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BurmaNet News: November 7, 1994
- Subject: BurmaNet News: November 7, 1994
- From: strider@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 08 Nov 1994 08:39:00
************************** BurmaNet **************************
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
**************************************************************
BurmaNet News: Monday, November 7, 1994
Issue #55
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Contents:
1. BKK POST: WASHINGTON PAVES WAY FOR BURMESE JUNTA TO SAVE FACE
AND THE COUNTRY
2. REUTERS: SENIOR BRITISH OFFICIAL VISITS BURMA
3 REUTERS: BURMA'S KHIN NYUNT TO VISIT INDONESIA
4. BKK POST: SUCHINDA MEETS BURMESE LEADER
5. BURMANET: THE LITTLE GENERAL THAT COULDN'T
6. BKK POST: THAILAND PROMOTES MEKONG REGIONAL COPYRIGHT ACCORD
7. BKK POST/DA: WHAT PRICE JUSTICE?
8: S.C.B.: HUBBARD ON BURMA POLICY
9: BURMANET: CORRECTION
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BKK POST: WASHINGTON PAVES WAY FOR BURMESE JUNTA TO SAVE FACE AND
THE COUNTRY
Sunday, November 6, 1994
Washington has made it clear to the ruling Burmese junta that it
would impose further restrictions on political and economic ties
unless the Rangoon government improves its record on human
rights, political reforms and narcotics suppression.
The veiled threats were issued after senior US diplomats led by
Thomas Hubbard, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia
and Pacific Affairs, met senior junta member Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt
and Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw last week.
It was the first high-level discussion between the two countries
in six years since the US recalled its ambassador from Rangoon in
1989 after SLORC seized power in 1988.
Hubbard told a press conference in Bangkok last week after the
two-day visit to Rangoon that "We travelled to Burma to convey to
the Burmese authorities the strong US interest in progress on
issues of political concern, specifically human rights,
democratisation and counter-narcotics.
"We indicated that we would like to see more constructive
relations between the United States and Burma. We made clear,
however, that significant movement on issues of concern is
necessary if there is to be any progress in bilateral relations."
However, Hubbard and his team received no commitment from Rangoon
except a promise to continue talks with Aung San Suu Kyi and to
survey Burma's opium harvest with the cooperation of the United
States. This concession by SLORC may seem rather small but
indicates that pressure from a superpower at the right time does
produce results.
Burma today has virtually depleted its foreign exchange reserves
and is having difficulty paying even the salaries of its
diplomats, a Burma- watcher said recently. The Burmese kyat is
worthless and SLORC is using "foreign exchange certificates"
(FECs) to facilitate trade in Burma. But there are $10 of FECs in
circulation for each dollar it holds in hard currency reserves.
To avoid national bankruptcy, SLORC needs the cooperation of the
United States which could help obtain aid from international
financial institutions like the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank. The US has opposed support from these
organisations since it listed Burma as one of the countries that
did not cooperate fully with narcotics. To help avoid this
financial fiasco, SLORC would do well to accept Washington's
other proposals on greater democracy and human rights in the
country.
The United States is serious about its proposals, or threats if
one would like to call them that, when it says it wants to see
constructive relations between the two countries.
A recent report in the US News and World Report stated that the
National Security Council will within a month or so recommend for
the president's signature classification of Burma as a "serious
national security threat". If that classification is authorised
it would mean relations between Rangoon and Washington would
deteriorate further as it could entail covert operations in
Burma.
The generals in Burma must surely know about this as SLORC's
$10,000 per month part-time lobbyist in Washington would have
informed its client by now of the significance of that
authorisation. SLORC also fully realises that the Burma policy is
now being made by the National Security Council rather than the
State Department.
A National Security Council official in Hubbard's delegation said
Khin Nyunt listened to the US position without hostility and in a
way that indicated he understood what was being proposed. "The
ball is in the government of Burma's court," he said.
So who is Lt-General Khin Nyunt trying to fool when he announced
that the second meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi on October 28 took
place "not because of anybody's urgings or due to any pressure
put on us, but based on mutual understanding and concern for the
future welfare of the country."
One person concerned about the future welfare of Burma is Aung
San Suu Kyi, who is in her sixth year of house arrest. We doubt,
however, if Khin Nyunt and his cronies are. His statement can be
taken seriously only when SLORC relinquishes its illegal rule and
honours the results of the 1990 election won by the National
League for Democracy. Also, SLORC must scrap the rubber- stamp
constitution being worked out by the so- called National
Convention at gunpoint.
There is still time for the military to bow out gracefully and
regain the trust and respect of the Burmese people it once
enjoyed. Many in the armed forces want their respect back after
being shunned by the populace for so long. The United States has
paved the way for this to be realised. It would do SLORC good and
benefit the country as a whole to accept the proposals put forth
by Washington if peace, harmony and most of all, national
reconciliation are to be achieved in Burma.
"National reconciliation" as Aung San Suu Kyi puts it, "doesn't
just mean reconciliation between two people [SLORC and Aung San
Suu Kyi] -- I don't accept that at all. It's a reconciliation
between different ideas. What we need is a spiritual and
intellectual reconciliation. I've always said that the only
answer to Burma's problem is dialogue."
The dialogue has begun, and now SLORC must ensure that it
continues until a peaceable solution is found for the sake of the
42 million suffering Burmese.
**************************************************************
REUTERS: SENIOR BRITISH OFFICIAL VISITS BURMA
LONDON, Nov 7 (Reuter) - Britain said on Monday a senior Foreign
Office official would visit Burma this week for talks with the
ruling military government.
A Foreign Office spokesman said the November 8-11 visit, the
first by a senior British official since the Burmese elections of
1990, accorded with the European Union policy of ``critical
dialogue'' with the Rangoon government.
The visit by David Dain, an assistant under-secretary of state,
followed some ``potentially encouraging'' signals from the
government including meetings with Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Aung San Suu Kyi, he said.
Suu Kyi, who has a British husband, and another prominent
dissident, Tin U, have been detained since July 1989, but
nevertheless managed to lead their National League for Democracy
to an overwhelming victory in May 1990 elections.
The spokesman said Dain's visit would help the London government
judge whether any ``positive improvement'' had taken place in
Burma.
It would also ensure Burmese authorities understood the British
government's continuing concerns in the key areas of human rights
and democratic reforms, he said.
REUTER Transmitted: 94-11-07 09:38:48 EST
**************************************************************
REUTERS: BURMA'S KHIN NYUNT TO VISIT INDONESIA
JAKARTA, Nov 7 (Reuter) - The effective leader of Burma's ruling
State Law and Order Restoration Council, Lieutenant General Khin
Nyunt, will visit Indonesia to study the role of women, Women's
Affairs Minister Mien Sugandhi said on Monday.
``Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt will visit Indonesia on December
19-24. We invite him to see the role of women in Indonesia and
they will also attend Indonesian Mother's Day in South Sumatra on
December 22,'' Sugandhi told reporters after meeting President
Suharto.
Burma has been largely ostracised by the international community
since the army massacre of democracy protesters in 1988 and a
later crackdown on opposition figures, including Novel peace
prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi.
Khin Nyunt visited Indonesia in December 1993 as part of a move
to recover international acceptance after the military council's
1988 takeover. Sugandhi said other women officials from Burma
would accompany Khin Nyunt.
REUTER
Transmitted: 94-11-07 02:50:29 EST
**************************************************************
BKK POST: SUCHINDA MEETS BURMESE LEADER
Sunday, November 6, 1994
Former military strongman Suchinda Kraprayoon is currently paying
Burma a visit to meet the State Law and Order Restoration Council
first secretary Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt.
It is not known what Gen Suchinda is in Burma for but the Burmese
television monitored in Bangkok said that he met with Lt-Gen Khin
Nyunt who is also the Burmese military intelligence chief.
Gen Suchinda resigned as prime minister after soldiers opened
fire on unarmed pro-democracy protesters in Bangkok in May 1992
when they were staging a protest against him.
The general was also the mastermind of the February 23, 1991 coup
d'etat against the democratically elected government of Gen
Chatichai Choonhavan.
**************************************************************
BURMANET: THE LITTLE GENERALS THAT COULDN'T
November 7, 1994
Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon is the second most loathed man in
Thailand. Among his rivals for the title of most loathed would be
the cousins Noonpakdi, Gen. Issarapong and Gen. Chainarong, who
helped him pull off the 1991 coup. These three and a few others
headed up the the National Peace Keeping Committee (NPKC), which
was Thailand's version of the SLORC.
The last time a member of Suchinda's faction visited Rangoon was
on the eve of their 1991 coup. The two armies have "brotherly"
relations and they sometimes confer with each other about what
they are planning to do. The visit by members of Suchinda's
clique to Rangoon in 1991 was returning a favor shown to
them when leaders of Burma's army travelled to Bangkok in 1989 to
inform the Thais that they were about to stage a "coup."
Suchinda coup went off bloodlessly and at first he was popular
because the government he unseated was widely viewed as
irreedemably corrupt. Suchinda promised a speedy handover of
power to an elected government and swore he had no designs on the
Prime Minister's job for himself. Then the trainwreck started.
The man who was designated as the next Prime Minister, Narong
Wongwan, was (and still is) deeply involved in heroin
trafficking. When the U.S. Embassy revealed that Narong's visa
application had been rejected because of suspected involvement in
trafficking, public opposition to Narong became intense.
Suchinda dropped Narong in favor of himself, thereby breaking his
promise not to put an unelected man in the top job. Suchinda then
appointed a cabinet filled with the same people he had overthrown
months earlier on account of their corruption.
At this point, people took to the streets. Head counts differ,
but 200,000 is not a bad estimate. The NPKC's response was to
order the army to shoot. Somewhere between 40 and 200 people,
most of them students, died. The crowds in the streets were too
much for Suchinda to control and he was forced to step down,
retiring in disgrace. Since then, he's maintained a low profile.
Although Suchinda and the coup leaders are in disgrace, they're
not in penury. Bangkok papers last week revealed that Suchinda's
friend and collaborator Gen. Issarapong Noonpakdi, is in
possession of a mansion built on 5000 acres of what used to be
national forest land and legally, still is. How the land was
magically transformed into Gen. Issarapong's private playground
is very much a mystery. Gen. Issarapong seems to need so much
land because he likes to play with trains, real ones. It seems
that Gen. Issarapong likes trains so much that his friend
Suchinda gave him one as a lawn decoration. It is not yet clear
whether Suchinda stole the train from the army or the State
Railway Authority.
Suchinda's current trip to Burma is probably no more than a
golfing holiday as the days when he could arrange a seem safely
over. However, there may yet be room for one more joint venture
between the generals. Given SLORC's facility for building
railroads (using forced labor) could it be that Suchinda is
arranging for some tracks to go with his friend's train?
**************************************************************
BKK POST: THAILAND PROMOTES MEKONG REGIONAL COPYRIGHT ACCORD
Saturday, November 5, 1994
by Somporn Thapanachai
Thailand wants the countries in Mekong Basin to have a
single framework for cooperating on intellectual property
protection, says Deputy Commerce Minister Jurin
Laksanavisit.
The country will offer to host a meeting on the subject
involving officials from the Mekong region -- Thailand,
Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma and China -- in January, he
said.
Thailand has signed memoranda of understanding on protection
of intellectual property rights with Vietnam and Laos and
will sign another with China on November 18.
Mr Jurin said that after signing a memorandum with China, he
hopes to complete another with Burma soon.
Once bilateral agreements are in place with all its
neighbours, Thailand wants to hold the meeting of officials
to discuss information exchanges, technical and personnel
training exchanges and law-enforcement cooperation.
Mr Jurin said he hoped a unified approach to cooperation
would encourage more trade and investment among countries in
the region, because they would be confident that their
products would be protected in other countries.
He will lead the Thai delegation to Beijing to sign the
memorandum with Song Jian, a member of the State Council and
supervisor of the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Offices.
The patent office is independent but the trademark and
copyright offices are under China's State Administration of
Industry and Commerce.
Suchai Jaovisidth, director-general of the Department of
Intellectual Property, said the agreement with China would
emphasise information exchanger to improve efficiency,
particularly using computers.
Thailand intends to be a regional centre for patent and
copyright protection. Japan has contributed 100 million baht
to help the country establish an intellectual property
centre within four years.
**************************************************************
BKK POST/DA: WHAT PRICE JUSTICE?
November 5, 1994
Rangoon, Depthnews Asia--
"Corruption in Burma's judiciary remains a problem despite strict
action taken by the government against erring officials. Minn Thu
reports."
Burma's judicial halls have become a vast marketplace where
buyers, sellers, middlemen and influence peddlers haggle for the
price of justice.
Nowadays, justice is a commodity to be sold and bought in this
former socialist country of 43.91 million people. This least
developed country has been under martial law since the 1988 coup
d'etat.
The judiciary has lost the public's trust and confidence because
of rampant bribery and corruption in the court, resulting in
power abuse, malpractice and injustice. Even the families of some
officials are said to be involved in this sordid affair,
interfering in government affairs such as in the administration
and dispensation of justice.
It is said that enterprising people from both foreign and local
firms give money to officials vested with power whenever they
travel abroad. Others are giving dole-outs and presents for
anticipated favours.
Some influence peddlers were reported to be demanding "interview
fees" from foreign businessmen and prospective investors who
wanted to meet with government officials.
This grim picture of the justice system in Burma came from the
military's State Law and Order Restoration Council's (SLORC) Lt
Gen. Khin Nyunt. He is SLORC secretary 1 and director of Defence
Services Intelligence.
Lt Gen Nyunt, also the chief of the Office of Strategic Studies,
described the situation as "bad news" that has smeared the image
of the country and its people. He said the image has spread to
other countries and to foreign businessmen and investors.
He cited as an example a suspect in a drug case who was released
by the judge and the law officer of a court after they were
bribed by the defence counsel. Another court acquitted three
people accused of distributing counterfeit currency, totally
disregarding strong evidence against them.
In another case, a township law and order council chairman was
being prosecuted for allegedly asking for bribe money in
connection with he dismantling of a building.
The SLORC leader added that some judges were trying cases that
were not within their jurisdiction or power. One judge was found
using a vehicle which had been confiscated as evidence, while
others had committed acts that an ordinary person would not dare
to, such as taking drugs, misappropriating state funds, and even
raping the sister of a suspect right in the court room.
He noted that many were stretching the law in both criminal and
civil cases to suit their selfish ends and extort money, while
others were making arbitrary judgements, sometimes with complete
disregard for the law.
Lt Gen Nyunt deplored the fact that these things were happening
despite strict action taken against corrupt officials in the
judiciary. He reported 21 officials had been removed, 20
dismissed, 54 forcibly retired, and 339 had been either
reprimanded or had lost their promotions and salary increases.
Serious offences by law officers, police surgeons, police
officers and other investigators, chemical examiners, and lawyers
have also been reported. Advocates and lawyers are also becoming
remiss in the performance of their duties, not only due to lack
of proper training and experience but also because many of them
believe that money matters most.
"It is high time they watched their step," Mr Nyunt warned.
* At the ongoing national convention that is drafting the basic
principles for a new Constitution, SLORC said it wants 25 per
cent representation in all emerging legislatures.
Burma will soon have a bicameral union legislature and a
legislature in each of the 14 states and divisions (that would be
redesignated regions) provided for under the basic principles
passed by the national convention.
The bicameral union legislature would be composed of a 440-seat
lower house, to be called the House of Representatives, and a
224-seat upper house, to be called the House of Nationalities. In
both houses, the military wants 25 per cent of the total seats.
Each of the 14 states and divisions would be given a quota of 16
representatives with about a third or fourth coming from the
military.
**************************************************************
S.C.B.: HUBBARD ON BURMA POLICY
dks@xxxxxxx
Nov 7, 1994
wcsbeau@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Reid Cooper) writes:
> I was going over some old issues of *The New Light of Myanmar*
> when I came across the following quote [...]
I'm glad you mentioned Myanmar in a.f.d-q again. The attached
testimony has been overtaken by events in some respects, but it
may still be interesting or useful (given that Hubbard was just
in Rangoon last week). Comments, especially from skeptics, are
welcome, as always.
Cheers,
Dhanesh
|
| Testimony by
| Thomas C. Hubbard
| Deputy Assistant Secretary
| Bureau of East and Pacific Affairs
| U.S. Department Of State
| Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
| House Foreign Affairs Committee
| June 29, 1994
|
|
| Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join you today to discuss our
| objectives and policy vision in Burma.
|
| Our primary objective in Burma, Mr. Chairman, is an end to
| the current regime's pervasive human rights abuses and the
| establishment of a democratic, representative government
| reflecting the will of the Burmese people. In view of Burma's
| role as the predominant supplier of heroin to the US, our
| second important objective is to bring an end to the production
| and export of Burmese opium and heroin. These objectives are
| mutually reinforcing.
|
| As you may know, Mr. Chairman, Burma was the subject of a
| White House, Deputies-level meeting earlier this year. The
| most important decision reached by the deputies was endorsement
| of more vigorous U.S. Government efforts to promote human
| rights and democratization in Burma. In this respect, we have
| urged the regime in Rangoon to begin a dialogue with Aung San
| Suu Kyi and to release her unconditionally. We are also
| encouraging European and Asian governments to press the regime
| on critical human rights issues. And we are urging more
| vigorous UN action on Burma, including the establishment of a
| UN Special Envoy to seek human rights improvements and
| implementation of the results of the 1990 elections.
|
| In addition to these and other diplomatic measures, we are
| seeking to broaden our humanitarian assistance efforts directed
| at displaced Burmese in the region. AID is now ready to begin
| implementation of its million-dollar earmark to provide
| assistance for displaced Burmese in Thailand or Burma. This
| will focus on health-care assistance in the Thai-Burma border
| and elsewhere in Thailand.
|
| Throughout this process, we have greatly valued the
| contributions of Foreign Affairs Committee staff and we look
| forward to continued cooperation with you on this important
| issue.
|
| Three key events in recent Burmese political history
| influence U.S. policy towards Burma: the violent suppression
| of the Burmese democracy movement in 1988 by the State Law and
| Order Restoration Council, commonly referred to as the SLORC;
| the house arrest in July 1989 of Burmese democratic activist
| and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; and the
| refusal of the SLORC to recognize the results of the 1990
| Parliamentary elections in which Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the
| National League for Democracy, won an overwhelming majority.
|
| Burma remains one of the world's worst violators of human
| rights. The SLORC military junta maintains its grip by
| suppressing political freedoms, rigorously controlling the
| press and harassing and imprisoning democratic leaders. Aung
| San Suu Kyi and other leading political prisoners remain under
| dention. The Burmese people's basic political and civil
| liberties are either non-existent or sharply curtailed. The
| Burmese Army continues to employ forced labor under inhumane
| conditions in its campaigns against ethnic minorities. Over
| 70,000 refugees remain in camps on the Thai-Burma border, and
| nearly 200,000 Rohingya Moslems who fled Arakan State are still
| in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the Burmese military continues its
| unprecedented expansion and has nearly doubled the number of
| its combat units in recent years.
|
| The SLORC regime has consolidated control over the country
| and is in a confident frame of mind. The economy, although
| troubled by persistent inflation, is growing and attracting new
| foreign investment and increased numbers of tourists. The
| SLORC has effectively silenced the democratic opposition and is
| successfully negotiating separate cease-fire accords with many
| of the ethnic insurgent groups, some of which have been in
| almost continual revolt against the Burmese Central Government
| since the end of the Second World War. The SLORC shows no
| intention of implementing the results of the 1990 elections.
|
| Motivated in part by a desire to regain some international
| stature, the SLORC has taken some steps in the past two years
| to ease the harshness of martial law. Measures include the
| reported release of over 2000 political prisoners, the lifting
| of a nation-wide curfew, the re-opening of the universities,
| and the signing of an MOU with UNHCR which provides for their
| official presence in Burma to ensure that the Rohingya Muslim
| refugees remaining in Bangladesh are repatriated voluntarily in
| safety and dignity.
|
| The SLORC has also permitted Aung San Suu Kyi family
| visits, and allowed Congressman Bill Richardson to meet with
| her in February. However, there has been no fundamental change
| in the government's repressive rule, and there has been no
| movement towards a dialogue between the SLORC and Aung San Suu
| Kyi since her February meeting with Congressman Richardson.
|
| In January 1993, the SLORC convened a hand-picked National
| Convention to draft guidelines for a new constitution. The
| National Convention has as its principal objective the
| consolidation and legitimization of the military's role in
| Burma's future political institutions. Several chapters of the
| constitution have reportedly been completed, but it could be
| months or even years before it is finished. The constitution
| may eventually be submitted to a referendum, perhaps followed
| by regime-controlled elections. Most observers contend that
| the SLORC will not soon relinquish its grip or its vested
| interest in retaining power.
|
| With its leadership in detention or exile, the democratic
| opposition within Burma is in very difficult straits. The
| Burmese population remains intimidated by the regime and
| focussed on the routines of daily life, while some enjoy the
| new business opportunities stemming from the SLORC's limited
| economic reforms. At the same time, politically aware Burmese
| remain deeply alienated from the regime and rightly cynical
| about its attempt to institute merely cosmetic political
| change. As a result, many educated Burmese have fled the
| country.
|
| Strains between the primarily Burman democratic opposition
| and their ethnic allies, have been exacerbated by the SLORC's
| attempts to reach separate cease-fires with ethnic insurgents.
| Thailand, in pursuit of better relations with Burma and serving
| its own perceived national security interests, has clamped down
| on the activities of Burmese exiles and is taking an increasing
| role in SLORC's efforts to bring the ethnic groups into
| cease-fire agreements. We have encouraged the Thai Government
| to maintain policies that are sympathetic to the humanitarian
| needs of displaced Burmese.
|
| While the SLORC is in its strongest position ever, it
| remains wary of Aung San Suu Kyi and the potential threat she
| represents to their continued rule. In spite of nearly five
| years of detention, Aung San Suu Kyi remains as determined as
| ever to pursue the struggle for democracy in Burma, and still
| commands great moral authority. She has renounced personal
| political ambitions and categorically rejects the regime's
| offer for her to leave the country. She maintains that a
| genuine dialogue with the regime is the only way to end the
| country's political impasse.
|
| The U.S. has repeatedly urged publicly and privately that
| the Burmese military regime immediately lift Aung San Suu Kyi's
| house arrest and release all political prisoners. Since taking
| office, President Clinton has made three separate statements on
| Burma making clear our support for the democratic struggle in
| Burma and the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all
| other remaining political prisoners.
|
| Not only does Burma have an abysmal human rights record
| within its own borders, but, as the world's largest producer of
| opium and heroin, it has contributed to addiction and the
| spread of drug-related crime everywhere. Since 1988, the
| military regime has sharply reduced its already limited
| counter-narcotics program with the result that opium production
| reached an estimated level of 2,575 metric tons in 1993. The
| SLORC undertakes few narcotics related law enforcement measures
| and has reached political accommodations with certain ethnic
| insurgent groups in the Shan State permitting them to continue
| opium production and trafficking in return for ceasing
| hostilities against the central government. At the same time,
| however, the Burmese Ar currently pursuing a military
| campaign directed against the Shan United Army headed by heroin
| warlord (and indicted US fugitive) Khun Sa.
|
| While our influence on Burma's closed society is limited,
| we continue to push for democratic reform and basic human
| rights bilaterally and multilaterally. Following the brutal
| suppression of the democracy movement in 1988, the US suspended
| all bilateral assistance programs and, along with the EU,
| Australia, and Japan, implemented a voluntary arms embargo.
| We also revoked GSP privileges and suspended eligibility for
| Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC) programs.
|
| We have lobbied for successively stronger resolutions for
| the past three years at the UNGA and five at the UNHRC,
| condemning the junta for its human rights violations and urging
| transition to democratic rule. As a direct result, the latest
| UNGA and UNHRC resolutions request the assistance of the UN
| Secretary General in addressing the situation in Burma. In
| fact, we would have preferred an even stronger resolution than
| that adopted by last year's UNGA, and it was for this reason
| that we chose not to co-sponsor the resolution that was
| ultimately adopted.
|
| Most recently, our delegation to the International Labor
| Organization Conference, held in Geneva in June 1994, worked
| vigorously to increase international pressure on the SLORC to
| end forced labor and permit freedom of association for workers.
|
| In 1989, the U.S. ceased certifying Burma as a cooperating
| country on counter-narcotics efforts. As a result, the U.S. is
| required by law to vote against development bank lending and
| other IFI loans to Burma, except for projects which meet basic
| human needs. It should be noted that even in the absence of
| decertification, the U.S. would still oppose loans to Burma
| because of its major human rights violations.
|
| The United States has a significant interest in ending the
| flow of heroin from Burma, the world's largest producer of this
| narcotic. We maintain narcotics cooperation with Burma under
| constant review as one option to ameliorate the deadly impact
| of Burmese heroin on the United States, but it is unlikely that
| the heroin trade can be curtailed without fundamental political
| change in Burma. That is why the recent inter-agency policy
| review concluded that a higher level of cooperation is not a
| reasonable prospect at this time and that the promoting of
| democracy in Burma is ultimately the best way to achieve our
| counternarcotics objectives as well.
|
| Heroin from Burma is a threat not only to the US but also
| to Burma's neighbors including China, India, Thailand and
| Malaysia. US officials therefore are consulting with those
| governments to develop more effective approaches directed
| against the production and trafficking of heroin from Burma,
| including efforts to stem the supply of arms and essential
| chemicals that sustain the Burma-based trafficking groups such
| as Khun Sa's Shan United Army.
|
| We are also pursuing a variety of counternarcotics measures
| including regional diplomatic initiatives, support for UNDCP
| crop substitution projects and dialogue with the Burmese regime
| calling for serious and sustained efforts to comply with the
| 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs.
| We are also exploring possibilities for other programs that
| might assist impoverished farmers without directly benefitting
| the SLORC regime.
|
| In order to stem the flow of arms to Burma, the U.S. has
| made over 40 demarches to almost twenty countries urging them
| to desist from arms sales to Rangoon. Regrettably, countries
| such as Poland, Portugal, Singapore and South Korea continue to
| tolerate the sale and transshipment of military items to Burma.
| China alone has sold an estimated one billion dollars' worth
of
| arms to the SLORC since 1989. We will continue to press other
| countries to desist from supplying the SLORC with arms and
| military equipment.
|
| To be frank, the U.S. has found it difficult to build
| broader international support for a more effective arms
| embargo. Our efforts lto nudge the UN General
| Assembly towards voluntary arms restraints were not successful,
| largely on the procedural grounds that the Third Committee
| could only address human rights issues; among Asian nations
| there was no support at all for our initiative. While we would
| even support a mandatory embargo, obtaining such an embargo
| would be a major challenge. This is because it would require
| UN Security Council approval for which strong regport,
| including from China, would be essential. Nevertheless, we
| will continue to explore and encourage support for multilateral
| endorsement of such an embargo.
|
| In the wake of Congressman Bill Richardson's unprecedented
| February meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi and SLORC strongman LTG
| Khin Nyunt, we have urged the international community to
| encourage the SLORC to begin a dialogue with her as the best
| way to end the political impasse in the country.
|
| had hoped for more immediate signs of progress,
| the SLORC has not ruled out the possibility of high level
| dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi. More political prisoners,
| including the well-known Zargana, have been released.
| Negotiations between the International Committee of the Red
| Cross (ICRC) and the SLORC for access to political prisoners
| are underway and making headway. Nevertheless, the situation
| in Burma remains grim.
|
| The United States has not had an Ambassador in Burma the
| last four years. Following the departure of our last
| ambassador in 1990, we originally supported the appointment of
| a new ambassador. Given the length of time since we have had
| an ambassador in Burma, we now believe that such an appointment
| must be evaluated with great caution lest it be interpreted by
| the SLORC as a sign of US approval. Retaining U.S. diplomatic
| representation at the charge level has allowed the United
| States to express its displeasure with the human rights record
| of the SLORC in readily understood diplomatic parlance. In
| addition, given the SLORC's growing interest in international
| contacts, we believe that the decision of whether and when to
| appoint an Ambassador to Burma provides us with a useful
| incentive to use with the Burmese leadership to encourage
| improved human rights practices.
|
| We have no current plans to appoint an Ambassador to Burma,
| but would be prepared to reconsider this position in light of
| significant movement towards respect for human rights and
| democracy.
|
| The question is often asked whether the US should seek to
| limit trade and investment with Burma. As you know, detained
| Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi advocates
| restricting foreign investment until there are significant
| human rights improvements, [but] the prevailing view among most
| governments in the region favors more, not less, trade.
|
| While we are exploring whether multilateral or bilateral
| sanctions are both feasible and effective, there are obstacles
| in this area. The economic impact of multilateral sanctions on
| Burma would be limited by several factors. First, the Burmese
| economy is agricultural and largely self-sustaining. It proved
| surprisingly resilient even during the years of self-imposed
| isolation under long-time dictator Ne Win. Burma's extensive
| borders with India, China and Thailand are porous and black
| market trade cannot be stopped, making enforcement of sanctions
| extremely difficult.
|
| The SLORC wants closer political and economic ties with the
| West, including the U.S., so the political impact of
| wide-ranging trade restrictions in Burma might be more
| significat than their economic effects. In this respect,
| multilateral sanctions would clearly be preferable, but Japan
| and ASEAN oppose trade and investment embargoes, and the
| European countries have no enthusiasm for them either.
| Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Australia, France, and the U.K.
| are actively pursuing business interests in Burma, and
| Singapore may soon rival the U.S. as the largest investor in
| Burma.
|
| Nevertheless, we continue to work closely with the
| international community to explore ways to promote positive
| change. And while the U.S. ad ASEANshare the long-term goal
| of a more open, progressive and stable Burma, our respective
| tactical approaches differ. For example, in 1993 ASEAN
| conducted an internal debate about the possibility of including
| Burma as an observer. As a result, Thailand, as the ASEAN
| Standing Committee Chairman, invited Burma to attend the
| opening ceremonies of the ASEAN annual gathering this July in
| Bangkok as the RTG's guest. The U.S. has repeatedly stated
| that while it is up to ASEAN members themselves to decide which
| countries will participate, we believe it is premature, absent
| significant political reform and an improvement in the
| country's human rights record to extend observer status or
| membership to the Burmese.
|
| Like the U.S. and ASEAN, the U.S. and Japan share similar
| goals on human rights and democratization but disagree on how
| to achieve them, with the U.S. preferring the isolation of
| Burma and Japan favoring engagement. De differences
| in approach however, Japan froze new foreign assistance to
| express displeasure following the events of 1988-89.
| Diplomatic exchanges have also been reduced. Japan maintains
| its freeze on new economic assistance, but will renew small
| scale technical assistance projects.
|
| Finally, China's shift towards a decentralized
| market-oriented economy has stimulated growing cross-border
| trade with its neighbors, including Burma. A growing number of
| Chinese-financed infrastructure projects underscores China's
| role as the dominant economic influence in Burma. These
| growing commercial ties are another reason why China would
| resist further efforts to isolate Rangoon.
|
| Despite the difference in approach, we will continue to
| stress more vigorous efforts to bring pressure to bear upon the
| regime in Rangoon. Burma continues to present one of the most
| frustratinglling problems in our international
| relations. Political freedom remains non-existent, and the
| regime has yet to show a real willingness to grapple with
| narcotics issues.
|
| The SLORC calculates that foreign aid will flow if it is
| able to quell the insurgencies, show a nominal effort to
| neutralize the drug lords, and open up the economy even in the
| absence of recognizing the results of the 1990 elections,
| releasing the most important political prisoners, or any "real"
| improvement in human rights.
|
| No government which does not express the political will of
| the people can endure indefinitely, and the voice of Burma's
| democratic forces will be heard again. Our attempts to promote
| true democracy and human rights will continue unabated, as will
| our unflagging support for Aung San Suu Kyi and other political
| prisoners.
|
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BURMANET: CORRECTION
November 7, 1994
In the November 6 issue of the BurmaNet News, an article titled
"WHY THE DIFFERENCE" was misidentified as appearing in the
Bangkok Post. The article actually appeared in The Nation.
BurmaNet regrets this error.
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NEWS SOURCES REGULARLY COVERED/ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET:
AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS
AFP: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
AW: ASIAWEEK
AWSJ: ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
Bt.: THAI BAHT; 25 Bt.=US$1 (APPROX),
BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
BI: BURMA ISSUES
BIG: BURMA INFORMATION GROUP
BKK POST: BANGKOK POST (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
BRC-CM: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-CHIANG MAI
BRC-J: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-JAPAN
CPPSM: C'TEE FOR PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND
FEER: FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
JIR: JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
KHRG: KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP
Kt. BURMESE KYAT; 110-120 KYAT=US$1 BLACK MARKET
6 KYAT=US$1 OFFICIAL
MOA: MIRROR OF ARAKAN
NATION: THE NATION (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
NLM: NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR (DAILY STATE-OWNED NEWSPAPER, RANGOON)
S.C.B.:SOC.CULTURE.BURMA NEWSGROUP
S.C.T.:SOC.CULTURE.THAI NEWSGROUP
SEASIA-L: S.E.ASIA BITNET MAILING LIST
USG: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
XNA: XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
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