Background to Thai Spy Story

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"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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BACKGROUND ON THE THAI SPY ARTICLES

Naeo Na is a Thai newspaper with a fairly good reputation (it's not a 
tabloid but its not Matichon either).  They have run a series of articles 
on a spy codenamed "Victor."

Naeo Na is being somewhat disingenuous in it's "Victor" articles.  
Without saying it too bluntly, they are accusing the "Victor" from the NSC of
being a Burmese spy.  They avoid referring to the man by name, although they
know that as well.  The person they are referring to as "Victor" is Xuwicha
Hiranprueck, who is a Thai businessman.  There is strong evidence of close
cooperation between Xuwicha and Col. Thein Swe, the Burmese military attache
in Bangkok, but calling Xuwicha a spy is probably misleading.

First off, Naeo Na is by the standards of Thai-language media, taking serious
risks.  Although Thailand has one of the freest presses in Asia, Thai
journalist exercise a healthy amount of self-censorship, especially on border
issues and anything too closely connected to the military.  The "Victor"
articles run afoul of both of these taboos and so the directness of the
articles is more notable than any punches the authors might have pulled.

Naeo Na is avoiding a direct attack on Gen. Charoen or criticizing Thai
policy.  Instead they are putting most of the blame on a Thai version of
Ollie North.  Xuwicha however makes little secret of what he's doing and
seems to be acting with a mandate from higher authorities.  The methods may
be of his own devising and he has racked up an impressive list of enemies 
(and friends), but he doesn't seem to be a loose cannon.  There is also a 
conflict going on within the Thai National Security Council which may 
have little to do with any tender feelings for Burma's ethnic 
minorities.  The "Victor" articles are about Xuwicha, but they have at least 
as much to do with internal Thai and NSC politics.

Charoen's predecessor at NSC was Prasong Soonsiri, the current Thai Foreign
Minister.  At least one of the splits among NSC personnel is supposed to be
between Charoen's men and Prasong's men.  There are probably other splits as
well but following the nuances of Thai politics is a bit like Churchill's
observation on Kremlin politics: it's like watching a pack of dogs fighting
under a rug--you never know just who's fighting or who's winning, and the
only way you find that one of them's lost is when a carcass is gets pushed
out from under the side.

Xuwicha has come under intense scrutiny in the Thai press over the past month
and especially in Naeo Na, which ran a silhouette on the cover of its weekend
newsmagazine and referred to "Victor" as the Thai James Bond.  Still, it
hasn't seemed to affect Xuwicha's position and he continues to be active in
efforts to get the Mon rebels to sign a cease-fire with the Burmese
government.

Xuwicha appears to be the public face, if not the architect of Thailand's
current effort to get the ethnic groups to sign cease-fires with the SLORC. 
If he is the architect, the plans were almost certainly signed off by people
higher up.  His own presence in Thai policy-making circles is expected to
depend on whether that policy produces results.  Despite the current round of
bad press, Xuchicha's fate is likely to turn more on whether he can produce
a cease-fire arrangement between the Mon and the Burmese.  

He played a key role as early as 1992 in brokering the Kachin cease-fire and
throughout '93 was seen as the point man on pressing the Karens and Mons to
negotiate.  The Mons are claiming that he was the person who gave the order
for the Loh Loe refugee camp to be closed and the refugees moved over the
Burma border to Halockani (i.e. forced repatriation).

Thus far, the Mons have resisted signing a cease-fire and the revenge-
motivated attack carried out by a local Burmese battalion on Halockani
refugee camp late last month didn't do Xuwicha any favors.  The Mons haven't
want to sign before because they don't trust SLORC and the use of refugees as
human shields at Halockani hasn't exactly swelled the Mons affection for
them.

Events in Shan State are also relevant to Xuwicha and Thai policy because 
the Thai government (or at least the parts in control of the border) have 
an interest in ending the fighting, on SLORC's terms if necessary.  The 
biggest obstacle they face is probably Khun Sa.

For the first time, SLORC is making a serious effort to take out Khun 
Sa.  Xuwicha and SLORC have been trumpeting the war on drugs; cynics 
suspect that Khun Sa's declarations of Shan independence have more to do 
with it.  Either way, Shan State has been the scene of fierce fighting 
since last December and it's only likely to get worse.  On paper, the 
Burmese army outguns Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army but the Burmese are at the 
end of a long supply line, amidst a hostile population and the jungle 
hills of northeastern Burma negate much of their nominal superiority.  At 
last count, both sides are facing off with some 20,000 men apiece and 
once the ground dries out from the current rains, major battles are 
probably in the offing.

Until this last round of fighting, even (educated) Shans regarded Khun Sa as
simply a drug warlord.  Now that he's finally fighting SLORC, events are
turning him into a Shan nationalist in the eyes of his own people, if not the
DEA.  If SLORC doesn't wipe Khun Sa out, their offensive may give him a
legitimacy and effectiveness he's not had before.  There is even talk of a
wider insurrection in Shan State.  To date, the heavy fighting has been
confined to a narrow stretch along the Thai border.  If Khun Sa is able to
stand his ground against SLORC, it won't be good news for Xuwicha and may set
the Thai Government to looking for a new policy.

Taking out Khun Sa would free up a lot of firepower for use on the other 
ethnic groups, should SLORC need to use it.  They probably have enough 
muscle even without the guns in Shan State, but Khun Sa's presence in the war 
is a morale boost for the other ethnic groups and is part of what's keeping 
the Mons and Karens from surrendering (which is exactly how they view a 
cease-fire imposed under Thai pressure).

So, things to watch for in the coming months are whether the Mon sign a
cease-fire and how Khun Sa fares against SLORC.  If both of these come up
zeroes for "Victor" and SLORC, look for a change in "advisors" at the NSC. 
If both of these go SLORC's way, the Mons and Karens are unlikely to stand
alone and an end to the ethnic insurgency along the Thai/Burma border becomes
more likely.  An end to the insurgency would likely be followed in short
order by a repatriation of the 77,000 refugees in camps along the Thai/Burma
border.  This repatriation would of course be "voluntary" unless anyone tried
to resist.
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The author of this background paper has no connection to Naeo Na or the 
journalist who wrote the "Victor" article. 
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