BurmaNet News Supplement: October 1

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Subject: BurmaNet News Supplement: October 12

Status: R


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"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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BurmaNet News: Burma Survey, PART I
Wednesday, October 12, 1994
Supplement to #32

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As of today, the BurmaNet News will shift from a "several times a week" to a
daily format.  This special survey of recent articles about Burma is a
supplement to today's issue of the BurmaNet News and is drawn from several
sources.  Most of these articles have not been on the net before although a
few have appeared on soc.culture.burma or reg.burma.  These articles are
included here for the benefit of seasia list subscribers.  Because of it's
size, this supplement is being distributed in three sections.
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QUOTE OF THE DAY:

     "When I quietly observed that there must be something wrong when the
     people do not want to stay in their country but prefer to exile
     themselves, Gen Ne Win flew into a rage.  Later on, the then Burmese
     foreign minister, who was also present at the meeting, assured me that
     these outbursts were not unusual; he himself had to endure many of them.
     As he had to use a hearing aid, however, he just switched it off and
     remained unperturbed to the annoyance of Chairman Ne Win."
 
                    Thanat Khoman, Thai foreign minister 1959-1971.
 
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Contents:

INSIDE BURMA
  NEWSWEEK: BURMA: THE JUNTA'S MEETING WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI
  NATION: GENERALS HAVE MOST TO LOSE IN HIGH-STAKES GAME
  TIMES [LONDON]: OBITUARY, U MYINT THEIN

CONSTITUTION
  NCUB: STATEMENT ON THE HOLDING OF CONSTITUTIONAL SEMINAR
  JCA: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM

INTERNATIONAL
  BKK POST: BURMESE FM TALKS TO UN
  NATION: BURMA: RECONSTRUCTING THE ENGAGEMENT

BURMA/U.S.
  REUTERS/BKK POST: CLINTON, CHUAN AGREE ON FREE TRADE PRIORITY 
  NATION: CLINTON PLEDGES TO END TRADE THREAT
  BKK POST: DEMOCRATIC REFORM EFFORT IN HONG KONG TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

BURMA/S.E. ASIA
  NATION: MEKONG NATIONS AGREE TO BAN ON HAZARDOUS WASTE ON RIVER
  BKK POST: LAOTIAN FM LAUDS BURMA FOR RECONCILIATION 
  BKK POST: LAOS HOSTING SUB-REGIONAL MEET ON TOURISM, TRANSPORT
  FEER: TAIWANESE TAKEOVER [WAGE RATES IN S.E.ASIA] [abridged]

BURMA/THAI RELATIONS
  NATION: FESTERING COUP ALLEGATIONS HURTING THAILAND
  NATION: NSC CHIEF DENIES THAI HAND IN JULY'S FAILED CAMBODIA COUP
  NATION: BRIDGE TO LINK WITH BURMA
  BKK POST: MAE SAI-TACHILEK BORDER HOURS E TENDED
  BKK POST: RUMOURS ON PRASONG'S OUSTER
  SEASIA-L: "GEN. WIMOL & BURMANET NEWS"
  NATION: NO INTERFERENCE IN POLITICS, SAYS NEW [THAI] SUPREME COMMANDER

DRUGS
  NATION: OPIUM SEIZED IN BURMA
  REUTERS: CHINA EXECUTES BURMESE TRAFFICKER

REFUGEES
  REUTERS: BURMA SUSPENDS REFUGEES' RETURN FROM BANGLADESH
  SEASIA-L: BURMA REFUGEES DEPORTED FROM MIZORAM, INDIA 
  NATION: OFFICIALS TO FACE WRATH OVER ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
  BKK POST: NAVIGATING THE IMMIGRATION SEA
  BKK POST: ANGEL IN WHITE AT THE IMMIGRATION PRISON

AIDS
  NATION: BLOOD, SEX  AND BORDER CROSSING POINTS

ETHNICS
  REUTERS: THOUSANDS READY TO FLEE OPIUM WARLORD'S STRONGHOLD [SHANS]
  NATION: PHRA PHAYOM SEEKS PREVIEW OF YANTRA'S BIRTHDAY SHOW [KARENS]

CULTURE
  NATION: WITTY REMARK ON BURMESE COOKING
  S.C.B.: BURMESE BOOK 'FOLKTALES OF LUDU U HLA

LETTERS
  AW: LETTER REGARDING MYINT THEIN
  FEER: TWO LETTERS TO THE EDITOR ON "ISOLATING BURMA"
  FEER: THOUGHTLESS INDULGENCE 
  AW: RESPONSE TO MAUNG THITSA




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INSIDE BURMA
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NEWSWEEK: BURMA: THE JUNTA'S MEETING WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI
Oct 3, 1994
by Ron Moreau
BANGKOK

THE  picture on the national television were are extraordinary that most 
Burmese viewer must have thought they were dreaming. There was imprisoned 
opposition leader and Aung San Kyi looking healthy and relaxed, if thin, and 
chatting amiably with the military of Burma in an army guest house. It was no
dream. For the first time since being pleased under house arrest more than
five year ago, Suu Kyi, 49, had been allowed out of her crumbling home in the
capital, Rangoon; and, again for the first, she was talking face to face to
the country's military chief, Gen Than Shwe, and his the first, she was
talking face to face to the country's military chief, Gen Than Shwe, and his
powerful sidekick, Lt Gen Khin Nyunt, head of the military intelligence.
While the topics under discussion were not disclosed, the most important
thing was that the encounter took place at all.

Burma's junta, which calls itself the Slorc, incarcerated Suu Kyi in 1989, 
nearly one year after taking power in a bloody coup. In 1990 it annulled a 
national election after her NLD won it hands down. The junta has subsequently
imprisoned, or worse, hundreds of opposition activists. It is still accused
of abusing human rights. Most foreign diplomats Burmese saw last week's
meeting as and important first step in along process that may eventually lead
to Suu Kyi's freedom - and a less repressive political climate.
The simple act of sitting down with Suu Kyi was and unprecedented gesture
from the junta. Previously, the generals had refused to negotiate with her.
All they had said was that she was free at any time to join her British
husband and their two children in Britain - and never return. While she has
maintained that she would never discuss, let alone consider, the opposition
of exile, she has always been willing to talk to the generals about the
plight of her country.  

The junta doubtlessly decided to meet openly with her in an effort to spruce
up its reputation, particularly with prospective foreign investors. Since
seizing power, the Slorc has dumped the catastrophic "self-sufficient
socialism" of former leader Ne Win in favor of more-market-oriented
economics. It has newly reopened Burma's land border with China, letting
cheap consumer goods flood across. And it has attracted some foreign
investment into the nascent energy and tourism industries. But the junta
knows that as long as Suu Kyi remain in direction, badly needed Western and
Japanese aid, trade and Japanese aid, trade and investment will not be
forthcoming . Hence the public - relations campaign to shows its "good will"
toward Suu Kyi.

The Slorc feels secure enough to launch one because it is succeeding in 
delivering a gradually improving standard of living to the poor, fractious
and 95%The Slorc feels secure enough to launch one because it is succeeding
in delivering a gradually improving standard of living to the poor, fractious
and multiethnic country. The benefits of the recent modest growth in the
economy are showing, a series of peace deals have been struck with ethnic
insurgents, and the domestic opposition remains frightened and disorganized. 
Rallying point: Still, Suu Kyi is unlikely to be released any time soon since
she remains such a rallying point. (The junta has said she will remain 
under house arrest at least until 1995 .)

A constitutional convention, packed with delegates hand-packed by the junta,
has been meeting off and on since January 1993 to draft a  new national
charter and is now in session . Its final document will guarantee the
military a leading a role in running the country and will probably ban anyone
who is married to a foreigner (i.e Suu Kyi) from holding public office. But
no matter how much the general try to stack the deck against her, Suu Kyi
remains the country's most popular political figure and the one the generals
have no choice but to talk to.

******************************************************
NATION: GENERALS HAVE MOST TO LOSE IN HIGH-STAKES GAME
Thursday, October 6, 1994
 
Mya Maung looks to the history of military rule in Burma for clues to the 
generals' motivation in meeting with their most famous political opponent.
 
[Photo caption: SUU KYI: waging spiritual war]
 
The recent televised meeting of the two most senior members of the 
Burmese military junta with Aung San Suu Kyi, the formidable opposition 
leader incarcerated since July 1989, has around curiosity and speculation 
among Burma watchers and dissidents.
 
The question is, what are the generals up to? The answer to this question 
must be sought in the light of what the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (Slorc) has done with respect to the democracy movement since 
they seized power in 1988 by killing thousands of demonstrators. 
Subsequent to the 1988 military coup, they held a multi-party democratic 
election in 1990 and dishonoured the result of the election, which was won 
in a landslide by Suu Kyi's opposition party, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD).
 
Since the 1990 election, the generals have systematically subdued the 
NLD's defiant leaders, hundreds of NLD candidates that won seats in the 
election and other dissidents by arresting them and handing out long-term 
jail sentences, The NLD, as a political force and organization to sever the 
military stranglehold on power has been virtually decimated with their 
offices across the country closed down by the military regime. Like the 
dissident students that initiated the 1988 political uprising, a number of 
elected candidates and members of the NLD political party have had to 
flee to the so-called liberated areas along the Thai-Burmese border where 
they formed the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) in alliance with the 
ethnic minority rebel groups. The Slorc has been pursuing a policy of 
"divide and rule" by striking "bilateral" cease-fire agreements with each of 
the ethnic minority rebel groups to destroy the DAB.
 
Since the beginning of 1993 the Slorc began its political mobilization to 
ensure "the leading role of the tatmadaw (army)" in the future politics and 
governance of Myanmar (the new name of Burma). Among political 
manoeuvres by Slorc is the holding of the National Convention (labelled 
by Suu Kyi as an absolute farce) to draw up the catch-22 constitution. It 
brought together some 700 arbitrarily chosen delegates, coercing them to 
endorse the military demand for its leading role and arresting dissident 
delegates -- the most recent arrest of five dissidents occurring this. month.
 
Many outside observers saw this undemocratic process of drawing the 
military-dictated constitution as a step toward democratization .
 
The military regime has also adopted an "open-door market economy" -- 
without giving up its tight control of foreign exchange and industries with 
the highest foreign exchange earning power and introducing ostensible 
macro-economic liberalization and privatization.
 
Despite the success of the generals in decimating political opposition and 
amassing personal wealth from joint ventures formed with foreign firms, 
the economy of Burma remains in shambles; escalating inflation estimated 
to run as high as 150 per cent, dollarization and Sinonization of the 
economy, shortages of rice and other basic necessities, a chronic annual 
trade deficit of US$300 to US$4.00 million. There is outstanding foreign 
debt of around US$5 billion as well as seething corruption.
 
Against this background of the Burmese generals' success in fragmenting 
the unified forces democratic alliance and attracting investments from the 
constructive engagers/investors of the Asean and the West, the only 
obstacle in their path of establishing a militarized government similar to 
the Indonesian model remains Burma's symbol of "Freedom from Fear," 
the 1991 Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Her continued incarceration 
and the spiritual war she has been waging against the illegitimate military 
regime for more than five years have been the main source of trouble and 
international pressure for the Burmese generals.
 
Since last year's visit by US Congressman Bill Richardson, who was the 
first non-family visitor allowed to meet with Burma's most famous prisoner 
of conscience, there has been a mounting international pressure on the 
Burmese generals for her release.
 
The Thai Prime Minister spoke about it at the time of the last July Asean 
ministerial meeting, while the official newspaper of Singapore, The Straits 
Times, carried an editorial, "Myanmar Not to Blow It."
 
Hence, the recent staging of the meeting between the captors and the 
captive should be seen as a response to the mounting international 
pressure on the Burmese generals to deal with Burma's focal point of the 
democracy movement which they have not been able to eradicate. The 
timing of the meeting also coincides with the present annual meeting of 
the UN General Assembly, which has previously passed three different 
resolutions against the Slorc's human rights violations and urged "the 
unconditional release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi".
 
>From what has happened in the past five years, the meeting seems to be 
another political ploy of the generals to stall international sanctions
rather than the beginning of real "positive changes and democratization," a
view held temporarily by Richardson last year and later retracted when Khin 
Nyunt adamantly stated that there is no need to meet her.
 
Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw, who is presently attending the UN General 
Assembly meeting, will be using the meeting as a propaganda ploy in 
order to improve Myanmar's international image and show the genuine 
desire of the generals to democratize Burma. At previous UN General 
Assembly meetings Ohn Gyaw used the Slorc's ostensible efforts and 
success in eradicating opium growing and heroin export from Burma's 
Golden Triangle for the same purpose.
 
Although the meeting signals the start of a peaceful dialogue between the 
two opponents, the crucial questions still to be answered are, what was 
the subject of the first meeting and what will be the subject matter of the 
next meeting if, and indeed when, it takes place. The positions and views 
of the Nobel Laureate and those of the generals are diametrically 
opposed to each other with respect to "freedom from fear" and "rule by 
force and fear".
 
Will the generals give up power and wealth, and retract their demand for a 
leading role in politics and let Suu Kyi establish democracy in Burma? So 
far, the answer to this question seems more negative than positive.
 
Like the National Convention that has been used by the generals to stall 
or rather not to transfer power to the legitimate winners of the 1990 
election, the dialogue between the generals and their main adversary is 
likely to be a long-drawn process with frequent recesses at the will of the 
generals. As Nelson Mandela of South Africa put it, "only free men can 
negotiate. "
 
Mya Maung is a Professor of Finance, School of Management, Boston 
College, US and a visiting fellow at the Centre for International Studies,
the London School of Economics and Political Science.

*************************************************************
TIMES [LONDON]: OBITUARY, U MYINT THEIN
October 6, 1994, Thursday
SECTION: Features
LENGTH: 794 words
HEADLINE: U Myint Thein
BODY:     U Myint Thein, OBE, Chief Justice of
Burma, 1957-62, died on October 3 aged 94. He was
born in Rangoon in 1900.

KNOWN to his friends as ''Uncle Monty'', U Myint Thein was a man whose
indomitable spirit in the face of tyranny and his personal generosity
won friends and admirers throughout the world. Before becoming Burma's Chief
Justice he had served his country as ambassador to both Nationalist and
Communist China and subsequently represented it at the United Nations.  

These were the years of constitutional government in Burma, which had become
independent from British rule in 1948. When the former Burmese
Army commander U Ne Win seized power in 1962, U Myint Thein was, like other
politicians and officials who refused to co-operate with the new,
military regime, dismissed from his post and imprisoned. His dignified
bearing in these trying circumstances only increased the esteem in which
he was held in his own country and abroad.

    U Myint Thein was born into a brilliant Rangoon family. He read law at
Rangoon University and then came to Britain where he continued his
studies at Queens' College, Cambridge. He was called to the Bar by Lincoln's
Inn in 1925 after which he returned to Burma to play his part in the
legislative process as it existed under the administration of the Indian
Empire. His posts included membership of the Burma Legislative
Council from 1935 until the outbreak of the Second World War.     

In January 1941 the Japanese invaded Burma and, by March, Rangoon had fallen.
British forces extricated themselves only with the utmost difficulty and
retreated northwards into India, leaving the country at the mercy of the
invaders. U Myint Thein opted to remain in his country during the Japanese
occupation. He spent the next few years thinly disguised as a mali
(gardener) and at great risk to his own safety did much to mitigate the
hardships endured by many British internees. His services were recognised
(not over-generously) by his appointment as OBE in 1945.

After the war he was appointed Chief Judge of the City Civil Court in
Rangoon, a post he held until Burma's independence in 1948. At that point
he was made his country's first Ambassador to China, then under the
nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and having its capital in Nanking.
When, in 1949, Mao Tse-tung overthrew this government, driving it and Chiang
Kai-shek to seek refuge in Taiwan, U Myint Thein stayed in what had
now become the People's Republic of China, moving to Peking where the new
capital and embassies now were.

In 1953 he led the Burmese delegation to the United Nations where with great
skill he handled Burma's complaint against Kuomintang (Chinese
nationalist) infiltrators into Eastern Burma. He accompanied his Prime
Minister, U Nu, to China in 1954 and to the first Non-Aligned Summit in
Bandung in 1955. 
A judge of the Supreme Court from 1953, he became Chief Justice in 1957 and
held that appointment with distinction until 1962 when he
was imprisoned by the revolutionary government of Ne Win which overthrew U Nu
and embarked on a ''Burmese Road to Socialism''. His wife, Daw Phwa
Hmee, herself a barrister and the first woman to practise before the Courts
in Burma, died during her husband's detention.

In spite of a number of requests for his release by the International
Commission of Jurists, U Myint Thein remained in ''protective
custody'' until 1968. After his release he lived quietly in Rangoon, lonely
in the loss of his accomplished partner. But despite retirement and
ill health, he kept alive his interest in every aspect of the world in which
he had played so active a part, aided by the soundness of his
judgment and his phenomenal memory. 

To the end he retained a mischievous sense of fun, relishing the company of
his friends and conducting an extensive correspondence. He
continued to take a deep interest in the welfare of his country even in old
age and followed the dramatic political events in Burma in 1988 which
saw the end of Ne Win's quarter century long sway over the country.
Thereafter he shared the anxiety of all humane, liberal spirits as Burma
attempted without success to fight its way back to constitutional democracy.
A Buddhist, he was sympathetic to other religions and his faith fortified him
in times of affliction.

U Myint Thein was regarded both inside and outside Burma as a judge of rare
insight and forbearance, as well as being a man of courage and
spirit.  He was also a diplomat of skill and resource, quite apart from being
a scholar, poet and wit. In the days before democracy ceased to
exist in Burma he had received the title of Agga Maha Thray Sithu, the
country's highest honour. 

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CONSTITUTION
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NCUB: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF BURMA (NCUB) 
ON THE HOLDING OF CONSTITUTIONAL SEMINAR
 
1 . Due to lack of investment in basic economic structure, the drop in
exports,
 
the great disparity between the official and black market currency exchange 
rates, the inflation rate of over 45% and the more than five-fold increase in
consumer prices compared to those of 1988, the current situation of the 
economy and the livelihood of the people of Burma has assumed a crisis 
proportion. It is evident that the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) has no capability to solve the problems.
 
2. The SLORC has also to face serious political malaise because it has to 
continue ruling the country by military dictatorship since it seized power in
1988, and because of its refusal to hand over power after the May 1990 
election, its inability to establish real internal peace though it has
reached cease-fire agreement with a number of groups, the increasing
international pressure due to its unjust detention of Daw Aung Sann Suu Kyi
as well as hundreds of politicians and the continued wide spread violations
of human rights by its troops.
 
3. In order to escape from the political dilemma, the SLORC has been holding
a fraudulent national convention. It is attempting to give credibility to its
national convention by reaching cease-fire agreements with some armed 
organizations and allowing their delegates to attend its convention. There
are some indications that the SLORC would make the effort somehow to relate
its negotiation with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to its national convention.
 
4. The basic principles laid down at its fraudulent national convention show 
that the SLORC is attempting to fabricate a state constitution that would 
perpetuate military dictatorship. The main objective of the SLORC is to 
eternalize its rule in the garb of legality by forming a government according
to that constitution. If the SLORC gained, by that means, legality to
continue its rule, it would not only be unnecessary for it to respect the
result of May 1990 elections but it would also gain a valid guarantee for the
perpetuation of its rule. With the sign-board of a legal government, the
SLORC would try to gain international assistance for solving the economic and
other problems.
 
5. After devising a constitution in accordance with its wishes, it is certain
that the SLORC would apply pressure on the groups, with which it has now 
reached temporary ceasefire agreements, to abide by the constitution or, in 
other words, to lay down arms. In that case, the cease-fire agreements would 
break down and the fire of civil war would rage more violently than ever. So 
long as a constitution guaranteeing (1) democratic and human rights, and (2) 
equality for the indigenous ethnic nationalities has not emerged a genuine 
peace cannot be established in the country. If peace cannot be established,
the SLORC would use the civil war as an excuse to commit human rights
violations without end.
 
6. If the SLORC cannot cloak a semblance of legality on its rule through a 
constitution that would result from its fraudulent national convention, the 
SLORC would certainly have to relinquish its power, as it would not be able
to overcome the economic, political and the general crisis it is facing now 
Accordingly, it is necessary for all the democratic and nationality forces to
make a concerted effort to prevent the emergence of a constitution that would
prolong, in any form, the existence of military dictatorship. Only then there
would be a possibility for the emergence of a general political conference 
where the political problems will be solved correctly by political means.
 
7 With the objectives mentioned above, the NCUB, with its initiative and 
sponsorship, is to hold a seminar on the constitutional matters of the Union
of Burma in Manerplaw, the Liberated Area. At the seminar, matters relating
to the SLORC's national convention and how the SLORC is manipulating to 
institute military dictatorship according to the principles laid down by its 
convention, will be widely discussed. In addition, the draft "Constitution of
the Future Federal Union of Burma'' approved by the 1993 congress of the 
Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) will be submitted for discussion, and 
views criticism and advice relating to it will be recorded for future
reference.
 
8. Discussions, resolution and declarations made by the seminar will be
documented on video film, voice tapes and in writing for domestic and
international distribution including the United Nations Organizations and
democratic counties all over the world. In conclusion, we, the NCUB would
like to request Burmese organizations and patriots abroad, and NGOs as well
as individuals promoting human rights, to hold similar seminars on the
constitution of the Union of Burma, in their respective countries
 
 
August 19, 1994                         Executive Committee of NCUB


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JCA: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM
Journal of Constitutional Affairs 
No. 1, September 1994
Burma Lawyers' Council
76 pp. (63 pp. in Burmese, the rest in English are reproduced below)
 
For more information, please contact:
BLC, P.O.Box 31, Mae Sariang, Mae Hong Son Province 58110, Thailand
 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM
Professor Ian Robinson 
August 10, 199l

''Democracy'' means ''rule by the people,'' as distinct from "rule by 
one" such as a king or General, and " rule by the few" such as the
traditional nobility or an army junta. But how should the people rule? How
should they decide when they (or their elected representatives) disagree
about what policy to pursue? The standard response, as we have seen, is
majority rule. But that response still leaves three critical questions
unanswered.

The first question is "which majority shall rule?" should it be the 
majority in those parts of the Shan region where the Pa-O will dominate, for 
example, or the majority in the Shan region as a whole, where the Shans will 
dominate, or the majority in Burma as a whole, where the Burmans will 
dominate, or the majority in the entire South - East Asian region where, 
presumably, the Chinese and the Indians will dominate? We can call this the 
boundary problem, since it concerns where to draw the boundaries that will 
determine which groups will actually get to be a majority.

The second question is closely related: should the boundary that 
determines who will be the majority be drawn in the same way for all
political issues? It may make sense, for example, that issues of national
defense against foreign powers be decided by a national majority since they
boundaries. But if a country has four distinct language groups, each 
concentrated in a different region of the country, and each concerned to 
maintain its own language -- the situation in Switzerland, for example -- it 
make sense to determine question of the language and curriculum of the 
schools by means of a national vote? Perhaps such an issue is better decided 
by the majorities in each of the four regions, so that each can have what it 
wants without trying to force its preferences on the other three. That is the
majority of Swiss people decided. The right to make policies of a particular
kind is called having "jurisdiction,'' so we can call this the jurisdiction 

The third basic question raised by the majority rule follows from the 
fact that it matters how the boundary and jurisdiction questions are
resolved, for every minority there must also be at least one minority group.
minority rights and interests consistently lose out to the majority group, as
they might if many political issues divide along the same ethnic or religious
lines, why should that minority continue to support the democratic system?
Burma is an obvious example at the national level since the Burman ethnic
majority constitutes perhaps two- thirds of the total Burmese population, and
many political issues hinge on ethnic tensions between the Burman majority
and the many ethnic minorities of Burma. This is sometimes called the problem
of tyranny of the majority.

Federal systems of government are one unimportant way of dealing 
with these critical political question facing all democratic societies.
Federal political systems may be deemed as systems in which regional
majorities and their governments are given jurisdiction over some unimportant
political questions, while the national majority and its central or federal
government is given jurisdiction over others. Federal systems thus seek to
resolve the problem of the tyranny of the majority by defining the nation as
the appropriate answer to the boundary question for some jurisdictions, but
the region as the best answer for others.

In a genuine federal system, this division of powers or jurisdictions can
only be changed with the approval of both the federal government and the 
majority of the regional governments. In quasi-federal systems, one order of 
government -- is able to change the division of powers without gaining the 
consent of the other order of government. The United States, Canada, 
Australia, Germany and Switzerland, among other countries, are all examples
of genuine federalism. India and Burma, on the other hand, are quasi-federal 
states because the central government has the constitutional right to give or
take regional government powers without their consent

A federal constitution can be more or less "centralized," that is, it may
assign regional governments a greater or lesser number of important powers,
and more or less of the financial resources necessary to wield those powers
effectively. The Swiss federation gives more powers to its regional 
governments than the Canadian, and the Canadian more than the American. So 
American federalism is the most centralized of the three varieties. Different
orders of government. For example, the Canadian federation having to do with 
the organization and sale of labour, but the American federation assigns the 
same powers to the central government.  Genuine federal systems can therefore
differ from one another in many ways, in accordance with differences in the
character of the countries in which they operate. They are particularly
appropriate in countries with one or more minority group each of which is
concentrated in a particular region of the country. For these are the social
circumstances in which the tyranny of the majority problem is most likely to
lead minority groups to raise the jurisdictional or the boundary question "or
both" concerning the central government. In their strongest forms, these
challenges take the form of independence movements aimed at resolving both
questions by forming an entirely new country.

Genuine federalism is often attractive in these circumstances because it
offers a real alternative to the civil war that often follows from attempts
to create an entirely new country. It may permit small, regionally based
ethnic groups to enjoy the economic and political advantages of membership in
a larger state, such as free access to a larger market, greater political
power in international forums, and more effective defense against the threat
of external aggression. But, at the same time, by language, education and
culture -- to regional governments, it can ensure that these regional
majorities are protected from the worst dangers of tyranny by the national
majority.

It is a difficult and controversial political problem to match boundaries and
jurisdictions in a way that will satisfy both national and regional
majorities. 

And as societies and states evolve, divisions of powers that were once 
satisfactory to all can be rendered obsolete or burdensome. Thus, federal 
states and societies are constantly in flux, and require constant rebalancing
if they are to remain legitimate in the eyes of both national and regional 
majorities.

Such systems are messy and contentious, but that is inevitable in any
political system that seeks to bring together two or more distinct peoples 
within the framework of a single nation. Federal political that are often
found in such political systems. The appropriate response to such conflicts
-- at least, for a society that wishes to protect the civil and democratic
rights of all its citizens -- is not to attempt to repress them by
centralizing the federation, or abandoning federalism. Rather, it is
decentralize down to the level at which most members of the regional
majorities that comprise them believe that their basic values and interests
are secure within the federation.

India's efforts to centralize their quasi-federal system under Mrs 
Gandhi and her sons in the last 20 years could be argued to illustrations of 
regional minorities. As a result. Levels of communal violence and state 
repression have moved in exactly the opposite direction, toward a more 
genuine and decentralized form of federalism in India. This would have given 
regional majorities more of the power of self-determination which they feel
they must have, and which they increasingly believe they can only attain by
armed struggle in pursuit of total national autonomy.

Many would argue that Burma's tragic fate since World War Two 
underscores this lesson. There, an even more centralized quasi-federal system
than India's dominated by a single, very large national ethnic minority,
resulted in outright civil war within a few years of independence. There is
an old fable in which the sun and the wind make a bet concerning which one
can get the man below them to take off his coat most quickly. The confident
wind went first , storming and howling as fiercely as it could, but the man
only clutched his coat tighter about him, never letting go even when he was
blown right off the road. When its turn came, the friendly sun simply beamed
down on the man, who soon grew warm, and took off his coat. If the SLORC and
its military predecessors have been the storm winds, genuine federalism -- if
combined with democracy and respect for individual rights -- may yet be
Burma's sun. 

We must hope that the clouds will break soon.
 

*************************************************************
INTERNATIONAL
*************************************************************
BKK POST: BURMESE FM TALKS TO UN
Sunday, October 9, 1994
by Saritdet Marukatat
New York
 
BURMESE Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw has held two rounds of 
discussions with a representative of United Nations' Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, according to Foreign Minister Prasong Soonsiri.
 
Sqn Ldr Prasong met with the Burmese minister yesterday during which 
Mr Ohn Gyaw briefed him about the meetings without giving details.
 
Mr Ohn Gyaw is in New York to attend the UN General Assembly, which 
he is scheduled to address on Tuesday. While here the Burmese minister 
also met European Union chairman and German Foreign Minister Klaus 
Kinkel.
 
Meanwhile, a well-placed source said State Law and Order Restoration 
Council Secretary Khin Nyunt, believed to be the junta's key man, will 
hold another meeting with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in 
Rangoon.
 
The schedule of the talks has not been set but it will discuss in detail the 
attempts by the government to bring about national reconciliation, the 
source said.
 
It will be a follow-up to the dialogue between Gen Than Shwe, chairman of 
SLORC, Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, and Aung San Suu Kyi last month in 
Rangoon.
 
The first meeting centered on attempts by the Rangoon government to 
resolve social and political problems int he country, the source added.
 
Asked to comment on the future talks between the junta and the Nobel 
Peace Prize winner, Sqn Ldr Prasong said it was a good thing and he 
would like to see more talks as it would narrow the gap and eliminate 
distrust between the two sides.


******************************************************
NATION: BURMA: RECONSTRUCTING THE ENGAGEMENT
Thursday, October 6, 1994
 
Despite potential pitfalls, benchmark diplomacy holds the most promise 
for resolving the Burma crisis. By Peter Goblensky.
 
THE recently completed meetings of Asean states, their dialogue partners 
and other important regional stakeholders were significant for a number of 
reasons.
 
As a harbinger of the economic strength of the region and the potential of 
Asean as an organization to reflect this, all 10 Southeast Asian nations 
were present in varying capacities. As well, in recognition that most of the 
regional conflicts have been largely healed -- save for the gaping wound 
that is Burma -- the meetings devoted considerable energy to regional 
security issues. And finally, despite posturing to the contrary, the policy 
of constructive engagement towards Burma came under careful scrutiny, 
played to mixed reviews and emerged with new friends and suggestions to 
redefine it.
 
As the "runt of the litter" (the Burma delegation attended as invited 
guests of Thailand -- not, as were the others, as official observers) the 
Slorc representatives did not find the protection and nourishment they 
had hoped for but nor were they isolated or ostracized. While a consensus 
of approach to the stalled democracy that is Burma today did not emerge, 
three distinct strategies were considered.
 
The hardline approach advocated by the United States and supported by 
other nations in the international community suggests that truck or trade 
with the Slorc will further entrench its power and lend legitimacy to the 
regime. The strategy assumes that international pressure and the threat of 
sanctions and further ostracization will coax the regime to restore 
democracy to its legitimate owners.
 
At the.opposite end of the strategic spectrum is the official Asean policy 
of constructive engagement. Maligned by some as a smokescreen for 
increasing trade, investment and supporting the political status-quo in 
Burma and praised by others for encouraging dialogue with the regime 
and counteracting isolationism, constructive engagement with the regime 
in Rangoon has been a dominant and influential force in the region. But it 
is the proposed variation on both themes, a third, middle-of-the-road 
strategy that combines dialogue, benchmarks and a timetable for change 
in Burma that attracted the most interest from Asean and its dialogue 
partners.
 
There are two critical assumptions implicit in this new approach of 
"benchmark diplomacy." The first is a genuine desire on the part of Slorc 
to commit itself to dialogue and change. Belief in such a desire may require 
a quantum leap of faith from the world community. To date, the Slorc, 
appearing to respond to international pressure, has developed a reputation 
for introducing well-timed but essentially cosmetic changes to the political 
process in Burma. The second assumption is more ominous: if this "critical 
dialogue'' or benchmark diplomacy fails it will probably result in increased 
pressure from the international community for sanctions and concerted 
action to restore democracy to the beleaguered people of Burma. Arguably, and
despite the potential pitfalls, benchmark diplomacy holds the 
greatest promise for resolving the political, human rights and humanitarian 
crisis that is Burma.
 
In this context, benchmark diplomacy can be defined as a process of 
negotiations with the Slorc regime to secure their commitment to a series 
of specific, achievable objectives. Progress in achieving these objectives 
would be defined and measured by the implementation of a series of 
actions 'and reforms (benchmarks) designed to effect real, not cosmetic 
change.
 
In this instance, the overarching goal of benchmark diplomacy is to secure 
the restoration of democracy to the people of Burma. Without question, 
there would have to be a serious and substantial commitment to dialogue 
and change from the regime in Rangoon. A dangerous disadvantage in 
deploying benchmark diplomacy is that it may be manipulated by their 
regime to buy time and create the illusion of change while reinforcing the 
status-quo. Benchmarks without realistic time-lines or dates for their 
implementation would leave the exercise boned and gutted by the 
wayside.
 
If the political legitimacy of benchmark diplomacy derives from a mutual 
desire to discuss and negotiate, the moral authority of the initiative will 
come from one source only: the definition of each benchmark. This is, 
obviously, the greatest challenge facing the strategy of benchmark 
diplomacy.
 
Benchmarks that do not include the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and 
acceptance of her central role in all negotiations, the release of political 
prisoners, an equitable peace for minorities, a cessation of state and state-
sanctioned abuses of human rights, and the transfer of power to 
democratically elected representatives, is akin to launching a boat into a 
lake without water: it finishes where it starts!
 
There are few stakeholders better equipped to launch this initiative then 
Asean and its member states. Clearly the association is moving 
confidently and assertively beyond the stage when it was an organization 
that was less then the sum of its parts.
 
By using benchmark diplomacy with Slorc it regains the initiative lost to 
other voices in the international community and reconstructs the 
engagement with the regime. The engagement policy then becomes more 
deliberate and purposeful. In terms of the long-range goals of regional 
stability and security surely a healthy, vibrant economy in a democratic 
Burma is worth the effort.
 
Peter Globensky is a former chief of staff to the Canadian Minister of 
External Relations and International Development and is currently the 
director of programmes for the International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development in Montreal, Canada. He coordinated the 
mission of Nobel Peace Laureates to Bangkok and Geneva in 1993 which 
sought the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the restoration of democracy 
to Burma.

*************************************************************
BURMA/U.S. RELATIONS
*************************************************************
REUTERS/BKK POST: CLINTON, CHUAN AGREE ON FREE TRADE PRIORITY 
Saturday, October 8, 1994
Washington
 
US President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai agreed on Thursday
that trade liberalisation in the Pacific Rim should be a priority at 
an upcoming summit of Asian-Pacific leaders, the White House said.
 
Mr Clinton met Mr Chuan for 30 minutes in the Oval Office and the US 
president joined Mr Chuan to greet Thai and US business leaders in 
another section of the White House.
 
Mr Chuan visited Washington after a week-long visit to Canada.
Both leaders will represent their countries at a mid-November summit of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group in Jakarta, Indonesia.
 
"Both leaders emphasised the importance of the upcoming APEC meeting 
in November and agreed that a commitment to regional trade liberalisation 
should be a priority objective at that meeting," said White House 
spokeswoman Dee Dee Myers.
 
The 17 members of APEC are the United States, Canada, Japan, South 
Korea China, Taiwan, Hong Kong the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea and 
New Zealand.
 
Myers said that during the meeting Clinton reaffirmed the importance the 
United States attaches to its long-standing relationship with Thailand, one 
of five treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific region.
 
Following their meeting, the two leaders greeted a group of Thai and 
American business leaders and expressed strong support for 
strengthening private sector ties between the two countries.
 
Mr Chuan indicated that Thailand anticipates having $60 billion in 
infrastructure projects in the next few years, and Clinton expressed 
confidence that American companies, which already have more than $10 
billion invested in Thailand, will compete vigorously for a large share of 
these projects, Myers said.
 
Before the meeting, the two leaders witnessed the opening of the Thai-US 
Business Council together with leading businessmen of the two countries.
 
Apart from the trade issue, the two leaders also touched on many other 
issues.
 
According to a release of Foreign Minister Prasong Soonsiri, Mr Clinton 
praised the Thai Government, which came from elections, as being 
democratic and leading the country towards prosperity.
 
The Thai premier congratulated Mr Clinton for being able to solve the 
problem over Haiti. He said Thailand is ready to cooperate with the United 
States and the United Nations on the Haiti problem and has assigned 
Defence Minister Vijit Sookmark to coordinate with the UN and US 
ambassador to Bangkok David Lambertson to work out details.
 
On Cambodia, Mr Chuan told Mr Clinton he was unhappy seeing news 
media and other people in the United States report incorrectly about 
Thailand.
 
Mr Chuan stressed that the Thai Government supports the present elected 
Cambodian government and the Thai military is not in any way supporting 
the Khmer Rouge.
 
Mr Clinton said he understands the Thai Government and that the US 
Government will report this to the Congress, Mr Prasong said in his 
release.
 
On Burma, Mr Chuan said Thailand and the United States have the same 
objective but different ways of practice. Thailand and other ASEAN 
members have the policy of constructive engagement which aims more at 
bringing Burma out to associate with the rest of the world outside rather 
than putting pressure on that country. Changes in Burma may be taking 
place very slowly, but in a positive way.
 
Mr Clinton asked Mr Chuan's opinion about a recent meeting between the 
Burmese junta and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The prime 
minister said the meeting was a result of external pressure and that he 
used to talk about this with the foreign minister of Burma.

END OF PART I