities' actions in
> attempting to register private satellites dishes and impose
> fines on the many Burmese who had set up unauthorized satellite
> television receivers slowed the spread of access to uncensored
> television news and other programming from abroad. No seizures
> of satellite receivers, however, were reported in 1993.
>
> The Government made heavy use of its monopoly of television and
> radio to pursue its political policies and, with the exception
> of coverage of some aspects of the national convention, did not
> accord air time to opposing views. The same was true of all
> newspapers--two national dailies in Burmese and one in English,
> as well as daily papers published by the Rangoon city
> government and the Central (Mandalay area) Military Command. A
> revamping and renaming of the country's main daily in April
> resulted in increased publication of locally edited
> international wire service news, but that paper, as well as
> other newspapers, remained staunchly official organs, with
> military officials appointing editors and vetting editorials.
> Especially for domestic news, journalists had to hew to strict
> publishing and broadcast guidelines. All forms of
> media--domestic and imported books and periodicals, stage
> plays, motion pictures, and musical recordings--were officially
> controlled and censored. Persons working in these fields
> admitted to exercising self-censorship lest they run afoul of
> the authorities.
>
> University teachers and professors remained subject to the same
> restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and
> publications as other government employees. These included
> warnings against criticism of the Government; instructions not
> to discuss politics while at work; and strictures against
> joining or supporting political parties, engaging in political
> activity, and meeting foreign officials. While all teachers
> remained subject to dismissal for political disloyalty, some
> left the profession voluntarily to escape the political
> pressure.
>
> The universities, closed for several years after the 1988
> disturbances, were open for most of 1993. However, they were
> closed from December 1992 until mid-February in what many
> believe was a move to avoid student demonstrations during the
> startup of the politically sensitive national convention.
> Meanwhile, on the main campus of Rangoon University, fences
> built around the various faculties prior to the university's
> reopening remained in place, reportedly to help control
> potential student unrest. In a move also widely believed
> intended primarily to disperse and isolate students, a fifth
> national university opened outside Rangoon in November.
>
> b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
>
> The Government does not respect the right to freedom of
> peaceful assembly. A prohibition on outdoor assemblies of more
> than five people was unevenly enforced, but political
> demonstrations were strictly banned.
>
> Political parties were required to request permission from the
> authorities even to hold internal meetings of their own
> membership. The military's intimidation generally served to
> discourage public expressions of antigovernment sentiments. In
> the few reported instances of unauthorized political activity,
> security forces generally intervened swiftly to detain or
> imprison participants in unauthorized meetings and to halt
> distribution of antigovernment leaflets. The authorities
> reportedly were quick to deploy a large-scale force in Mandalay
> in September when a spontaneous demonstration unexpectedly took
> on political overtones.
>
> The right of association existed only for those organizations,
> including trade associations and professional bodies, permitted
> by law and duly registered with the Government. Moreover, the
> Government severely restricted the activities of even these
> organizations. Ten political parties remained formally legal
> at the end of 1993--down from 75 at the beginning of 1992--but
> they were virtually paralyzed through arrests, intimidation,
> and surveillance. In February the authorities permitted a
> large private funeral to be organized for the wife of one-time
> oppositionist and former Prime Minister U Nu. While the
> Government denied visas to two sons living abroad, it permitted
> a daughter active in the Burmese opposition in India to attend.
>
>
> c. Freedom of Religion
>
> Freedom of religion is provided for in law. Despite the
> privileged position of Buddhists in government service, this
> right is widely observed in practice although there have been
> human rights abuses against some believers. Buddhist pagodas,
> Muslim mosques, and Christian churches operate openly with
> minimal interference, at least in those areas of central Burma
> accessible to independent observers. Christians, Muslims, and
> animists are particularly numerous among minority ethnic
> groups. While generally allowing these groups to practice
> freely, security services monitor the activities of religious
> communities. The Government requires all religious
> organizations to register and subjects religious publications
> to the same control and censorship imposed on secular ones.
> Restrictions on unauthorized religious groups remained in
> force, and the military continued to monitor activities in and
> around Buddhist monasteries and pagodas. The SLORC has been
> largely successful in halting political activism among the
> Buddhist clergy.
>
> Religious groups can and did establish links with
> coreligionists in other countries, although such links were
> reportedly monitored by the Government. The Catholic Church,
> for example, maintained ties to the Vatican. While foreign
> religious representatives were usually allowed only to obtain
> visas for short stays, in some cases they were permitted to
> preach to Burmese congregations. Though permanent missionary
> establishments have not been permitted since the 1960's, some
> foreign Catholic nuns and at least one priest continued to
> reside upcountry, most working in homes for the aged.
>
> As part of its large-scale "urban development" program in
> recent years, the Government has taken control of several
> Christian and Muslim properties throughout Burma, including
> cemeteries. On the other hand, school authorities in Rangoon
> eventually exempted Muslim students from bowing to their
> teachers, when those students complained the action resembled a
> practice used in Buddhist worship.
>
> d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
> Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
>
> Although Burmese citizens have the legal right to live anywhere
> in the country, both urban and rural residents have been
> subject to arbitrary relocation. Except for limitations in
> areas of insurgent activity, Burmese citizens could travel
> freely within the country but had to inform local authorities
> of their temporary place of residence. People staying
> overnight with friends or relatives within their home cities or
> villages were also required to report this to the authorities.
>
> People who failed to report either guests or intentions to stay
> overnight to the authorities were theoretically subject to a
> jail term, and arrests were occasionally made. Noncitizen
> residents, including ethnic Indians and Chinese born in Burma
> who hold foreigners' registration cards, had to obtain prior
> permission to travel.
>
> Though travel strictures continued to ease, the Government
> maintained controls on departure from the country. While the
> authorities simplified certain requirements for obtaining a
> passport, other requirements plus bureaucratic procedures and
> corruption still presented formidable hurdles. Those traveling
> abroad to work, however, encountered fewer difficulties,
> particularly as Burmese authorities sought to increase hard
> currency earnings from the taxes they impose on such persons'
> earnings. Emigrants, by contrast, were required to reimburse
> the Government for "educational expenses" before receiving exit
> permission and were severely limited in what they could take
> with them.
>
> Burmese citizens who left legally were generally allowed to
> return to visit relatives, and those wishing to extend their
> stays found it easier to obtain permission to do so. Even some
> who had stayed abroad illegally and acquired foreign
> citizenship found it easier to return to visit or do business.
> In a move widely believed to be intended to encourage wealthy
> older overseas Burmese to retire in Burma, the Government
> announced in May that Burmese abroad would have 2 years to
> reapply for citizenship lost through naturalization in another
> country. At about the same time, the Ministry of Home Affairs
> announced that Burmese abroad holding expired travel documents
> could obtain new passports or an extension of their old ones.
>
> Obtaining these benefits, however, remained subject to
> government approval on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, some
> Burmese living abroad, particularly those who had traveled or
> remained abroad illegally, continued to fear subjecting
> themselves to potential punitive action by Burmese authorities
> if they should return to Burma. By September, 14 persons had
> been allowed to resettle in Burma, and another 14 had had their
> Burmese passports extended or replaced.
>
>
> In 1993 foreigners were allowed into the country in increasing
> numbers on an individual, rather than only on a tour group,
> basis. The authorities also took several steps to liberalize
> travel for foreigners within Burma, though large areas of the
> country remained off limits on security grounds. Tourist and
> family visit visas are routinely granted for 2 to 4 weeks, and
> can be extended on a case-by-case basis. However, select
> foreigners, such as human rights advocates and political
> figures, continued to be denied entry visas unless traveling
> under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the Government. A
> private voluntary organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres/
> Holland, is now operating in Burma and has foreign personnel
> assigned to Rangoon on a permanent basis.
>
> In April 1992, following the flight into Bangladesh of an
> estimated 265,000 Muslims from Arakan State in order to escape
> military repression, the Governments of Bangladesh and Burma
> signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for the
> voluntary repatriation of the refugees. However, Burma, unlike
> Bangladesh, did not accept a role for UNHCR in the repatriation
> process at that time. In the absence of an adequate
> international monitoring presence in Burma, most Rohingyas were
> reluctant to return to Arakan. After a private visit by High
> Commissioner Sadako Ogata to Burma in late July and subsequent
> talks between the Burmese authorities and UNHCR representatives,
> the Government of Burma signed a Memorandum of Understanding
> with the UNHCR in November which provides that the UNHCR will
> have a presence in Arakan State and will have access to all
> returnees. The agreement is intended to cover the monitoring
> and administration of the return to Burma in safety and dignity
> of about 200,000 Rohingyas who remain in refugee camps in
> Bangladesh. Of those who fled between late 1991 and mid-1992,
> some 50,000 were repatriated to Burma in 1993.
>
> Foreign refugees or displaced persons may not resettle or seek
> safe haven in Burma. The Government treats people claiming to
> be refugees as illegal immigrants and expels or imprisons them.
>
> Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
> to Change Their Government
>
> Burma is governed solely by the military, and the Burmese
> people do not have the right or the ability peacefully to
> change their government. Since 1988 active duty military
> officers have occupied many important positions throughout the
> bureaucracy, particularly at the policymaking level. Despite
> the appointment of several civilians to the Cabinet in 1992,
> military or recently retired military officers have continued
> to occupy most cabinet-level positions, numerous director
> general and subordinate posts, and key positions once held by
> technocrats in the economic ministries.
>
> In the 1990 election the NLD and associated parties achieved an
> overwhelming victory. The SLORC subsequently set aside the
> results and disqualified, detained, arrested, or drove into
> exile many successful candidates, including most of the NLD
> leadership. By the end of 1993, 174 of the 485 deputies
> elected had either been disqualified, resigned under pressure,
> gone into exile, been detained, or died. At least 46
> successful candidates from the election or prominent NLD
> activists were serving prison sentences. In 1992 the SLORC
> held discussions with selected representatives of the few
> political parties which had not been banned outright, with a
> view to staging a national convention to write a new
> constitution without the participation of most leading members
> of the democratic opposition. The national convention finally
> opened on January 9 and continued intermittently throughout the
> year until September 16, when it finally adjourned until the
> following January. Of the approximately 700 delegates
> attending, only about 150 held mandates from the 1990
> elections. Members of six of the eight interest groups
> represented were selected by the SLORC. Using these groups as
> a majority, the Government forced through its own rules, its
> own agenda, and finally its own principles for a new
> constitution, guaranteeing continued military control of the
> Government. During an intermediate stage, representatives of
> the NLD and minority groups were able to put forward some
> proposals clearly at odds with government preferences. But the
> authorities carefully controlled the level of visible
> opposition by censoring presentations, declaring unwelcome
> documents off-limits to the public, forbidding discussion from
> the floor, and intimidating individual delegates behind the
> scenes. There has been no genuine public discussion of the
> process that will be used to arrive at a new constitution.
>
> One NLD victor in the 1990 election and national convention
> delegate, Dr. Aung Khin Sint, was convicted and sentenced to 20
> years' imprisonment for distributing opposition literature to
> his fellow delegates.
>
> In some regions where government forces exercise limited or no
> control, including in cases where the Government has reached an
> accommodation with former insurgent groups, indigenous
> populations have considerable autonomy in running their own
> political and economic affairs. Even in government-controlled
> areas, they generally retain their social and cultural
> institutions.
>
> Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
> Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
> of Human Rights
>
> No internal human rights organizations are allowed to exist.
> The Government continued to oppose outside scrutiny of its
> human rights record but permitted somewhat greater access in
> 1993 for some journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and
> foreign government officials wishing to examine the country's
> human rights situation. Burmese authorities allowed UNHRC
> Special Rapporteur Professor Yokota to conduct another
> fact-finding mission in the country in November 1993.
>
> In 1991, 1992, and again in 1993, the U.N. General Assembly
> (UNGA) adopted increasingly strong resolutions urging the
> Burmese Government to end human rights abuses and undertake
> genuine democratic reform. The 1993 UNGA resolution called on
> the Government to release unconditionally Aung San Suu Kyi and
> other detained political leaders and to respect the expressed
> will of the Burmese people by implementing the results of the
> 1990 elections.
>
> The UNHRC Special Rapporteur appointed in March 1992, Professor
> Yozo Yokota, visited Burma in December 1992 and presented his
> report in February 1993. He returned to Burma in November 1993
> to fulfill his mandate as Special Rapporteur. The report
> offered a harsh catalog of human rights abuses in Burma and
> called for far-reaching remedial action. In later reviewing
> the report, the UNHRC took special aim at the refusal of
> Burmese authorities to accord Dr. Yokota the "full and
> unreserved cooperation" and access to persons of his choice
> that had been conditions of his mission. The Government, for
> its part, disputed the Special Rapporteur's mandate and
> rejected many of his findings.
>
> Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
> Disability, Language, or Social Status
>
> Women
>
> Women in Burma in general have traditionally enjoyed a high
> status, exercising most of the same basic rights as men and
> taking an active role in business. Consistent with traditional
> culture, they keep their own names after marriage and often
> control family finances. However, participation of women
> remained low in the minuscule industrial sector and in the
> bureaucracy; a few professions, such as forestry and geology,
> are entirely barred to women. Women do not consistently
> receive equal pay for equal work. There continued to be no
> women's rights organizations in Burma or government agency
> specifically devoted to safeguarding women's interests.
>
> There was no nationwide pattern of violence directed
> specifically against women. However, reliable reports
> continued to indicate that many Burmese women and children in
> the border areas were forced or lured into serving as
> prostitutes in Thailand by criminals and criminal
> organizations. Recruitment of these women generally occurred
> in remote areas where Burmese officials were unable to prevent
> the practice. In 1993, impressment, including of women, for
> military porterage duties continued, with attendant casualties.
>
> Although Burmese culturally view rape with great abhorrence, in
> 1993 there continued to be a consistent pattern of reports
> alleging rapes of ethnic minority women in border areas by
> Burmese soldiers.
>
> Children
>
> In mid-July the Government issued a law stipulating children's
> rights and containing provisions covering their protection and
> custody, education, employment, and judicial treatment.
> Burmese authorities also adopted in September a "National
> Program of Action" for the survival, protection, and
> development of the country's children. By year's end it
> remained unclear whether the Government intended to give the
> program the political impetus needed to ensure the
> interministerial cooperation and resource allocation required
> to make it a success.
>
> Government and UNICEF figures indicated the plight of children
> to be worse than was earlier realized. Infant mortality is
> high (94 per 1000); 37 percent of children under 3 are severely
> or moderately malnourished; 31 percent of children aged 5
> through 14 suffer from iodine deficiency; only 62 percent of
> children enroll in primary school; and only 25 percent of
> children complete the prescribed 5-year course.
>
>
> National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
>
> Burma's numerous ethnic minorities, which have their own
> distinct cultures and languages, have been underrepresented in
> the Government and largely excluded from the military
> leadership. Despite recently increased government investment
> in the border areas in road, hospital, and school construction,
> economic development among minorities continued to lag and many
> still live at the subsistence level.
>
> Since only people who can prove long familial links to Burma
> are accorded full citizenship, some people not of ethnic
> Burmese ancestry, primarily Indians and Chinese, continued to
> be denied full citizenship and to be excluded from government
> positions. Individuals without full citizenship are also
> barred from certain advanced university programs in medicine
> and technological fields and are often the object of
> prejudice. However, Indian and Chinese minorities continued to
> play an important role in the economy--a situation resented by
> many Burmans.
>
> In Arakan State, some Rohingyas, who in general do not enjoy
> full citizenship, have also have been denied national identity
> cards. Though a limited number of outside observers were able
> to visit Arakan State, albeit on a government-controlled basis,
> credible reports continued to emerge of discrimination and
> travel restrictions for Muslims in the area. The
> well-documented human rights abuses which precipitated the
> original Rohingya exodus, however, appeared to have largely
> subsided. At the same time, claims that Buddhists from
> elsewhere in Arakan State were being resettled nearer the
> border in previously Muslim areas were reliably confirmed.
>
> Multiple, reliable sources indicated that the military
> occasionally required minority populations in the border
> regions to provide without compensation vehicles, equipment,
> and lodging for soldiers.
>
> Religious Minorities
>
> The SLORC continued to associate itself closely with the
> majority Buddhist religion, giving wide publicity to the
> participation by its members in various Buddhist rites and
> ceremonies. While this reportedly was a cause of concern among
> some members of other religions, the Government in fact
> continued to permit members of the major non-Buddhist faiths to
> practice their religion. Religious organizations, however,
> remained subject to registration and censorship controls
> applicable to the entire population. Restrictions on Muslims
> in Arakan State appear to be result primarily from their lack
> of full citizenship and to discrimination on ethnic grounds.
>
> People with Disabilities
>
> Official assistance to persons with disabilities is extremely
> limited. There is no law mandating accessibility to government
> facilities for those with disabilities. A small number benefit
> from the services of the Mary Chapman School for the Deaf in
> Rangoon, which recently began receiving government patronage,
> or from modest religious-associated assistance programs funded
> through private donations. Most disabled persons, however,
> must rely on traditional family structures to provide for their
> welfare, and many become destitute. The principal exception is
> disabled members of the military, who receive medical
> attention, rehabilitation, and financial assistance, though
> most veterans receive such benefits only for a few years after
> discharge. Reliable reports indicate that high-ranking
> officers receive better treatment than the rank and file.
> Since 1986 Burmese authorities have permitted representatives
> of the ICRC to work in Burma to upgrade provision of orthopedic
> prostheses. Because of both landmines and train-related
> accidents, Burma has one of the highest rates of amputees in
> the world.
>
> Section 6 Worker Rights
>
> a. The Right of Association
>
> In 1993 there continued to be no right of association among
> workers in Burma. Workers were not free to form or join trade
> unions of their own choosing, and leaders of unofficial labor
> associations, such as youth organizer Nay Lin of the Federation
> of Trade Unions of Burma, were subject to arrest. A new labor
> law was promised in connection with the drafting of a new
> constitution, but it is doubtful the document will ensure the
> right of workers to organize freely. At a minimum, any trade
> unions which might form are expected to be firmly under
> government control. Workers are not permitted to strike, and
> there were no reported instances in 1993 of attempts to do so.
>
> In July 1989, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility
> for trade concessions under the Generalized System of
> Preferences program, pending steps to afford its labor force
> internationally recognized worker rights. In 1990 the U.S.
> Government declined a formal request to reconsider the
> suspension.
>
> In June 1993, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
> Conference cited Burma in a "special paragraph", its strongest
> form of censure, for its longstanding failure to take "the
> necessary measures in legislation and practice to guarantee to
> all workers and all employers without any distinction and
> without prior authorization the right to organize even outside
> the existing trade union structure should they so wish."
>
> b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
>
> Workers continued not to have the right to organize and bargain
> collectively. Government arbitration boards, which once
> theoretically provided a means for airing labor disputes, were
> abolished in 1988. The Government unilaterally sets wages in
> the public sector. In the private sector, wages are set by
> market forces. In a job-scarce economy, this means employers
> determine wage levels. The Government pressures joint ventures
> not to pay salaries greater than those of ministers or other
> high-level employees. Joint ventures circumvent this via
> supplemental pay, including remuneration paid in foreign
> exchange certificates, as well as through incentive and
> overtime pay and other fringe benefits. Foreign firms
> generally set wages near those of the domestic private sector
> but follow the practice of joint ventures in awarding
> supplemental wages and benefits.
>
> No special export processing zones exist.
>
> c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
>
> Burma's legal code does not prohibit forced labor. The
> military routinely employed corvee labor on its myriad building
> projects and, according to credible reports, officials accepted
> bribes to excuse some people from work. Forced labor was used
> in constructing the railroad line opened in 1993 to Loikaw,
> capital of Burma's Kayah State.
>
> The Burmese Army has for decades impressed civilian males to
> serve as porters. According to reliable reports, in 1993 the
> army continued to abduct youths off the streets, chiefly in
> minority areas but also in some urban areas of central Burma.
> Women were also occasionally impressed as porters, cooks, and
> laundresses for soldiers in frontline areas, according to
> credible reports. Military authorities commonly permitted
> conscripts and their families to pay them money in lieu of
> porter duty.
>
> In June a Burmese diplomat in Singapore organized the
> confinement and forced return to Burma of a group of 11 Burmese
> seamen transiting Singapore en route from Australia to Thailand
> after the men prevailed in a wage dispute with the help of the
> International Transport Federation. All remained free in 1993
> but are unable to regain employment abroad.
>
> d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
>
> Children aged 13 to 15 may work 4 hours a day. The "Child Law"
> of July 14, 1993, governs most matters concerning children
> under the age of 16. It gives each such child the right to
> "engage in work in accordance with law and its own volition."
> To date, the "law" referred to includes both the Factories Act
> of 1951 and the Children Pledging of Labor Act, this latter
> being an Indian law from 1933 still on the books. In theory,
> the penalty for employers disregarding this regulation was 2
> years in prison, but there were no reports of any prosecutions
> in 1993 for illegally employing children, despite the fact
> that, in cities, working children were highly visible. They
> were hired at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of
> work, and economic pressure forced them to work not only for
> their survival but also to support their families. Burmese law
> requires children to attend school through the fourth standard,
> usually reached between the ages of 12 and 15. The Department
> of Basic Education estimated, however, that 38 percent of
> children aged 5 to 9 never enroll in school. Of those who do,
> less than 30 percent complete the fourth grade. Two-thirds of
> Burma's primary schoolchildren, principally in rural areas,
> leave school for economic reasons. In the higher grades, the
> drop-out rate for girls is double that for boys.
>
> e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
>
> Depressed economic conditions and lack of attention by
> government authorities continued to dictate substandard
> conditions for workers. The Law on Fundamental Workers Rights
> of 1964 and the Factories Act of 1951 regulate working
> conditions. There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-hour
> workweek for employees in the public sector and a 6-day,
> 44-hour workweek for private and parastatal sector employees,
> with overtime paid for additional work. Workers have 21 paid
> holidays a year.
>
>
> Only government employees are protected by minimum wage
> provisions. The minimum wage was raised in March to $3 per day
> (20 kyats) at the official exchange rate, but less than $0.20
> at the unofficial, free market rate. The Government raised
> wages for public employees by 25 percent in March, but pay in
> the state sector remained far below the amount needed to
> provide a decent standard of living or counter the practice of
> taking bribes. The actual average wage rate for casual
> laborers in Rangoon was about twice the official minimum.
> Wages continued to lag far behind inflation.
>
> To protect health and safety at workplaces, there are numerous
> regulations pertaining to room size, ventilation, fire hazards,
> and the availability of latrines and drinking water. In
> practice, these were seldom enforced, particularly in the
> private sector. (###)
>
>