SHOULD NGOs GO INTO BURMA?

[darnott@xxxxxxxxxxx]

                           CAVEATS, CAUTIONS 
                        AND STRINGENT CONDITIONS
                                                                    
           (On the suggestion that NGOs should go into Burma)
                                               
                         Burma Peace Foundation
         777, UN Plaza, 6th Floor, New York, New York 10017, USA
      Tel (+1-212) 338 0048; Fax 692 9748 Email darnott@xxxxxxxxxxx
 
 
                                  UPDATE
 
SINCE THIS TEXT WAS FIRST WRITTEN, DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI HAS BEEN
RELEASED. POTENTIALLY THIS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS THE
RESTORATION OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN BURMA. SO FAR,
HOWEVER, NO FURTHER POLITICAL MOVEMENT HAS OCCURRED, HUMAN RIGHTS
MONITORS SPEAK OF A WORSENING IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, AND
FIGHTING CONTINUES IN THE CIVIL WAR.
 
SLORC DOES NOT APPROVE OF CROSS-BORDER ASSISTANCE, AND HAS
WRITTEN A PROHIBITION ON CONTACT WITH FOREIGN ORGANISATIONS
(INCLUDING, PRESUMABLY, HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS) INTO ITS
CEASE-FIRE TERMS WITH AT LEAST ONE ETHNIC GROUP. TWO PROPOSALS
WHICH THE BURMESE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAD AGREED WITH MEDECINS
SANS FRONTIERES (FRANCE), WERE REJECTED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.
MSF WORKS ON THE THAI/BURMESE AND BANGLADESH/BURMESE BORDERS WITH
VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS, AND IS OUTSPOKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. 
 
IF AND WHEN THE POLITICAL PROCESS MOVES FORWARD, AND/OR THE
SITUATION FOR THE ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE REST OF THE POPULATION
APPEARS TO BE IMPROVING, "CAVEATS" WILL BE REVISED. AT PRESENT,
HOWEVER, ALL THE RECOMMENDED CAVEATS, CAUTIONS AND CONDITIONS
STILL APPLY.
 
DAVID ARNOTT  7 OCTOBER 1995
 
 
                                  PREFACE
 
Since 1992 the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),
the martial law administration acting as the de facto government
of Burma, has expressed interest in having international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) undertake relief and
development projects in the country. This study summarizes some
of the issues involved for the international community in
general, and NGOs in particular. It concludes that on balance,
NGO involvement at this time would not be in the long-term
interests of the Burmese people; but for those organizations
which decide to go in, it lists a number of conditions which, if
followed, would help limit the damage. The critique of NGO
involvement and the need for stringent conditions applies even
more of course to bilateral and multilateral loans, aid or
development assistance. The memo is offered as a working document
within the current debate on NGO involvement in Burma rather than
as an authoritative rule-book. Comments are welcome. It assumes
that readers have a basic understanding of the political,
economic and human rights situation in Burma.
 
This document does not cover the working difficulties that NGOs
are likely to face in negotiating and working with SLORC. Many
NGOs have pulled out simply because they have found SLORC
impossible to work with in terms of bureaucracy, resistance to
independent action by international NGOs, and the lack of local
NGOs. (What SLORC sometimes calls Burmese NGOs turn out to be
under direct or indirect military control. One Burmese "NGO", for
instance, is run by the wife of the Head of Military
Intelligence.) Anecdotes about these matters is best obtained
directly from NGOs still working in the country or those which
have pulled out.
 
 
                          THE MILITARY BACKGROUND
                                                      
              ("Politics is war carried out by other means")
 
A basic standpoint of this paper is that SLORC logic remains
essentially military, with all policy decisions subordinated to
questions of control over the people and survival of the ruling
group, and that the invitations to NGOs must be seen in this
light. This applies to the whole of Burma, and the non-Burman
areas in particular. 
 
 
                       SHOULD NGOS GO INTO BURMA?
                                                               
                         Political assumptions 
          underlying attitudes towards NGO activities in Burma
 
 
Among those genuinely concerned for the well-being of the Burmese
people, differing assessments on whether or not NGOs should go
into the country rest partly on political judgements concerning
the state of the democracy movement and ethnic resistance, and
whether SLORC has turned over a new leaf or not. Those who think
the Burmese democracy movement has a chance of succeeding and/or
who see no change in SLORC tend to oppose NGO involvement, or
insist on very stringent conditions. Those on the other hand who
consider that SLORC is in an unassailable position and/or that
the junta has reformed with time and international pressure, tend
to support NGO involvement on the grounds that the humanitarian
gains far outweigh any political loss. 
 
Regardless of one's view on the political future of Burma, it is
undeniable that there is an enormous human crisis in the country,
which is in desperate need of relief. Some NGOs argue that no
matter how much SLORC gains politically from relief efforts, it
is worth it if lives can be saved. However, it can also be argued
that Burma is a resource-rich country where poverty has only been
created by military misrule, and that the only way to end this
poverty in the long term is to do everything possible to end
military rule. 
 
 
ARGUMENTS HOLDING THAT SLORC IS IN A VULNERABLE POSITION AND THAT
ANY MOVES WHICH COULD STRENGTHEN IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE AVOIDED:
 
* Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been released and is busy re-
establishing contact with her party.
 
* The failure of SLORC to follow its release of Suu Kyi by
dialague with her and her colleagues is causing many
international actors and analysts to write off the release as a
merely cosmetic gesture, rather than a real move towards
democracy.
 
* In spite of the fact that the delegates and the agenda of the
National Convention were chosen by SLORC, there has been a high
degree of resistance to many of SLORC's central proposals,
particularly the stipulation that the military should retain its
political dominance.
 
* The Burmese army is deeply split and is held together by
the continued presence on earth of General Ne Win, 86 years old
and said to be in poor health. There is a good chance that his
death will break the log-jam and open up the political situation.
 
* SLORC is insisting that Burma should be a military-dominated,
centralised, unitary State. Multi-ethnic States constructed along
these lines are inherently unstable, as we see in the case of the
former Yugoslavia. The most recent statement of SLORC's
centralised, military vision for Burma was made in the Burmese
Foreign Minister's speech to the UN General Assembly on 3 October
1995.  
 
* Despite the increased number of cease-fires and the military
reverses of the Karen, support from the non-Burman nationalities
for a federal democracy is stronger than ever. Armed resistance
continues in Shan State, Karenni State, in Southern Karen State,
on Burma's Western border, from the Chin, Nagas and the recently
allied Rohingya organisations.   
 
* The cease-fires are extremely fragile, as we see from the
renewal of fighting between SLORC and the Karenni.
 
* SLORC is anxious about new uprisings, particularly related to
the ever-increasing price of rice, caused in part by shortages
produced by the export of 1 million tons of rice over the past
year. The release of Aung San Suu Kyi was not announced by the
State media, presumably for fear of an uncontrolled response from
the people.
 
* SLORC's attempt to create a mass movement, the Union Solidarity
and Development Association, which would eventually become a
political party to contest future elections, is being done in a
very heavy-handed manner, with people punished for non-attendance
at the rallies. Popular enthusiasm for this enterprise is
understandably less than total.
 
* The country's economy is in an appalling and highly unstable
condition:
   
        Most wealth is concentrated in the towns, while
     rural Burma, particularly in  non-Burman areas, is a
     disaster zone. SLORC's urban beautification schemes in
     towns around the country are largely based on evictions
     of the poor.
        
        Inflation is increasing, due largely to the
     irresponsible printing of money by SLORC; the value of
     the Kyat, already 20 times less than the official rate,
     continues to plunge. A civil servant's salary is no
     longer enough even to buy enough plain rice for two
     people (rice prices have more than quadrupled in real
     terms since 1988).
        
        An increasing number of refugees, including many
     from the Burmese heartland, claim the impossibility of
     earning a living as their reason for leaving the
     country.
           
 
* The Wa, with whom SLORC made a peace agreement in 1989 are
extremely upset that their proposals for a separate Wa state
within the Union of Burma were ignored at the National
Convention. This group, fielding about 30,000 troops, has
recently formed a political alliance with the Kokang, Palaung and
other "cease-fire" groups. The alliance, the Peace and Democracy
Front, is calling, among other things, for respect of the 1990
elections and  the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other
political detainees.
 
* The Burmese people are still committed to the person and
policies of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for
Democracy (NLD).
 
* During the years of Aung San Suu Kyi's detention, the NLD has
maintained a strong underground network, which the release of
Aung San Suu Kyi has re-vitalised.
 
* A number of pro-democracy groups have studied the lessons of
1988 and are currently training underground in political theory
and political defiance and preparing themselves for the next
phase of the political struggle.
 
* International pressure for the restoration of democracy is
still strong. The Burma resolution at the 1994 session of
the General Assembly moved UN involvement in Burma to a new level
by asking for the Secretary-General's assistance in ending the
civil war and restoring democracy. The UN Commission on Human
Rights has adopted resolutions on Burma since 1990 which have
grown stronger every year, most recently (March 1995) making a
strong criticism of the National Convention. The International
Labour Organisation has recently increased its criticism of
SLORC's practice of forced labour and its restrictions on freedom
of association.
 
* SLORC's attack on the Karen from the end of 1994 angered the
international community, and has lost SLORC most of the public
relations gains it had made over the past two years.
 
 
 
ARGUMENTS HOLDING THAT SLORC IS UNASSAILABLE FROM A POLITICAL AND
MILITARY STANDPOINT, THAT THE ETHNIC AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION HAS
BEEN DEFEATED, THAT THERE IS LITTLE LEFT TO LOSE, AND THAT
THEREFORE IT IS BEST TO SAVE WHAT CAN BE SAVED; LIVES FOR
INSTANCE: 
 
 
* The release of Aung San Suu Kyi has won international approval,
and some governments argue that SLORC should be rewarded by the
renewal of international assistance. In the case of Japan, Suu
Kyi's release has removed the main obstacle to the renewal of
major Government assistance, which would be followed by a
substantial increase in Japanese investment. Mitsui has already
signed a $700 million contract to build a gas pipeline from the
offshore Yadana field to Burma.
 
* Thailand is committed to keeping SLORC in power.
 
* The other ASEAN countries are supporting SLORC internationally.
 
* China continues to sell arms to SLORC and to support it
politically.
 
* Although Western countries criticize SLORC's human rights
record, they do not discourage their private sector from doing
business in Burma.
 
* Competition for trade and resources, as well as political and
strategic influence, is driving India to follow China and
Thailand in forging closer links with SLORC. 
 
* Transnational corporations are developing Burma's large
offshore reserves of gas and oil which will pump foreign exchange
into the economy for years to come, no matter how badly it is
managed.
 
* SLORC will push the National Convention into endorsing a SLORC-
drafted constitution, which will guarantee the continued
dominance of the military; new elections will be held, and SLORC
will this time ensure the victory of the party it backs. 
 
* The NLD has been decimated and demoralized.
 
* The Mon have signed a cease-fire and there is strong pressure
on the Karen to do the same.
 
* The alliances between the ethnic and political opposition have
been seriously weakened by the loss of the Karen bases and the
cease-fire signed by the Mon.
 
 
                      CONDITIONS FOR NGO INVOLVEMENT
 
The present study concludes that the struggle for change in Burma
is still alive domestically and internationally, and that NGO
activity in the country at this time may impede this process, or
further SLORC's long-term plans. 
 
If, however, there are NGOs which are not convinced of these
dangers and are seriously considering projects in Burma,
adherence to the following conditions or ground rules may help
limit the political and economic damage. This would apply
particularly if these ground rules were used to define the terms
of NGO involvement during the preliminary negotiations with
SLORC. 
 
All NGOs considering Burma programs should consult with each
other, and especially with NGOs already working in the country.
For instance they should approach Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)
and ask to see the Memorandum of Understanding MSF negotiated
with SLORC. Where possible they should negotiate collectively
with SLORC. This possibility should be explored and discussed as
to pros, cons, and practicality. In the negotiations, and
subsequently in the field, they should stick firmly to such
ground rules. 
 
NGO representatives should be aware that they have a strong
bargaining position since SLORC wants them in Burma for the
political legitimacy and money they can provide, as well as for
the "carrot" role which NGO programmes can play in SLORC's civil
war attempts to get the ethnic opposition to disarm and "return
to the legal (sic) fold". It is essential that NGOs use the
advantage of this bargaining position and refuse to give in on
any key conditions, even if this means walking away from Burma
and leaving the offer open until SLORC agrees to the terms.
 
NB Although these ground-rules were designed with NGOs in mind,
many of them are equally applicable to multilateral agencies
delivering humanitarian assistance. Indeed, in some cases the
ground-rules may be more relevant to UN agencies than NGOs. 
 
 
BEFORE MAKING MAJOR COMMITMENTS TO A BURMA PROGRAMME, NGOs
SHOULD:
 
1. Engage in ongoing consultations with: 
 
   * The Burma Donors' Secretariat
   * The elected representatives in exile 
   * Authentic representatives of the different ethnic groups 
   * Burma expert groups and individuals 
   * A wide range of human rights NGOs, and 
   * NGOs with Burma experience, particularly those currently
     there.
 
     (SEE CONTACT LIST AT END)
 
                                     
At such meetings, NGOs could discuss conditionalities and assess
the long-term implications of relief and development programs.
The Burma meetings/round tables held regularly in Bangkok, New
York, Boston, San Francisco, Washington DC and London, which
bring together a variety of Burma expert groups, also provide a
useful context for this kind of consultation. 
 
2. Discreetly support the human rights and Burma lobby groups in
their work to maintain political pressure on SLORC. 
 
3. Ask these groups and other observers, including reliable NGOs
which do not have Burma programs, to monitor foreign aid (NGO,
multilateral and bilateral) on a continuous basis. 
 
4. Never be in a hurry to enter Burma. Be prepared to negotiate
for a long time to obtain optimum working conditions. 
 
5. Give serious prior attention to the circumstances which would
lead them to cease operations in Burma.
 
6. Do their own survey work and not just accept the statistics of
SLORC or UN Agencies. On the basis of this research, groups can
identify problems and appropriate programs. [how possible is
this, beyond a basic needs assessment/health survey?  How safe
would it be for local people to participate in such research?]
 
7. Be aware that people in Burma are so used to SLORC's
development aid projects being obviously military or stage-
managed, that they may well view NGO activity with suspicion and
even hostility.
 
8. Be aware of the Burmese military's decimation or domination of
most aspects of civil society in Burma, and its resistance to any
revival. By performing functions best performed by suppressed or
as yet unborn local organizations, international NGOs may inhibit
the revival of civil society, and thus serve to prolong military
rule.
 
9. Be aware that where local organizations do exist (eg Church or
monastic organizations), the ability of foreign NGOs to negotiate
with SLORC more firmly than is possible for their local partners
may reduce the authority of the local groups (while advancing
projects the latter may have initiated).
 
10. Hold firmly to the principle of cross-border assistance from
neighbouring countries where logistically possible as an
alternative to assistance via Rangoon. An important test, which
NGOs should monitor closely, will be whether there can be an
increase in the number of NGOs able to deliver cross-border
assistance from China to areas of Kachin State controlled by the
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), which has expressed a
strong desire for cross-border assistance to balance any aid
coming via Rangoon. Note that SLORC is currently opposed to
cross-border assistance.
 
11. Build such conditions as listed in this memo into the
Memorandum of Understanding negotiated with SLORC. In particular
the capacity of flexibility (to scale up or down, to effect 
programme changes etc) should be guaranteed. 
 
 
PRELIMINARY STEPS
 
12. Make an effort to hire expatriates who speak Burmese -- this
makes an enormous difference to their ability to control or even
understand what is going on.
 
13. Set up small-scale pilot projects prior to larger programs,
in order to test working conditions, but be aware that SLORC is
operating on a time-frame of several years. Go step by step, with
a short planning horizon, perhaps on the basis of 6-monthly
programs, thus allowing continuous evaluation. It must be made
clear to SLORC that NGOs are genuinely prepared to withdraw if
the negotiated conditions are not respected after the project has
begun.
 
14. Work independently of UN agencies in the early stages in
order to ensure more local involvement. The most valuable place
for NGOs is at the local level, filling needs they identify
through their own assessment missions and data collection.
Cooperation with UN Agencies is valuable when programmes are
running. 
 
 
BASIC PROGRAM CONDITIONS
 
(suggested by Burmese, and westerners who have worked in Burma). 
 
15. No investment should be made in infrastructure (roads/rail)
because of the way this is used to mobilize the military.
 
16. Priority in NGO programs should be given to those in greatest
need, ie the forced relocatees and the internally displaced
people. They should be given assistance to return to their
original homes if they so wish, and longer-term development
assistance provided to enable them to resettle there. Both of
these groups are located principally in the non-Burman areas.
Representatives of these ethnic groups should therefore be
involved at every stage of the programs. [How likely is it that
NGOs will be allowed to help those forcibly relocated return to
their homes in SLORC-controlled or "brown" areas?]
 
17. Humanitarian aid delivered via Rangoon should be balanced by
cross-border assistance, in cooperation with the organizations of
the ethnic groups.
 
18.  Where not covered by point 17, assistance programs should 
be balanced between urban and rural projects. 
 
19. The area of any program should be clearly defined and NGOs
involved should then have complete freedom of movement in this
area without SLORC escorts of any kind. The statements of people
presented to the NGO as "village leaders" by SLORC officials
should never be taken seriously.
 
20. NGOs should work with the lowest possible level of
administration rather than through any central government
authority in Rangoon.  
 
21. Every effort should be made to strengthen local support
structures and local NGOs independent of SLORC control. 
 
22. International NGOs should press for the respect of the Right
of Association, permitting the free formation and independent
functioning of local NGOs. Where possible and appropriate, the
international NGOs should insist on the formation of independent
local NGOs as a condition for entering the country.
 
23. NGOs must be given full freedom to choose their local
partners. Once cease-fire agreements are in place, local NGOs
which have close links with the minority organizations should be
fully accepted as potential partner organizations.
 
24. Local presence and access is vital. NGOs should ensure that
continual project monitoring (process, impact and evaluation) is
conducted personally by the expatriate staff of the NGO. SLORC
should be informed that in the event that proper access is
restricted or the NGO is prevented from monitoring its project(s)
for any reason whatsoever, all inputs to that project will be
stopped immediately. In the case of projects with lasting effect,
such as schools or hospitals, monitoring should continue
regularly after completion, to ensure freedom from military
intervention and proper use of the materials and facilities. In
the case of food, medicines or other relief aid, NGO
representatives should be present for its distribution. If this
is not possible (as with medicines left with the doctors at a
hospital), NGO representatives should return regularly to inspect
records of how the materials were distributed and ensure that
they are not confiscated by the military when the NGO is not
present. 
 
 
STAFF AND MATERIALS
 
25. Only people with experience of working in politically
difficult situations should be sent. In working with SLORC, be
transparent and flexible -- do unexpected things in order to
retain freedom of manoeuvre. 
 
26. Expatriate staff, preferably Burmese-speaking, should be in
all positions of significant authority. NGOs must have full
freedom to hire employees of their choice. Even so, they should
remain aware that there will always be informers, and that their
employees may be subject to pressure and threats from SLORC
Military Intelligence to act as informers and collaborators.
 
27. No locally-hired staff should be present when NGOs are
talking to local people (they might be informers, or be under
subsequent SLORC pressure to inform. Even if they are not, local
people may be afraid that they are, and may not speak frankly).
If at all possible, neither these employees nor any SLORC
officials should even see which local people are spoken to. NGOs
should bring their own interpreters from outside Burma if they
want reliable translations.
 
28. In any project involving construction or any kind of labor,
workers should be hired and managed by NGO representatives rather
than representatives of SLORC. Otherwise, experience shows,
villagers will be forced to provide slave labor, building
materials, and money, while SLORC officers pocket the money
budgeted for wages, and sell any building materials provided by
the NGO. NGOs should choose their own suppliers for any materials
they have to purchase. 
 
29. All accounts relating to the hire of labor, purchase of
materials etc should be closely overseen by the NGO staff.
 
30. In projects requiring the use of land for agriculture or
buildings, NGO representatives should freely consult beforehand
with as many local people as possible in the absence of SLORC
officials and locally hired staff, to find out their views of the
project and full details of who owns the land to be used. Payment
or compensation for such land must be handled personally by NGO
representatives in order to prevent SLORC confiscation of land
without compensation. 
 
 
MONETARY FACTORS
 
31. No aid, except where strictly necessary, should enter the
country in monetary form.  Special exchange rates should be
negotiated for that aid which has to be brought in monetary form.
(Because of the discrepancy between the official and black market
exchange rates and SLORC's enthusiastic use of its money printing
presses, SLORC benefits directly from all foreign currency
entering Burma, and approximately 95% of it is available for
arming the military. Indiscriminate printing of Kyats to exchange
for aid money also fuels inflation, thereby further impoverishing
the majority of the population.)
 
32. NGOs should consult Burma-based UN officials and NGOs on the
ways and means to get round the exchange difficulties.
 
     
REDUCING LEGITIMATION OF SLORC
 
33. NGOs should make every effort to avoid participating in
official ceremonies or being photographed with SLORC officials
(see one or two issues of "The New Light of Myanmar" to get the
point).
 
34. The military should not be allowed to distribute aid provided
by NGOs. 
 
35. Projects should have the approval of the Burmese democracy
movement and the peoples in whose territory they are carried out
(Via Burma Donors' Secretariat - see point 1 and contact list).
 
 
                             RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
NGOs should not go into Burma at this time. If they do decide to
go in, however, they should negotiate collectively with SLORC,
and stick to firm guidelines as suggested in this memo.
 
N.B.This document is a collective production incorporating
feedback from 30 or 40 people including Burmese ethnic leaders,
NGO workers, Burmese democracy figures, UN consultants, Burma
experts et al. I hope that it can be further improved. Please
send feedback to the Burma Peace Foundation.
 
 
Burma Peace Foundation April 1994/October 1995
 
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CONTACT LIST
 
1) BURMA DONORS' SECRETARIAT
c/o Harn Yawnghwe, R.R.4, Shawville, Quebec, Canada JOX 2YO
Tel (+1-819) 647 6131, 647 5405; Fax 647 5403;
Email yawnghwe@xxxxxxxxxx
(BDS is the best contact point for the Burmese democracy movement
and the non-Burman ethnic groups)
 
 
2) BURMA BORDER CONSORTIUM
Jack Dunford, CCT Tel (+66-2) 236 0211; Fax 236 7000; 
Sally Thompson, 12/15, Convent Rd, Silom  Rd, Bangkok 10500,
Thailand. Tel (+66-2) 238 2568; Fax 266 5376;
Email dunfoj@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(Coordinates NGO and Agency assistance to Burmese refugees on the
Thailand/Burma border. Hosts the monthly Burma Meetings, 9am
sharp. 1995: 13 October, 10 November, 8 December. 
Contact above for venue. Has the most comprehensive information
on the refugee situation and is well informed regarding cross-
border assistance)
 
3) MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (FRANCE)
Jean-Herve Bradol, 8, Rue St Sabin, 75544 Paris Cedex 11, France.
Tel (+33-1) 40 21 29 29; Fax 48 06 68 68 
 
4) MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (NETHERLANDS)
Max Euerplein 40, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
Lex Winkler, Tel (+31-20) 520 8700
 
5) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (UK)
33 Islington High St, London N1 9LH, England.
Zunetta Liddell, Tel (+44-171) 713 1995; Fax 713 1800; 
Email hrwatchuk@xxxxxxxxxx      
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                                 ANNEXES
                                                      
                  (Not enclosed in the Internet version
 
 
1) The Hunting of the SLORC -- an analysis of SLORC's
Low-Intensity Conflict strategy
 
2) "Mission to Burma" ICVA report 1993
 
3) Australian response to the ICVA report "Mission to Burma"
 
4) The Involvement of United Nations Agencies in Burma -- Em
Marta 
 
5) Comments on the possible resumption of foreign NGO aid to the
SLORC -- Saw Ba Thin
 
6. The Thai-Burmese Border: The Need for Humanitarian Assistance
by Jack Dunford (This and Annex 7 are papers delivered at the
conference "Burma The Silent Emergency", Sydney, 28 May 93, which
looked at the prospect of NGO involvement in  Burma) 
 
7. Burma -- The Silent Emergency by Russell Rollason
 
8. NGOs in Burma, "Burma Issues" July 1994 
 
9. Will forever flow the Ayeyarwady?  Khin Maung Kyi (a critical
analysis of the Burmese economy)
 
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