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NMSP: ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW



Received: (from strider) by igc2.igc.apc.org (8.6.9/Revision: 1.6 ) id UAA04248 for conf:reg.burma; Thu, 26 Jan 1995 20:11:40 -0800
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 1995 20:11:40 -0800
Subject: NMSP: ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW MON STATE PARTY


NMSP: Report on Activities of the New Mon State Party

October 1994

1.  What  countries/areas  of conflict is your organization working
on?

        The New Mon State Party (NMSP) is a political  organization
representing the Mon people of Mon Knmer family in Burma (Myanmar),
a  country  in  Southeast  Asia. It was founded by Nai Shwe Kyin on
20th July 1958  after  the  Mon  People's  Front,  it  predecessor,
surrendered  to  the  then U Nu's government on 19th July 1958. Nai
Shwe Kyin was one of the Executive  Committee  member  of  the  Mon
People's  Front  but  disagree  with  decision of the EC and stayed
behing to continue the armed struggle to fulfil the Mon  aspiration
of self-determination.

The  NMSP  has passed through several phases of different political
changes during th armed resistance of over four decades against the
ultra-nationalities Burman governments after  Burma's  independence
from  Britain in 1948. In 1974, the military dictatorship headed by
Gen Ne Win created  the  nominal  Mon  State  covering  Thaton  and
Moulmein  districts  to  appease  the  Mons.  The  NMSP claims five
districts, namely, Pegu, Thaton, Moulmein, Tavoy and Mergue  to  be
incorporated in the Mon State. Thus far the aspirations of the Mons
have  not  been  fulfilled  yet.  In 1983 it become a member of the
National Democratic Front (NDF) which is an  umberlla  organization
for   all   non-Burman   ethnic   nationalities  resisting  Rangoon
governments for  self-determination.  A  rough  estimation  of  the
ethnic  nationalities  population  and  distribution  of  the major
ehtnic  nationality  of  Burma  is  shoun  in  Appendix  A  and   B
respectively to give a rough idea of how they stand.

After 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations were crushed countrywide by
the  military  junta,  which  took  the name of State Law and Order
Restoration Concil(SLORC); students,monks  and  civilians  fled  to
Thailand-burma  border  the  under control of ethnic members of the
NDF. The NDF took the initiative to address  a  wider  cohesion  of
opposition groups by forming the Democratic Alliance of Burma(DAB).
comprising  21  organizations  in  and  out of the country. For the
first time since the start of armed resistance in 1948, Burman  and
non-Burma ethnic nationalities reach a common consensus on the need
for a free and democratic Burma. This was a historical milestone in
the struggle for national unity.

The  may  1990  general  elections  held  by  SLORC  as a resuly of
international pressure demonstrated the overwhelming support of the
masses of Burma for democratic reform. Destite the landslide vitory
by the opposition parties and rejection of the general masses,  the
military  junta  refused  to  step  down and instead stepped up its
efforts of oppression over  the  opposition.  Members  of  National
League  for  Democracy  (NLD)  which  won  80%  of  the  seats took
desperate steps by fleeing to safe havens under  the  influence  of
the  DAB.  Since  they have been given a mandate by the majority of
their colleagues to from a government before they  came  over,  the
DAB helped them from the National Coalition Government of the Union
of Burma (NCGUB) at Manerplaw on December 18, 1990, led by Dr. Sein
Win.

To  widen  the  scope  of  lobbying  and consolidate the democratic
opposition forces, a braod based coalition was formed in 1992 under
the name of National Council of the Union of Burma(NCUB), which  is
made  up  os some of the oldest political parties in Burma and some
new organizations. It unites the ethnic natiolalities fighting  for
self-dentermination  with  ethnic Burmans through the membership of
the National Democratic Front (NDF) , the  democratic  Alliance  of
Burma  (DAB),  the  National  Coalition  Government of the Union of
Burma (NCGUB) and the National League for Democracy-Liberated  Area
(NLD-LA),  The  NMSP is an active member of all the above mentioned
fronts with its leaders holding top ranking offices.

Unity through force never lasts long. A  stable  and  long  lasting
unity  can  only  be  achieved  peacefully,  through negotiation by
political means. With this concept General Aung  San  attempted  to
unify  the  country  peacefully  but  it  was never honoured by his
successors. The SLORC is trying to stay in power by subjugating the
people at gun point. Its policy towards the ethnic nationals is  to
eliminate them.

IN  an attempt to mislead the international community, the SLORC in
1993  scheduled  a  bogus  National  convention  to  draft   a  new
constitution   with  hand-picked  members  in  the  majority.  This
National convention will be conducted according to the dictates  of
the  mailtary  junta  to assure the leading role of the military in
national politics. A pre-drafted guide-line of the Constitution has
already been place before members of the convention  for  necessary
approval.  It would be rushed through the Convention, followed by a
sham general election and perhaps establishing a  phony  democratic
government.  Neither  the  true leaders of ethnic nationalities nor
the general population are represented, and therefore it  will  not
be a genuine National Convention.

Since  the  burtal crackdown on the pro-democracy uprising in 1988,
the Burma Army (Tatmadaw) has increased in  size  to  over  300,000
troops,  with  new tanks, jet fighters and patrol boats from China,
for no other reason than to keep a strong hand over its own people.
It thrives on war, but will not be able to maintain its power in  a
state  of  peace.  Considering  its  history,  the  Burma Army must
regarded as little more than robbers, rapists  and  murderers.  The
only  distinction  is  that its men are dressed in uniforms so that
people will think they are soldiers. It forcibly took thousands  of
civilians  to  the  front  lint  to  act  as porters. Itconscripted
preganant women as porters and were gang-raped by solders at night.
Villages were burnt to relocate rural villagers into  concentration
camps  and  centralized  army villages, in a techinque derived from
counter-insurgency strategy known as Total Approach Stragegy or Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC).

In late 1991  the  military  had  launched  an  all-out  offensives
against  the  ethnic  nationals  and  the  student  led  opposition
especially in the Karen, Kachin, Karenni (Kayah)  ,  Mon  and  Shan
states  at  the  cost  of  thousands  of  Burma  Army  causalities.
Demoralized SLORC's soldiers were physically forced to press on, to
take Manerplaw, the jungle Headquarter of NDF,  DAB  and  NCGUB  in
Karen  State. Many units were reportedly close to munity. Thus, the
seemingly  unexpected  Burma  Army  declaration  to  haly  military
operations against Manerplaw was not a surprise.

LIC  favours  political, economic and psychological operations over
traditional military warfare. It is anti-insurgency war  which  has
become  a  war  against  the  whole  population.  LIC  avoids major
military  confrontation,  aiming  rather  at  control  of  civilian
populations  by  social  and  economic patterns designed by the LIC
strategists. Its  techniques  include,  "strategic  helmating"  and
other  forms  of  forced relocation, and the creation of "free-fire
zones".   All   techniques   of   demographic    engineering,    in
fact-hamleting,  sponsored  migration,  ethnic  cleansing, eviction
from rural or urban centres have been used  in  LIC.  LIC  includes
economic   sabotage,  political  assassinations,  terrorization  by
torture,  dissappearance  and  reprisal  killings.  It   seeks   to
infiltrate organizations, spread misinformation, and exploit ethnic
and other conflicts in order to divide the enemy.

China  and  Thailand  in  particular  are  putting  pressure on the
Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah) and Mon respectively to  come  to  a
settlement with SLORC. They have political, military and commercial
relations with SLORC.  Most of the neighbours (plus japan, the US ,
South  Korea  and  others ) find the civil war an obstacle to trade
and  commercial  exploitiatin  of  Burma's  considerable  resources
(though  the  illicit  teak and heroin trade florish in a civil war
cortex,  where  control  is  lacking  ).  It  is  possible,  though
unlikely,  that these countries have not seen that their support of
SLORC's civil war stragegy eill sustain military rule.

2. What specific on-the-ground  activities  has  your  organization
conducted during 1993 ( please give site, scope, focus and dates of
activity ?.)

        The National Security Council of Thailand has got the upper
hand  in directing the Burma policy in Thailand. It is adamant that
the civil war in Burma should come  to  an  end.  For  the  present
Thailand does not need the Karen, Karenni and Mon areas as a buffer
between  her  and  Burma  because  of  the  policy of "constructive
engegement". Peace in Burma will favour Thai  commercial  interests
for quick profit and help stem the increasing flow of refugees from
Burma.   Certain   projects   under   consideration,   namely,  the
construction  of  a  series   of   hydro-electric   dams   on   the
Thailand-Burma  border,  and  a  pipeline  to bring gas through Mon
territory from Yetagun, Andamen Sea, and Gulf of Martaban  offshore
fields, would be risky and difficult in condition of civil war.

The   military   junta   has   approached   various   armed  dthnic
nationalities asking them to hold peace  talks,  end  the  fighting
without  surrendering  their  armed and to develop their respective
areas or states in  the  jungles.  Duringthe  second  fortnight  of
November 1993, Lieutenant GEneral Khin Nyunt invited the Mon, Karen
and  Karenni  armed  organisations  in the jungles to return to the
legal fold and hold talks. The  ethnic  nationalities  have  always
spoken  of  a two-stage process for peace: first a cease-fire, then
political negotiations. None of  Lieutenent  General  Khin  Nyunt's
"invitiatios"  spoke  of  a cease-fire or political settlement, but
rather of the armed organizations, "returning to  the  legal  fold"
and  cooperating  with SLORC government in the development of their
regions. If his statements are to be taken at face value, this is a
retreat from the promise made to the Kachin that SLORC  would agree
a nation-wide cease-fire with other groups before the initiation of
talks.  However, the Thais have spoken of cease-fire with the other
groups before the initiation of  talks.  However,  the  Thais  have
spoken  of cease-fires to the Mon, Karen and Karenni, and they have
influence with both the ethnic nationalities and the SLORC.

If there were a  general  cease-fire  and  peace  talks,  an  early
consideration  would  be the safe return and reesettlement in their
villages of the refugees  and  displaced  people,  including  those
displaced  under SLORC's forced relocation scheme. A major question
would be whether any return could be condidered safe before a solid
political agreement had been reached between SLORC and  the  ethnic
nationality organizations.

Whehever  it  occurred  the return and resettlement programme would
not simple since in most cases the villages  of  origin  have  been
destroyed  and  the  fields  untended  (  in  some case for several
years). Substantial international relief and development assistance
would be required, and an important  features  of  any  discussions
between  the  ethnic nationalities and SLORC would no doubt be  the
woys in which this assistance could be delivered and the respective
roles in  the  relief  and  development  programme  of  the  ethnic
nationalities  organizations  NGOs, international agencies, and the
military.

Responding to pressure of the National Security Council of Thailand
and SLORC's invitation, five representatives of New Mon State Party
(NMSP) met with representatives of SLORC at  Moulmein,  capital  of
Mon State, Burma, for the first time from 29th December 1993 to 3rd
January  1994. After exchanging formalities, discussion on areas of
influence (perimeter) was made. But no  substantial  agreement  was
reached  and  the  meeting  was adjourned for reporting back to the
higher authorities of both sides.

After  more  than  three  months  interval  a  second  meeting  for
cease-fire  discussion  was  again made on 20th March 1994. Because
SLORC's representatives  retracted  from  what  they  have  already
accepted  in  the  first  meeting:  the  meeting  was postponed for
reconsideration for four days. Talks  started  again  on  the  25th
March 1994. This meeting too ended in a deadlock. After two days of
recess  the  meeting  resumed again on the 28th March 1994, with an
understanding to meet again for the third time in the near  future,
after   both   sides   have   reported  back  to  their  respective
headquareters, and the meeting came to a close.

In the meantime the five Mon representatives are to report back  to
the  Central  Executive  Committee  and  if  need be to the central
committee in preparation for the next negotiation.

3. Who is the contact person in your organization for each  project
(please  gove  contact  information including name, address, phone,
fax, camail)?

        The New Mon State Party is on violent resistance since  its
        foundation  in  1958.  Its  headquarters  is  close  to the
        Thailand-Burma border. Thus, contact with the outside world
        had to be done through Bangkok, Thailand.

       < Some contact address are given>

Report ends.