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Human Rights Watch Director Stateme
- Subject: Human Rights Watch Director Stateme
- From: maung@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 07 Sep 1995 14:22:00
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
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Hearing on
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA
Thursday, September 7, 1995 - 9.30 AM
Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building
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Statement by
Holly Burkhalter
Washington Director
Human Rights Watch On Human Rights in Burma
September 7, 1995
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for taking the leadership to hold this important
hearing on Burma at a most critical time. I also want to thank you for
inviting us to testify. My name is Holly Burkhalter and I am the Washington
Director of Human Rights Watch. I appear here today on behalf of Human Rights
Watch/Asia(formerly Asia Watch). Since 1985, our organization has carried out
independent monitoring of human rights in Asia, conducting investigations,
publishing repoits, engaging in dialogue with governments, and wherever
possible collaborating with and supporting the work of local human rights
monitors. Human Rights Watch has consultative status at the United Nations.
In my testimony this morning, I would like to give a brief overview of the
current human rights conditions in Burma, then outline our recommendations to
the international community and the U.S. government.
Human Rights Developments
The release of Aung San Suu Kyi on July 10, 1995, one day before the end
of her legal period of detention, was a welcome move on the part of the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Her release comes after years of
international pressure on SLORC, including five unanimous resolutions by the
U.N. General Assembly and numerous appeals from individual governments,
including the United States, Japan, and members of the European Union.
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The decision to release Aung San Suu Kyi was also a measure of the SLORC's
confidence in its ability to hold down the lid on dissent. Indeed, it is
difficult to know whether her release will lead to an improvement in the human
rights situation in Burma, or whether it may only lead to a further
entrenchment of the current military government. This could occur if SLORC
succeeds in attracting increased international investment and economic
assistance and, as a result, finds less need to respond to calls from the
international community for fundamental change.
We believe it is certainly far too early to reward the SLORC with further
investment and bilateral or multilateral assistance. Just two days after her
release, Aung San Suu Kyi said. "In the long run, I think we would need
international investment, but I don't think we should rush into this.. .1 want
to study the situation very carefully before I can say whether 1 truly believe
this is the right time for investment." {1}
In late July, Human Rights Watch/Asia published a major report documenting
current human rights conditions in Burma. Even while Burma's most prominent
democracy leader has been freed, the overall human rights situation in the
country is worsening. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
recently closed its office in Rangoon after the failure of'negotiations with the Burmese government to allow the organization access to Burma's detention
centers. Offensives have been renewed against ethnic minority groups,
including the Karenni Nationalities People's Party, which signed a cease-fire agreement with the SLORC in March 1995. In areas where fighting has resumed, tens of thousands of villagers have been forcibly taken from their homes and
fields to work for the army. Many have died from beatings and exhaustion.
After the fall ofthe Karen National Union headquarters in January 1995, a
breakaway group of ethnic Karen Buddhists, which has formed an alliance with
the Burmese army, attacked refugee camps in Thailand, killing several refugees
and Thai villagers and abducting scores of others.
Discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities across Burma has
increased in 1995. Many of these communities have been forcibly relocated
into government-controlled villages, while religious buildings and land have
been confiscated. In Arakan State, from which 270,000 Muslims fled during
1991-92, reports of forced labor and forced relocations of Muslims have
continued. As the SLORC has moved to attract international investment and tourism, at least two
million Burmese citizens since 1992 have been forced to
work for no pay under brutal conditions to rebuild the country's
infrastructure.
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Human Rights Watch/Asia estimates that at least 1,000 political prisoners
remain in Burmese jails, including sixteen members of parliament elected in
May 1990. The names of the detained M.P.'s are attached to my testimony, Mr.
Chairman. We learned just recently that three veteran politicians were
arrested and sentenced during July 1995. They are U Tun Shwe, former diplomat
and politician; U Thu Wai, a close associate of U Nu who worked with him to
form the Democratic Party; and U Htwe Myint, also a political activist. All of
them are in their late sixties or early seventies. While we do not have all of
the details from their trials, we do know that U Tun Shwe was sentenced to
seven years under Section 5J of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, which
allows for imprisonment of up to seven years of any one who "infringes
upon the health, conduct and respect of state or military organizations... or
spreads false news about the government."
It is also worth noting that while Daw Aung San Sun Kyi has been permitted to
meet with foreign diplomats, in early August, ASEAN ambassadors were warned
that a lunch meeting planned with Suu Kyi would be considered as violating the
principles of non-interference. And a Thai non-governmental organization had
planned to tape a speech from Aung San Suu Kyi to be broadcast at the NGO
forum in Beijing, but the Burmese Government denied the group a visa to
travel to Rangoon for that purpose. However, a tape of her speech was smuggled
out of Burma and was played at the Beijing conference. In it, she stated that
"It is fear of persecution for their political beliefs that has made so many
of our people feel that even in their own homes they cannot live in dignity
and security."
We believe that the SLORC must take significant action to improve the human
rights situation in Burma, as spelled out in detailed recommendations by the
U.N. Human Rights Commission.
Recommendations:
We urge the international community to respond to the release of Aung San Suu
Kyi by engaging in dialogue with the SLORC about what specific steps it will
take to implement United Nation's resolutions on Burma, while at the same time
initiating direct, ongoing contacts with Aung San Suu Kyi in order to discuss
the human rights situation. Unfortunately, the visit to Burma by the
Assistant Secretary General, Alvaro DeSoto, in mid-August was not particularly
successful, as he was unable to meet with the SLORC Secretary, Khin Nyunt. He
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did have several meetings with the Army Chiefof Staff and with Aung San Suu
Kyi. But there have been no indications that the UN team might be able to
broker direct negotiations between Aung San Suu Kyi, the SLORC, and the ethnic
minorities. It is crucial that Mr. DeSoto's mandate be extended when the
bilateral Assembly convenes this fall.
Diplomatic contacts with the SLORC must be accompanied by internationally
coordinated measures to continue and increase pressure on the SLORC to
undertake fundamental human rights reforms.
Among the measures we would recommend to the international community for
exerting pressure on the SLORC:
-- a freeze on all further private investment unless and until all forced
labor in Burma has ended and this can be verified by independent human rights
monitors.
-- continued suspension of bilateral assistance;
-- a clear statement from the donor countries at the World Bank that
multilateral assistance cannot be resumed until basic human rights and
political reforms are undertaken, a decision by the International Labor
Organization to conduct a Commission of Inquiry into forced labor;
-- a concerted effort to stigmatize China for its role as the SLORC's major
arms provider {2}
U . S. P O L I C Y
The United States was a leader in drafting and supporting the passage of the
March resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and should work
vigorously at the upcoming General Assembly session to assure passage of a
strong resolution which will be considered in December. Secretary Christopher
was very outspoken about human rights in Burma at the post-Ministerial ASEAN
meeting on August 3, when he urged the ASEAN nations to demand greater
progress before admitting Burma to the association. He noted that "...problems
continue, including grave human rights violations, massive forced labor and
drug trafficking. We believe that the true significance of Aung San Suu Kyi's
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release depends on whether it leads to real movement toward restoration of a
government accountable to its people. We welcome this strong diplomatic
support by the United States in international fora, which has played an
important role in isolating SLORC and pressing the regime for change.
President Clinton ordered a high-level review of Burma policy in mid-1993
The review was completed in October 1994, at which time Thomas Hubbard,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs,
went to Rangoon to present the new policy directly to Gen. Khin Nyunt. He
offered the SLORC "two visions of a future relationship with the U.S., either
increased cooperation based on positive movement on human rights,
democratization and counter-narcotics issues, or increased isolation."
No immediate progress was announced as a result of the visit, and Mr. Hubbard
was denied access to Aung San Suu Kyi (then under house arrest). Burmese
officials told him that they would continue talks with her (as of today, no
further talks have yet taken place), and that they would allow prison visits
by the lCRC. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) also asked to undertake
a joint opium survey in Burma.
Since Mr. Hubbard's visit, the United States has enhanced relations with Burma
considerably in the area of anti-narcotics assistance On June 21, 1995, at a
hearing in the House of Representatives, the administration announced that it
would reward the SLORC for all allowing the DEA to conduct an opium yield
survey in December 1994 by stepping up some forms of anti-narcotics program
narcotics assistance to Burma. This decision seemed to contradict the
administration's earlier statements that without progress on all three fronts
-- human rights, democratization, and narcotics control -- an upgrading of
U.S. cooperation could not take place. in its March 1995 presentation
to the Congress, the administration denied counter-narcotics certification to
Burma, as the U.S. has done every year since 1989. According to State
Department figures, heroin production has nearly tripled since the SLORC took
power in 1988. {3}
On June 21, 1995, the administration announced a "compromise" between those
who wanted to hold the line and those who had argued for substantially
increased anti-narcotics assistance. It said the U.S. would hold discussions
with SLORC officials on drug policies, provide in-country training to SLORC
anti-drug enforcement units, exchange intelligence information, and increase
funding for the U.N. Drug Control Program's activities in ethnically-
controlled areas of Burma.
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Meanwhile, the Administration has taken no action to impose further economic
sanctions beyond those already in place, and it has been reluctant to in any
way restrict or discourage private investment in Burma. The U.S. is now the
fourth largest investor in Burma, according to Burmese government figures.{4}
The SLORC has said it expects foreign investment to reach billion by the end
of the current fiscal year. {5}
Mr. Chairman, we believe there should be no increased anti-narcotics
assistance or cooperation extended to the SLORC until there is a genuine
improvement in the overall human rights situation, and an end to abuses
committed against ethnic minorities. (We note with pleasure that the House of
Representatives in a 359-38 vote in June passed an amendment to the
foreign aid appropriations bill prohibiting all foreign aid (including anti-
drug assistance) to Burma.
We understand that U.S. policy options are still under review, in light of the
release of Aung San Suu Kyi. The administration's initial reaction to word of
Sun Kyis release was positive, but appropriately cautious. President Clinton
welcomed the news but expressed "concerned about a number of serious and
unresolved human rights problems in Burma..."
We believe the Administration deserves credit for playing a leading role in
maintaining the international consensus on Burma, and hope it will continue to
do so.
As essential first steps to follow on Suu Kyi's release the ASEAN governments
and dialogue partners should call on the SLORC to unconditionally release all
political prisoners, and to begin by immediately freeing all detained Members
of Parliament; to resume negotiations with the ICRC and promptly allow the
ICRC prison access; to repeal or reform repressive laws which prohibit freedom
of association, expression, and the right of citizens to participate freely
in the political life of the country.{6} The U.S. and other governments
should also support the renewed effort by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Burma, Prof Yozo Yokota, who will attempt to visit Burma this fall, and urge
the authorities to permit him to travel without interference, and establish
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an ongoing human rights monitoring presence in Rangoon. {7}
The Burmese government's continued violations of international law and refusal
to fulfill the U.N.'s resolutions should not be tolerated by the international
community. Unless firm steps are taken to back up the numerous diplomatic
appeals, massive human rights violations in Burma are likely to continue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Footnotes:
{1) British Broadcasting Corporation, July 12, 1995.
{2} Since 1988, China has supplied at least $1.4 billion worth of arms to
Burma, including two deals in November 1994 worth $440 million. Beijing has
never revealed the precise details of its arms transfer to Burma.
{3} State Department estimates: Opium production (in metric tons): 68 tons
in 1988; 190 tons in 1993.
{4} On March 9, 1995 the Burmese government published the following figures
showing all investment in Burma since 1989: France ($1.05 billion), Singapore
($293.4 million), Thailand ($265 million), the U.S. $203 million): Japan
($101 million.) Total SA accounted for almost all French investment it is an
oil company in which the French Government and state-owned enterprises own 25
percent of the voting rights
{5} Investment Target is $4 Billion,"Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, July 10
1995: "Despite criticism of Burma;s human rights record, foreign investors led
by France, Singapore, the U.S. and Thailand have moved in to the resource-rich
nation, taking advantage of recent economic liberalization."
{6} This includes SLORC Orders 2/88, 4/9l, 10/91, the 1950 Emergency
Provisions Act, 1957 Unlawful Associations Act, 1962 Printers' and publishers'
Registration Act, 1975 State Protection Law, and the 1908 Villages and Towns
Act which permits village councils to order citizens to work as forced
laborers.
{7} Prof. Yokota last visited Burma in November 1994.His mandate was continued
by the U.N. Human Rights Commission at its March 1995 meeting.
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Attachment
Detained Members of Parliament in Burma (as of July 1995)
U Ohn Kyaing, M.P.-elect for Mandalay Southeast-2
U Tin Htut, M.P.-elect for Einme-l
U Win Hlaing, M.P.-elect for Tatkon-2
Saw Naing Naing, M.P.-elect for Pazundaung
U Tin Aung Aung, M.P.-elect for Manalay Northwest-l
Dr. Zaw Myint Aung, M.P.-elect for Amarapura-1
Dr. Myint Aung, M.P.-elect for Kanbalu-2
U Kyi Myint, M.P.-elect for Latha
Dr. Zaw Myint, M.P.-elect for Henzada-2
U Mya Win, M.P.-elect for Ingapu-1
U Hla Than, M.P.-elect for Coco Islands
U Tin Soe, M.P.-elect for Kyauktada
U Saw Win, M.P.-elect for Htilin
U Hla Tun, M.P.-elect for Kyimyindine
U Khin Maung Swe (released May 1, 1992; re-arrested August 1994)
U Sein Hla Oo (released May 1, 1992; re-arrested August 1994)