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USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF (r)



Subject: USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYAS (PART 4 OF 4)

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Protection Issues in the Refugee Camps in Bangladesh
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Severe  beatings,  threats,  extortion, and arrests have fostered an extree
climate of fear and mental destress among  refugees.  Bangladesh  officials
have  employed,  and in some camps intensified , coercive measures as a way
of prompting the expeditious return of the Rohingyas.

Since  1991,  camp  officials  have  been  able  to  assault  the  refugees
physically  and mentally with almost total impunity. Despite clear patterns
of abuse, only a handful of camp officials were removed from  office  (i.e.
transferred  to  other  sectors  of the government without punishment), and
then onlly after repeated complaints by  foreign  embassies.  According  to
UNHCR, the Bangladesh government has removed camp officials responsible for
the  most  egregious abuses; however, it took more than three years for the
Bangladesh government to respond in this manner, and  such  cooperation  is
perhaps  best understood as a concession in light of UNHCR's cooperation in
massively repatriating the refugees.

In camps where abuses  have  been  most  severe,  refugees  were  tortured.
Several  refugees  from  Moishkum  Camp  reported  that  the  CIC  and Camp
Magistrate forced a refugee caught selling nuts to stand outside all day in
the summer sun and count trains of sands on a sheet  of  white  paper.  The
following  week,  the Camp Magistrate confirmed nonchalanty in front of the
author, a UNHCR protection Officer, and a UNHCR Protection  Assitant,  that
he and other camp officials had indeed inflicted this punishment.

An  informed  source  told of a separate incident that occurred at Moishkum
Camp in December 1993. A refugee was caught trying to hook up his  shed  to
the  electric source in the camp. At mid night, the CIC and Camp Magistrate
allegedly called the refugee to the camp office. The refugee, who had  been
asleep, did not report quickly enough, so he was drenched in water "to wake
him up", slapped, and forced to stand at attention outside in the cold. The
victim  was  subsequently held tied up in the police barracks for more than
twelve hours before he was jailed for approxinately tow months.  The  UNHCR
Protection Officer also confirmed this incident.

During  mid-1994,  there  was  apparently  a  lull in physical abuse. UNHCR
explained this as a combination of the new Rohingya relief and Repatriation
Commissioner (RRRC) and the shift to mass repatriation. However,  according
to  a  September  1994  report  by  Medicins  Sans  Frontiers-France (MSF),
beatings  increased  again  in  September   in  connection   with   refugee
intransigence to repatriation.

All  of the refugee interviewed reported knowledge of beating in the camps.
INcidents renged from one or two hits with a cane to repeated  beatings  on
the  elbow  and  knee joints. Refugees who had been beaten demonstrated how
they had been forced to keep their heads under a low table with their hands
on the table, while a camp official rammed their elbow repeatedly into  the
refugee's  back.  In  some  camps,  refugees  had  been locked in outhouses
[toilets] after beating. ONe refugee described that  experience.  He  said,
"YOu  are  trying to breathe from the beating, and then they lock you up in
the toilet, and it stinks, and you start to get sick."

Camp officials have split families as a means of punishing reufgees who are
not present in their shed when attendance is taken. In the second  week  of
August,  for  example,  the  CIC  of  Moishkum  Camp  ordered the women and
children from four families to be moved to Dcchua Palong  II  transit  camp
for  repatriation,  without  the  heads  of  their households. Refugees who
witnessed the incident said that the women and children were "screaming and
crying in fear" and that camp officials beat them as they were forced  into
a truck. When UNHCR confronted the Camp Magistrate with questions regarding
these  activities, in the presence of the author, he replied, "HOw else can
we teach them a lesson ? They don't  follow  the  rules  if  they  are  not
punished in such a way."

Refugees  in Balukhali II, Shailerdeba, Mayapara I, and Nayapara II refugee
camps all told stories about  how  police  blackmail  refugees  with  false
charge and/or beat them if they foal to pay the police "rent" for the space
that  their  shed  occupies. Other refugees said that the police threatened
them with repatriation if they did not make such paymeits. The police  also
demanded money for "protection" from local villagers. Typically, between 50
and  500  taka  were  extorted  from  each  family ($!=40taka). Many of the
refugees interviewed were able  to  pay  the  police  because  they  worked
outside  of  the  camps  in the rice or brick fields. However, the standard
payment to refugees for a ten hour day of hard labor was between 40 and  50
taka;  thus,  the  extortion  payments  represented a significant economiic
burden for the refugees. Some refugees indiccated that in the past, the had
been forced to borrow maney to appease the police and camp officials.

In response to reports of abuses  at  MOishkum  camp,  a  UNHCR  protection
officer  stated,  "What can we do ? We don't have twenty four hour presence
in the camps. If they don't do it in front of us, they will do it  when  we
are  not  around."  Similarly, in response to a query about why the abusive
CIC's and Magistrates are not replaced, a UNHCR official said, "They  would
be  replaced  with  those who are more junior and less qualified." Refugees
claimed that they had been similarly rebuffed when reporting  human  rights
abuses to UNHCR.

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Concerns Regarding Inadequate Food and Shelter
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Nearly  all of the reufugees interviewed complained that camp officials and
government relief workers had deprived them of adequate  shelter  and  food
stuffs.  At  times, these deprivations have become so severe that they have
led to deteriorations in health conditions in the camps.

In May 1994, a cyclone that hit southeast  Bangladesh  completely  levelled
nearly all of the shelters in the refugee camps. Despite UNHCR's payment to
Khaka  of  U.S.$750,000  for  bamboo  to  reconstruct refugee shelters, the
refugee remained without adequate shelter for four months after the cyclone
throughout the rainy season.

In Dumdumia camp I and II, more  than  10,200  refugees  have  been  living
without  adequate protection from the environment for the past three years,
the duration of their stay in Bangladesh. Some NGO workers in Cox's  Bazaar
believe  that  this  has  been  a  deliberate  government  polity  aimed at
encouraging the refugees to return to Burma.

In late August 1994, health officials in the camps expressed  concern  that
increased  health problems might result from the decline in caloric intake.
Between June and August, food rations were reduced to levels that are below
the World Helath  Organization's   suggested  minimum  caloric  intake  for
sendentary  refugees. IN response to the author's queries about , the RRRC,
Khindaker Fazlur Rahman, said, "Burma asked Bangladesh to  scale  down  the
rations  because  they cannot provide the same amount of food for them upon
return. " Suggestions similar to this were reportedly made at a MInisterial
meeting in March 1994 as a means of facilitating mass repatriation.

The decline in caloric intake was also due  to  the  withholding  of  fresh
vegetables,  potatoes, and sugar during those months. Reufgees also claimed
that camp officials distribute incomplete rations.  In  order  to  subsist,
refugees  need  3 kgs of rice and 1/4 kg of Dal [lentil] per week. Refugees
insist that their rations have been reduced to between 2.5-2.8 kgs of  rice
and as little as 1/8 kg of Dal.

Multiple  families  are sometimes listed in one family book, which deprives
them of goods such as blankets, clothing, and soap, which  are  distributed
on  a  family  basis. Some reufgees do not receive any rations because they
have not been recorded in any family book. One UNHCR staff member explained
that by depriving the refugees of relief goods to which they are  entitled,
hte  police,  camp officials, and other relief workers are able to generate
additional revenue for themselves.

Reufgees  in  Moishkum  camp  have  been  subjected  to  especially  severe
deprivations  of  food  and  shelter. Refugees living in Moishkum camp said
that on several occasions camp officials told them  they  are  deliberately
withholding  food  as  a  means  "forcing" or "encouraging" the refugees to
return. A fifty-five year old women from Moishkum said  that  the  Camp  in
Charge of Moishkum tokd a gathering of refugees:

     We  are making a system to repatriate you by reducing food so they you
     cannot survive here long, so you will go back to Myanmar. I  will  see
     how  long you will survive here in the camp. According to my estimate,
     you will survive for three months, and then you will have to go back.

According to one refugee, camp officials not  only  reduced  the  refugees'
rations,  but they also confiscated the refugees' poultry and destroyed the
small garden plots that  refugees  had  planted  near  their  sheds.  UNHCR
officials  confirmed  this.  According  to  refugees  in Moishkum camp, the
decrease in rations coupled  with  such  confiscations  have  substantially
reduced the ability of the refugees to survive at the subsistance level.

Refugees  have  also been deliberately prevented from receiving rations. In
August, camp officials were taking attendance in Moiskum Camp twice a  day.
Refugees  who  were  absent  from  their  sheds during attendance had a 'N'
marked in their ration books, which prevented them from  receiving  rations
in  the rugure. In front of a UNHCR official, the Camp Magistrate confirmed
that this was occurring. According to the MOU, refugees are prohibited from
leaving the camp without  special  permission.  However,  police  regularly
overlook  this  rule  in  return  for  small  bribes  (5-10 cents) from the
refugees. Refugees are thus able to supplement their foodstuffs with income
that they earn working as laborers outside of the camps. Labor is one means
by which the Rohingya are able to provide themselves with a  food  cushion.
For  example,  refugees  can  supplement  their  diets  with vegetables and
protein or purchase rice when rations ae reduced or delayed. Camp officials
in Moishkum  have  effectively  removed  this  cushion  by  preventing  the
refugees from leaving the camp.

These  deprivations  were  not restricted to food. Refugees in Moishkum say
that they sent a plea for assistance on a cassete tape to Rohinging  living
in  Saudi  Arabia. In response, clothes were sent to the refugees through a
Madarasa (Islamic religious school) in Chittagong. The refugee  claim  that
when  the  clothes  arrived, the Camp in charge called all of the refugees,
showed them the clothes, and told them, "If you want these, then go  home".
The  refugees  in  Moishkum  never  received the clothing. According to the
refugees, the last time they received new clothing (typically a longyi  and
shirt) was in January 1993."

According to one UNHCR official, the refugees in Moishkum were likely to be
repatriated  last  because  the majority of the camp population were from a
remote region in Maungdaw, and UNHCR hadn't yet negotiated  an  appropriate
point  at the border for their return. According to this same official, the
Camp in Charge was anxious that he would be one of the last official  along
the border because Moishkum was not gearing up for mass repatriation. These
measures  were  seen  as  effort  to  expedite  the repatriation process by
coercing the refugees to leave.

In January 1995, UNHCr asserted that physical coercion and other protection
problesm are less endemic in the camps. If that is the case, then it  is  a
welcome  development.  However,  concern remains about other, less tangible
forms of coercion, for example threats and scaling down  of  rations,  that
may be used to dissaude refugees from seeking to opt out of repatriation.

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The rationale for the Bangladesh Government's Policy
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The policy of Bangladesh government toward the Rohingya is articulated in a
Position  Paper on the Myanmar Refugees in Bangladesh, dated June 11, 1994.
The paper said, in part,

   Ever since the arrival of Myanmar nationals into Bangladesh from Myanmar
   Bangladesh has been making efforts for their quick, safe  and  voluntary
   return.

Reasons for terminating the present MOU [UNHCR-Bangladesh] were as follows:

(a) declining trend in return of refugees after signing MOU  with UNHCR;
(b)  no  perceptible  change  in  the  declining trend since signing of MOU
between UNHCR and Myanmar on  NOv. 5, 1993;
(c) UNHCR's officials in Bangladesh have undertaken  various  manipulations
to deter and even discourage repatriation under the pretext of ascertaining
"voluntariness";
(d)  subterfuge  such  as "discussion" w/GOB official by UNHCR officials to
cahnge/modify written instructions an action  plan  conveyed  to  UNHCR  by
MInister of Foreign Affairs;
(e)  Deliberate  disinformation provided by UNHCR to foreign visitors (e.g.
Euro Parliamentary delegation)"
(f) improvement of situation in Rakhine State;
(g) public pronouncement by Myanmar  leaders  welcoming  back  all  Myanmar
refugees from Bangladesh;
(h) need to reexamine key concepts and methodology relating to:
(i) refugees;
(ii) voluntariness/safety and dignity of reufgees;
(iii)  sanctity  of  existing  government agreements vis-a-vis manipulative
moves made by UNHCR through its "action plans"; and
(iv) review of existing repatriation agreements and procedures in all their
detail and facts.

This  policy paper highlights tow of the major points of contention between
Dhaka  and  UNHCR  in  the  repatriation   process:   the   definition   of
"voluntariness" and the determination of refugee status. The government has
consistently  acknowledged  in the MOU and in official statements thaat the
Rohingya in Bangladesh are refugees and that they have a right to voluntary
repatriation. However, the government has failed  to  adhere  to  practices
that are consistent with its stated policies.

Points(a)  through  (c)  above  imply  that  the repatriations prior to the
signing  of  the  Bangladesh/UNHCr  MOU  were  "voluntary"  and   attribute
subsequent  decline  in  repatriation  levels  to UNHCR "manipulations". As
substantiated earlier in this paper, the majority of pre-MOU  repatriations
carried  out  by  the  government  were  in  fact  involuntary according to
accepted international standards. The "declining trend"  in  repatriations,
referred to in (a) above, was a result of the introduction of procedures to
ensure   voluntary   repatriations   following   the   large-scale   forced
repatriations between December 1992 and January 1993.

With renewed UNHCR involvement in the repatriation process, more than 9,000
Rohingya were in transit camps awaiting repatriation. Once given the choice
to reject repatriation, they largely chose to  remain  in  Bangladesh.  The
fact  that  the BAngaldesh government had sent them to the transit camps in
the first place indicated  that  it  was  either  applying  a  standard  of
voluntariness  inconsistent with the international norm or not applying any
standard at all.

Point  (c)  accses  UNHCR  of  deterring  and  discouraging  refugees  from
returning.  UNHCR's  actions  are guided by its mandate. A major portion of
the UNHCR mandate concerns the protection of refugees.  Returning  refugees
to  a situation that is obviously dangerous to them, unless such a decision
is made freely and consciously by  the  refugee,  is  contrary  to  UNHCR's
mandate.

There  is  no  clear  indication that the human rights situation in Rakhine
state has improved. As asserted  below,  compelling  evidence  exists  that
human  rights  abuses  remain  pervasive. Consequently, many Rohingyas have
reasonable cause to fear persecution.

Point(g), Burma's public pronoumcement welcoming back the Rohingya whom  it
expelled  does  not  represent  a  commitment to ensure the human and civil
rights of these refugees. Neither does it  invalidate  refugees'  continued
fear of persecution nor their need for asylum.

Regarding  Point(h),  According  to  the UNHCR/Bangladesh MOU, refugees are
entitled "to return on the basis of their [the refugees'] own  judgemnt  of
the  situation  in  their  country," and the two sides shall cooperate with
each other to prevent any  attempt  by  any  side  to  interfere  with  the
exercise of freedom of option by the reufgees."

Such  an  interpretation  is  consistent  with  international  refugee law.
However, many of the policies and practices of Bangladesh  officials,  from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Camp in Charge, are contrary to such
an  interpretation.  Many  government  policies and practices are, in fact,
fundamentally at odds with these norms. The RRRC, for  example,  stated  in
an interview with the author that the refugees needed to be "encouraged" to
return and rejected the appropriateness of applying international norms. He
said,

     Do these people have the mental capacity to make a voluntary decision?
     They are thirty year old men with a five year old mentality. The don't
     understand.  Refugee  and  human   rights   standards   of   voluntary
     [repatriation]  shouldn't  be used [with the Rohingya]. You should use
     your own. To use the other, the refugees must have the mental capacity
     and ability to decide voluntarily.

The Bangladesh government does not acknowledge that  the  Rohingya  have  a
well-founded  fear  of  persecution  in  Burma.  Rather,  it  explains  the
refugees' intransigence towards repatriation as part  of  their  desire  to
stay in Bangladesh where food, medicine, and shelter are provided for free.
Indeed, Bangladeshis regularly refer to the Rohingya as "privileged".

The  Rohingya  whom  the  author  interviewed  indicated that they were not
staying in Bangladesh because life  was  pleasant  for  them.  Rather,  the
reason  they referred repeatedly was that they feared persecution in Burma.
At the same time, refugees were articulate about  the  hardships  that  the
government of Bangladesh imposed upon them and the human rights abuses that
were  occurring in the camps. Far from being a "privileged existence," life
in  Bangladesh  was,  according  to  refugees,  the  only  alternative   to
persecution in Burma.

On  another  level,  the  bangladesh  government  cites  complications  and
problems that the refugees have created as the rationale  for  their  swift
repatriation.  they  include  the  financial  burden that the refugees have
created; the deforestation that has occurred since the 1991  influx;  crime
associated  with  the  refugees; the burden that staffing the refugee camps
places on the government civil service; and the burdens  that  the  refugee
influx has placed on the local communities.

Only some of these assertions are accurate, however. Despite Dhaka
s  claim that caring for the Rohingya is an economic burden. Bangladesh has
borne little of the cost of caring for the refugees. With the exception  of
$2.5   million   that  Bangladesh  spent  on  relief  prior  to  the  UNHCR
involvement, UNHCR, donor governments, and NGOs have paid for almost all of
the relief operation. If anything, the UNHCR relief operation has led to  a
net  financial  gain  for the Bangladesh government and its citizens, as it
has increased employment UNHCR has donated $3.2 million in  aid  under  the
"Affected   Bangladeshi   Villagers   Program"   for   local,   non-refugee
populations, and projects related to health,  food,  education,  sanitation
and  road  repair. Similarly, the Bangladesh Government has benefitted from
tariffs that it has imposed on relief goods, and substantial  donations  of
equipment to the government, including vehicles.

The   refugee  influx  has  indisputably  had  a  negative  impact  on  the
environmant , especially in areas where camps have been created. Similarly,
without an alternative fuel source with which they can cook, refugees  have
had  to  collect fire wood, thereby contributing to deforestation. However,
there is also  a considerable flow of black market  hardwood  that  is  not
controlled  by  the  Rohingya  but rather by large Bangladeshi-owned lumber
yards. While black market traders have employed refugees to cut this  wood,
the  refugees  themselves  are not engaged in the trade. Deforestation also
has occurred in areas near brick fields, as wood is  needed  to  flame  the
kilns.  These  operations are owned and operated by Bangladeshis who employ
the Rohingya as laborers. According to the minutes of  the  June  13,  1994
Myanmar  Refugee  Relief  Coordination Committee Meeting, it was recognized
therein that "refugees cut wood for the owners of the brick fields."

There has been some crime  associated  with  the  Rohingya.  However,  most
arrests  of  Rohingya  have  been  of  individuals  who were vocal in their
opposition to repatriation, or of refugees who committed minor  infractions
of camp rules.

The  Bangladesh  government's  assertion  that  providing  staffing for the
relief effort is costly is misleading. According to one newspaper  article,
there are 2,000 Bangladeshi civil servants involved in the Rohingya refugee
operation. However, their salaries are provided by UNHCR.

Many  in  the  local  community  have  indeed expresssed resentment towards
refugees, citing decreases in prices caused by the  sale  of  UNHCR  relief
good  on  the  local  markets,  a  perceived  increase  in crime, decreased
employment opportunities for manual laborers, and the unsightly  appearance
of  the  refugee  camps, which lie directly along the road. Other villagers
allowed the author to interview refugees in their homes and stated that the
villagers felt no  ill  will  towards  them,  but  rather  that  they  were
benefiting  economically  because  the  wage rate for Rohingya laborers was
about fifty percent of the local wage rate.

CONCLUSION
----------
According to statements made by UN High Commissioner for  Refugees,  Sadako
Ogata,  "the  two  main  functions  of [UNHCR] are to provide international
protection to refugees and to seek durable solutions  to  their  problems."
Unfortunately  these  objectives  have  not been realized with the Rohingya
Refugee Relief Operation. The refugees have not been adequately  protected,
and  a  durable  solution  is  not  likely  to  evolve  under  the  present
repatriation and reintegration scheme. As a  consequence,  the   lives  and
welfare of three hundred thousand refugees are endangered.

Teh  implementation of the current program for the mass repatriation of the
Rohingya has created  a  situation  in  which  the  Rohingya  refugees  are
imperiled  no matter where they are. In Burma, human rights abuses continue
unabated, while in Bangladesh, the Rohingya are  subject  to  ill-treatment
and  pressure to repatriate. The entire equation has created a situation in
which the refugees are effectively denied full  protection,  the  right  to
seek asylum, and the right to voluntary repatriation.

Some of the shortcomings in providing adequate protection and assistance to
the  refugees are attributable to UNHCR. HOwever, the agency is constrained
by the government of the country  in  which  it  operates.  The  burden  of
responsibility  falls  heavily opon the Government of Bangladesh, which has
countenanced the repeated violations of basic norms of international  human
rights and refugee and humanitarian law that are binding upon all nations.

UNHCR  asserts  that  the  present repatriation is voluntary. However, this
assertion is bedged a semantics. The fact that the refugees are  not  being
physically  forced across the border and that they are not staging protests
is not evidence that they wish to return home.

In fact, the term "voluntary repatriation" is a  term  of  art;  there  are
clearly defined principles for voluntary repatriation that are set forth in
international   law,  international  practice,  and  conclusions  from  the
executive body that establishes UNHCR's operational guidelines.

Central to these obligations is respect  for  the  principle  of  voluntary
repatriation.  In  order  for  a  repatriation to comport with standards of
voluntariness, it must fulfill three objective  criteria:  1)  it  must  be
truly  voluntary  (that  is,  free of coercion and based upon the refugees'
freely expressed wishes. Clearly implied in this criterion is the existence
of the option not to repatriate): 2) the voluntary nature of the  refugee's
decision  must  be  manifest;  and , 3) the country of origin must reassume
responsibility for the protection of the returnees. These  three  standards
provide  objective  criteria by whoch the legality of any  repatriation can
be adjudicated. As detailed above, these criteria have been and continue to
be, consistently violated.

Some  observers  believe  that  UNHCR's  shift  to  mass  repatriation   is
predicated  on  the  agency's concern that it will be unable to prevent the
continued deterioration of the refugees' security in Bangladesh,  and  that
Bangladesh  will  employ less constrained methods to return the Rohingya to
Burma. ONe UNHCR official agreed with this assessment.  He  stated:  "Given
the  GOB's strong feelings and the associated abuses, UNHCR has come to the
realization that they will be better off in Burma than if they continue  to
stay  here."  However,  returned  refugees  are  likely  to  be  subject to
intensified abuses in Burma, where UNHCR will be even  less  likely  to  be
able to assist them.

The  return  of  Rohingya  is even more disquieting because the same regime
that persecuted the Rohingya is now, in conjuction with UNHCR, facilitating
their return. The officers and soldiers of the Tatmadaw continue  to  abuse
people  residing  in Bangladesh with total impunity. To expect the Tatmadaw
as an institution , or the individuals who comprise it, now to respect  the
rights  of  the returnees is naive. Similarly, it is unreasonable to expect
the "re-integration efforts" of UNHCR to effect any durable  change,  other
than the removal of the Rohingya from Bangladesh.

HIgh Commissioner Ogata has noted UNHCR's "special obligations" to women in
all  of  UNHCR's  activities  including protection, assistance, and durable
solutions. These obligations are reflected, in part, in four conclusions of
the Executive Committee that relate specifically to refugee women; three of
these conclusions recognize the  vulnerability  or  the  refugee  women  to
physical assault including rape.

Special  attention  needs  to  be  focused  upon  the  safety  and physical
integrity of returning refugee  women.  While  the  numbers  are  disputed,
refugees  and  human  rights  organizations  have repeatedly indicated that
Rohingya women have been subjected to rape by Burmese military officials. A
high incidence of rape of ethnic women by  military  forces  is  also  well
documented in eastern Burma.

The bangladesh government and UNHCR are obligated and obliged to take these
realities  and  related  concerns  into  account.  In accordance with their
duties to protect the refugees, they should repatriate the Rohingya only if
they can take a proactive role in ensuring the safety and integrity of  the
refugees upon their return to Burma.

The  UNHCR  presence  in Arakan cannot effectively ensure the safety of the
returnees. Teh agency has been unable to adequately protect the refugees in
Bangladesh, yet it asserts that it can protect returnees in  Burma  despite
the  nature  of the SLORC, the geographical and logistical constraints, and
the fact that UNHCR is operating with less than half of the staff  that  it
employs  in the Rohingya operation in Bangladesh. Indeed, it seems unlikely
that any organization could ensure the safety of the returnees,  given  the
SLORC' record.

RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------
The  U.S.  Committee for Refugees is concerned about a number of aspects of
the Rohingya refugees' current situation and future prospects. In order  to
safeguard  the  refugees' well-being and ensure that their basic rights are
respected, USCR makes the following recommendations:

1. UNHCR should promote strict adherence  to  the  principle  of  voluntary
repatriation.   It   should   undertake  a  detailed  review  of  the  mass
repatriation program to ensure that it is free of coercion,  that  refugees
are  fully  informed  about their options, and that those who do repatriate
are indeed doing so voluntarily.

The report has documented Bangladesh authorities' use of threats, beatings,
arrests, extortion, withholding of food and humanitarian  relief,  and  the
confiscation  of  goods and money as means of coercing Rohingya refugees to
"volunteer" to repatriate. UNHCR reports that such  practices  rarely  take
place  now and that the government of Bangladesh has removed camp officials
responsible for such actions.  However,  NGOs  working  with  the  refugees
continue  to  express  concern.  They  say  most  refugees  do  not want to
repatriate but that they do not believe they can refuse  to  do  so.  Given
that, and continuing concerns about human rights in Burma, it is imperative
that  UNHCR  maximize its efforts to monitor all stages of the repatriation
process. We encourage a return to  case-by-case  interviews,  which,  while
time   consuming,  would  better  ensure  that  refugees  are  repatriating
voluntarily, and an information campaign to ensure that the refugees  under
stand  that "voluntary" repatriation means that they have the option to not
repatriate.

2. The Bangladesh government  should  continue  to  prvide  asylum  to  the
Rohingya  refugees  pending  a  verifiable  improvement in the human rights
situation in Burma. It should also ensure that camp officials do not coerce
the refugees to volunteer to repatriate.

Teh level  of  coercion  by  the  Bangladesh  authorities  has  diminished.
However,  NGOs  working in that area say that is only because most refugees
believe they must repatriate and therefore do so.  However,  when  refugees
refuse, the authorities again resume coercion. That must stop.

3.  Donor countries should pledge continued financial support for the UNHCR
Rohingya operation in Bangladesh. They should also continue to insist  that
repatriation be fully voluntary.

Donors  can play a significant role in influencing poliey. Inadequate donor
funding for care and maintenance of refugee populations can contribute to a
sense of urgency htat a refugee situation  must  be  "solved".  Donors  can
demonstrate   their   continued  commitment  to  asylum  by  ensuring  that
sufficient funds are availabe to support those refugees who do not  believe
that it is safe yet to repatriate. Donors should also strongly impress upon
the Bangladesh government their commitment to voluntary repatriation.

4.  The  Bangladesh  government  should  under  take heightened efforts, in
cooperation with UNHCR, to ensure that the refugees' basic human rights are
respected. It should permit  human  rights  organizations  and  journalists
access to the camps.

During their stay in Bangladesh, the Rohingya have been regularly subjected
to  abuses by Bangladesh officials. As stated above, UNHCR reports that the
prevalence of such abuses has diminished. The  Bangladesh  government  must
strive  to  ensure  that  such abuses do not occur. Permitting human rights
organizations and journalists to visit the camps freely would  provide  the
refugees an important safeguard.

5.  SLORC  should  respect the basic human rights of the Burmese people. It
should rewrite its citizenship law so that it does not  exclude  long  time
Rohingya  residents  from  the  rights and protections that are afforded to
other citizens of Burma.

SLORC continues to engage in abuses such as the use of forced labor, forced
relocations, and confiscation of land and property against its own  people.
Many  in  the  international  community  rightly  condemn  SLORC  for those
actions. UNtil SLORC ceases such abuses, it will be  difficult  to  believe
that it is safe for the refugees to repatriate.

6.  UNHCR  should  increase  the  number of international staff who work in
Arakan State.

UNHCR reports that it has adequate personnel to carry  out  its  monitoring
functions  in  Arakan.  The  might  well  be  the  case if there were other
international organizations working in the returnees' home areas. But  that
is  not  the  case  in ARAkan. Given that, and the SLORC's still deplorable
human rights record, a larger-than-usual presence is in order.

An integral element of "full access" is the use of independent interpreters
able to operate with  out  fear  of  pressure  from  government  officials.
Towards  this  end,  UNHCR  should  make arrangements to employ Bangladeshi
rather than Burmese national as translators in Arakan.

7. SLORC should allow international NGOs to work with returnees  in  Arakan
State.

NGOs  can  and  should  be an integral part of the relief and reintegration
process. Besides  the  practival  assistance  they  offer,  their  presence
reinforces UNHCR's monitoring capicity by providing returnees other avenues
through  which to raise protection concerns. UNHCR should continue to press
SLORC to allow international NGOs to work in Arakan.

8. The international community should press for independent verification of
the safety of returnees.

There has been no independent assessment of the human rights  situation  in
Arakan.  SLORC should permit independent human rights observers and NGOs to
visit Arakan for that purpose.

/* ENDOFREPORT */