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NMSP: ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW
- Subject: NMSP: ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW
- From: strider@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 26 Jan 1995 20:11:00
Received: (from strider) by igc2.igc.apc.org (8.6.9/Revision: 1.6 ) id UAA04248 for conf:reg.burma; Thu, 26 Jan 1995 20:11:40 -0800
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 1995 20:11:40 -0800
Subject: NMSP: ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW MON STATE PARTY
NMSP: Report on Activities of the New Mon State Party
October 1994
1. What countries/areas of conflict is your organization working
on?
The New Mon State Party (NMSP) is a political organization
representing the Mon people of Mon Knmer family in Burma (Myanmar),
a country in Southeast Asia. It was founded by Nai Shwe Kyin on
20th July 1958 after the Mon People's Front, it predecessor,
surrendered to the then U Nu's government on 19th July 1958. Nai
Shwe Kyin was one of the Executive Committee member of the Mon
People's Front but disagree with decision of the EC and stayed
behing to continue the armed struggle to fulfil the Mon aspiration
of self-determination.
The NMSP has passed through several phases of different political
changes during th armed resistance of over four decades against the
ultra-nationalities Burman governments after Burma's independence
from Britain in 1948. In 1974, the military dictatorship headed by
Gen Ne Win created the nominal Mon State covering Thaton and
Moulmein districts to appease the Mons. The NMSP claims five
districts, namely, Pegu, Thaton, Moulmein, Tavoy and Mergue to be
incorporated in the Mon State. Thus far the aspirations of the Mons
have not been fulfilled yet. In 1983 it become a member of the
National Democratic Front (NDF) which is an umberlla organization
for all non-Burman ethnic nationalities resisting Rangoon
governments for self-determination. A rough estimation of the
ethnic nationalities population and distribution of the major
ehtnic nationality of Burma is shoun in Appendix A and B
respectively to give a rough idea of how they stand.
After 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations were crushed countrywide by
the military junta, which took the name of State Law and Order
Restoration Concil(SLORC); students,monks and civilians fled to
Thailand-burma border the under control of ethnic members of the
NDF. The NDF took the initiative to address a wider cohesion of
opposition groups by forming the Democratic Alliance of Burma(DAB).
comprising 21 organizations in and out of the country. For the
first time since the start of armed resistance in 1948, Burman and
non-Burma ethnic nationalities reach a common consensus on the need
for a free and democratic Burma. This was a historical milestone in
the struggle for national unity.
The may 1990 general elections held by SLORC as a resuly of
international pressure demonstrated the overwhelming support of the
masses of Burma for democratic reform. Destite the landslide vitory
by the opposition parties and rejection of the general masses, the
military junta refused to step down and instead stepped up its
efforts of oppression over the opposition. Members of National
League for Democracy (NLD) which won 80% of the seats took
desperate steps by fleeing to safe havens under the influence of
the DAB. Since they have been given a mandate by the majority of
their colleagues to from a government before they came over, the
DAB helped them from the National Coalition Government of the Union
of Burma (NCGUB) at Manerplaw on December 18, 1990, led by Dr. Sein
Win.
To widen the scope of lobbying and consolidate the democratic
opposition forces, a braod based coalition was formed in 1992 under
the name of National Council of the Union of Burma(NCUB), which is
made up os some of the oldest political parties in Burma and some
new organizations. It unites the ethnic natiolalities fighting for
self-dentermination with ethnic Burmans through the membership of
the National Democratic Front (NDF) , the democratic Alliance of
Burma (DAB), the National Coalition Government of the Union of
Burma (NCGUB) and the National League for Democracy-Liberated Area
(NLD-LA), The NMSP is an active member of all the above mentioned
fronts with its leaders holding top ranking offices.
Unity through force never lasts long. A stable and long lasting
unity can only be achieved peacefully, through negotiation by
political means. With this concept General Aung San attempted to
unify the country peacefully but it was never honoured by his
successors. The SLORC is trying to stay in power by subjugating the
people at gun point. Its policy towards the ethnic nationals is to
eliminate them.
IN an attempt to mislead the international community, the SLORC in
1993 scheduled a bogus National convention to draft a new
constitution with hand-picked members in the majority. This
National convention will be conducted according to the dictates of
the mailtary junta to assure the leading role of the military in
national politics. A pre-drafted guide-line of the Constitution has
already been place before members of the convention for necessary
approval. It would be rushed through the Convention, followed by a
sham general election and perhaps establishing a phony democratic
government. Neither the true leaders of ethnic nationalities nor
the general population are represented, and therefore it will not
be a genuine National Convention.
Since the burtal crackdown on the pro-democracy uprising in 1988,
the Burma Army (Tatmadaw) has increased in size to over 300,000
troops, with new tanks, jet fighters and patrol boats from China,
for no other reason than to keep a strong hand over its own people.
It thrives on war, but will not be able to maintain its power in a
state of peace. Considering its history, the Burma Army must
regarded as little more than robbers, rapists and murderers. The
only distinction is that its men are dressed in uniforms so that
people will think they are soldiers. It forcibly took thousands of
civilians to the front lint to act as porters. Itconscripted
preganant women as porters and were gang-raped by solders at night.
Villages were burnt to relocate rural villagers into concentration
camps and centralized army villages, in a techinque derived from
counter-insurgency strategy known as Total Approach Stragegy or Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC).
In late 1991 the military had launched an all-out offensives
against the ethnic nationals and the student led opposition
especially in the Karen, Kachin, Karenni (Kayah) , Mon and Shan
states at the cost of thousands of Burma Army causalities.
Demoralized SLORC's soldiers were physically forced to press on, to
take Manerplaw, the jungle Headquarter of NDF, DAB and NCGUB in
Karen State. Many units were reportedly close to munity. Thus, the
seemingly unexpected Burma Army declaration to haly military
operations against Manerplaw was not a surprise.
LIC favours political, economic and psychological operations over
traditional military warfare. It is anti-insurgency war which has
become a war against the whole population. LIC avoids major
military confrontation, aiming rather at control of civilian
populations by social and economic patterns designed by the LIC
strategists. Its techniques include, "strategic helmating" and
other forms of forced relocation, and the creation of "free-fire
zones". All techniques of demographic engineering, in
fact-hamleting, sponsored migration, ethnic cleansing, eviction
from rural or urban centres have been used in LIC. LIC includes
economic sabotage, political assassinations, terrorization by
torture, dissappearance and reprisal killings. It seeks to
infiltrate organizations, spread misinformation, and exploit ethnic
and other conflicts in order to divide the enemy.
China and Thailand in particular are putting pressure on the
Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah) and Mon respectively to come to a
settlement with SLORC. They have political, military and commercial
relations with SLORC. Most of the neighbours (plus japan, the US ,
South Korea and others ) find the civil war an obstacle to trade
and commercial exploitiatin of Burma's considerable resources
(though the illicit teak and heroin trade florish in a civil war
cortex, where control is lacking ). It is possible, though
unlikely, that these countries have not seen that their support of
SLORC's civil war stragegy eill sustain military rule.
2. What specific on-the-ground activities has your organization
conducted during 1993 ( please give site, scope, focus and dates of
activity ?.)
The National Security Council of Thailand has got the upper
hand in directing the Burma policy in Thailand. It is adamant that
the civil war in Burma should come to an end. For the present
Thailand does not need the Karen, Karenni and Mon areas as a buffer
between her and Burma because of the policy of "constructive
engegement". Peace in Burma will favour Thai commercial interests
for quick profit and help stem the increasing flow of refugees from
Burma. Certain projects under consideration, namely, the
construction of a series of hydro-electric dams on the
Thailand-Burma border, and a pipeline to bring gas through Mon
territory from Yetagun, Andamen Sea, and Gulf of Martaban offshore
fields, would be risky and difficult in condition of civil war.
The military junta has approached various armed dthnic
nationalities asking them to hold peace talks, end the fighting
without surrendering their armed and to develop their respective
areas or states in the jungles. Duringthe second fortnight of
November 1993, Lieutenant GEneral Khin Nyunt invited the Mon, Karen
and Karenni armed organisations in the jungles to return to the
legal fold and hold talks. The ethnic nationalities have always
spoken of a two-stage process for peace: first a cease-fire, then
political negotiations. None of Lieutenent General Khin Nyunt's
"invitiatios" spoke of a cease-fire or political settlement, but
rather of the armed organizations, "returning to the legal fold"
and cooperating with SLORC government in the development of their
regions. If his statements are to be taken at face value, this is a
retreat from the promise made to the Kachin that SLORC would agree
a nation-wide cease-fire with other groups before the initiation of
talks. However, the Thais have spoken of cease-fire with the other
groups before the initiation of talks. However, the Thais have
spoken of cease-fires to the Mon, Karen and Karenni, and they have
influence with both the ethnic nationalities and the SLORC.
If there were a general cease-fire and peace talks, an early
consideration would be the safe return and reesettlement in their
villages of the refugees and displaced people, including those
displaced under SLORC's forced relocation scheme. A major question
would be whether any return could be condidered safe before a solid
political agreement had been reached between SLORC and the ethnic
nationality organizations.
Whehever it occurred the return and resettlement programme would
not simple since in most cases the villages of origin have been
destroyed and the fields untended ( in some case for several
years). Substantial international relief and development assistance
would be required, and an important features of any discussions
between the ethnic nationalities and SLORC would no doubt be the
woys in which this assistance could be delivered and the respective
roles in the relief and development programme of the ethnic
nationalities organizations NGOs, international agencies, and the
military.
Responding to pressure of the National Security Council of Thailand
and SLORC's invitation, five representatives of New Mon State Party
(NMSP) met with representatives of SLORC at Moulmein, capital of
Mon State, Burma, for the first time from 29th December 1993 to 3rd
January 1994. After exchanging formalities, discussion on areas of
influence (perimeter) was made. But no substantial agreement was
reached and the meeting was adjourned for reporting back to the
higher authorities of both sides.
After more than three months interval a second meeting for
cease-fire discussion was again made on 20th March 1994. Because
SLORC's representatives retracted from what they have already
accepted in the first meeting: the meeting was postponed for
reconsideration for four days. Talks started again on the 25th
March 1994. This meeting too ended in a deadlock. After two days of
recess the meeting resumed again on the 28th March 1994, with an
understanding to meet again for the third time in the near future,
after both sides have reported back to their respective
headquareters, and the meeting came to a close.
In the meantime the five Mon representatives are to report back to
the Central Executive Committee and if need be to the central
committee in preparation for the next negotiation.
3. Who is the contact person in your organization for each project
(please gove contact information including name, address, phone,
fax, camail)?
The New Mon State Party is on violent resistance since its
foundation in 1958. Its headquarters is close to the
Thailand-Burma border. Thus, contact with the outside world
had to be done through Bangkok, Thailand.
< Some contact address are given>
Report ends.