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USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF (r)
Subject: USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYAS (PART 4 OF 4)
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Protection Issues in the Refugee Camps in Bangladesh
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Severe beatings, threats, extortion, and arrests have fostered an extree
climate of fear and mental destress among refugees. Bangladesh officials
have employed, and in some camps intensified , coercive measures as a way
of prompting the expeditious return of the Rohingyas.
Since 1991, camp officials have been able to assault the refugees
physically and mentally with almost total impunity. Despite clear patterns
of abuse, only a handful of camp officials were removed from office (i.e.
transferred to other sectors of the government without punishment), and
then onlly after repeated complaints by foreign embassies. According to
UNHCR, the Bangladesh government has removed camp officials responsible for
the most egregious abuses; however, it took more than three years for the
Bangladesh government to respond in this manner, and such cooperation is
perhaps best understood as a concession in light of UNHCR's cooperation in
massively repatriating the refugees.
In camps where abuses have been most severe, refugees were tortured.
Several refugees from Moishkum Camp reported that the CIC and Camp
Magistrate forced a refugee caught selling nuts to stand outside all day in
the summer sun and count trains of sands on a sheet of white paper. The
following week, the Camp Magistrate confirmed nonchalanty in front of the
author, a UNHCR protection Officer, and a UNHCR Protection Assitant, that
he and other camp officials had indeed inflicted this punishment.
An informed source told of a separate incident that occurred at Moishkum
Camp in December 1993. A refugee was caught trying to hook up his shed to
the electric source in the camp. At mid night, the CIC and Camp Magistrate
allegedly called the refugee to the camp office. The refugee, who had been
asleep, did not report quickly enough, so he was drenched in water "to wake
him up", slapped, and forced to stand at attention outside in the cold. The
victim was subsequently held tied up in the police barracks for more than
twelve hours before he was jailed for approxinately tow months. The UNHCR
Protection Officer also confirmed this incident.
During mid-1994, there was apparently a lull in physical abuse. UNHCR
explained this as a combination of the new Rohingya relief and Repatriation
Commissioner (RRRC) and the shift to mass repatriation. However, according
to a September 1994 report by Medicins Sans Frontiers-France (MSF),
beatings increased again in September in connection with refugee
intransigence to repatriation.
All of the refugee interviewed reported knowledge of beating in the camps.
INcidents renged from one or two hits with a cane to repeated beatings on
the elbow and knee joints. Refugees who had been beaten demonstrated how
they had been forced to keep their heads under a low table with their hands
on the table, while a camp official rammed their elbow repeatedly into the
refugee's back. In some camps, refugees had been locked in outhouses
[toilets] after beating. ONe refugee described that experience. He said,
"YOu are trying to breathe from the beating, and then they lock you up in
the toilet, and it stinks, and you start to get sick."
Camp officials have split families as a means of punishing reufgees who are
not present in their shed when attendance is taken. In the second week of
August, for example, the CIC of Moishkum Camp ordered the women and
children from four families to be moved to Dcchua Palong II transit camp
for repatriation, without the heads of their households. Refugees who
witnessed the incident said that the women and children were "screaming and
crying in fear" and that camp officials beat them as they were forced into
a truck. When UNHCR confronted the Camp Magistrate with questions regarding
these activities, in the presence of the author, he replied, "HOw else can
we teach them a lesson ? They don't follow the rules if they are not
punished in such a way."
Refugees in Balukhali II, Shailerdeba, Mayapara I, and Nayapara II refugee
camps all told stories about how police blackmail refugees with false
charge and/or beat them if they foal to pay the police "rent" for the space
that their shed occupies. Other refugees said that the police threatened
them with repatriation if they did not make such paymeits. The police also
demanded money for "protection" from local villagers. Typically, between 50
and 500 taka were extorted from each family ($!=40taka). Many of the
refugees interviewed were able to pay the police because they worked
outside of the camps in the rice or brick fields. However, the standard
payment to refugees for a ten hour day of hard labor was between 40 and 50
taka; thus, the extortion payments represented a significant economiic
burden for the refugees. Some refugees indiccated that in the past, the had
been forced to borrow maney to appease the police and camp officials.
In response to reports of abuses at MOishkum camp, a UNHCR protection
officer stated, "What can we do ? We don't have twenty four hour presence
in the camps. If they don't do it in front of us, they will do it when we
are not around." Similarly, in response to a query about why the abusive
CIC's and Magistrates are not replaced, a UNHCR official said, "They would
be replaced with those who are more junior and less qualified." Refugees
claimed that they had been similarly rebuffed when reporting human rights
abuses to UNHCR.
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Concerns Regarding Inadequate Food and Shelter
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Nearly all of the reufugees interviewed complained that camp officials and
government relief workers had deprived them of adequate shelter and food
stuffs. At times, these deprivations have become so severe that they have
led to deteriorations in health conditions in the camps.
In May 1994, a cyclone that hit southeast Bangladesh completely levelled
nearly all of the shelters in the refugee camps. Despite UNHCR's payment to
Khaka of U.S.$750,000 for bamboo to reconstruct refugee shelters, the
refugee remained without adequate shelter for four months after the cyclone
throughout the rainy season.
In Dumdumia camp I and II, more than 10,200 refugees have been living
without adequate protection from the environment for the past three years,
the duration of their stay in Bangladesh. Some NGO workers in Cox's Bazaar
believe that this has been a deliberate government polity aimed at
encouraging the refugees to return to Burma.
In late August 1994, health officials in the camps expressed concern that
increased health problems might result from the decline in caloric intake.
Between June and August, food rations were reduced to levels that are below
the World Helath Organization's suggested minimum caloric intake for
sendentary refugees. IN response to the author's queries about , the RRRC,
Khindaker Fazlur Rahman, said, "Burma asked Bangladesh to scale down the
rations because they cannot provide the same amount of food for them upon
return. " Suggestions similar to this were reportedly made at a MInisterial
meeting in March 1994 as a means of facilitating mass repatriation.
The decline in caloric intake was also due to the withholding of fresh
vegetables, potatoes, and sugar during those months. Reufgees also claimed
that camp officials distribute incomplete rations. In order to subsist,
refugees need 3 kgs of rice and 1/4 kg of Dal [lentil] per week. Refugees
insist that their rations have been reduced to between 2.5-2.8 kgs of rice
and as little as 1/8 kg of Dal.
Multiple families are sometimes listed in one family book, which deprives
them of goods such as blankets, clothing, and soap, which are distributed
on a family basis. Some reufgees do not receive any rations because they
have not been recorded in any family book. One UNHCR staff member explained
that by depriving the refugees of relief goods to which they are entitled,
hte police, camp officials, and other relief workers are able to generate
additional revenue for themselves.
Reufgees in Moishkum camp have been subjected to especially severe
deprivations of food and shelter. Refugees living in Moishkum camp said
that on several occasions camp officials told them they are deliberately
withholding food as a means "forcing" or "encouraging" the refugees to
return. A fifty-five year old women from Moishkum said that the Camp in
Charge of Moishkum tokd a gathering of refugees:
We are making a system to repatriate you by reducing food so they you
cannot survive here long, so you will go back to Myanmar. I will see
how long you will survive here in the camp. According to my estimate,
you will survive for three months, and then you will have to go back.
According to one refugee, camp officials not only reduced the refugees'
rations, but they also confiscated the refugees' poultry and destroyed the
small garden plots that refugees had planted near their sheds. UNHCR
officials confirmed this. According to refugees in Moishkum camp, the
decrease in rations coupled with such confiscations have substantially
reduced the ability of the refugees to survive at the subsistance level.
Refugees have also been deliberately prevented from receiving rations. In
August, camp officials were taking attendance in Moiskum Camp twice a day.
Refugees who were absent from their sheds during attendance had a 'N'
marked in their ration books, which prevented them from receiving rations
in the rugure. In front of a UNHCR official, the Camp Magistrate confirmed
that this was occurring. According to the MOU, refugees are prohibited from
leaving the camp without special permission. However, police regularly
overlook this rule in return for small bribes (5-10 cents) from the
refugees. Refugees are thus able to supplement their foodstuffs with income
that they earn working as laborers outside of the camps. Labor is one means
by which the Rohingya are able to provide themselves with a food cushion.
For example, refugees can supplement their diets with vegetables and
protein or purchase rice when rations ae reduced or delayed. Camp officials
in Moishkum have effectively removed this cushion by preventing the
refugees from leaving the camp.
These deprivations were not restricted to food. Refugees in Moishkum say
that they sent a plea for assistance on a cassete tape to Rohinging living
in Saudi Arabia. In response, clothes were sent to the refugees through a
Madarasa (Islamic religious school) in Chittagong. The refugee claim that
when the clothes arrived, the Camp in charge called all of the refugees,
showed them the clothes, and told them, "If you want these, then go home".
The refugees in Moishkum never received the clothing. According to the
refugees, the last time they received new clothing (typically a longyi and
shirt) was in January 1993."
According to one UNHCR official, the refugees in Moishkum were likely to be
repatriated last because the majority of the camp population were from a
remote region in Maungdaw, and UNHCR hadn't yet negotiated an appropriate
point at the border for their return. According to this same official, the
Camp in Charge was anxious that he would be one of the last official along
the border because Moishkum was not gearing up for mass repatriation. These
measures were seen as effort to expedite the repatriation process by
coercing the refugees to leave.
In January 1995, UNHCr asserted that physical coercion and other protection
problesm are less endemic in the camps. If that is the case, then it is a
welcome development. However, concern remains about other, less tangible
forms of coercion, for example threats and scaling down of rations, that
may be used to dissaude refugees from seeking to opt out of repatriation.
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The rationale for the Bangladesh Government's Policy
----------------------------------------------------
The policy of Bangladesh government toward the Rohingya is articulated in a
Position Paper on the Myanmar Refugees in Bangladesh, dated June 11, 1994.
The paper said, in part,
Ever since the arrival of Myanmar nationals into Bangladesh from Myanmar
Bangladesh has been making efforts for their quick, safe and voluntary
return.
Reasons for terminating the present MOU [UNHCR-Bangladesh] were as follows:
(a) declining trend in return of refugees after signing MOU with UNHCR;
(b) no perceptible change in the declining trend since signing of MOU
between UNHCR and Myanmar on NOv. 5, 1993;
(c) UNHCR's officials in Bangladesh have undertaken various manipulations
to deter and even discourage repatriation under the pretext of ascertaining
"voluntariness";
(d) subterfuge such as "discussion" w/GOB official by UNHCR officials to
cahnge/modify written instructions an action plan conveyed to UNHCR by
MInister of Foreign Affairs;
(e) Deliberate disinformation provided by UNHCR to foreign visitors (e.g.
Euro Parliamentary delegation)"
(f) improvement of situation in Rakhine State;
(g) public pronouncement by Myanmar leaders welcoming back all Myanmar
refugees from Bangladesh;
(h) need to reexamine key concepts and methodology relating to:
(i) refugees;
(ii) voluntariness/safety and dignity of reufgees;
(iii) sanctity of existing government agreements vis-a-vis manipulative
moves made by UNHCR through its "action plans"; and
(iv) review of existing repatriation agreements and procedures in all their
detail and facts.
This policy paper highlights tow of the major points of contention between
Dhaka and UNHCR in the repatriation process: the definition of
"voluntariness" and the determination of refugee status. The government has
consistently acknowledged in the MOU and in official statements thaat the
Rohingya in Bangladesh are refugees and that they have a right to voluntary
repatriation. However, the government has failed to adhere to practices
that are consistent with its stated policies.
Points(a) through (c) above imply that the repatriations prior to the
signing of the Bangladesh/UNHCr MOU were "voluntary" and attribute
subsequent decline in repatriation levels to UNHCR "manipulations". As
substantiated earlier in this paper, the majority of pre-MOU repatriations
carried out by the government were in fact involuntary according to
accepted international standards. The "declining trend" in repatriations,
referred to in (a) above, was a result of the introduction of procedures to
ensure voluntary repatriations following the large-scale forced
repatriations between December 1992 and January 1993.
With renewed UNHCR involvement in the repatriation process, more than 9,000
Rohingya were in transit camps awaiting repatriation. Once given the choice
to reject repatriation, they largely chose to remain in Bangladesh. The
fact that the BAngaldesh government had sent them to the transit camps in
the first place indicated that it was either applying a standard of
voluntariness inconsistent with the international norm or not applying any
standard at all.
Point (c) accses UNHCR of deterring and discouraging refugees from
returning. UNHCR's actions are guided by its mandate. A major portion of
the UNHCR mandate concerns the protection of refugees. Returning refugees
to a situation that is obviously dangerous to them, unless such a decision
is made freely and consciously by the refugee, is contrary to UNHCR's
mandate.
There is no clear indication that the human rights situation in Rakhine
state has improved. As asserted below, compelling evidence exists that
human rights abuses remain pervasive. Consequently, many Rohingyas have
reasonable cause to fear persecution.
Point(g), Burma's public pronoumcement welcoming back the Rohingya whom it
expelled does not represent a commitment to ensure the human and civil
rights of these refugees. Neither does it invalidate refugees' continued
fear of persecution nor their need for asylum.
Regarding Point(h), According to the UNHCR/Bangladesh MOU, refugees are
entitled "to return on the basis of their [the refugees'] own judgemnt of
the situation in their country," and the two sides shall cooperate with
each other to prevent any attempt by any side to interfere with the
exercise of freedom of option by the reufgees."
Such an interpretation is consistent with international refugee law.
However, many of the policies and practices of Bangladesh officials, from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Camp in Charge, are contrary to such
an interpretation. Many government policies and practices are, in fact,
fundamentally at odds with these norms. The RRRC, for example, stated in
an interview with the author that the refugees needed to be "encouraged" to
return and rejected the appropriateness of applying international norms. He
said,
Do these people have the mental capacity to make a voluntary decision?
They are thirty year old men with a five year old mentality. The don't
understand. Refugee and human rights standards of voluntary
[repatriation] shouldn't be used [with the Rohingya]. You should use
your own. To use the other, the refugees must have the mental capacity
and ability to decide voluntarily.
The Bangladesh government does not acknowledge that the Rohingya have a
well-founded fear of persecution in Burma. Rather, it explains the
refugees' intransigence towards repatriation as part of their desire to
stay in Bangladesh where food, medicine, and shelter are provided for free.
Indeed, Bangladeshis regularly refer to the Rohingya as "privileged".
The Rohingya whom the author interviewed indicated that they were not
staying in Bangladesh because life was pleasant for them. Rather, the
reason they referred repeatedly was that they feared persecution in Burma.
At the same time, refugees were articulate about the hardships that the
government of Bangladesh imposed upon them and the human rights abuses that
were occurring in the camps. Far from being a "privileged existence," life
in Bangladesh was, according to refugees, the only alternative to
persecution in Burma.
On another level, the bangladesh government cites complications and
problems that the refugees have created as the rationale for their swift
repatriation. they include the financial burden that the refugees have
created; the deforestation that has occurred since the 1991 influx; crime
associated with the refugees; the burden that staffing the refugee camps
places on the government civil service; and the burdens that the refugee
influx has placed on the local communities.
Only some of these assertions are accurate, however. Despite Dhaka
s claim that caring for the Rohingya is an economic burden. Bangladesh has
borne little of the cost of caring for the refugees. With the exception of
$2.5 million that Bangladesh spent on relief prior to the UNHCR
involvement, UNHCR, donor governments, and NGOs have paid for almost all of
the relief operation. If anything, the UNHCR relief operation has led to a
net financial gain for the Bangladesh government and its citizens, as it
has increased employment UNHCR has donated $3.2 million in aid under the
"Affected Bangladeshi Villagers Program" for local, non-refugee
populations, and projects related to health, food, education, sanitation
and road repair. Similarly, the Bangladesh Government has benefitted from
tariffs that it has imposed on relief goods, and substantial donations of
equipment to the government, including vehicles.
The refugee influx has indisputably had a negative impact on the
environmant , especially in areas where camps have been created. Similarly,
without an alternative fuel source with which they can cook, refugees have
had to collect fire wood, thereby contributing to deforestation. However,
there is also a considerable flow of black market hardwood that is not
controlled by the Rohingya but rather by large Bangladeshi-owned lumber
yards. While black market traders have employed refugees to cut this wood,
the refugees themselves are not engaged in the trade. Deforestation also
has occurred in areas near brick fields, as wood is needed to flame the
kilns. These operations are owned and operated by Bangladeshis who employ
the Rohingya as laborers. According to the minutes of the June 13, 1994
Myanmar Refugee Relief Coordination Committee Meeting, it was recognized
therein that "refugees cut wood for the owners of the brick fields."
There has been some crime associated with the Rohingya. However, most
arrests of Rohingya have been of individuals who were vocal in their
opposition to repatriation, or of refugees who committed minor infractions
of camp rules.
The Bangladesh government's assertion that providing staffing for the
relief effort is costly is misleading. According to one newspaper article,
there are 2,000 Bangladeshi civil servants involved in the Rohingya refugee
operation. However, their salaries are provided by UNHCR.
Many in the local community have indeed expresssed resentment towards
refugees, citing decreases in prices caused by the sale of UNHCR relief
good on the local markets, a perceived increase in crime, decreased
employment opportunities for manual laborers, and the unsightly appearance
of the refugee camps, which lie directly along the road. Other villagers
allowed the author to interview refugees in their homes and stated that the
villagers felt no ill will towards them, but rather that they were
benefiting economically because the wage rate for Rohingya laborers was
about fifty percent of the local wage rate.
CONCLUSION
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According to statements made by UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako
Ogata, "the two main functions of [UNHCR] are to provide international
protection to refugees and to seek durable solutions to their problems."
Unfortunately these objectives have not been realized with the Rohingya
Refugee Relief Operation. The refugees have not been adequately protected,
and a durable solution is not likely to evolve under the present
repatriation and reintegration scheme. As a consequence, the lives and
welfare of three hundred thousand refugees are endangered.
Teh implementation of the current program for the mass repatriation of the
Rohingya has created a situation in which the Rohingya refugees are
imperiled no matter where they are. In Burma, human rights abuses continue
unabated, while in Bangladesh, the Rohingya are subject to ill-treatment
and pressure to repatriate. The entire equation has created a situation in
which the refugees are effectively denied full protection, the right to
seek asylum, and the right to voluntary repatriation.
Some of the shortcomings in providing adequate protection and assistance to
the refugees are attributable to UNHCR. HOwever, the agency is constrained
by the government of the country in which it operates. The burden of
responsibility falls heavily opon the Government of Bangladesh, which has
countenanced the repeated violations of basic norms of international human
rights and refugee and humanitarian law that are binding upon all nations.
UNHCR asserts that the present repatriation is voluntary. However, this
assertion is bedged a semantics. The fact that the refugees are not being
physically forced across the border and that they are not staging protests
is not evidence that they wish to return home.
In fact, the term "voluntary repatriation" is a term of art; there are
clearly defined principles for voluntary repatriation that are set forth in
international law, international practice, and conclusions from the
executive body that establishes UNHCR's operational guidelines.
Central to these obligations is respect for the principle of voluntary
repatriation. In order for a repatriation to comport with standards of
voluntariness, it must fulfill three objective criteria: 1) it must be
truly voluntary (that is, free of coercion and based upon the refugees'
freely expressed wishes. Clearly implied in this criterion is the existence
of the option not to repatriate): 2) the voluntary nature of the refugee's
decision must be manifest; and , 3) the country of origin must reassume
responsibility for the protection of the returnees. These three standards
provide objective criteria by whoch the legality of any repatriation can
be adjudicated. As detailed above, these criteria have been and continue to
be, consistently violated.
Some observers believe that UNHCR's shift to mass repatriation is
predicated on the agency's concern that it will be unable to prevent the
continued deterioration of the refugees' security in Bangladesh, and that
Bangladesh will employ less constrained methods to return the Rohingya to
Burma. ONe UNHCR official agreed with this assessment. He stated: "Given
the GOB's strong feelings and the associated abuses, UNHCR has come to the
realization that they will be better off in Burma than if they continue to
stay here." However, returned refugees are likely to be subject to
intensified abuses in Burma, where UNHCR will be even less likely to be
able to assist them.
The return of Rohingya is even more disquieting because the same regime
that persecuted the Rohingya is now, in conjuction with UNHCR, facilitating
their return. The officers and soldiers of the Tatmadaw continue to abuse
people residing in Bangladesh with total impunity. To expect the Tatmadaw
as an institution , or the individuals who comprise it, now to respect the
rights of the returnees is naive. Similarly, it is unreasonable to expect
the "re-integration efforts" of UNHCR to effect any durable change, other
than the removal of the Rohingya from Bangladesh.
HIgh Commissioner Ogata has noted UNHCR's "special obligations" to women in
all of UNHCR's activities including protection, assistance, and durable
solutions. These obligations are reflected, in part, in four conclusions of
the Executive Committee that relate specifically to refugee women; three of
these conclusions recognize the vulnerability or the refugee women to
physical assault including rape.
Special attention needs to be focused upon the safety and physical
integrity of returning refugee women. While the numbers are disputed,
refugees and human rights organizations have repeatedly indicated that
Rohingya women have been subjected to rape by Burmese military officials. A
high incidence of rape of ethnic women by military forces is also well
documented in eastern Burma.
The bangladesh government and UNHCR are obligated and obliged to take these
realities and related concerns into account. In accordance with their
duties to protect the refugees, they should repatriate the Rohingya only if
they can take a proactive role in ensuring the safety and integrity of the
refugees upon their return to Burma.
The UNHCR presence in Arakan cannot effectively ensure the safety of the
returnees. Teh agency has been unable to adequately protect the refugees in
Bangladesh, yet it asserts that it can protect returnees in Burma despite
the nature of the SLORC, the geographical and logistical constraints, and
the fact that UNHCR is operating with less than half of the staff that it
employs in the Rohingya operation in Bangladesh. Indeed, it seems unlikely
that any organization could ensure the safety of the returnees, given the
SLORC' record.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------
The U.S. Committee for Refugees is concerned about a number of aspects of
the Rohingya refugees' current situation and future prospects. In order to
safeguard the refugees' well-being and ensure that their basic rights are
respected, USCR makes the following recommendations:
1. UNHCR should promote strict adherence to the principle of voluntary
repatriation. It should undertake a detailed review of the mass
repatriation program to ensure that it is free of coercion, that refugees
are fully informed about their options, and that those who do repatriate
are indeed doing so voluntarily.
The report has documented Bangladesh authorities' use of threats, beatings,
arrests, extortion, withholding of food and humanitarian relief, and the
confiscation of goods and money as means of coercing Rohingya refugees to
"volunteer" to repatriate. UNHCR reports that such practices rarely take
place now and that the government of Bangladesh has removed camp officials
responsible for such actions. However, NGOs working with the refugees
continue to express concern. They say most refugees do not want to
repatriate but that they do not believe they can refuse to do so. Given
that, and continuing concerns about human rights in Burma, it is imperative
that UNHCR maximize its efforts to monitor all stages of the repatriation
process. We encourage a return to case-by-case interviews, which, while
time consuming, would better ensure that refugees are repatriating
voluntarily, and an information campaign to ensure that the refugees under
stand that "voluntary" repatriation means that they have the option to not
repatriate.
2. The Bangladesh government should continue to prvide asylum to the
Rohingya refugees pending a verifiable improvement in the human rights
situation in Burma. It should also ensure that camp officials do not coerce
the refugees to volunteer to repatriate.
Teh level of coercion by the Bangladesh authorities has diminished.
However, NGOs working in that area say that is only because most refugees
believe they must repatriate and therefore do so. However, when refugees
refuse, the authorities again resume coercion. That must stop.
3. Donor countries should pledge continued financial support for the UNHCR
Rohingya operation in Bangladesh. They should also continue to insist that
repatriation be fully voluntary.
Donors can play a significant role in influencing poliey. Inadequate donor
funding for care and maintenance of refugee populations can contribute to a
sense of urgency htat a refugee situation must be "solved". Donors can
demonstrate their continued commitment to asylum by ensuring that
sufficient funds are availabe to support those refugees who do not believe
that it is safe yet to repatriate. Donors should also strongly impress upon
the Bangladesh government their commitment to voluntary repatriation.
4. The Bangladesh government should under take heightened efforts, in
cooperation with UNHCR, to ensure that the refugees' basic human rights are
respected. It should permit human rights organizations and journalists
access to the camps.
During their stay in Bangladesh, the Rohingya have been regularly subjected
to abuses by Bangladesh officials. As stated above, UNHCR reports that the
prevalence of such abuses has diminished. The Bangladesh government must
strive to ensure that such abuses do not occur. Permitting human rights
organizations and journalists to visit the camps freely would provide the
refugees an important safeguard.
5. SLORC should respect the basic human rights of the Burmese people. It
should rewrite its citizenship law so that it does not exclude long time
Rohingya residents from the rights and protections that are afforded to
other citizens of Burma.
SLORC continues to engage in abuses such as the use of forced labor, forced
relocations, and confiscation of land and property against its own people.
Many in the international community rightly condemn SLORC for those
actions. UNtil SLORC ceases such abuses, it will be difficult to believe
that it is safe for the refugees to repatriate.
6. UNHCR should increase the number of international staff who work in
Arakan State.
UNHCR reports that it has adequate personnel to carry out its monitoring
functions in Arakan. The might well be the case if there were other
international organizations working in the returnees' home areas. But that
is not the case in ARAkan. Given that, and the SLORC's still deplorable
human rights record, a larger-than-usual presence is in order.
An integral element of "full access" is the use of independent interpreters
able to operate with out fear of pressure from government officials.
Towards this end, UNHCR should make arrangements to employ Bangladeshi
rather than Burmese national as translators in Arakan.
7. SLORC should allow international NGOs to work with returnees in Arakan
State.
NGOs can and should be an integral part of the relief and reintegration
process. Besides the practival assistance they offer, their presence
reinforces UNHCR's monitoring capicity by providing returnees other avenues
through which to raise protection concerns. UNHCR should continue to press
SLORC to allow international NGOs to work in Arakan.
8. The international community should press for independent verification of
the safety of returnees.
There has been no independent assessment of the human rights situation in
Arakan. SLORC should permit independent human rights observers and NGOs to
visit Arakan for that purpose.
/* ENDOFREPORT */