Karen Human RIghts Group report (#1

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Subject: Karen Human RIghts Group report (#1)


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       A REPORT BY THE KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP

Karen Human Rights Group
PO Box 22
Mae Sot, Tak 63110
Thailand
(email sent to the KHRG at strider@xxxxxxxxxxx will be forwarded)


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IS THE SLORC USING BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE?

Preliminary Report
based on information independently gathered by the Karen Human
Rights Group

March 15, 1994


On August 12, 1993 in the middle of the night, villagers in a
large part of the Donthami and Yunzalin river watersheds (between
the Bilin and Salween Rivers, in Thaton and Mudraw [Papun]
districts) heard SLORC planes fly low over their areas.  The planes
dropped dozens, maybe scores (the number is unknown) of strange
devices consisting of a 2-metre parachute with a "white box" and
one or two balloons hanging underneath.  The next morning the
villagers started finding the devices in forests and fields.  SLORC
troops in the area never tried to recover the devices.

Between 3 days and 2 weeks later, villagers in the drop area and
some areas downriver started getting sick with a disease resembling
cholera or shigella.  The symptoms were very serious diarrhoea
with faeces "like rice water", in some cases combined with watery
vomiting, bringing death by severe dehydration within one to two
days; as a Karen medic described it, "You go to the toilet 3 times,
then you're dead".  Other symptoms reported include nausea,
dizzyness, in some cases head and body aches, and some found that
if they pinched their skin and released it, the flesh stayed
pinched out.  The disease was very communicable and spread very
rapidly until it covered most of Bilin Township, made worse by the
fact that villages in the area have no sanitation and villagers
generally just use the forest instead of a toilet or latrine. 
Generally it only attacked adults over 15 - many families were
entirely wiped out except for one or two of the youngest children. 
Up to this time, the entire area involved had reported a few deaths
per month from dysentery.  Suddenly in September 1993, village
leaders in the area reported 185 deaths in one month from this
disease.  The Karen National Union (KNU) responded by sending
medical teams into the area several times.  They managed to save
many using dextrose/saline intravenous drips combined with
tetracycline\ (in at least one case they saved a woman from the
brink of death with 11 successive 500ml. drips), but the death toll
is now over 300.  By December it appeared that the disease had
abated in most areas, although a few cases are still being
reported.  Deaths have now been reported far from the original
disease area in the major village of Ka Ma Maung on the Salween
River, under SLORC control.  SLORC authorities have quarantined
several villages in the area.  A few cases have also been reported
closer to the Thai border, and with the regular movement of Karen
civilians it could easily spread across the border into Thailand. 
A new outbreak of diarrhoea, possibly the same disease, has just
occurred in March just west of the Salween River where it forms the
Thai border east of Papun.

Since the start of 1994, an epidemic of a very similar or identical
disease has broken out about 100 km. further south in Dta Greh
(Burmese name Pain Kyone) township, between Hlaing Bwe town and
the Dawna Range in Pa'an District.  This area is very close to
Thailand but is isolated by the Dawna Range at the border. 
Statistics on this outbreak are not available yet.  A trader from
the area recently reported that "SLORC planes came 2 or 3 times,
flying not too high at night.  They dropped things by parachute -
one was near Pwe Taw village.  In the morning the villagers found
it.  It had 4 strings, a very good sheet of material, a foam box
and a broken balloon.  In the foam box there was something like
a bell, some wire and pieces like radio parts.  One villager took
off the sheet and kept it.  After that, many of the villagers
got diarrhoea, and they couldn't cure it because medicines and
IV drips are very expensive and hard to get, so many people died
of diarrhoea.  An average of six or seven people died in each
village, and over 10 people died in my village.  More middle aged
people died than children.  The planes dropped 6 or 7 parachutes
around Tha Mo and Pay Hta, which are big villages, but I only
saw 2 parachutes myself."  This account has not yet been confirmed.
 The area where he claims the drop occurred is exactly where the
disease is now occurring.  There could also have been human
transmission of the disease from the original area to the north.

The disease is curable with basic medicines, but the villagers
in the target area have no access to such medicines; since 1992,
the SLORC has sent #99 Light Infantry Division into the
Donthami/Yunzalin area with specific orders to drive all villagers
in this area into camps or out of the area.Villagers now affected
further south in Pa'an District have suffered similar tactics.  In
the process they have been terrorized, stripped of all money and
belongings, and thousands have been displaced or have fled to
refugee camps in Thailand (see the Karen Human Rights Group reports
Forced Relocation in Thaton District (9/1/93), The SLORC's New
Forced Relocation Campaign - Translations of SLORC Orders (8/1/93),
Report from Thaton District (10/3/93), Statements by Internally
Displaced People (28/4/93), and The SLORC's 1993 Offensive Against
Karen Civilians (10/7/93)).  Furthermore, a Karen medic who
operates in the area reports that the SLORC actively blocks any
medicine reaching the area from towns in Burma as part of their
program to make sure no supplies can reach opposition forces.  Some
villagers in the area have been executed when caught with supplies
of basic medicines.

Villagers in the Donthami/Yunzalin area say they have never heard
of such an epidemic, not even in their grandparents' time.  They
also say that as soon as the first people began getting sick,
SLORC troops stopped entering all villages in the area and in
most cases didn't even leave their camps, which is also
unprecedented.
 
This is a "brown" area, where both SLORC and Karen troops operate,
and the SLORC has always entered these villages regularly to
capture porters and loot food and belongings.  Villagers who were
used to having to rotate weekly shifts of slave labour maintaining
SLORC army camps were suddenly forbidden from entering those camps.
 
One group of SLORC troops came near a village, but stayed in
the monastery outside the village.  While all the villagers were
getting the disease, only the SLORC troops and the monks remained
healthy.  In Laykay, a large village with a large SLORC army camp,
villagers were forbidden from entering the camp and soldiers were
forbidden to leave.  However, the villagers learned that the
soldiers in the camp had been "vaccinated" (to use their word)
against the disease.  In Yo Klah, where there is also a SLORC camp
right in the village, villagers were forbidden to enter the camp
but soldiers came into the village to order villagers to keep their
food clean and boil all drinking water, and they forced the
villagers to dig latrines for themselves at gunpoint.  However,
they did not go to any other villages to do this.

Villagers have found many of the air-dropped devices in the
Donthami/Yunzalin area.  The KNU has obtained a number of them, the
Karen Human Rights Group has obtained three, and others have
obtained several more.  They consist of a clear plastic parachute
2 metres in diameter with 4 nylon suspension lines holding a "white
box" and 1 or 2 balloons.  Unfortunately, to our knowledge none of
the balloons have been recovered - villagers report that in every
case, the balloons have been broken when found.  The "white box"
consists of a thick white styrofoam box 31.5 cm. x 17 cm. x 10 cm.
deep complete with formed styrofoam lid.  Inside, in specially
moulded slots, are a 6.2 cm. diameter pressure-sensing anode
connected to a swinging arm on a gauge, a 13 x 6 cm. circuit board,
and a small microwave transmitter.  The unit is powered by small
battery which fits in a slot in the bottom, and there are also one
or two slots which are empty on the units we have recovered.  The
entire units, as indicated by printing on the swinging-arm gauge,
a logo on the outside of the styrofoam box, and the battery unit,
were made by "Viz Manufacturing Co., 335 East Price St.,
Philadelphia Pennsylvania 19144-5782, USA - Phone 215-844-2626,
Telex 710-670-2626, Fax 215-844-4410".

The devices appear to be typical commercially available
"radiosonde" devices, manufactured to be sent up under weather
balloons.  This is supported by the plastic wrapping for the
battery, which is labelled "Activation Instructions for Radiosonde
Battery".  The battery itself is a disposable chemical unit 6cm. x
6cm. x 4cm. thick, made up of clear plastic tightly wrapped around
layers of wax, chemical, and something like cardboard, all packaged
in a white plastic bag with printed instructions.  It is activated
by removing the plastic bag, immersing it in water, shaking off
the excess, then connecting the power connector, putting it back
in the plastic bag and inserting it in the slot in the radiosonde
box.  The battery we have recovered is printed with the date
January 2, 1992, and other information including "BATTERY,
RADIOSONDE. NSN-6135-01-054-2098.  VIZ 3500-100".  On one unit, the
swinging-arm device has serial number 503-2288 stuck on it, and the
circuit board has serial number 0728868.  Another unit has serial
number 617-1014 on the swinging-arm device, and 0728904 on the
circuit board.  The units also bear a small stick-on
computer-printed label on the box bottom including printing such as
"1392-521, CT 6/2535", which would imply that they passed through
Thailand,as the year 1992 was the year 2535 on the Thai calendar.

Radiosondes are meant to be sent up under weather balloons, not
dropped out of planes with parachutes.  Unlike all the radiosonde
equipment, which is clearly marked with the VIZ name and logo,
the parachutes have no markings and appear to have been rigged
up by SLORC for this special purpose.  They consist of a circular
sheet of clear "crinkly" plastic, similar to that used to make
ordinary plastic bags.  The sheet has been cut to a diameter of
2 metres, and at least part of the cutting appears to have been
done roughly with hand scissors.  The lines were held on with
ordinary office-type staples.  There are also some other features
which may have been added by SLORC.  One unit was recovered with
a 27 cm. long metal device with 4 radial folding fins attached
to it, which fold out to a diameter of 28 cm. - this appears to
be the tail assembly from an RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade shell,
and was probably attached to make the unit descend vertically
and at a proper rate; it would not work as an antenna for microwave
transmission.  Each pressure-sensing device has a spot of paint
on it which appears to have been hastily hand-applied; some units
are marked with blue paint, some with red.  Each unit also has
a three-wired cable attached to the circuit board which goes to
a slot in the bottom of the box, where there is a plastic
connector.

Here the cable is soldered to a piece of apparently standard
two-wired household power cord about 20 cm. long.  In every case,
at the other end of this cord about one-half cm. of the wires
have been stripped and soldered, but they are just hanging free
outside the box, not connected to anything.  This may have
something to do with the balloons, none of which were recovered
because the villagers said in every case that the balloons were
broken and destroyed when found.  Villagers who found one unit
hanging from a tree said that the broken balloon was hanging down
and a foul-smelling "black-yellow-green" liquid was dripping from
it.  Other villagers who took devices home said they later
destroyed them because they were giving off a "foul smell".  A
Karen military column which went to villages to retrieve the
devices reported that in several cases, they were told that the
villager who had retrieved the device had later died of the
disease, so the villagers had destroyed it.

While these devices appear to have been originally manufactured
for use under weather balloons, knowledgeable sources indicate
that throwing them out of low-flying airplanes would be virtually
useless for weather applications.  Also, the short length of the
microwave transmitter antenna indicates a very high frequency
transmission, possibly in the gigahertz range, which would only
be receivable along a straight "line of sight".  This would make
sense for a weather balloon, which sends signals down to earth
from heights up to 100,000 feet, but would be useless for
transmitting from the ground where there are some hills and ground
cover as in the drop area.  The transmission also appears to be
quite low powered because the transistor on the circuit board does
not even have a heat sink.  These limitations would imply that the
signals may only be receivable from the planes which dropped the
devices, or that the SLORC was not particularly interested in the
signal anyway.

Possible Explanations

Several possibilities are under consideration.  Firstly, there
may be no relationship between the SLORC air-drops and the
epidemic. However, if this is the case, why did SLORC troops stop
entering the area so quickly, which they have never done before,
and what was the purpose of the air drops?  Dropping such devices
from low-flying planes by night would have very limited usefulness
for meteorology, and the SLORC has no reason to be studying the
weather in the drop area anyway.  The weather there is very stable
and predictable, generally not varying for months at a time. 
Perhaps the devices are sensitive enough to pick up and transmit
vibrations which would indicate Karen troop movements, similar
to devices used by American forces in Vietnam; however, on first
inspection the devices do not appear to have this capability,
they could probably not transmit for very long on their batteries,
and many more of them would have to be dropped to be very effective
for this purpose.  The devices could act as beacons which are
dropped on targets, then transmit a signal which guides in a guided
weapon, but no weapons were fired on the area.  Another possibility
is that the barometric pressure readings could be used to help
calibrate the SLORC's Carl Gustav Swedish rockets and other
air-exploding shells to function properly in local areas.  However,
much of the drop area is only seldom penetrated by Karen troops,
and in the areas where Karen troops do operate, they use guerrilla
tactics, based on ambush and quick retreat.  There are very few
head-on battles which would involve the heavy use of such shells. 
Another possibility is that the barometric readings could help the
SLORC predict the effectiveness of future strikes with chemical or
bacteriological agents, chemical defoliants, or napalm.  Advice
from military experts is needed to properly assess these
possibilities.  In any case, an unexplained SLORC air-drop just
days before the outbreak of a once-in-a-century epidemic in the
same area would seem to be quite an incredible coincidence.

The other possibility is that there is a connection between the
SLORC air-drop and the epidemic.  If so, how did the mysterious
devices cause the disease?  The balloons (which we have not
recovered) could have contained the bacteriological agent, or some
other device could have been attached, which would ideally have
dispersed the agent while the device was still in the air.  The
microwave transmission could be used as a "homing signal" so that
Strategic Headquarters could map the dispersal of the agent.  The
barometric pressure readings might be useful as well in estimating
its dispersal, or the SLORC may not have been interested in the
barometric information, only using meteorological devices because
they can be bought without suspicion and if found people will
assume they have been used for meteorological applications. 
Unfortunately, toxicologists say that it is very unlikely that they
could recover any trace of the disease off the devices themselves
this long after the fact.  Another possibility is that the devices
did not deliver the agent, but were only used to map its dispersal
while the agent itself was sprayed from the planes by some other
means.

Some events from the past are also relevant to the question:

There has been no such epidemic in generations, and the drop area
corresponds to the disease area. In 1985 in the Baw Kloh area of
southern Burma's Tenasserim Division, at least one balloon attached
to a packet of "powder" was dropped by a Burmese military plane. 
Just afterward, a cholera epidemic began in the area which lasted
through the entire rainy season. Almost all villagers got sick,
though only 10 to 20 reportedly died.  Only one balloon was
retrieved, and no proper analysis was done.

In mid-1993 an identical device was recovered in forest less than
10 kilometres west of Manerplaw, across the Salween river from
the Meh Bpa area, where the heaviest fighting occurred in the
SLORC's 1992 offensive against Manerplaw.  During that offensive
SLORC bomber aircraft were over the area every day, but they have
not been back since.  It is not known when this device was dropped.

The serial number on the gauge is 607-1019, and on the circuit
board 0762537.  A UPC code sticker on the bottom reads "Prod-Seq
# 012907C".  The device is code-marked with blue paint.
In the 1992 offensive against Manerplaw, several Karen soldiers
were wounded on different occasions by air attacks at frontline
positions with suspected chemical weapons.  They suffered burns
and rashes which were still spreading over their bodies months
later, and partial or complete loss of mobility in various parts
of the body with no apparent cause.  In Kachin State the same
year, the Kachin Independence Organization claimed that chemical
shells were being used against them, and that they had intercepted
messages telling SLORC frontline commanders to withdraw several
hundred metres because SLORC planes were about to drop "chemical
weapon shells".

Well-placed and reliable sources indicate that the SLORC has its
own facilities for manufacturing mustard gas and possibly other
chemical warfare agents, built with the assistance of a west German
firm.

In the Bundestag (German parliament) on 24 September 1991, the
German government admitted that between 1978 and 1989, a total
of 15 Burma Army officers received "ABC Protection" training (ABC
= Atomic/Bacteriological/Chemical) from the Bundeswehr (German
Army) at Sonthofen Military Academy in west Germany.  When asked
if similar training also occurred in East Germany, the government
answered "The Federal Government does not have any knowledge about
Burmese citizens also being trained in handling ABC warfare agents
by the former NVA [Nationale Volksarmee, the East German armed
forces]".  It is interesting that the Burma Army, with no external
enemies, would be interested in "protecting" themselves against
these types of warfare.  The German government claimed that this
was part of a program offered to many third world countries; the
list of countries which benefitted includes several which have
close ties with German arms manufacturer Fritz Werner, such as
Sudan, where Fritz Werner built a military plant.  In Burma, Fritz
Werner established the entire arms and munitions manufacturing
industry under the Ne Win regime, which has since been nationalised
by SLORC.  Fritz Werner has also built "fertilizer" and "bottling"
factories in Burma for the SLORC, all of which are highly secure
locations.  In the year 1984 West Germany exported DM 16.1 million
worth of chemical pre-products to Burma, and DM 7.5 million worth
of chemical end products.  We are now seeking further information
on all of these points.

Why?

Right now, while the SLORC is trying to convince the world that
it wants to negotiate "peace", and while it sends delegations
worldwide and hires public relations firms in a desperate attempt
to improve its international image, why would it engage in an
act of bacteriological warfare which would bring it unprecedented
international condemnation and probably even force the UN Security
Council into action?  This is a difficult question to answer,
but not so difficult if one understands the SLORC mentality. 
If the SLORC really wants to improve its international image,
why doesn't it simply decrease the grotesque level of human rights
abuses it perpetrates in ethnic areas?  This would also have the
effect of making villagers less supportive of opposition groups.
 However, the SLORC is now actually stepping up its human rights
abuses, possibly as a form of threat to opposition groups that
they had better agree to negotiate.  The SLORC is now so confident
of its power and of the support of its neighbouring allies that
it feels it can do anything it likes within the country, as long
as it makes the right statements overseas.  With the news blackout
it maintains over most of the country, it is confident that none
of its activities in remote areas, like the area in question,
can be proven.  Even when they are proven, the SLORC simply claims
that the information is "propaganda by terrorist groups" and flatly
denies any human rights abuses exist at all, confident that no
foreign governments will take action against them.  They probably
would not even realize that to use bacteriological warfare is
to step across the line, putting themselves in the spotlight and
forcing foreign countries to respond.

The epidemic area is the same area where the SLORC has sent fresh
combat troops since 1992, particularly the notorious 99 Light
Infantry Division, to attempt to drive all villagers into
controlled camps or out of the area so that Karen troops cannot
operate.
 
Much of the region has already been declared a free-fire zone
where any villagers seen are shot on sight.  Many have fled the
area, but many more remain, hidden in the forests or in villages,
and the Karen Army continues to operate.  The SLORC may therefore
be using disease as a last resort to clear out the area's
population by killing some and forcing the rest to flee the
spreading disease. This could also be an experimental operation in
preparation for more widespread use of bacteriological agents,
possibly against other remote areas or the Manerplaw area.

Although other diseases such as anthrax tend to be generally
preferred for bacteriological warfare, there are also reasons for
the SLORC to choose a disease approximating cholera or severe
dysentery instead.  An outbreak of a non-native disease like
anthrax would immediately be extremely suspicious, and much easier
to trace back to the SLORC, whereas diseases like cholera and
dysentery already exist in the region.  By using a disease which is
fairly easy to treat, they can protect their own soldiers against
it quite easily, at the same time knowing that the villagers will
suffer severely because they have no access to the required
medicines.  The disease does not have to kill them all, only force
them out of the area from fear of it.

However, by forcing villagers to move the SLORC is causing itself
problems now, as evidenced by the fact that the disease has now
spread to other areas well under their control like Ka Ma Maung,
and could spread further into Burma.  It is also spreading toward
the Thai border, and given the general flow of Karen refugees
and others across the borders, it could easily spread to rural
areas of Thailand.  Diseases and bacteriological warfare have
no respect for borders, and if the SLORC is responsible  for this
epidemic then this strategy of theirs has the potential to pose
a major regional threat.  It is imperative that foreign governments
and the UN Security Council see that such a threat is not realized.

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The Karen Human Rights Group is a small and independent
organization operating out of Manerplaw, headquarters of the Karen
National Union (KNU) and Burma's democratic forces.

Although the KHRG relies on the logistical support of the Karen
National Union, the group is independent and apolitical and focuses
on human rights abuses in Karen regions.  Whenever possible, abuses
against other ethnic peoples in Burma are also reported.