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COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO REFUGEE A
Subject: COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO REFUGEE AND DISP. PEOPLE PROBLEM(5/10/94)
/* Written 3 Oct 6:00am 1995 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* ---------------" Comprehensive Response (reposted) "-------------- */
Part 1 of 2.
A Comprehensive Response To
Burmese Refugee and Displaced People Problem
********************************************
5 October 1994
Dr U Ne Oo, Adelaide Australia
1. Burma in the Year 1993-94.
==============================
Reflecting Burma's political situation, some analysts describe the
year 1993-94 as the watershed year in Burmese politics [1]. The
ruling military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), seems to be adopting a more conciliatory approach towards
the detained opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi [2]. In
September 1993, Burmese military claims to have adopted a republic
style constitution, which is interpreted as the military making a
concession to ease tension with the ethnic oppositions [3]. There
is no increase in the level of human rights abuses in this year,
partly because SLORC had managed to silence the oppositions
effectively [4], and reports of serious violations are rare in
comparison to the periods of August-September 1988 and the
aftermath of May 1990 election. These indications are that Burma
may be at the beginning of a "post-conflict era" in which all
parties in the conflict could resolve their problems in a peaceful
environment. However, the climate of fear continues for the
general populace as the system of repression is still being
enforced; therefore it must continue to judge the military junta as
a serious violator of human rights.
The military continues to show its willingness to hold on to power:
making efforts to hold its dominant position in government in the
event of a transfer of power to any future administrations. To
secure the leading role for the army in the future, the military
imposed guidelines in drafting the constitution [5] and has also
been desperately seeking ways to establish its political
legitimacy.
The Military Government of Myanmar(SLORC) appears to be making
efforts to improve its political stature. The military government
declared the year 1994-95 as ``All-round Development Year'' and is
carrying out various infrastructure and development projects. It
claims to have made measures to bring Burma's civil war to an end;
it is successful in negotiation with some armed ethnic rebel groups
to enter the military cease-fire. A highly publicised anti-narcotics
operation was launched in order to appease the western governments,
particularly the Government of the United States [6]. This is a
move that appears to exploit the drug issue as a legitimate avenue
to enter the international stage. Attempts have been made so as to
attract the businesses and investments, in particular, from the
United States [7]. In order to improve its international image, the
military junta reportedly hired public relation personnel from a
private firm to lobby the western governments.
With regards to the human rights situation in the minority areas, as
expected, the general condition seems to be ameliorated as a result
of the military's renewed initiatives for a cease-fire. However, a
resurgence of human rights abuses that are not necessarily related
to the government's counter-insurgency measures have occurred. The
local military administration has become more systematic in
oppressing the villagers: organizing forced labour and porterage;
taking bribe and extorting money; and confiscating properties.
Although these type of abuses, normally, are considered less
serious in comparison to those which occur in generalized violence,
the cumulative effect upon the life and livelihoods of villagers is
found to be severe enough to cause the displacements.
The sincerity of military's initiatives for a cease-fire becomes
questionable as the military authorities refuse to make a
political settlements with the ethnic rebels who are struggling for
the establishment of the Federal Union of Burma. The failure to
make political settlement, in fact, is rather dubious because the
military itself claims to be promoting a republic style constitution.
As the military is preoccupied with keeping a stranglehold on state
power, the government's neglect on the welfare of normal citizens is
beginning to show its effects. The humanitarian situation within the
country continues to deteriorate and the hardships become
unbearable to normal citizens. The economic desperation, which
combined with political repression, has become another cause of
displacement for the Burmese population. Forced relocations, forced
labour, extortions and confiscation of properties in ethnic
minority areas have resulted in the outflows of refugees into
neighbouring countries.
A humanitarian oriented approach to Burma's multitude of problems is
therefore necessary. The national reconciliations - minorities and
majority Burman as well as the military and civilian population -
should be given the priority. A unified approach from all fronts
(i.e. the political, human rights and humanitarian) that derives
from all legitimate concerns becomes necessary to tackle Burma's
problems. Therefore a comprehensive response to the Burma's
refugee problem should be made by the United Nations and
international community.
All parties in the conflict should be encouraged to enter negotiation
in order to create an environment conducive for refugee's voluntary
return. Measures to improve the human rights situation must be made
in order to eliminate the root causes that put the refugees to
their flights. A voluntary return of refugees, assisted and
monitored by the UNHCR and international community, must be arranged
as a comprehensive response to the refugee problem. The entire
response to Burma's refugees problem must be formulated within the
framework of peace-making and aimed at a longer-term peace-building
in Burma. Outlined in this paper is the strategy to approach it from
all fronts.
2. Human Rights and Refugees [8]
================================
Since the leadership changes in April 1992, the SLORC is seen
changing its behaviour in relation to the serious human rights
abuses. Certain incremental measures have been taken to improve
its human rights records [9]. These measures include the signing
of a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees for the safe repatriation of Burmese-muslim refugee from
Bangladesh, also known as Rohingyas, and release of some political
prisoners [10]. SLORC also claims to have made initiatives to end
the civil war with ethnic minorities who are demanding a greater
autonomy. There appears to be some reduction in the number of
serious violations of human rights, especially those directly
related to government counter-insurgency operations, in the
minority areas due to these initiatives for the cease-fire. However,
the climate of fear continues for the Burmese populace and the
minorities in particular, because the system of repression is still
being enforced by the Myanmar military government. It is observed
that a resurgence of widespread abuses, which do not necessarily
relate to the military's counter-insurgency measures, have occurred
in minority areas and are causing the displacement of the civilian
population.
The nature of these abuses stem from the lack of an independent
judiciary, the weaknesses in the structure of government
departments and the authorities' inability to control corruption.
In particular, the Military government's implementation of various
infrastructure projects has led to forced labour and enslavement of
villagers. the loosening grip of central control upon the regional
military councils has resulted in a widespread pattern of
corruption and mismanagement [11]. The systematic repression by
authorities that led to the insecurity in the normal life of
villagers is producing the outflow of refugees into neighbouring
countries.
2.1 Refugees in Thailand
-------------------------
As a symbol of the Myanmar military government's renewed
initiatives for the cease-fire, the Burmese army has suspended a
large scale military offensive on insurgents in minority areas.
There appears to be some amelioration of the human rights
conditions, particularly the abuses directly related to
counter-insurgency measures. However, the forced relocation scheme
continues to play a key role in the military government's counter-
insurgency strategy, particularly in Karen State [12]. Although
large-scale battles with insurgents have not occurred, there are
reports of isolated skirmishes happening throughout the year [13].
Forced relocations, forced labour and porterage, confiscation of
properties and extortion of money from villagers are commonly
reported. The following is a summary of reported abuses within
Karen and Mon States; and Tennasserim Division - all bordering
Thailand. These abuses are found to be the major root causes of the
flights of refugees into Thailand.
2.1.1 Forced relocations:
--------------------------
The Burmese Army has used the strategy of forced relocation,
commonly known as the ` four-cuts strategy' [14], in its counter-
insurgency operations since mid-1970s. Villages within the
strategic area are ordered to relocate to places near military
outposts. The area is then declared as free-fire zones in which
anyone seen is considered rebel and subjected to being shot on sight.
In 1992, the Burmese military declared a unilateral cease-fire and
suspended the large scale offensive with Karen ethnic rebels.
However, as a government counter-insurgency measure, an intensive
forced relocation campaign in Karen State was carried out instead.
As a result, a large number of villages had to move to places near
military outposts [15]. The villagers are ordered to move at short
notice with little possessions. The houses and food left behind are
destroyed by military and the compensations have never been paid
to the villagers. The restriction on the movement of villagers has
also caused disruption to their normal farming activities. The
humanitarian situation for these villagers in relocated camps were
reported to be egregious.
As of 1994, it appear that the incidences of forced relocations
and the restrictions on the movement of villagers had somewhat
eased in minority areas due to government's renewed cease-fire
initiatives. However, the military continues to relocate of
villages without compensation and exercises the right to shoot on
the free-fire zones. Deteriorating humanitarian situation in these
relocated camps, i.e. malnutrition and the lack of medical care, is
causing sickness and death to the villagers. The Karen Human Rights
Group(KHRG) [16] has reported an incident of the forced
relocation, testimony given by a refugee who fled to the
Thai-Burmese border, as [17]:
"They ({\em SLORC}) also force villages to move. They
forced Tha Yet Pin and Shan Ywa villages to move to Mi
Kyaun Win, and Tha Yet Pin Seit had to move to Kyaik Maw
Win. At the new places,the villagers had to clear the bush to
build houses for themselves, and there were landmines close all
around. They have to go very far just to get water, at least
500 meters down the hill. Now they just have to survive day
by day, doing day labour for money cutting bamboo, cutting
sugarcane or cutting wood. About 400 families from my area
have already fled. Everyone from small villages has to flee
to big villages, the forest, or the refugee camps. My village
has 50 houses, but when I left there were already 200 houses
there from all the smaller villages around. Over the last 3
months very many villagers have been sick. At least 5
or 6 adults have died of the sickness in my village, and at
least 10 children."}
The military enforced the free-fire zones by threatening to shoot
and to kill anyone seen on sight. Consequently, the displaced
villagers are having no means to support themselves in new sights.
The nature as well as extent of hardships and anxieties for the
relocated populace inside Burma are very similar to that of
external refugees: threat of persecution upon return to their
normal inhabitant, difficulty to survive in a new environment, the
humiliations and indignity. One displaced villager told her
experience to KHRG as [18]:
"Major Kyaw Shwe ordered us to move. He is a commander from
38 Infantry Battalion. He said we had to move because there
had been fighting in our village, but I'm sure there was no
fighting there, only very far away. They gave us 3 days to
move out of the village and said that after that, if they
see anyone in the village they'll shoot them on sight. ...\ABR
Another villager went back and tried to sleep one night in
the old village, and the soldier captured him, tied him up
and tortured him all night. Now we face the problem of
starvation because we can't work on our farms. We can't do
any thing. We don't have enough clothes. We don't know how
to make a living in the new place, but we can't dare go back
to our old place either.
No one can resist them because everyone is afraid to die. Our
lives now are just work in the morning to eat in the evening,
surviving hand to mouth. Now I need to buy a new sarong but
I can't. We all feel deeply humiliated and small in the new
place, because we see the people from the village with new
clothes while we don't even have a change of clothes. The
village head there feel sorry for us, so whenever the SLORC
orders forced labour he gets his villagers to go instead of us."
2.1.2 Forced Labour:
---------------------
For decades, the Burmese army have been forcibly conscripting
civilians for porter duty in counter-insurgency operations. The
extensive use of forced labour in large scale infrastructure
projects have been reported only in recent years [19]. Various
ambitious development projects are announced and carried out as
public movements [20]. As sources reports, government use of
forced-unpaid labour has been widespread throughout the country in
building airports, constructions of roads and railways [21].
Reports in early April 1994 confirm the large scale use of forced
labour in construction of 110 miles rail route, know as Ye-Tavoy
railway, in Tennasserim Division in southern Burma. The villagers
living in the vicinity of this railway are ordered to clear the
route, build military encampments and make earthen embankments for
construction. Each household in the villages has to work 15 days
a month at the construction sites and fees have never been paid.
The government's practice of using forced and long-term unpaid
labour in its development projects disrupt the livelihood
activities of villagers; and the local people are being forced to
abandon their former inhabitant as life become impossible, one
refugee told the CPPSM [22]:
"We were continuously required to work in the railway
construction and we didn't even have time to do our own jobs
to survive. Again, we had to work very tiredly for the
railway. We couldn't afford to work on for the unpaid hard
job and so decided to flee away."
Local military authorities enforce the order to do unpaid labour by
threatening villagers to punish should they evade the duty.A
refugee told the military authorities punish his family members as
a result of him failing to turn up at work site [23]:
"Then the soldiers came to my house and poked my wife in the
side with a rifle butt. They kicked her hard in the stomach,
and she vomited blood. Then they kicked my baby son down into
the fire, and all the hair on his head was burnt. They
slapped my 7-year old son in the face and he cried out. They
beat them because I had escaped."
Villagers are forced to sleep at the road side without adequate
shelters; the military guarding them day and night. Working
condition is inhumane and medical attention and food for the
workers have never been provided by the authorities: conditions
that one has been led to describe only as the enslavement of the
villagers. A refugee told his experience as [24]:
"They guarded us carefully because they were worried that
someone might escape. Sometimes people tried to escape and
were caught, and the soldiers beat them up severely. Sometimes
they beat them with wood, sometimes they kicked, sometimes
they punched, until the people were bleeding from the head,
and some of them were bleeding seriously. \ABR No one was
killed by beatings, but one or two men died from sickness and
exhaustion. The soldiers never gave any medical care. \ABR At
night we just made a fire and slept on the ground. We
couldn't build a shelter because we didn't have time, and we
were in a different place every night. We had no mats to
sleep on, just the bare ground. The soldiers were always
around the whole night, guarding us closely. We had to ask
permission to go to the toilet. They didn't follow us, but we
didn't dare try to escape because there were other groups of
soldiers nearby."
The local communities has also been coerced to hire equipment from
the railways construction authorities. Both technical management
and local military authorities hired bulldozers and sell the fuel
to villagers for use in the railway construction. The CPPSM reports
[25]:
"These 5 bulldozer machines, the fuel and the nails are
likely to be the only materials supported by the central
SLORC government through its local military authorities
for the construction of the railway and the local encampments
along the railway line. Whatever it has been, it is clear
that even this inconsiderable quantity of material support of
the central SLORC has already been misappropriated by its
widely corrupt and unscrupulous local military authorities
and technical management of the railway construction for
their personal benefit."
In other settings [26], the military forcibly conscripted villagers
for use in guarding roads, building military encampments and
transporting military equipments. Little information was given to
the villagers about their assignments and fees have never been paid
to the porters. Such constant harassment by military authorities
brought anxiety and further insecurity to the life of rural
populace. A refugee told KHRG [27]:
"There used to be over 100 houses in my village, but many
people have run away and now there are only 10 house left.
The soldiers often ask for 10 or 20 porters every month. One
porter had to go from each house, sometimes including many
women. The SLORC also grabbed people to be porters whenever
they came to ask for money and we couldn't pay. Sometimes
I've been a porter for 1 or 2 days, sometimes for over a
month. We had to carry rice, ammunition, salt, chillies and
sugar, and we also have to carry the soldiers' clothes. I was
very afraid to them all the time."
The military authorities ensure the villagers comply the order to
do slave labour by intimidation, as one Burmese trader testified [28]:
"Once when Tha Mo village refused to go for slave labour they
sent a package to the village head with a message that said
``You figure out what it means." When the village head opened
it he saw one red chillie, ane bullet, and one piece of
charcoal. At first no one understood it , but then people
guessed that the chillie is very hot, so it means we have to
suffer a hot situation and a great deal of trouble, the
bullet means they will shoot us and kill us, and the charcoal
means they will burn down our village. After that, the
villagers were very afraid to refuse again."
2.1.3 Informal taxations and Extortions:
-----------------------------------------
Since the military seized state power in 1988, the administrative
duties have been carried out by the local Law and Order
Restoration Council (LORC). As the central authorities loosen its
grip on power, the LORC become increasingly powerful and the local
offices become autonomous centers for administrative affairs.
Reported since 1992 are the incidences of local commanders
collecting informal taxes in an attempt to fill government
coffers [29].
Such frequent and unreasonable taxation has also contributed to
the hardship of the local population. These informal taxes were
collected usually by local LORC in the name of `porter
fees',`courier fees', `educational fees', `development fees', etc..
The excessiveness of such collections may be clear from the fact
that the villagers in those areas are normally living on
subsistence incomes. Although the `porter fees' are regularly
demanded from the public, the porters themselves have never been
paid for their work. Local military authorities seize villagers who
cannot pay porter fees or evade porter duty, and demand ransom
monies. One villager told the KHRG [30]:
"Sometimes we had to send 4 or 5 porters at a time and
sometimes 15 porters, depending on what the soldiers are
doing. We tried to hire people to go in our places. For
long-time porters it costs us 1,000 Kyat, for medium-time
porters 500 Kyat, and for short time porters 100 or 200 Kyat.
The soldiers also collect `porter fees' as often as 4 or 5
times a month. I don't know what they use that money for.
Sometimes when they enter the village they also catch people
and take them away, and we have to pay a ransom of 500 or
1,000 Kyat before they release them."
The authorities' imposition of the informal taxes, such as porter
fees, that are excessive in total amount has forced the villagers
to resort to selling their possessions and finally fleeing to the
refugee camps at the border. A refugee described his experience [31]:
"In my village I fed my children by working my field, but now
I have no farm to work. I had to pay porter fees so I had to
sell my field. My father lived by working the fields, and my
grandmother gave me that field, but I had to sell it to get
the money. I have 3 brothers, and my grandmother gave us one
field each. We all sold our fields at the same time, last
year. We got 30,000 Kyat altogether. Since then I had to work
the fields for other as a laborer, but only got 10 or 20 Kyat
a day and all that went to porter fees. I couldn't support my
family that way so I came here. After I sold the field I had
nothing anymore."
The military authorities ensures the payments and demands are met
by threatening villagers with punishment and, even, to force the
whole village to move. One villager told his experience [32]:
"Troops from 36 Battalion arrived at our village on April 30,
1994. They stole 8 pots and one pig, just as if it were their
own. They steal so many things from us - they've also ordered
1,000 shingles of leaf roofing and 20 cattle carts, and we
have to send it all by May 15. Whenever they come to the
village , all the girls have to hide away because the
soldiers always give them trouble. T--- army camp also
demanded 75 tons of logs from us. The log circumference has
to be 2 feet to 4 feet, and they must be 10 feet long. They
said if we don't send these on time, we will be forced to move
within one week."
2.1.4 Civilians targeted in military operation:
------------------------------------------------
The flagrant disregard of humanitarian laws by Burmese army has also
been a major contributor in the deterioration of the human rights
situation in minority areas. The use of non-combatant civilians in
military operations, such as forced porterage, surveillance support
duties, clearing of mines and, sometimes, civilians being forced to
march in front of military columns are violations of
internationally accepted humanitarian laws. One witness describes
the incidence of civilians being forced to walk in front of
soldiers in the minefield [33]:
"The soldiers force all the men to guard the road, and
sometimes the men have to go in front of the troops on
operations just to clear the landmines. One man from every
village or group of houses has to go, sometimes 200 or 300
men altogether because there are so many little groups of
houses around. They have to walk in front along with one
cart pulled by a cow. then the soldiers follow behind. No
landmines exploded near my village, but it happens sometimes
in other places. The villager steps on the landmine and the
soldiers just ignore him and leave him there. ...''}
In the event of skirmishes with ethnic rebels, the Burmese army has
been known to attack a nearby minority village. One villager
describe an incident where Burmese soldiers took revenge on
villagers after fighting with rebels [34]:
"One day the two boys were just outside the village near the
forest. The Karen soldiers had attacked the Burmese and
disappeared into the forest, so the Burmese soldiers came and
fired their guns all around the village, and shot the two
boys dead. Kyaw Bwe and Kyaw Aye didn't know anything, they
didn't even know how to run away. But the SLORC couldn't
catch any Karen soldiers, so instead shot dead two innocent
boys.
After they killed the boys they came into the village, went
directly to the village head and beat him brutally. They
interrogated him,..."}
The military authorities demand compensation from the local
population in the case of army properties being destroyed in
operation [35]. The army threatens to shoot the villagers if they
refuse to pay. One villager told the KHRG [36]:
"There was a truck that exploded about the beginning of
February at Tah Paw, not far from a SLORC camp. At the time I
was on my way home from Thaton town. The mine destroyed the
truck, so the SLORC ordered Tah Paw village to pay 60,000
Kyat. They didn't want to pay, because their village only has
50 houses and they can't afford it or get the money. So the
villagers just kept quiet and hoped that the SLORC wouldn't
bother to come get the money. But instead, the SLORC came
into their village and shot their guns beside and above all
the people to frighten them. Then they started shouting,`` If
you don't pay the money we'll kill all of you in this
village. " All the women, men, old people and children were
afraid so they started collecting money among themselves.
Some of them didn't have any money so they took the rice they
had for the next one or two months, sold it for money and
then gave it. After paying, people had no food to eat and had
to find some way to get some food. At the same time other
villages had to pay too: Noh Aw Hla had to pay 50,000, Noh La
Plaw 50,000, Pwa Ghaw 50,000, Kru See 50,000, Pan Ta Ray
50,000 and Day Law Po 50,000. For just one truck they asked
this much money - they are only coming here to do business.
How can the people not get poor when they do this ?}
2.1.5 Extrajudicial executions:
--------------------------------
To enforce the free-fires zones, the military exercises the right
to shoot and to kill anyone seen in the defined area. One refugee
told [37]:
"Three of my other nephews from Htee See Baw Kee village were
also killed brutally by the SLORC troops. They had run away
into the forest when the soldiers had come to catch porters,
and they were hiding in the forest for 2 weeks. They didn't
even know the villagers had been driven out. When they
returned to the village without knowing, the soldiers grabbed
them right away, forced them to put on Karen army uniforms
and shot them dead. \ABR We know for sure that they weren't
Karen soldiers, just innocent civilians. They were my
nephews, and their names were Pa Thu, Thaung Ngwe, and Htun
Thaung. They thought it was safe to go back to their village,
but they were killed."
Extrajudicial executions have taken place, without due process of
examining the case, if persons suspected of rebels are captured.
A fair trial for villagers has not been given to establish their
claims [38]:
2.1.6 Generalized violence:
----------------------------
In December 1993, the Burmese army launched an offensive on the drug
warlord Khun Sa in southern Shan State [39]. The case of forced
porterage by civilians, including prisoners from central Burma,
have been reported [40]. There are also reports of local civilians
in southern Shan State had been rounded up, detained and used for
porterage [41]. Amnesty International has also reported the forcible
returns of displaced villagers who fled into Thailand from fightings
and porterage [42]. The Royal Thai Government have consistently
refused to allow the international NGOs and Red Cross to assists
these displaced villagers and refugees, particularly at northern
Thailand. The total number of refugees and displaced people in
Thailand is approximately 420,000 [43].
2.2 Refugees in India and China
--------------------------------
Student refugees who fled to India since 1988 are reported to be
living at two camps located at Mizorum and Manipur States bordering
Burma. Some moved further to the capital New Delhi and have sought
assistance from UNHCR. Since April 1993, about 100 Arakanese
Student activists in Bangladesh also moved into Mizorum State in
India. Although smaller in their numbers compared to those in
Thailand, Burmese displaced persons can also be found in every
border town in India [44].
There are also approximately 12,000 refugees from Kachin State in
northern Burma who had fled to China since 1992. Despite the fact
that the Burmese army reached cease-fire agreement with Kachin
Independence Army in early 1994, there are continuing cases of
internally displaced people in Kachin State [45].
2.3 Humanitarian Concerns
--------------------------
The sad state of decline in the humanitarian situation for the
general Burmese populace also deserves international attention
[46]. The continuing economic despair for the general populace and
deterioration in social service infrastructure due to lack of
government's financial support are causing the hardships and
insecurity for all Burmese to increase; recent UNDP report warned
Burma in the state of economic collapse [47]. Many charged the
western countries' boycott on aid and government's increased
expenditures on military as the major contributors for such a state
of decline, but the military's desperate push for its political
legitimacy is also found to be a contributing factor.
There has been a continuing embarrassment amongst the ruling
military elite since the United Nations designated Burma the status
of Least Developed Country in 1987 [48]. The military's admission of
such failure is apparent from SLORC announcing 1992-93 as ``The
Year of the Economy", 1993-94 as ``The Second Year of Economy" and
1994-95 ``All-round Development Year" [49]. As already reported in
Sec. 2.1.2, the implementation of various ambitious development
projects have caused forced labour for population. In order to
boost the economy, military government set the production of rice
for domestic consumption and export as a top priority; and launched
vigorous campaigns to encourage the peasantry to adopt
multiple-cropping and the cultivation of summer paddy. A total
output of 675milion baskets is predicted for the year 1993-94 and
is said to increase to 900million baskets in 1994-95.
For many years, Burma's rural populace enjoy relative freedom of
government's economic policies [50]. The rural economy is subsistence
in nature and this suits the village lifestyle. However, the
military's recent push for such an increase in productivity without
proper investment in agricultural sector has led to the forced
procurement of rice and other primary products [51]. In November
1993, the student group in Arakan State reported of the near
famine situation for rural populace - which the state of rural
poverty believed to be prevalent throughout Burma [52]. The
apparent moral decline of the rural families, which threatened the
social fabric of rural poor, is a direct consequence of the junta's
economic mismanagements.
The reported cases of increase in prostitution inside Burma and the
trafficking of Burmese women and girls into Thailand are much
attributed to this deterioration in rural life [53]. The girls
reportedly sold to Thailand are originated from villages in Burma's
inland areas, such as Sagaing Division, which show the
deterioration has been widespread [54]. Since the military
government has made little or no effort to curtail this trafficking
problem, spreading of HIV/AIDS becomes the immediate threat to
rural communities in Burma. Furthermore, given the facts that an
increase in prostitution inside Burma which combined with the
government's effort to expand tourism for foreign dollars, there
has been a concern that Burma will become another destination for
the sex-tour.
The increase of illegal drug use in Shan State and Kachin State
also needs attention. According to reports, the spread of HIV/AIDS
amongst intravenous drug users has been at an alarming situation
[55]. The general situation for women and children, along with the
internally displaced people throughout Burma, have been in a state
of overwhelming humanitarian needs [56,57].
Although human rights abuses are the compelling reasons for
displacement of much of the population that need urgent attentions,
the deteriorating humanitarian situation within Burma should also
be addressed. The international community must therefore be urged
to adopt an approach which tackles both human rights and humanitarian
concerns in Burma.
3. The Root Causes.
====================
The underlying root causes for Burmese refugees and displaced
people, as explained in Sec 2. , are complex in nature and
therefore require a complex response. A widespread abuse of human
rights, that perpetrated by authorities and sanctioned by system
of repression, in the counter-insurgency measures can be seen as
the primary root causes. Deteriorating humanitarian situation and
generalized climate of fear for general populace; the dire poverty
and insecurity to the life of civilians that are generated by
political system must also be taken into account. A comprehensive
response from all parties in the conflict, therefore, is necessary
to solve the refugee problem.
One obvious root cause has been the long standing civil war in
Burma. The government's counter-insurgency measures are responsible
for the displacements and deterioration in the humanitarian
situation. The use of civilians for porterage and surveillance
duties in the military operation has also contributed to the
hardship of villagers. The military's enforcement of free fire
zones is also given rise to the serious human rights abuses, such
as torture and extrajudicial executions.
There may be some difficulty in seeing the government's activity
such as taxations on populace as a legitimate root cause for the
refugees' flights. However, as it has clearly been demonstrated in
Sec 2.1.3 , this government policy is directly responsible for much
of the poverty and insecurity of the life of local populace; and
the practice of enforcing this by means of threats and
intimidations have caused the displacements. These types of human
rights abuses cannot be said as particularly serious enough to give
immediate threat to the security of a person. But the cumulative
effect of such abuses have threatened the livelihoods and caused
hardships and anxieties. Such cases do not normally conform to the
notion of persecution found in 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees. However, these people are clearly in need of
protections [58].
The majority of displaced Burmese in Thailand are generated by
similar circumstances. With the viewpoint of Convention, it may be
easier to establish the well founded fear of persecution for student
activists and the ethnic refugees who are likely to be a close
relative or in association with ethnic freedom fighters. However,
people who fled from the hardships and anxieties that generated
mainly by the form of oppressions described in Sec 2.1.3, or
possibly Sec 2.1.2, will find difficult to prove their fear are
being well founded; Rather likely that they be charged as so
called `illegal and economic migrants'. Such arbitrariness to the
definition of refugees had already been pointed out in Asia Watch
report in 1992 [59].
Although the obvious root cause for the refugees' flights, such as
the internal displacements and forced portering, are stemmed from
the Burmese Army's counter insurgency campaign, the cessation of
armed hostility will not, therefore, guarantee a safe return for
refugees. The practice of using forced labour and collecting
excessive amount of taxes from the villagers must also be rectified.
Various NGOs [60] as well as opposition sources [61] have already
expressed that the implementation of cease-fire alone does not
provide enough safety to the return of refugees. It is concluded
that the cease-fire must be implemented as the first priority and
the improvement of human rights and humanitarian situation must
also be made for the safe and voluntary return of refugees.
4. Armed Conflicts in Burma
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Part 1 of 6.
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