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BurmaNet News: April 6, 1995 [#140]



**************************BurmaNet***************************
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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The BurmaNet News: 6 April 1995
Issue #140

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 

NOTED IN PASSING:

          "The dictatorship imposed on Burma for thirty some
          years has molded all it's citizens--unfortunately that
          includes prodemocracy friends--in a political culture
          that does not tolerate difference of opinion. In many
          ways, we have unconsciously learned in those thirty
          years to behave in the way of the those that we
          despise." 
               <See SCB: FLAME WAR IN SOC.CULTURE.BURMA>

Contents:
*********************CONTACT REQUESTS*************************

***********************INSIDE BURMA***************************
THE NATION:BURMA ADMITS 'DE FACTO' DEVALUATION
BKK POST: BURMA OPPOSITION FEARS LOSING KEY ETHNIC BACKING

**********************KAREN STATE*****************************
KHRG: WHITHER DKBA?: SLORC'S NORTHEN KAREN OFFENSIVE, 1 of 4

********************THE KARENNI********************************
KNPP:     REGARDING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KARENNI 
          NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND THE SLORC

********************SHAN STATE********************************
THE NATION:MTA READY TO JOIN BURMA UNION

***********************THAILAND********************************
BKK POST:PREMIER ORDERS OFFICIAL PROTESTS AGAINST RANGOON
BKK POST:VICTIM'S KIN THREATEN TO PARADE CORPSE IN PROTEST
BKK POST:MEASURES TO HELP MAE SAI  
THE NATION:CHINA HAILS ASEAN BID FOR SE ASIA MEET IN THAILAND
THE NATION:ARMED ROBBERS KILL 1

********************INTERNATIONAL***************************
UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR Parts 4-6 of 6

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*************THE BURMANET NEWS--APRIL 6, 1995*****************
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*********************CONTACT REQUESTS*************************
This is a new section of the BurmaNet News that you can use in
trying to contact someone whose address you do not have.  If you
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1 Looking for Cham Toik, does he have an email address?


********************INSIDE BURMA*******************************


****************KAREN STATE/KAWTHOOLEI*************************
WHITHER DKBA?: SLORC'S NORTHEN KAREN OFFENSIVE

An Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group
March 29, 1995 / KHRG #95-10

The purpose of this report is not to describe the military
details of the fall of Manerplaw and other areas, as these
subjects have been covered elsewhere.  Instead, this report
focusses on the effects on the civilian population of this year's
SLORC/DKBA offensive in the Moei and Salween river areas along
the Thai/Burma border.  Some information on the formation of the
DKBO/DKBA and the fall of Manerplaw is given in order to make the
other information more understandable, but the main issues
covered in the report are the destruction of villages, forced
relocations, new flows of refugees, movements of existing refugee
camps and terrorist attacks in Thailand, all of which are part
of the ongoing SLORC/DKBA offensive.  The first section of the
report gives a detailed summary of events and how they fit into
the overall picture, while the second section consists of
detailed interviews with villagers involved in various aspects
of the situation.  There have been countless rumours flying up
and  down the border area, so many reported incidents have taken
a great deal of time and effort to check and confirm.  Rumoured
events which proved impossible to confirm have either been
omitted from the report or noted as unconfirmed reports.

Contents

I.   SUMMARY OF EVENTS
     The DKBO and the fall of Manerplaw
 ................................2  The broader offensive
 ........................................................3   
Refugee movements
 ...........................................................5
     Border Incursions
 ..............................................................8
          Manerplaw area
 ....................................................9       Mae
Paw Muh Hta / Huay Heng ..............................9
Ka Htee Hta, U Da Hta, Ber Lu Ko .....................11 
Baw Noh ..............................................12
Gray Hta, Sho Kloh, Beh Klaw .........................14 
Huay Bone, Huay Kalok ................................15 
Other Camps ..........................................16
Attacks on Thai targets ..............................16
The Thai response ....................................17
     SLORC / DKBA relations ..........................18
     Chronology of recorded events ...................19
 
II.  INTERVIEWS
     SLORC & DKBA in the villages ....................21
     Life in Myaing Gyi Ngu ..........................24
     Meh Sa Ger refugees .............................27
     Ka Htee Hta refugee camp ........................29
     Ber Lu Ko kidnapping ............................32
     Gray Hta killings ...............................33
     Meh Po / Huay Heng truck shooting ...............34
 
III. APPENDICES
     Map
     Burmese copies of statements, Copies of related newspaper 
     articles 
I.  SUMMARY OF EVENTS

The DKBO and the fall of Manerplaw

Since 1992 we have received reports from villages, particularly
in Thaton and Pa'an Districts, that local SLORC commanders and
Intelligence units were actively spreading propaganda that the
Karen National Union is anti-Buddhist, that the Karen Revolution
is a Christian revolution and that Karen leaders had told their
Christian supporters that as soon as the revolution succeeded
they would kill all the Buddhists.  Villagers were told that
SLORC troops didn't really want to burn and loot their villages
and execute people, but that they had to because the KNU was
around, so it was all the KNU's fault.  They were told not to
cooperate with the KNU and to pressure the KNU into a ceasefire. 
Despite the villagers' fear and hatred of SLORC, over time this
propaganda gradually began to have an effect for several reasons. 
Two main factors were the villagers' complete lack of education,
and the truth to the accusation that Christians were promoted
over Buddhists in the KNU.  But perhaps most significant was the
fact that the KNU had never tried to politically educate the
villagers or get them politically involved in the revolution, so
they didn't even properly understand what the KNU was fighting
for; instead, they only knew they had to give rice to KNU forces,
their sons to the KNU Army, and see their villages burned as
SLORC retaliation for KNU military operations.  They were fed up. 
Then in 1993 some monks began offering them an alternative:
refuse to help the KNU, come and stay at "refuges" around
monasteries, all your food and other needs will be provided and,
best of all, SLORC won't bother you.  People began moving to
these "refuges", where they received food and other needs from
the monks - who were in turn receiving it all from SLORC.  The
villagers didn't know where the food was coming from, so they
began believing monks such as U Thuzana must have "magic powers". 
Thuzana and the other leaders sent their strongest supporters
back into the villages to bring the others, and when most people
didn't want to leave their homes the movement began threatening
them.  From that point on, the movement used fear and threats
more often than persuasion to get recruits. 
In late 1994 things became more serious, as monks and villagers
were ordered by Thuzana to disarm KNU soldiers in the villages. 
The movement became armed.  In December, it occupied Thu Mwe Hta
monastery at the junction of the Salween and Moei rivers.  In
1993-94, a huge new monastery hall was built there, and it was
later discovered that a large arms cache had been placed under
it - indicating the apparent amount of pre-planning which had
gone into this sequence of events.  At Thu Mwe Hta the group cut
off a main KNU supply line and called all KNU Buddhist soldiers
and villagers to come and join them.  Many KNU soldiers walked
away from hilltop positions which they had been defending,
underfed and undersupplied, for years.  SLORC walked into the
positions, including Min Yaw Kee ridge, from which they could
easily mount an assault on Manerplaw.

The movement became violent.  Some KNU soldiers and villagers who
wouldn't join them were killed in several villages.  The KNU sent
negotiating teams, including Buddhist monks, to Thu Mwe Hta but
they were arrested and held hostage.  Their release was
negotiated, and on Dec. 15th an agreement was struck between the
KNU and the new group.  Its leaders had already retreated on Dec.
12 to Myaing Gyi Ngu (Karen name Khaw Taw), near Ka Ma Maung,
where they set up headquarters at a monastery with a great deal
of weapons stored around it.  These leaders tore up the Thu Mwe
Hta agreement and the group at Thu Mwe Hta once again put the
river under siege.  On Dec. 21 the leaders declared the formation
of the "Democratic Kayin Buddhist Organization" (DKBO) and the
"Democratic Kayin 
Buddhist Army" (DKBA), and demanded that the KNU hand over
Manerplaw.  Negotiations at Thu Mwe Hta broke down.  SLORC's
Southeastern Regional Commander Maj. Gen. Maung Hla promptly
visited Myaing Gyi Ngu and promised the DKBA all required weapons
and uniforms.  SLORC immediately began providing the DKBA with
uniforms, a badge, food and other supplies - and apparently even
wrote several of the DKBA's political statements, in the opinion
of experienced Burmese dissidents who read them.  The KNU set a
deadline of midnight Dec. 31st for the "mutineers" to "return to
the fold".  The deadline passed, and a couple of days later the
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) began attacking Thu Mwe
Hta, which fell within a few days (shortly after the KNLA scored
a direct hit on the ammunition cache under the monastery hall). 
The Thu Mwe Hta group withdrew to the Sleeping Dog Mountain area.

The SLORC then took over complete control for the offensive. 
DKBA members were divided up, a small handful assigned to each
SLORC unit as guides, and the offensive began on January 20.  By
January 23 the SLORC established a foothold on the Manerplaw side
of the Salween.  Using the DKBA guides to indicate all the back
pathways and KNLA positions, they advanced quickly.  The KNLA
decided to limit its defence to delaying actions, and torched
most of Manerplaw before withdrawing.  The SLORC arrived in
Manerplaw on January 27th, and raised the yellow DKBA flag. 
However, on the hill below Manerplaw's monastery there was a more
realistic sign:  SLORC soldiers made huge white letters on the
ground, visible from the air, reading in Burmese "eA[ (661) cr&
(10)" ["Strategic Command 661 - Light Infantry Battalion 10"; a
Battalion in SLORC's #66 Light Infantry Division].  Observers on
the Thai side of the river got photos of the lettering, which a
few hours later had suddenly been rubbed out and replaced with
the English lettering "DKBA".
______________________________________________________________
________________ 
The Broader Offensive

While much attention was focussed on the SLORC's capture of
Manerplaw itself, the offensive against  the surrounding areas
has been largely ignored.  This offensive has continued since the
fall of Manerplaw, as the SLORC works toward securing the entire
Salween and Moei River sections of the Thai border.  The KNU and
pro-democracy groups were forced to abandon their Manerplaw
headquarters, but in the process of the Manerplaw/Salween
offensive it is the tens of thousands of villagers who have
suffered the most.  At least 100 Karen villages have been
destroyed or no longer exist.  The following is just a partial
list:

Manerplaw (*), Tee Thay Kee, Tee Taw Kloh, Klaw Deh (*), Kler
Thay Lu (t), Tee Thay Kee (t), Mae Po Hta (t), Mu Yu Hta (t), Baw
Shaw Lu (t), Pa Hee Lu (t), Pway Baw Lu (t), Htoo Wah Lu (t), Ka
Paw Lu (t), Lo Kwa Lu (*), Ga Ma, Ya Deh Ni, Naw Deh (*), Lah Hee
Lu, Thu Mwe Hta, Mae Let Hta, Gawa Yeh, Meh Leh Kee, Oo Ghay Thu,
Meh Bpa, Min Yaw Kee, Meh Pru, dozens of small villages in Meh
Pru area, Meh Kong Kay, Meh Paw Muh Hta, Pu Mya Lu (t), Thay Law
Hta (t), Mae Paw Muh Hta (t), many villages in Dawn Gwin (*) and
Meh Paw Muh Hta areas, Bwa Der, Maw Leh Meh Hta, Meh Ku Hta, Meh
Nyo Hta, Nya Ku Pu, Wah Ku Der, Ee Thu Ku, Ko Ra Hta, Baw Bo Kyu,
Klaw Hta, Ko Lar Hta, Htoo Ka Toe, Htay Day, Htoo Bway Kay, Htay
Kler Toe, Saw Bway Der, Moi Yeh Hta, Du Ho Reh, Kyauk Nyat, Thee
Muh Hta, Ka Dteh Hta (*), Weh Gyi, Weh Gyi (t), Oo Thu Hta, Ka
Htee Hta (t), Bon Ya Hta (t), Oo Da Hta (t), Oo Kweh Hta (t),
Yaung Nai Oo (t), ... and many others not named here. 
Those denoted by (t) were displaced Karen villages or refugee
camps on the Thai side of the border.  Only a few of the villages
mentioned (denoted by *) were primarily Karen military garrisons 
or positions, and these were abandoned and in some cases burned
by withdrawing Karen troops before SLORC forces could arrive. 
Many of the other civilian-only villages were burned and
destroyed by advancing SLORC troops or forced to flee before
SLORC could arrive.  Those who remained in their villages
suddenly found themselves with no Karen Army in the area to
protect them.  In these cases, many fled as soon as SLORC
appeared near the village, or after SLORC had shelled or shot up
the village upon entering it.  Villages in the Kyauk Nyat area
of the upper Salween River found that after their area was
occupied, the DKBA began posting notices in some villages stating
that all villagers must join DKBO or their villages would be
burned.  When this happened, Christians were the first to flee,
followed by Buddhists.

There are also reports that many villages west of the Salween
River are being forcibly relocated south and west to areas
further inside Karen State in the area of Myaing Gyi Ngu,
headquarters of the DKBO.  It appears that the SLORC and the DKBA
may be trying to clear all civilians out of the region within 10
km. or more of the Thai border, effectively establishing this
swath of territory as a military-only zone.  This would support
the opinion of some analysts who feel the SLORC is trying to
implement a "Fifth Cut":  in addition to the "Four Cuts" program
to cut off the opposition from civilian support, SLORC now seems
to be doing everything it can to cut off the escape route of
refugees to Thailand.  Over the past year or two, SLORC seems to
have realized that  the flight of refugees is a weak point in its
complete control over the country; there has been a great
increase in SLORC's verbal attacks on refugees in the media and
in SLORC pressure on neighbouring countries to return the
refugees.  In recorded conversations last year, some senior SLORC
Intelligence officers discussed how in the Irrawaddy Delta they
have no problem with forced labour projects because the people
can't escape, but in areas closer to the borders such as Arakan
State and the Ye-Tavoy railway, people flee to neighbouring
countries, causing problems for the projects and international
bad publicity for SLORC [see "SLORC Officers Talk", KHRG #94-27,
25/9/94].  SLORC may feel that if it can eliminate the
embarrassing existence of refugees, it will be one large step
closer to absolute power within Burma and general acceptance
abroad.  This would help to explain the SLORC's use of the DKBA
to attack refugee camps in Thailand [see the section in this
report on border incursions].  While most people agree that it
would be virtually impossible for SLORC to completely block
escape across its long and forested border with Thailand, it
could certainly decrease the flow of refugees to a trickle if it
can establish a wide "free-fire" military-only zone adjacent to
the border, and if Thailand is willing to cooperate by
immediately handing back any refugees it captures (as it is
already doing along the Shan State border), then this "Fifth Cut"
could be very effective.  Fewer people would even try to escape
if they knew they had little chance of succeeding. Already, new
refugees have reported that there are 700 Karen families from the
Kyauk Nyat area who want to flee to Thailand but are trapped
between 2 main SLORC lines extending north-south along the
Salween River and east-west from Kyauk Nyat to Papun.

Of those who have fled the current offensive, over 10,000 have
arrived in Thailand, many are hiding in the mountains and forests
of their home areas, many have fled to the homes of relatives or
friends in villages or towns further inside Burma, and some have
gone, whether by force, threats, fear, or willingly, to DKBA
camps.  In these DKBA locations, they are reportedly being
provided with food for the time being by SLORC.  One particular
location near Myaing Gyi Ngu has been set up by SLORC as a "model
village", and is now regularly featured in their media as a
propaganda exercise.  SLORC Television and print media have shown
SLORC Generals and SLORC "Non-Governmental Organizations" (such
as the "Maternal 
and Child Health and Welfare Organization" headed by Intelligence
Chief Khin Nyunt's wife) visiting the "model village" to give
gifts to dazed-looking Karen villagers who have "fled the yoke
of KNU rule".  SLORC's Burmese-language radio reported that SLORC
had invited foreign NGO's to come in and give aid to these
"refugees", but as yet there have been no reports of any takers. 
It appears likely that SLORC will maintain one or two such places
as they are for show, while most villagers who go to the DKBA
will be kept in other villages - where they will be treated well
for a few months, then put to use as porters and labourers for
the SLORC military.  The testimony of "Saw Htoo Thaw" in this
report gives an insight into life in the "model village",
including forced labour and forced conscription as porters and
soldiers.

As soon as Manerplaw itself had fallen, the SLORC worked quickly
to secure its grip on the Moei River near Manerplaw.  Thousands
of porters had already been rounded up for the Manerplaw
offensive from towns and villages stretching from Mudon and
Moulmein in the south to Thaton in the north.  SLORC's tactics
in rounding up these porters, such as surrounding video cinemas
and capturing all the men or abducting people from their homes
in the middle of the night, were reminiscent of their tactics in
1992,  when they rounded up an estimated 20,000 civilians for
their last major Manerplaw offensive [for details on Manerplaw
porters, see "Porters: Manerplaw & Kawmoora Areas", KHRG #95-07,
25/2/95].  Immediately after the capture of Manerplaw, SLORC
began setting up small camps every kilometre or so along the
river to the south of Manerplaw.  Many porters were brought in
from the hills surrounding Meh Tha Waw, the SLORC supply base to
the south, to carry supplies to these camps.  Many of these
porters were "say muh wah" - Karen girls, almost all teenagers,
from remote hill villages who wear the traditional white dress
before marriage.  Witnesses on the Thai bank of the Moei River
saw 100 or more of these girls being held under guard in fenced
enclosures along the Moei riverbank every evening.  The fences
were still visible in photos taken weeks later, each of their
sharpened bamboo stakes with an  empty milk-tin hanging on top
so the girls couldn't get over the fence at night without making
alot of noise.  None of them are known to have escaped.

At the same time, SLORC completed a dirt road connecting Meh Tha
Waw to Manerplaw within 2 weeks.  When this was done the "say muh
wah" porters were sent back and SLORC trucks began moving
supplies, though some men and women porters were still visible
with SLORC troops along the road.  According to observers on the
Thai riverbank, it appeared that DKBA soldiers carried their own
loads, while SLORC porters carried only their guns and were
always accompanied by porters carrying heavy loads.  By February
10, the SLORC trucks were going up and down the road all day -
empty on their way to Manerplaw and full of soldiers, equipment
and pillaged goods on the way back to Meh Tha Waw.  SLORC was
clearly not anticipating any KNLA attack to retake Manerplaw and
was shifting most of its troops to increase its offensives to the
south - in KNLA 7th Brigade area, and at Kawmoora.

At the same time new Battalions were being sent through Papun for
an offensive further north to secure the entire area west of the
Salween River.  SLORC troops pushed up the Salween river from Thu
Mwe Hta (at the Moei river junction) and Dawn Gwin areas, and
down the Salween from Saw Hta, in the far north just below the
Kayah State border.  As combined SLORC and DKBA units appeared
up and down the Salween riverbank, refugee camps and Thai Karen
villages across the river began to flee.  Even the bustling Thai
trading village of Mae Sam Lap fled up a stream 2-3 km. into
Thailand after SLORC and DKBA crossed the river into Mae Sam Lap
several times.  Thai traders could be seen selling their wares
from bamboo 
shelters by the stream, looking like refugees, while the Thai
Army had to occupy Mae Sam Lap to protect the border.  SLORC
troops coming through Papun also formed another line west-east
from Papun to the Salween River at Kyauk Nyat, and performed
sweeping operations south of this line to drive out any KNU
forces while driving villagers into fleeing at the same time -
as soon as they fled, the DKBA was ready and waiting to take them
to Myaing Gyi Ngu.

[Continued in the next issue]
********************THE KARENNI********************************
KNPP:     REGARDING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KARENNI 
          NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND THE SLORC

1. During his tour of the Kayah State on November 17-18, 1993,
Major  General Khin Nyunt,  secretary-1 of the State Law and
Order Restoration  Council (SLORC), declared to the world that
he was offically inviting the  armed organizations to enter into
cease-fire talks with the SLORC. 

2. The prevailing thinking and trend in the world today is for
nations  to avoid resolving their differences through armed
confrontation and to  settle them on the negotiating table
peacefully and through justice for  both the sides.

3. On the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence with
neighboring  countries and a peaceful life for every human being
on this planet, and with the aim to promote  a peaceful life and
the standard of living of the Karenni  people, and including the
people of Burm a, the Karenni  National Progressive Party will
establish peaceful relations with Burma. 
4. The cease-fire with the SLORC does not mean that the Karenni
National P rogressive Party has given up its basic policies.
Quite the contrary, it will continue to stick  to its political
stance.

5. Hence, following the Karenni National Progressive Party's
agreement to  cease-fire with the SLORC on March 7, 1995,   the
Karenni Government will do the following in the i nterest of all
the Karenni people:

     1.   Rehabilitate and develop the villages within the
          Karenni nation .
     2.   Implement education and health programs of the Karenni
          people.   
     3.   Undertake economic projects to raise the standard of
          all the Ka renni people.
     4.   Provide the leadership in carrying out tasks aimed at
          regional  tranquillity and rule of law in the Karenni
          nation.
     5.   Safeguard the interests of all the Karenni people and
          give emph asis to the work to promote democratic and
          civil liberties and human rights .
     6.   Undertake work to uphold national identity,
          traditional culture  and customs, national language,
          national dress, and freedom of relig ious faith.

Following the cease-fire agreement between the Karenni National
Progres sive Party and the SLORC, it is hereby solemnly declared
the Karenni Government will undertake the  six major tasks
defined above.
                                        
               Central Committee
           The Karenni National Progressive Party
                                             
                                             
Karenni Nation
Date:  March 18, 1995


********************INTERNATIONAL***************************
UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR Parts 4-6 of 6


UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR (4/6)[Para.95-113] 
II. ALLEGATIONS

A. Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution
------------------------------------------------
95. Numerious communications from non-governmental sources
continue to be received by the Special Rapporteur reporting
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings of civilians by
Myanmar military forces under a variety of circumstances.

96. In the regions of the country with predomianantly non-Burman
population and where insurgencies have been taking place, namy
of the alleged killings are summary executions of civilians who
are accused of either being insurgents or collaborating with
insurgents. For example, in March 1994, members of the Myanmar
military's Western Military Command patrolling the Naf River
(Rakhine State) came across some Muslims fishing from a small
boat. The soldires reportedly tried to extort money form the
fishermen and, when unsuccessful, tied them up with rope and
brought them to Balu Khali village in Maungdaw Township. Eight
of the fishermen were reportedly interrogated and tortured over
five days; the soldires charged them with carrying out
clandestine operations rather than simply fishing. On 31 March
1994, the fishermen were reportedly executed.

97. Many of the reports from non-governmental sources have
described occasions on which soldiers of the Myanmar army have
opened fire with light arms against civilians without any
evident provocation. Such situations have frequently been
reported in the context of attempt by the army to arrest annd
detain civilians for the purposes of forced portering and other
labour; as villagers attempt to avoid being arrested or to escape
the approaching troops, soldires are often reported to open fire.
For example, on 11 September 1994, Myanmar Army forces from
Division No.33 , Battalion No. 27, reportedly
entered Kyaun Sein village. When the vilalgers ran away because
they were  afraid to be teken as porters, the Tatmadaw
reportedly opened fore on them . One villager was hit by a bullet
and died the same evening, while three other men were captured
by the soldires and executed on 12 September 1994. 
98. In addition to the reports received by the Special
Rapporteur alleging summary or arbitrary executions, he also
interviewed persons, during his visit to the refugee camps in
Thailand, who claim to be witnesses to such huan rights
violations.

99. The Special Rapporteur has received testimonies alleging
governmental responsibility for a pattern of deaths in custody.
In the cases received by the Special Rapporteur of alleged
violations of the right to life of persons held in detention in
which charges were filed, the detentions were primarily carried
out under SLORC orders, in application of the 1950 Emergency
Provisions Act, particularly section 5(J), and article 17 of the
1908 Unlawful Association Act. During his visit to Myanmar, the
Special Rapporteur requested the Government of Myanmar to
provide information concerniing the fate of 25 political leaders
and elected representatives, studenta and monks who had
allegedly died while in custody. Priou to his dieparture from
Myanmar, the Government provided the Special Rapporteur with its
response to his inquireies; the response of the Government of
Myanmar is reproduced in annex I to this report. Concerning the
25 cases raised by the special Rapporteur, this response may be
summarized as follows: the Government denied detention in 7
cases; 4 persons were said to have been released; 3 persons were
said to be still serving their terms; 10 persons were said to
have been given medical treatment upon falling ill, but to have
succumbed to disease nevertheless; and 1 person was said to have
committed suicide.

100. Other cases of reported summary or arbitrary executions were
described in paragraphs 53 to 55 of the interim report of the
Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly at its
forty-ninth session (A/49/651 of 8 November 1994). These cases
included allegations of: severe torture, causing the death of the
victims; the killing of civilaians for having disobeyed orders
from the Tatmadaw to relocate their homes, to supply goods or
provide labour for little or no compensation; arbitrary "revenge"
killings of persons frm villages near to the locations of attacks
carried out by insurgents forces against the
Tatmadaw. Collective and arbitrary punishments are often said to
include summary executions of civilians present in the area. 
101. In response to the request of the Special Rapporteur for
information on any infestigations into these allegations
undertaken by the Government, the Government of Myanmar replied,
in a note verbale dated 4 November 1994, as follows:

    "No instances of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
    execution can be permitted in the Union of Myanmar and no  
  provision is made in the law for such."

102. The Special Rapporteur is aware that sometimes reports of
arbitrary killings tend to be exagggerated or distorted, that
there are cases of good treatment of villagers and captured
insurgents by the Tatmadaw soldiers, that there is evidence that
the Government is trying to discipline those soldiers who have
committed serious human rights violations, that instances of such
violations appear to be decreasing and that the insurgents also
commit serious violations of human rights from time to time.
However, the Special Rapporteur cannot deny, inview of so many
detailed and seemingly reliable reports, that violations appear
to be committed consistently and on a wide scale by the soldiers
of the Myanmar Army against innocent villageers
(particularly those belonging to the ethnic minorities) in the
form of summary or extrajudicial  executions and arbitrary
killings which occur in the contexts of forced labour ,rape,
forced relocation and confiscation of property.

103. In relation to specific cases, the Special Rapporteur draws
attention to the report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (E/CN.4/1995/61,
paras. 227-230). In this connection, the Special Rapporteur is
aware that the Government of Myanmar has recently responded in
detail to the allegations transmitted to it by theSpecial
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. 
B. Arbitrary arrest and detention

104. Although some political prisoners have been released during
the last two years from centres of detention in Myanmar, reports
from various sources describe how an unknown number of civilians
continue to be arrested for criticizing SLORC, the tatmadaw and
the process being undertaken in the National C0nvention of
drafting a new constitution aimed at facilitating the transfer
of power to to a civilian government. Other persons reportedly
arrested in a large numbers are suspected insurgents (or
sympathizers there with ) who remain detained in prisons in
country areas, especially in the regions with predominantly
non-Burman populations.

105. The Nobel Prize winner, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is still being
held under prolonged house detention without trial; on 20 July
1994, she had completed five years indetention. Seeking her
release and return to freedom in Myanmar, including respect for
all of her civil and political rights under international law,
parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations and individuals
throughout the world have sent thousands of petitions to the
United Nations in the last few months.

106. In a letter dated 5 October 1994, the Special Rapporteur
requested the government of Myanmar to provide specific reasons,
including reference to specific legal authority, for keeping Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest after 20 July 1994, and to
indicate precisely when the Government intends to release her. 
107. In a note verbale dated  4 November 1994, the government of
Myanmar provided the Special Rapporteur wiht the follawing
detailed responses to the above inquiries:

 "1. (a) ... she (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) had beeninfluenced by 
anti-government , opportunistic politicians and insurgent  groups
in their attempt to seize political power for their own  end, at
a time when political vacuum developed by the people's  genuine
desire to forsake the socialist economic system and  their
yearning for the return to a multi-party democratic  system;

 "(b) For her own good and for the good of the country she had 
to be restrained in order to prevent her from promoting the 
cause of these unsavoury political elements who found their way 
and got themselves into positions of influence around her to 
create disunity among the only unified establishment left in 
this country, the Tatmadaw, which was endeavouring to stabilize 
the situation created by the political vacuum;

 "(c) Despite repeated caution on the part of the authorities, 
she made seditious speehes incitiong the people to acts of 
violence and to cause division wihtin the armed forces and 
division between the armed forces and the people.

 "2. The specific legal authority ofr restraining Daw Aung San 
Kuu Kyi is the 1975 Law to Safegurad the State Against the 
Dangers of Those Desiring to Cause Subversive Acts. Under this 
Law, if there are reasons to believe that any citizen has done 
or is doing or is about to do any act which infringe the
 sovereignty and security of the State or public peace and 
tranquility, the Council of Ministers is empowered to pass an 
order, as may be necessary, restricting any fundamental right 
of such person.

 "3. Also, under Section 10 (b) and Section 14 of this 1975 Law 
to Safeguard the State Against the Dangers of Those Desiring to 
Cause subversive Acts, there is thelagal basis for the
 restraint of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi after 20 July 1994. Under 
this Law the Council of Ministers may pass an order as may be 
necessary restrictiog any fundamental right of a citizen if 
there are reasons to believe that he has committed , or is 
committing or is about to commit, any act which infringes the 
sovereignty and security of the State or public peace and 
tranquility. To exercise such power a Central Body, consisting 
of the Minister for Home Affairs as Chairman, and the Minister 
for Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs as members has 
been formed.

 "4. The Central Bady in passing restriction orders for
 safeguarding the State against dangers has the following
 powers:
    (a) arresting and detaining a pweson for a period not
    exceeding 60 days at a time up to a total of 180 days;    
(b) Restraining a person up to one year.

 "5. If it becomes necessary to extend the period of detantion 
or restraint, the Central Body may be autiorized by the Council 
of Ministers to detain or restrain a person for a period not 
exceeding one year at a tile up to a total of five years. 
 "6. In accordane with Section (13) of the Law, the Central Bady 
shall obtain the prior sanction of the Council of ministers if 
it is necessary to continue the restraint of the person against 
whom action is taken for a period longer than contained in 
Section 10 (b).

 "7. In so doing, in accordance with Section (14) of the Law, 
the Council of Ministers may, in granting prior sanction to 
continue the detention and arrest or to continue to restrain, 
permit a period not exceeding one year at a time up to a total 
of five years.

 "8. Hence, the Central Bady can restrain a person for one year 
with its won mandate entrusted by Section 10 (b) of the Law and 
, with prior sanction of the Council of Ministers, can extended 
the period of restraint for five years in accordance with 
SEction (14) of the Law.

 "9. In view of the foregoing, there is the legal basis for 
restraining Daw Aung San Suu Kyi after 20 July 1994 based on 
Section 10 (b) and Section (14) of the 1975 Law to Safeguard  the
State Against the Dangers of those Desiring to Cause
 Subversive Acts."

108. In his letter dated 5 October 1994, the Special Rapporteur
also requested the Government of Myanmar to provide information
regarding: Khin Zaw Win; U Khin Maung Swe (aged 52 years, a
prominent dissident Members of Parliament-elect and member of the
Central Executive Committee of the National League for
Democracy); U Sein Hla Oo (aged 58 years, a journalist and
opposition politician); Dr. Htun Myat Aye ( dentist) ; Daw San
San Tin ( a translator); Daw San San Nwe ( a writer) and her
daughter.

109. Inits note verbale dated 4 November 1994, the government of
Myanmar provided the Special Rapporteur with the following
general response to the above inquiries:

        "In the Union of Myanmar, a person cannot be arrested  
      and detained if it is not in accordance with the law. It 
       is provided in Section 61 of the Code of Criminal
        Procedure that no police officer shall detain in custody 
       a person for a period exceeding 24 hours. Where it is   
     necessary to detain such an accused for more than 24      
  hours, special order of a Magistrate has to be obtained      
  under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The     
   arrested person has the right of defence and the right      
  to have lagal defence counsel. Moreover, the arrested or     
   detained person has the right to apply freely for bail      
  to the Magistrate concerned and the Court may grant him      
  bail according to the merits of the case."

110. The following are the detailed charges againsst the persons
mentioned in the summary of allegations received by the Special
Rapporteur in the note verbalel of 4 November 1994 from the
Government of Myanmar:

---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Name             !              Charge(s)
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Khin  Zaw  Win     "(a) Under Section 17 (a) of the Unlawful   
                 Association Act (1908) for contactiong  some  
                  members   of   teh   terrosist   groups  and 
                   providing funds for them. He  was  sentenced 
                   on   6   October   1994   to   therr  years' 
                   imprisonment after due process of law;      
              "(b) Under Section  5(e)  of  the  Emergency     
               Provisions  Act  for  arranging to write and    
                distribute  seditious  literature.  He   was   
                 sentenced  on 6 October 1994 to seven years'  
                  imprisonment after due process of law;       
             "(c) Under  Section  9  (2)/24  (1)  of  the      
              Foreign  Exchange Regulations Act (1947) for     
               trying to smuggle out  precious  stones  and    
                foreign  currency  .  He  was sentenced on 6   
                 October 1994 to  three  years'  imprisonment  
                  after due process of law.
                    "...  Moreover,  Yangon Divisional (Northern 
                   District  )Court  found  Dr.  Khin  Zaw  Win 
                   guilty  of  an  illegal  act under Section 5 
                   (2)/(4) of the Government  Officiaal  Secret 
                   Act  (1923)  for  smuggling out confidential 
                   data from the  Ministry  of  Energy  of  the 
                   Government   of   the   Union   of  Myanmar. 
                   Accordingly, he is sentenced  on  6  October 
                   1994   to   two   years'  imprisonment  with 
                   labour."
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Daw San San Nwe    "... guilty of an illegal act and criminal  
                  offence under Section 5 (e) of the Emergency 
                   Provisions Act and Section 109 of  the  code 
                   of     Criminal    Procedure    for    [her] 
                   colloboration  with  Dr.  Khin  Zaw  win  in 
                   writing  and  distributing  false  news that 
                   could jeopardize the security of the  State. 
                   Accordingly,   they   were  sentenced  on  6 
                   October 1994 to seven years' imprisonment.  
                  "Moreover, Daw San San Nwe was sentenced  to 
                   three   years'  imprisonment  under  Section 
                   17(1)  of  the  Unlawful  Associations   Act 
                   (1908)  on  6 October 1994 by the same sourt 
                   for contacting some members of the terrosist 
                   groups and providing funds for them.
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
U Khin Maung Swe   "...guilty of an illegal  act  and  criminal 
                   offence under Section 5 (e) of the Emergency 
                   Provision Act and Section 109 of the Code of 
                   Criminal  Procedure  for [his] collaboration 
                   with  Dr.  Khin  Zaw  Win  in  writing   and 
                   distributing    false    news   that   could 
                   jeopardize  the  security  of   the   State. 
                   Accordingly,   they   were  sentenced  on  6 
                   October 1994 to seven years'imprisonment."
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dr. Htun Myat Aye  "...has not been detained. As he  was  aware 
                    of  the  movements  of Dr. Khin Zaw Win and 
                    his colleagues, he was questioned and  then 
                    released."
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Daw San San tin    "when legal action was taken against Dr.    
                Khin Zaw Win and his colleagues,  [she]  was   
                 not included."
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
111. The Government of Myanmar also responded that U Khin Maung
Swe, U Sein Hla Oo, Daw san San Nwe and her daughter "had the
right of defence and the right to have legal defence counsel for
their cause".

112. The Special Rapporteur continues to receive reports
indicating that several persons who have reportedly been
sentenced may not benefit from the minimum standards of judicial
guarantees. Numerous persons aer reportedly subjected to lengthy
prison terms which constitute disproportional sentences in
relation to the offences for which they have been found guilty.
Information from reliable sources indicates that there are
general problems in the matter of fair trial especially in the
sense of free access to defence lawyers, sufficiency of time for
careful examination of the cases, and proportionality between
offences committed and punishments applied. For example, on 11
January 1994, the Special court of Yangon West District
sentenced to death four persons after they had been found guilty
of murdering a student: the judgements were rendered within a few
days of the arrest of those accused.

113. With respect to other specific cases, the Special
Rapporteur draws attention to the report of the working Group on
Arbitrary Detention (E/CN.4/1995/31 paras. 7-8 and 13-14) and
Decision No. 13/1994, adopted by the working group on 28
September 1994.

ENDS(4/6)\







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UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR (5/6)[Para 114-144] 
C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
---------------------------------------------------------- 114.
Numerous allegations, often in considerable detail, have been
received from various sources alleging that members of the
Myanmar military, intelligence and security services and police
continue to torture persons in detention or otherwise subject
them to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishemnt.
Such treatment seems to be routinely employed during the
interrogations of persons who have been arbitrarily arrested or
held on suspicion of real or perceived  anti-government
activities. Allegations include subjection tosevere beatings,
shackling, near suffocation, burning, stabbing, rubbing of salt
and chemicals in open wounds and psychological torture,
including threats of death. Other reported methods of torture
include sexual assault and rape, mostly among womenserving as
porters.

115. The Special Rapporteur received testimony from reliable
sources, corroborated by photographs, indicating that detaines
are very often chained and are forced to sleep on cold cement,
and that many of them suffer from sickness and serious diseases.
The same reliable testimony and photographic evidence indicate
that cells are often overcrowded and that prisoners are provided
with inadequate hygenic or medical care.

116. In addition to several reports received by the Special
Rapporteur alleging widespread torture and other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment in Myanmar, he has also interviewed
persons claiming to be victims or to have witness such human
rights violations.

117. With respect to specific cases, the Special Rapporteur draws
attention to the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture
(E/CN.4/1995/34, paras. 492-500). IN this connection, the Special
Rapporteur is aware that the Government of Myanmar has responded
to the allegations transmitted by the Special Rapporteur on
Torture.

D. Freedom of movement
----------------------
118. During his visit to Myanmar, the Special Rapporteur was
pleased to note that several members of intergovernmental and
international non-governmental  organizations are permitted to
travel through the country to implement their programmes
directly with the concerned population. Nevertheless, reliable
sorces informed the Special Rapporteur that forced relocation and
internal displacement of persons occurs on a wide scale. People
continue to be forcible relocated, without compensation, to new
towns and villages. For example, on 9 July 1994, some 80 persons
are said to have been forced to leave Kyein-ta-li
village in southern Rakhine State; they were forced to leave on
very short notice and were not allowed to bring any property with
them. In another example , about 1,500 persons were said to have
been forced to leave their homes in Nga-let village in Min-pya
township in northern Rakhine State on 13 July 1994; these persons
are said to have been rounded up by the military and put on seven
boats. In July 1994, in Rakhine State, a muslim community
composed of 250 households was allegedly forced to move from
their native village of Ngla, in Minbya township, to Maung Daw
township. IN a third example, another Muslim community composed
of 360 households was reportedly forced to move from their
village of Kawalong, Myauk U township, to be relocated in Maung
Daw on 4 October 1994.

119. Allegations have also beenmade that 30 Muslim heads of
family weree rounded up from villages around Pyapon township in
the delta area of the Irrawaddy division an dsent to Yangon,
where they were detained at the police lock-up in Barr Street.
The detained persons are all said to be holders of national
identity cards and to be owners of the land that they have worked
on for generations. Reports claim that these persons now face
deportation or forcible relocation, without compensation, to
Rakhine State.

120. Forced relocations and evictions have also been reported by
reliable sources in connection with major development projects.
According to several non-governmental sources, Myanmar
authorities are forcing Muslims to dismangle their cenmeteries
and religious buildings at six months' notice, to make room for
more profitable construction related to tourism. Such acts are
claimed to have taken place in, for example, Yangon, Mandalay,
and Yan-bye township, the local authorities have reportedly
ordered six mosques to be dismantled. The reason said to hav been
goven by the authorities for the order is that the trustees of
the mosques could not produce any documentation concerning the
legality of the buildings. The mosques are several hunderd years
old.

E. Freedom of expression
------------------------
121. During his visit to Myanmar the Special Rapporteur was
pleased to note that several members of the foreign press,
including members of foreign radio and television companies, were
alloweed entry into Myanmar. Foreign news papers were also
available in some book stores in Yangon, and more than 80
Myanmar magazines, of social and cultural interest, are
available to the public. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur was
also informed that, within Myanmar, the written press, radio and
television continue to be subject to governmental
censorship, and that the distribution of written material was
also subject to governmental restrictions and control. For
example, all magazines muxt be read by a governmental body before
their distribution.

122. According to an article entitled "Action taken against
destructive elements" which was published in the 23 August 1994
edition of the State-controlled English-language newspaper The
New Light of Myanmar (printed on p.12) , the receiving or
passing of information or written material from and to
foreigners appears to be illegal. By prosecuting persons for such
exchange of information, the Government of Myanmar
effectively intimidates its citizens and discourages them from
exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of expression. 
123. The Special Rapporteur is especially concerned about the
fact that during his visit to Myanmar he was unable to meet
citizens who wished to contact him, because of their fear of
subsequent repercussions. In this connection, the Special
Rapporteur notes that one of the charges against Khin Zaw Win,
who was arrested in July 1994, was that of haveing made
arrangements to send fabricated news on Myanmar to the Special
Rapporteur during his visit to the country in 1992. This
allegation was published on 23 August 1994 in the same article
of The New Light of Myanmar referred to above, as follows: 
     "Dr. Khin Zaw Win and group met those who have opposite   
  views on government and the Tatmedaw and made arrangements   
  for sending fabricated news on Myanmar to Professor Yozo     
Yokota, representative of the United Nations Commission on     
Human Rights during his visit in December 1992."

The Special Rapporteur was informed during his visit to Myanmar
that this particular charge was not considered as a basis for
judgment by the court, but the fact that it was widely reported,
including by the government newspaper, would have a strong
psychologocal effect on people and cause them to be extremely
reticent about contactiong him.

F. Labour rights
----------------
124. The Special Rapporteur has been informed that workers in
Myanmar do not enjoy basic labour rights including, in
particular, freedom of association and the right to organize.
There is hardly any trade union movement, and workers and trade
unionists who criticize the Government would risk interrogation
and arrest.

125. The Special Rapporteur received amny complaints from
several reliable sources that men, women and children from the
age of 14 years are allegedly used ofr forced labour for the
construction of railways, roads and bridges. Persons with past
records are randomly rounded up by local police or the military
in resettlement areas, and in downtown Yangon, along Insein Road
and in the small coffee houses. In the country side, village
headmen are responsible for filling forced labour and porter
quotas or providing large sums of money to the military instead. 
126. The Special Rappporteur received testimonies describing
minutely the duties of porters. Porters are required to carry
heavy loads of ammunition, food and other supplies between army
camps, generally over rugged mountains which are inaccessible by
vehicle. They must often construct the camps for the military
upon arrival. They are not paid for thier work and are allowed
only a minimum of food and rest.

127. The Special Rapporteur takes note of the fact that the
matter has been raised before appropriate bodiew of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO). On 7 November 1994, ILO
issued document GB. 261/13/7 entitled "Report of the Committee
set up to consider the representation made by the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions under article 24 of the ILO
Constitution alleging non-observance by Myanmar of the Forced
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)". The Committee has concluded
that "the exaction of labour and services, in particular
porterage service, under the Village Act and the Towns Act is
contrary to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),
ratified by the Government of Myanmar in 1955".

G. Rights of the child
----------------------
128. The Special Rapporteur is pleased to note that the
Government of Myanmar formally withdrew the reservations made by
Myanmar upon accession to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child  in July 1991 with respect to article 15 ( regarding
freedom of association) and article 37 ( regarding the
prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment in regard, interalia, to the treatment of children
during interrogation). However, the Special Rapporteur is
concerned that there is some evidence of childern being forced
to serve in the army as soldiers or as porters. This practice,
which is reported to remain widespread, would involve a variety
of human rihgts violations, including forced labour, cruel and
degrading traetment ( if not also torture) and threats to life. 
129. Regarding allegations of violations of childern's rights,
the Special Rapporteur interviewed several witnesses during his
visits to the refugee camps in Thialand. He met childrn of 16 and
17 years of age who claimed that they had been forced to serve
in the Myanmar Army two years earlier. Such military service of
childern is contrary to article 38, paragraphs 2 and 3, of th
eConvention on the Rights of the child, to which
Myanmar is a party.

H. Treatment of the Muslim population in Rakhine State
------------------------------------------------------
130. In early 1992, there was a mass influx of some 250,000
Muslim refugees into Bangladesh from Rakhine State in Myanmar.
To address this problem, a joint statement was made by the
Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh, on 23 April 1992,
concerning the voluntary repatriation of refugees. Bangladesh
requested the assistance of UNHCR to facilitate the repatriation
and memoranduan of understanding between UNHCR and the
Governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar were signed on 12 May 1993
and 5 November 1993, respectively.

131. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur welcomed the
willingness of the Government of Myanmar to cooperate with UNHCR
in order to ensure the voluntary and safe return of the Muslim
population who had fled to Bangladesh from Rakhine State.
Between September 1992 and the end of Spetember 1994, a total of
75,000 refugees had returned to Myanmar and, according to UNHCR,
it is anticipated that an additional 45,000 refugees will have
returned by the end of 1994. If the aforementioned anticipated
return is accomplished as planned, the total number of returnees
at the end of 1994 would be 120,000, or approximately half the
number who fled.

132. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the undertaking of the
Government of Myanmar to allow the establishment in December 1993
in Rakhine State of a UNHCR permanent field office with
internaitonal staff. This presence may dissapate the fear of many
of the Muslim population of Rakhine State who remain in the camps
on the Bangladeshi side of the Border. Many of them are said to
be fearful of possible ill-treatment by the Myanmar authorities
upon internaitonal monitoring.

133. In Myanmar, five reception centres(Taungpyo, Ngakhuya,
Pyinphyu, Kanyinchaung and Magyichaung) and one transition centre
(in Buthidaung) have been established. Upon arrival at the
recption centres, returnee families are issued "family lists"
serving as temporary identity documentation until they are
provided with a returnee identity card.

134. UNHCR reports that, up to the present, all returnees have
been able to move back into their former homes. Most returnees
who had access to land prior to their departure for Bangladesh
will be able to rgain their land after the next harvest. In cases
where the returnees are unable to claim their land back, the
authorities have committed themselves to finding alternative
solutions at the location of the returnees' former residences. 
135. UNHCR is playing a key role in helping create conditions in
Rakhine State conducive to the return of the refugees and to
monitor their wellbeing. The Special Rapporteur is informed that
the returnees are free to travel and will be entitled to the same
rights as other residents of Myanmar. The governmental
authorities are also obliged to inform UNHCR of cases of arrest
or detention of returnees and to allow UNHCR officers access to
any detained returnee.

I. The National Convention
--------------------------
136. On 9 January 1993, the Government convened a national
convention to lay down the basic principles for the elaboration
of a new and enduring consittution. Of the 702 delegates from 8
categories of people, 49 are selected by the 10 political
parties remaining after the 1990 elections, 106 are elected
representatives and the remainder of the delegates from the other
6 categories were chosen be SLORC. Before any real
discussion could take place at eh National Convention, a broad
frame work  of basic objectives was provided by the Government:
(a) non-disintegration of the Union; (b) non-disintegration of
national solidarity; (c) consolidation and perpetuity of
sovereignty; (d) emergence of a genuine multiparty democratic
system; (e) development of eternal principles of justice,
liberty an equality in the State; and (f) participation of the
Tatmadaw in a leadership role in the national politics in the
future.

137. The Special Rapporteur has been informed that each of the
eight groups represented were to have a panel of five chairmen
who would lead the discussions and that, in the political
parites group, only one chairman was from NLD - the party that
won a majority in the 1990 elections. In the elected
representatives group, where 89 of the remaining 106 delegates
were from NLD. No NLD representatives were selected as chairmen. 
138. During his visit to the Naitonal Convention, the Special
Rapporteur met with several delegates. He was informed that all
the delegates to the Naitonal convention are required to stay in
the Convention compound. IN the same dormitory, five delegates
live together. There is one sergeant clerk in each dormitory
serving the delegates. It is reported that these sergeant clerks
may also observe the activities of the delegates.

139. Delegates are not totally free to meet with other delegates
inside the compound. They are not entitled to leave the compound
without authorization. When they leave the compound, delegates
are not allowed to take out any written or printed materials. It
was also reported to the Special Rapporteur that when the
delegates return to their states to see their families they are
sometimes harassed by the local authorities. The special
Rapporteur is concerned that such an atmosphere does not permit
the delegates to be in touch with the populations they
represent, or enable they to take into account their grievances,
wishes and points of view and, thus, to represent them
meaningfully during the debates which are taking place in the
National Convention.

140. The Special Rapporteur was told that the delegates enjoy the
freedoms of expression and discussion. However, they cannot
distribute discussion papers among themselves: all papers have
to be distributed to the chairman of the groups. The chairmen
scrutinize the contents and, if the statements are found to be
contradictory with the agreed principles, the relevant parts are
deleted. Only then will the papers be read at the group
meetings. When the proposed statements are to be read before the
plenary meeting, they have to be submitted again for scrutiny by
the Work Committee.

141. The reply of the government in response to a query by the
special Rapporteur with regard to progress made so far in the
National Convention on the drafting of a new constitution, and
the anticipated schedule for future meetings, is reproduced in
the addendum to the interim report of the Special Rapporteur to
the General Assembly (A/49/594/Add.1,pp.13 to 15 of the English
version.)

J. The movement towards reconciliation with the insurgents
---------------------------------------------------------- 142.
The Special Rapporteur has been informed that the
government of Myanmar extended an official invitation to the
armed groups to return to the legal fold, to hold toalks with the
Government and to join hands with the government in the ongoing
national endeavour for the development of border areas and
national races. During his meetings in Myanmre, the
government of Myanmar provided the Special Rapporteur with a list
of the 13 ethnic and other armed groups which "had returned to
the legal fold", i.e. have signed ceasefire agreements whith the
Government of Myanmar. The list is reprodeced in annex II to the
present report.

143. In connection wiht the "return to the legal fold"of various
of the former insurgent groups, the Special Rapporteur notes a
list supplied to hum by the government of Myanmar which names 77
persons who have been released from imprisonment subsequent to
receiving sentences for a variety of politically related
offences, including offences under  section 17(1) of the 1908
Unlawful Association Act. This list is reprodeced in annex III
to the present report.

144. In response to the Government's invitation to "return to the
legal fold", it was reported in November 1994 that the leaders
of the Karen National Union (KNU) , the largest armed insurgent
group, was ready to discuss a ceasefire with the Government of
Myanmar. It is still too early to make any
meaningful assessment of developments in this respect. But, from
the viewpoint of protection of human rights, such a move towards
true national reconciliation should be welcomed because, as
stated above, many caases of serious human rights violations are
being committed in the context of military operations. For
example, Kachine state, where an isurgency was previously taking
place during which foreigners were prohibited to visit, has
become opened for journalists and tourists as a result of the
return of the Kachine Independence Organization (KIO) guerrilla
group to the legal fold. During a visit to Kachine State in
November 1994, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt was quoted as saying
that peace is now prevailing in Kachine State.

ENDS(5/6)\


UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR (6/6)[Para 144-155] 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions
--------------
145. The visit of the Special Rapporteur to the Union of Myanmar
at the invitation of the government was facilitated by the
efforts, cooperation and courtesy extended to him by the
officials of the government, in particular Lieutenent General
Khin Nyunt, Secretary One of SLORC, and U Ohn Gyaw, Minister for
foreign Affairs. Most of the requests of the special Rapporteur
to meet pwesons pertinent to his mandate were met, including
meetings with the Attorney-General, Chief Justice, Minister of
Information, some political leaders in detention and
representatives of political parties. However, the Special
Rapporteur was disappointed  that he was not allowed to meet Daw
Aung San suu Kyi. He also regrets that the meetings with the
representatives of political parties were held at a place and in
an atmosphere not fully ensuring privacy. However, the Special
Rapporteur commends the Government for arranging quite
effeciently his visit to Mon State, Mandalay State and Mengwe
State, Insein Prison, Mandalay Prison and other places and
facilities which he had requested to visit.

146. The Special Rapporteur generally observed in Yangon and
Mandalay that there were visible signs of relaxation of tension
in the life of the people. There were many consumer goods in
market places where many shoppers crowded. Streets and bridges
have been constructed or improved. There were many cars on the
streets. Indeed, inthe centre of Yangon, traffic congestion and
parking problems occurred at certain times of the day. However,
the Special Rapporteur was informed that this development and
construction is benefiting only a few persons. IN fact, there
were poor people in the cities and, in particular, in the
country side; these persons did not appear to be sharing in any
new prospersity, and rather appeared to be suffering from
inflationary pressures on basic necessities such as rice and
medicines.

147. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the expanding
cooperationbetween the Government of Myanmar and various United
nations organs and with international humanitarian
non-governmental organizations.

148. The Special Rapporteur continues to be concerned about the
serious restrictions imposed upon people in the enjoyment of
civil and political rights. The people do not generally enjoy
freedom of thought, opinion, expression, publication and
peaceful assembly and association. They seem to be always
fearful that anything they or their familiy members say or do,
particularly in the area of politics, could put them at risk of
arrest and interrogation by the police or military intelligence.
Consequently, most people with whom the Special Rapporteur spoke
casually avoided any conversation touching upon political
subjects. Several people told him that meny persons wished to
tell the Special Rapporteur their stories, but were too afraid
to come to see him.

149. The persons whose civil and political rights are most
severely restricted are the leaders of political parties,
particularly the NLD leaders, and delegates to the National
convention, again particularly those from NLD. Because of both
visible and invisible pressures, they cannot assemble in a group,
cannot freely discuss, and cannot publish or distribute printed
materials. In this situation it is difficult to assume that, in
the Naitonal convention, open and free exange of views and
opinions are taking place in order to produce a truly
democratic constitution.

150. The special Rapporteur is pleased to note that the
Government of Myanmar has continued to release persons who have
been detained for political activities. He also welcomes the
Government's decision to allow pwesons other than members of her
immediate family to visit Daw Aung San suu Kyi, as well as the
beginning of a dialogue between her and the government. He would
however, express concern that htere aer still hundreds of such
persons detained in Myanmar, most notably Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
He also regrets that, in the summer of 1994, five persons were
specifically arrested for engaging in political activities and
were subsequently sentenced to long prison terms.

151. Government representatives have repeatedly explained to the
Special Rapporteur that the Government is willing to transfer
power to a civilian government, but that, in order to do so,
there must be a strong constitution and that, in order to have
a strong constitution, it is doing its best to complete the work
of the National Convention. However, the Special Rapporteur
cannot help but feel that, given the composition of the
delegates ( only one out of seven delegates was elected in the
1990 elections), the restrictions imposed upon the delegates
(practically no freedom to assemble, to print and distribute
leaflets or to make statements freely) and the general
gukdelines to be strictly followed (including the principle
regarding the leading role of the Tatmadaw), the National
Convention does not appear to constitute the necessary "steps
towards the restoration of democracy, fully respectiong the will
of the people as expressed in the democratic elections held in
1990" (General Assembly resolution 47/144, para. 4).

152. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the fact that, subsequent
to the signing on 5 November 1993 of the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Union of Myanmar and UNHCR to
facilitate and guarantee the voluntary and safe return of
Myanmar residences from Bangladesh, and the subsequent opening
of a UNHCR field office in Rakhine State to allow UNHCR
international staff to monitor the repatriation of the refugees,
tens of thousands of refugees have been successfully
repatriated.

153. The Special Rapporteur further welcomes the undertaking of
various training programmes for military officers and soldiers
with the cooperation of ICRC and the Myanmar Red Cross Society
in the area of international humanitarian law.

154. The Special Rapporteur is paying special attention to the
recent successes of the government initiative to invite the armed
insurgent groups to enter into talks with the Government and ne
notes, in particular, some initially positive response from the
Karen National Union. He is hopeful that the process will move
forward in the direction of achieving true
reconciliation and peace  throughout the country.

B. Recommendation
-----------------
155. In the light of the foregoing conclusions, the Special
Rapporteur submits the following recommendations for the
consideration of the Government of Myanmar:

(a) The Government of Myanmar should fulfil in good faith the
obligations it has assumed under articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter of the United Nations "to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of ...
universal respec t for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction  as to race,
sex, language and religion". In this respect, the Special
Rapporteur notes that the Governemnt of Myanmar is in an ideal
position to encourage the delegates of the National Convention
to include various human rights provisions in the new
constitution using, as a reference, the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human rights, a copy of which should be
circulated to each delegate in the Burmese language;

(b) The Government of Myanmar should consider accession to: the
International Convenants on Human Rights; the convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment; and the two Protocols additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949;

(c) Myanmar law should be brought into line with accepted
international standares regarding protection of physical
integrity, including the right to life, protection against
disappearance, prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment, providing humane conditions for all
persons under detention and insurance of teh minimum standards
of judicial guarantees;

(d) The Government of Myanmar should take steps to facilitate and
guarantee enjoyment of the freedoms of opinion, expression and
association, in particular by decriminalizing the expression of
oppositional views, reliquishing government control over the
media nad literary and artistic communities, and permitting the
formation of independently organized trade unions;

(e) All political leaders, including elected political
representatives, students, workers, peasants and oter arrested
or detained under maritial law after the 1988 and 1990
demonstrations or as a result of the National Convention, should
be tried by a properly constituted and independent civilian court
in an open and internationally accessible judicial
process. If found guilty in such judicial proceedings, they
should be given a just sentence; alternatively, they should be
immediately released and the Government refrain from all acts of
intimidation, threats of reprisals agaainst them or their
families. With respect to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Governmet
should release her immediately and unconditionally;

(f) The Government of Myanmar should take the necessary steps to
bring the conduct of the military , including ordinary soldiers
and officers, into line with accepted international human rights
and humanitarian standards so that they do not arbitrarily kill,
rape, confiscate property, force persons into acts of labour or
porterage, relocate them or otherwise treat persons with respect
to their  dignity as human beings. When the hiring of local
villagers for porterage and other works may be required for
governmental purposes, it should be undertaken on a voluntary
basis and adequate wages should be paid. The nature of the work
should be reasonable and in accordance with established
international labour standards. When the relocation of villages
is considered necessary for military operations or for
development projects, proper consultation with the villagers
should take place and appropriate compensation should be paid for
those relocations which may be determined necessary for reasons
of the public good;

(g) The government of Myanmar should take all steps to refrain
from recruting any person who has not attained the age of 15
years into their armed forces, in accordance with article 38.3
of teh Convention on the Rights of the Child;

(h) All military and law enforcement personnel, including prison
guards, should be throughly informed and trained as to their
responsibilities, in full accordance with the standards set out
in international human rights instruments and humanitarian law.
Such standards should be incorporated into Myanmar law and
legislation, including the new constitution to be drafted. The
training programme undertaken with the cooperation of ICRC is a
good start in this direction and should be continued;

(i) Given teh magnitude of the abuses, official condemnation
should be made by the Government of all acts by authorities
invilving human rights violations. such acts, including all acts
of intimidation, thrieats or reprisal, should not benefit from
the present system of almost complete denial by, and impunity
under, the Government;

(j) The Government of Myanmar should consider revision of th 1982
Citizenship Law to abolish its burdensome requirements for
citizenship. The law should not apply its categories of second
class citizenship in a manner which has discriminatory effects
on racial or ethnic minorities, particularly the Rakhine Muslim
population. It should be brought into line with the principles
embodied in the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of
30 August 1961;

(k) The Government of Myanmar is encouraged to continue its
cooperation with UNHCR in facilitating and ensuring the
voluntary and safe return of Rakhine Muslims from Bangladesh; 
(l) The Government of Myanmar is also encouraged to continue its
cooperation with international non-governmental organizations in
facilitating and ensuring the free access of their international
staff to ordinary persons in the townships and villages in order
to establish contacts and provide assistance to persons who are
suffering from a shortage or lack of food, safe water,
medicines, medical care and proper education.

ANNEXES
-------
I.   RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MYANMAR TO ALLEGATIONS OF   
  EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION WHILE IN CUSTODY, AS RAISED BY THE   
  SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR DURING HIS MEETING WITH COLONEL KYAW WIN OF 
    THE DIRETORATE OF DEFENCE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ON 10 NOVEMBER 
    1994.

II.  NATIONAL ARMED GROUPS WHICH HAVE RETURNED TO THE LEGAL FOLD. 
III. CHART SHOWING PARTICULARS OF THOSE AGAINST WHOM ACTION HAS 
    BEEN TAKEN FOR HAVING CONTACT WITH KNU INSURGENTS AND WHO
HAVE      BEEN RELEASED BY THE MYANMAR AUTHORITIES DURING 1994. 
END OF REPORT\


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NEWS SOURCES REGULARLY COVERED/ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET: 
 ABSDF: ALL BURMA STUDENT'S DEMOCRATIC FRONT
 AMNESTY: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
 AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS
 AFP: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
 AW: ASIAWEEK
 Bt.: THAI BAHT; 25 Bt. EQUALS US$1 (APPROX),
 BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
 BF: BURMA FORUM
 BKK POST: BANGKOK POST (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)
 BRC-CM: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-CHIANG MAI
 BRC-J: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-JAPAN
 CPPSM:C'TEE FOR PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND 
 DVB: DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA (SHORTWAVE-RADIO, FROM NORWAY)
 FEER: FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
 GOA: GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA
 IRRAWADDY: NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED BY BURMA INFORMATION GROUP 
 KHRG: KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP
 KNU: KAREN NATIONAL UNION
 Kt. BURMESE KYAT; UP TO 150 KYAT-US$1 BLACK MARKET
                   106 KYAT US$1-SEMI-OFFICIAL
                   6 KYAT-US$1 OFFICIAL
 MOA: MIRROR OF ARAKAN
 MNA: MYANMAR NEWS AGENCY (SLORC)
 THE NATION: A DAILY NEWSPAPER IN BANGKOK
 NCGUB: NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA 
 NLM: NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR (DAILY STATE-RUN NEWSPAPER,RANGOON) 
 NMSP: NEW MON STATE PARTY
 RTA:REC.TRAVEL.ASIA NEWSGROUP
 RTG: ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT
 SCB:SOC.CULTURE.BURMA NEWSGROUP
 SCT:SOC.CULTURE.THAI NEWSGROUP
 SEASIA-L: S.E.ASIA BITNET MAILING LIST
 SLORC: STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL
 [SLORC] POSTED BY AN OFFICIAL SLORC SOURCE
 [SLORCITE] ATTRIBUTABLE TO BUT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED AS A SLORC  
            SOURCE
 TAWSJ: THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
 UPI: UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
 USG: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
 VOA: VOICE OF AMERICA
 XNA: XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
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