Thailand could gain an advantage over Singapore and Hong Kong
in opening markets there, says Narong Suthisamphat, executive
vice-president of Bangkok-based United Foods. At a recent
promotional meeting in northern Thailand, the enthusiasm of
local entrepreneurs extended to inviting participants from as
far north as Mongolia.
But Thailand's dreams of acting as a land bridge to China are
tempered by concerns about the strategic and economic impact of
drawing their giant neighbour closer. Yunnans population of 38
million and its developing industrial base make it potentially
the strongest economic component of the region.
China is bound to want access to this area, but there are
political and military as well as economic implications, says
Pravit Arkarachinores, the head of a newly formed council of
businessmen for northern Thailand.
Some of these developments have found an official agenda in the
so-called Northern Growth Quadrangle, encompassing parts of
Thailand, Burma, Laos and southern China. Backed by the Asian
Development Bank, the concept aims to generate trade and
economic growth in one of the last marginal areas of Southeast
Asia. Infrastructure projects, some funded by the bank, will
link the two driving forces of the effort: Chinas economic
vibrancy and Thailand's commercial sophistication.
Fro businessmen in northern Thailand, the concept offers the
promise of new markets for goods and services, as well as the
opportunity to act as a service centre for the region. And
outwardly, the Thailand's Government supports development in
the area, on the grounds that economic links enhance stability.
Security problems exist where there is a lack of economic
cooperation, Deputy Prime minister Suphachai Phantichaphak
told a recent conference in Chiang Mai.
But there are also indications that Bangkok, which has long
practised a policy of setting up strategic buffer zones, is in
no hurry to make itself too accessible to China. Intelligence
sources point out that two new bridges linking Thailand with
its neighbours -- one leading across the Mekong to Vientiane in
Laos and another, still being built, connecting Mae Sot with
Myawady in Burma -- are sited well away from the Chinese
border. There are no plans so far to bridge the Mekong at
Chiang Khong, which is less than 200 kilometres from the
Chinese border with Laos.
Cultural bridges between northern Thailand and Chinas Yunnan
province already exist. Yunnanese traders have visited Chiang
Mai for centuries, and there is still a vibrant Yunnanese
Muslim community in the city. and for almost three decades
after their 1949 defeat by the Chinese communists, remnants of
the Kuomintangs 93rd Regiment were accommodated in northern
Thailand, where they served as informal border troops until
most moved to Taiwan or settled in mountain villages in the
1980s.
Now Thailand is using cultural diplomacy to expand its official
contacts with Yunnan.
***************************************************************
FEER: RIVERS OF DREAMS Chinese Emigrants pour down the Mekong
December 22, 1994; p.26
by Bertil Lintner in Ruili, China, and Chiang Saen, Thailand
The Mekong River gathers strength in the Chinese province of
Yunnan, then flows south, nourishing Burma, Laos, Thailand,
Cambodia and Vietnam before spilling into the South China Sea.
Regional-development enthusiasts like to portray it as a "river
of peace and cooperation." Recently, however, the life-giving
waterway has gained a more sinister reputation: It has become
the leading conduit out of China for illegal migrants to the
West.
The new wave of illegal immigration isn't just hitting the
West, however. Thousands of Chinese are content to stay in
Burma, capitalising on the border region's economic boom to set
up businesses. Ethnic Chinese have come to dominate commercial
life in the northern Burmese city of Mandalay.
The Chinese who settle in Mandalay are mostly Yunnanese. The
majority of those heading for the West, on the other hand, come
from the Chinese coastal province of Fujian. Snakeheads, the
merchants of migration, currently charge about Rmb 220,000
(US$26,000) for passage overseas, says a well-connected source
in Ruili, on Yunnan's border with Burma.
Until recently, most of the Chinese migrants travelled
southwards from Yunnan on foot through Burma's Shan state to
Tachilek on the Thai border; now, because of fighting in the
area between Burmese government forces and troops loyal to
Golden Triangle warlord Khun Sa, most migrants reach Thailand
by taking a boat down the Mekong.
On the receiving side, at Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong, just
south of the Thai-Lao-Burmese border junction, other agents
help the migrants down to Bangkok, where they await further
transport.
"Now most migrants leave Thailand by air, using mostly cheap
East European airlines," says a source in northern Thailand
close to the immigration rackets. Indeed, intelligence sources
in northern Thailand have tracked some of the Chinese migrants
to Romania and even Italy. In Europe, they are commonly broken
up into smaller groups and smuggled into Puerto Rico or the
United States Virgin Islands. There, they can board domestic
flights to the U.S. mainland.
For Chinese headed no farther than Burma, an immigration racket
also exists. "When a person dies in Mandalay, his death is not
reported to the authorities," explains a source in Yunnan who's
close to the migration trade. "Instead, that person's
relatives send the identity card to a broker in Ruili or any
other border town in Yunnan."
In Yunnan, the identification papers are sold to anyone able to
pay Kyat 50,000, or US$500 at the blackmarket rate. The Chinese
buyer's photo is substituted on the card, and he can then move
to Mandalay as a Burmese citizen.
Ethnic Chinese pervade commercial life in Mandalay-including
the trade in precious stones, jade and narcotics. Their
partners are often ethnic Chinese from the Kokang district of
northeastern Burma, who are bona fide Burmese citizens but who
speak the same Chinese dialect as the Yunnanese immigrants.
The new wave of Chinese immigration has reignited traditional
anti-Chinese sentiment among many Burmese, as reflected in
regular cartoons and short stories on the subject in local
Mandalay publications. But local authorities seem confident the
situation won't get out of hand.
"Yes, there are many Chinese in Mandalay today," says a recent
visitor to the city. "But it's still manageable. It's not like
the Han influx to, for instance, Lhasa in Tibet."
But it may become that way, if illegal immigration continues
apace.
***************************************************************
FEER: CUTTING EDGE
December 22, 1994; p.26
by Bertil Lintner
[Photo caption: Timber trucks on the Burma Road.]
Every day, a seemingly endless stream of heavily laden timber
trucks groans its way up the sharp switchbacks of the Burma
Road. This legendary highway has become the main route for
timber leaving northern Burma for Yunnan in China.
But it's not only the volume of timber being exported to China
that's remarkable. The logs are scored with various
abbreviations such as KDA, UWSA and SSA; these are the marks of
former rebel groups in northern Burma that have agreed on
ceasefires with the government in Rangoon. Spared the threat of
attack, the groups now have a free hand to sell timber to
China.
"The rebels have become timber companies," jokes a resident in
Wanding, where the Burma Road crosses the international
frontier. "They've still got their guns, but their struggle for
independence, autonomy or whatever is over."
Most of the timber heading for China comes from the high
mountain passes of Kambaiti, Panwa and Hpimaw along the Chinese
border in Kachin state. This area is controlled by a remnant of
the now defunct Communist Party of Burma, and the deforestation
there is said to be the worst in the country's northern areas.
"This used to be the most densely forested part of the north.
But in three-to-four years' time, there won't be a tree left
there," says a local resident.
Following the most recent ceasefire agreement-with the Kachin
Independence Army in February-locals expect massive
deforestation in other parts of Kachin. This may, however,
cause more concern in Rangoon as the area under Kachin control
includes crucial watersheds feeding the headwaters of the
Irrawaddy river, which waters the central Burmese plains.
"If those areas are deforested, the effects would be felt all
over the country. There would be a endless circle of drought
and floods," says a forestry expert in Bangkok.
***************************************************************
FEER: A PIECE OF THE ACTION Burma-China drug trade thrives with
official complicity
December 22, 1994
by Bertil Lintner in Ruili and Kunming, Yunnan
Kill them! Kill them! thousands of people shouted in unison
from the stands of the central sports stadium in Kunming, where
they gathered to witness the trial of a group of drug
traffickers and other criminals.
Hands tied behind their backs, the prisoners carried signboards
identifying them and their crimes. Their names were scored with
red ink, indicating that they had already become non-persons.
After the trial, the 17 convicts were paraded through the
streets of Kunming, capital of southern Chinas Yunnan
province. Then they were executed one by one, each with a
single bullet in the nape of the neck.
Public shows of official force arent rare in Yunnan, which is
facing a worsening drug problem. But the mass trial, held in
October, was exceptional because the defendants included police
officials, a man with links to Burmese communist leaders, and
two people from Fujian province who may have ties to organised
crime.
As such, the trial for the first time indicated a willingness
by the Chinese authorities to grapple with official complicity
in the drug trade. Yunnan borders the Burmese and Laotian areas
of the Golden Triangle, the worlds most infamous opium-growing
area.
The most notorious of the convicts was Yang Muxian, an ethnic-
Chinese from Kokang, a district in northeastern Burma whose
population is predominantly Yunnanese. Yang had been arrested
on May 9 and charged with smuggling hundreds of kilograms of
heroin into Yunnan.
But he was no ordinary smuggler. His elder brothers, Yang
Muleng and Yang Muang, command a unit of the Communist Part of
Burma's former insurgent army. The force has been recognised by
Rangoon as a local militia since the communist insurgents
agreed to a ceasefire four years ago.
Two high-ranking Yunnan police officers as well as a man and
woman from Chinas coastal province of Fujian were also among
those executed, say witnesses to the trial and other local
sources. The group of convicts was diverse, but no more diverse
than the mix of players in the drugs drama of the Golden
Triangle.
It works like this. The Kokang militia turns locally grown raw
opium into heroin in a string of refineries. But the rustic
Yunnanese on the Burmese frontier dont have the means to
distribute the heroin to addicts in East Asia, Australia,
Europe and North America. This is done by international ethnic-
Chinese gangs, the so-called Triads or secret societies, which
have always been strong among the Fujianese. Their syndicates
are present in Chinatowns throughout the world.
Foreign anti-narcotics agents stress that it would be
impossible for this traffic to operate without the cooperation
of local government officials on both sides of the frontier.
They note that the militia status that Rangoon afforded the
Kokang force five years ago gives it virtual immunity from
prosecution on the Burmese side.
The militia has used that freedom to pump up heroin output.
Opium production in the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle
increased to an estimated 2,500 tonnes in 1993-94 from 1,200
tonnes in 1988. Another record harvest is expected for this
years growing season.
While some of the most blatantly obvious heroin laboratories
have been shut, the Kokang militia has set up a new refining
complex in Mong Hom-Mong Ya, a secluded valley west of the
Salween River. The heroin that Chinese authorities seized from
Yang came from these refineries, sources say.
The two police officers executed in Kunming came from Zhenkang,
a Chinese town across the border from Kokang thats on the main
smuggling route from the Golden Triangle into Yunnan.
Underlining the magnitude of official complicity, 150-200 local
border officials -- police, customs and security personnel --
were also detained in the wake of Yangs arrest, say sources in
both Kokang and Kunming.
China officially counts 250,000 drug addicts, with Yunnan
having the highest rate of addiction. The U.S. State
Departments narcotics bureau estimates the real figure is two
to three times bigger. But local authorities appear unable --
or perhaps unwilling -- to confront the drug problem. The army
is mostly doing business these days, and the local police are
just too corrupt, says a well-connected source.
In a sign that Beijing may not trust local authorities, it has
assigned the Peoples Armed Police to deal with the drug
problems in Yunnan. Set up in the early 1980s, the PAP has been
described as the new strike force of Chinas powerful internal-
security apparatus.
In the forces most spectacular action, thousands of heavily
armed PAP men, supported by armour, moved in late 1992 against
drug traffickers who had taken over the Yunnanese town of
Pingyuan, near the Vietnamese border. When the town was
recaptured after two months of heavy fighting, the police found
that drug barons were living in luxury villas with dancing
girls and karaoke bars. The haul after the operation: 854
people arrested, 981 kilograms of drugs seized and 353 assorted
weapons confiscated.
The PAP often doesnt even inform local officials before
conducting its anti-drug sweeps. But while its tactics may be
effective, analysts point out that riding roughshod over the
local authorities -- many of whom belong to ethnic minorities -
- is liable to cause resentment. Nonetheless, with corruption
rampant and organised crime increasingly powerful in the
provinces, Beijing may have no choice but to use the centrally
controlled force.
A Western Sinologist, though, warns against counting on the PAP
to cure the plague of provincial crime. He points out that
Public Security Minister Tao Siju -- whos also the PAPs
political commissar -- made headlines in 1992 when he said some
Hong Kong-based Triads are patriotic and good people who
are welcome to do business in China.
***************************************************************
NEWS SOURCES REGULARLY COVERED/ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET:
AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS
AFP: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
AW: ASIAWEEK
AWSJ: ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
Bt.: THAI BAHT; 25 Bt.=US$1 (APPROX),
BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
BI: BURMA ISSUES
BKK POST: BANGKOK POST (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
BRC-CM: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-CHIANG MAI
BRC-J: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-JAPAN
CPPSM: C'TEE FOR PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND
FEER: FAR EAST ECONOMIC REVIEW
IRRAWADDY: NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED BY BURMA INFORMATION GROUP
JIR: JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
KHRG: KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP
Kt. BURMESE KYAT; 150 KYAT=US$1 BLACK MARKET
100 KYAT=US$1 SEMI-OFFICIAL
6 KYAT=US$1 OFFICIAL
MOA: MIRROR OF ARAKAN
NATION: THE NATION (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
NLM: NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR (DAILY STATE-RUN NEWSPAPER, RANGOON)
S.C.B.:SOC.CULTURE.BURMA NEWSGROUP
S.C.T.:SOC.CULTURE.THAI NEWSGROUP
SEASIA-L: S.E.ASIA BITNET MAILING LIST
SLORC: STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COMMITTEE
USG: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
XNA: XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
**************************************************************