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BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OCT 95 (4 (r)



Subject: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OCT 95 (4.49-4.77)

/* posted Fri 9 Feb 6:00am 1995 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx(DR U NE OO) in igc:reg.burma */
/* -----------" BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, OCT 95 (4.49-4.77) "---------- */
Following materials are reproduction from the findings of Human Rights
Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affair, Defence
and Trade of the Parliament of Australia, published in October 1995.
Anyone wishing to inquire about the document may contact Ms Margaret
Swieringa, Secretary, Human Rights Sub-Committee, Parliament House,
Canberra A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA.
Best regards, U Ne Oo.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER FOUR: (4.49 - 4.77)
**************************
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
IN BURMA (MYANMAR)     October 1995

CHAPTER FOUR: BORDER REGIONS (4.49 - 4.77)
-----------------------------------------
REFUGEES

4.49  An  estimated  75,000  [41]  people  have  sought  refuge  along  the
Thai-Burma border. With the fall  of  Manerplaw  in  January  1995  another
6,000-12,000  people  mostly Karen crossed into Thailand. A further 300,000
Burmese are thought to be illegally in Thailand.  Of  these,  approximately
2,300  are students and other dissidents, people designated as 'of concern'
to UNHCR [42]. At any onw time there are thought to be 20,000-40,000  young
girls  and  women  from  Burma  who  have  been  drawn into prostitution in
Thailand [43]. Over 15,000 people, mostly Kachin are on the Chinese border.
About 6,000, mainly Chin and Naga, have fled  into  India.  In  1992,  over
200,000 Rohingyas crossed into Bangladesh; a UNHCR repatriation program has
seen  all but 50,000 of these people return to Burma in the last two years.
It is also estimated that there are up to half a million  displaced  people
inside Burma [44].

4.50  The number of refugees on the border is a measure of the abuse of the
ethnic minorities in Burma. Despite ceasefire agreements which go  back  to
1989  the  stories  persist  of  gross mistreatment - forced labour, forced
relocation, portering and  the  use  of  porters  as  human  mine-sweepers,
beatings, summary killings, torture, rape and political suppression and war
[45] - as the reason for their departure from Burma.

Student Refugees in Bangkok

4.51  In Thailand there are 2,300 Burmese students. They escaped from Burma
after the democracy uprising of 1988. Most suffered  trauma  as  they  fled
from  the shootings in Rangoon, were hunted by the military security forces
and travelled by whatever means they could through the jungles of Burma  to
the  border.  This  was  often  a  journey  of days or months in which they
battled sickness and military  pursuit[46].  Many  remain  on  the  border,
others  have  scattered  to  third  countries  for  asylum.  Some remain in
Bangkok. A number of witnesses told the Committee that these people are  in
precarious circumstances.

4.52 Although UNHCR has designated these students as persons of concern and
offers  them  a  survival  payment,  Thailand  does  not  recognise them as
refugees. Thailand is not signatory to the 1951 Convention Relationg to the
Status of Refugees. The students are therefore liable to arrest as  illegal
immigrants.  In 1991 a number were deported to Burma. Their fate is largely
unknown. Protests about the prospect of deportation led to long periods  of
detention  in  the  Immigration  Detention  Centre  (IDC)  in Bangkok. Many
students have been arrested and have spent time (90 days to a year ) in the
IDC where  conditions  have  been  described  as  very  bad  -  unsanitary,
overcrowded  and  violent.  A  student  who  has  since  come  to Australia
described the situation:

        We were not given enough food. ... In place  of  10  persons  to  a
        cell,  50 students were put in to sleep together. Some students had
        to stand up and some would have to sleep. ...

        During my stay in Bangkok, three of my friends were shot dead.  One
        was  shot  in the compound of teh Thai police station, one was shot
        on the Thai-Burma border, and  one  killed  himself.  He  committed
        suicide  due to depression about the difficult situation in Bangkok
        [47].

4.53 In 1993 the Government of Thailand changed its policy and developed  a
'safe  camp'  for  students 70 kilometres from Bangkok. Students lost their
UNHCR allowance unless they went to the safe camp. It  is  only  from  this
camp that students can be processed for third country settlement.

4.54 The Committee recommends that:

        THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND TO
        (A)  RATIFY THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATIONG TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
        AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL; AND
        (B) PERMIT THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH  COMMISSIONER  FOR  REFUGEES  TO
        PROVIDE  GREATER  ASSISTANCE  TO  THE  REFUGEES  ON  THE THAI-BURMA
        BORDER.

The Burma-Thailand Border

4.55 There are 23 camps along the Thai-Burma border. They have formed since
the mid-80s and for Thailand  their  presence  also  corresponds  with  the
influx of 400,000 reufgees along the Combodian and Laotian borders. Whereas
the  UNHCR  and  the United Naitons Border Relief Organisation administered
the Cambodian and Laotian refugee camps,  on  the  Thai-Burma  border,  the
Burma Border Consortium (BBC) was formed to provide emergency relief to the
Burmese  refugees.  The  BBC  consists of five non-government organisations
which supply emergency food aid and medical assistance. For the  most  part
the camps are internally administered.

4.56 Where there is a sudden influx of refugees, the makeshift shelters are
often   made   of   plastic  sheeting  [48]  making  the  camps  muddy  and
uncomfortable.  Toilets  are  of  the  most  basic  kind.  Food,  clothing,
medicines and clean driking water are limited. Often there is overcrowding.
Living  conditions  in  the  camps  create  an environment of psychological
despair and disease. The refugees suffer from depression, anxiety and other
mental illnesses as a result of  civil  war,  displacement,  psychological,
physical and sexual mistreatment by the SLORC's Tatmadaw and also instances
of  abuse  by  the  Thai border patrol officers and other Thai authorities.
They run a high risk of catching malaria which spreads quickly through  the
camps, causing ddeaths or permanent brain or nerve damage [49]. Other major
health  problems  are  tuberculosis  and serve diarrohoea, especially among
children in the new refugee camps. Dr Cynthia Maung, a doctor from Mae  Sot
in  Thailand  reported  that  'people  move  from  place to place without a
community [and it is therefore] difficult to  do  any  preventative  health
care.  Antibiotics  and clean dressings are all the treatments availabel in
the camps [50]. Substantial aid is needed for limb  replacement  and  other
infuries  from  landmines.  The Committee heard specific evidence about the
impact of landmines.

        I  went to the Mae Sot hospital at the time of the Kawmoora attack.
        ... I have seen people with no eyes, no face, no limbs, no legs  as
        a  result of landmines: soldiers and young people my age. That is a
        very difficult thing to see. ... For example there is a 17 year old
        boy in my village who is the youngest of  a  number  of  chilldren,
        none  of  whom  are in the area. His mother is old and sick and his
        father died a number of years ago. He went  across  the  Moi  River
        onto  the Karen side of the rive to cut bamboo to rebuild the house
        for himself and his mother.  It  was  just  an  innocent  activity,
        cutting  bamboo  like most villagers do; but he stood on a landmine
        which blew off one of his legs. This is a young  boy  whose  mother
        relies on him [51].

See Recommandation No. 32.

The Spread of HIV/AIDS

4.57  Another major health issue in the camps is the spread of HIV/AIDS. It
is difficult to know exactly what the dimensions of the problem  might  be.
The  United  Nations  Drug  Control  Program  (UNDCP)  estimated  that  the
percentage of infection of HIV positive case in Burma was:

        All tested Drug users    74.3%
        Prostitutes               9.0%
        Blood donors              0.5%
        Pregnant women            1.4% [52]

Similar percentages were quoted by te SLORC Minister for Health, Colonel Pe
Thein. He put the total number of people who tested  positive  in  1992  at
5,000.  However,  an  AIDS  specialist  from  the  Harvard School of Public
Health, Dr Tarantola, calculated that 300,000 to 400,000  people  in  Burma
were likely to be infected [53]. The Burma Support Group told the Committee
that  there  was  considerable  ignorance  inside Burma about the nature of
HIV/AIDS an how it might be avoided or treated. Teh Government brochure  on
the subject is sold to the public; it is not free [54]. The more vulnerabel
areas  for  HIV  infection are in the country and in the border camps. Here
the  spread  of  the  disease  is  magnified  by  the  reutrn  of  infected
prostitutes who have been repatriated by the Thai authorities.

4.58  Australia  provides  money through the aid program for the control of
HIV/AIDS on the border and inside Burma. It is one of the few  humanitirian
programs  that  operate inside Burma. Funding is supplied through NGOs. The
allocation for 1994-95 is $A200,000. One  NGO  reported  difficulties  with
protracted  negotiations,  the  military  presence  when  aid  workers were
travelling through the country and complications posed by the exchange rate
problems where the official rate is 6 kyats to the $US and the black market
rate is 120 kyats to the $US. Nevertheless, they believed there was genuine
concern in the Ministry of Health to solve the AIDS  crisis  and  that  the
level  of  theft  from the program was minimal. Australia's aid programs to
the area are dealt with more fully in Chapter 6.

4.59 The Committee recommends that:

    15. THE  AUSTRALIAN  GOVERNMENT  EXPLORE  WAYS,  WITHIN   THE   CURRENT
        HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM IN BURMA, TO ASSIST IN THE WIDER DISSEMINATION
        OF INFORMATION ABOUT HIV/AIDS.

The  Committee  endorses  the recommendation in Chapter 13 of its report on
Australia's Relations with Thailand concerning the role of the World Health
Organisation in this problem.

The Burma-Bangladesh Border

4.60 There are approximately one million Burmese of Indian origin in Burma.
Many were brought inbo burma during the British colonial period  to  assist
in  the  administration of the colony. They were resented by the indigenous
population and consequently they have been excluded from full  citizenship.
They  may  not  travel  freely, are not eligible for promotion in the civil
service or to  enrol  in  advanced  university  programs  in  medicine  and
technological  fields. There are restrictions on land ownership. Asia/Watch
believes that, of all the minority groups in Burma, the Muslims suffer  the
worst  discrimination.  They  are  disproportionately  represented  in  the
numbers of porters who are  interviewed  as  refugees.  Whole  villages  of
Muslims have been forcibly relocated. Tehy have suffered the destruction of
Mosques  and  the  prohibition  on religious services under the order which
forbids the gathering of  more  than  five  people  [55].  The  UN  Special
Rapporteur  has  called  for  revision  of  the  1982 Citizenship Law which
currently applies 'second  class  citizenship  in  a  manner  which  has  a
discriminatory effects on racial or ethnic minorities, particularly Rakhine
Muslims [56]'.

4.61 The Committee endorese:

    16. THE  CALL  OF  THE  UN  RAPPORTEUR  FOR  THE  REVISION  OF THE 1982
        CITIZENSHIP  LAW  TO  ELIMINATE  THE  CREATION  OF   SECOND   CLASS
        CITIZENSHIP, ESPECIALLY FOR THE RAKHINE MUSLIM PEOPLE.

4.62  In  1991-92  over  250,000  refugees fled across the Burma-Bangladesh
border. They were mainly Muslim Rohingya people from Arakan State. At  that
time  the  refugees  reported  horrendous  stories of forced labour, forced
porterage, forced relocation, rape, torture and summary executions. The  US
Committee  for  Refugees reported in 1995 that a doctor who had treated the
refugees in Bangladesh found that  'in  the  average  family  of  ten,  two
members  exhibited  evidence  of  recent  abuses  such  as  gunshot wounds,
beatings, burns, or physical exhaustion and that on average one  woman  par
family  had  been  raped  [57]'. The level of violence directed against the
Rohingyas appeared to be a reflection of their low status both legally  and
socially within Burma.

Repatriation

4.63  Although they were allowed to stay for the short term, Bangladesh had
little to offer the refugees and  ocnditions  in  the  camps  deteriorated.
Early  in  1992  the Government of Bangladesh came to an agreement with the
Goverment of Burma for the return of the refugees. No  provision  was  made
for  supervision  of  the  voluntary  nature  of  the  repatriation  or for
monitoring the resettlement. Protest demonstrations and reports of coercion
- the beating and  arrest  of  refugee  leaders  -  accompanied  the  first
repatriation  process.  Fifteen refugees were killed during demonstrations,
100 wounded and 119 arrested [58]. UNHCR was prevented from monitoring  the
situation  and  formally  withdrew  from  the  process on 22 December 1992.
Approximately 16,000 people appear to have been deposited across the border
in this period.

4.64 The recent and extensive repatriation process has been  supervised  by
the  UNHCR.  On  12  May 1993 they signed a new memorandum of understanding
with the Government of Bangladesh. UNHCR undertook to ascertain whether the
refugees were willing to return to Burma. The MOU stated that  UNHCR  would
conduct  independent  interviews  and  that  no refugees would be forced to
leave Bangladesh. Bangladeshi officials moved the refugees from the refugee
camps to transit camps for assessment by  UNHCR.  Since  mid-1993,  190,000
refugees have returned to Burma.

4.65  The  UNHCR  report  on  the  repatriation said that they informed the
refugees about the conditions inside Burma through group sessions and  over
loudspeakers. The refugees were able to opt out of the process at any stage
and  final verification interviews with heads of families were conducted in
private. Tehy illustrated the voluntary nature of  the  process  by  noting
that  5,000  individuals  had  so  far  chosen  not to be repatriated. They
provided returnees with kits of food on departure from Bangladesh. On their
arrival in Burma, each person received 2,000 kyats ($US20), 100  kyats  for
transport  to  their  village of origin and each family received a grant of
2,000 kyats to help build and repair their homes [59].

4.66 UNHCR reported that there were 13 international staff in Maungdaw, tow
in Buthidaung and four in Rangoon to monitor the returnees. It claimed that
its representatives had free and  full  access  to  the  returnees  in  the
villages.  In  conjunction  with  the  World Food Program, UNHCR instituted
small scale projects for the returnees to give them employment  and  reduce
poverty  - the improvement of sanitiation, production of food, construction
of roads and enlargement of ponds [60].

4.67 The Australian Ambassador to Burma, Mr Stuart Hume,  reported  to  the
Committee  that  he  had  visited Arakan State and had had discussions with
UNHCR about the repatriation. He noted that the willingness of the SLORC to
allow UNHCR and the two  NGOs,  the  World  Food  Pragram  and  the  Action
Internationale   Contre   la   Faim,  into  Arakan  State  to  monitir  the
resettlement was fundamental  change  of  policy.  He  observed  thaat  the
process appeared to be working successfully.

        All the elements that UNHCR wanted to deliver were being delivered.
        ...  I  was struck by the fact that at everypoint up until actually
        getting on to the truck to cross the  border,  these  refugees  had
        access to UNHCR personnel and the opportunity to say, 'I don't want
        to  go.'...  It is fairly clear from my discussions with UNHCR they
        have had good cooperation with the Myanmar  authorities,  from  the
        local  area commander and also from those government ministers that
        have  a  role  to  play  in  it.  [There  are]   approximately   12
        international   staff   inside   Myanmar  actually  monitiring  the
        distribution of  the  material  benefits  for  the  program:  food,
        transport and the reintegration into their villages of origin [61].

4.68  The  Burma  Support Group was not so sanguine about the program. They
believed that UNHCR had access to five repatriation centres  in  Burma  but
that  they  were  reliant  on SLORC interpreters. Tehy also cited a weaving
cooperative for 50 women which was run by the military and where there  had
been reports of rape [62].

The MSF Report

4.69  Teh repatriation process on the Burma-Bangladesh border is now almost
complete. As at 31 July  1995,  192,541  refugees  have  been  repatriated;
52,551 people remain in the camps. However this second repatriation process
has  also  been  severely criticised. Particular concern has been expressed
about the change of policy in December 1993 to one  of  mass  repatriation,
that  the  role  of  UNHCR  had  changed  form  facilitating  to  promoting
repatriation. It is claimed that:

        * THE NUMBERS OF TRULY VOLUNTARY RETURNEES ARE MUCH LOWER THAN  THE
        NUMBERS  WHO  HAVE  BEEN REPATRIATED. In surveys by UNHCR itself in
        April 1994 and by Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in May 1995 and in
        interviews conducted by Curt Lambrecht for  the  US  Committee  for
        Refugees  between  June and August 1994, a consistent percentage of
        20-30% per cent said they  whshed  to  return  to  Burma.  MSF  has
        claimed  that  UNHCR  used somewhat deceitful method of encouraging
        teh  refugees.  Mass  registration  replaced  private   interviews.
        Refugees  were  not  informed that if they registered with UNHCR it
        was  tantamount  to  agreeing  to  be  repatriated.   By   way   of
        encouragement  UNHCR  also  advertised that conditions inside Burma
        were safe and that their officers would supervise the resettlement.
        When  the  mass  registration  was  introduced   the   numbers   of
        'volunteers' allegedly jumped from the April UNHCR figure of 23 per
        cent to 95 per cent.

        *  THE  COERCIVE  PRACTICES HAVE CONTINUED WITHIN THE CAMPS. It was
        reported to Lambrecht that if families told UNHCR that they did not
        wish to return they were kept in the transit camps with  inadequate
        or  no  shelter, their leaders were arrested on spurious charges or
        they were beaten. The Camp Magistrate  in  Kutu  Palong  reportedly
        broke the arm of one of three refugees during a severe beating with
        bamboo  canes.  Moreover refugees claimed that they understood that
        if they did not register they would be denied food rations.

        * The conditions  within  Burma  have  hot  changed  substantially.
        Despite  UNHCR  claims that the situation inside Burma has improved
        and that the Government of Burma has  given  guarantees  about  the
        safety  of  the  returnees, human rights organisations still report
        abuses in Arakan State thorughout 1994 and 1995. Forced relocations
        of Muslims have continued and appear to be directed at  moving  and
        concentrating   the  Muslim  population  in  towns  closer  to  the
        Bangladesh border [63].  Forced  labour  and  large  infrastructure
        projects  are  still  being  undertaken  in  the region. Asia/Watch
        reports that forced labour  obligations  for  returnees  have  been
        negotiated  by  UNHCR and concession of four days of work from each
        family per month has been agreed. However no independent monitoring
        of this affangement has been agreed to by  the  Burmese  government
        [64].  In  July  1995  a  fresh  spate of atrocities was repoted by
        Reuters. Two Rohingyas were  reported  to  have  been  executed  by
        firing  squad  in  west  Arakan  State  for  refusing  to work on a
        military  project.  Reports  of  torture  and  travel  restrictions
        reached  the  refugees  in Cox's Bazar and reduced the repatriation
        rate for the month to 27 compared to 16,129 the month bofore.

        * UNHCR IS NOT CAPABLE OF PROPERLY  SUPERVISING  THE  RESETTLEMENT.
        Questions  were  raised with the Committee as to whether there were
        sufficient UNHCR monitors in Burma to ensure safe resettlement.  In
        1994  there  had been 5, this was raised to 10 and at the beginning
        of 1995 to 25.

4.70 The Committee recommends that:

    17. AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AND OFFICERS FROM AUSAID MAKE
        A SPECIFIC EVALUATION OF THE REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT  OF  THE
        ROHINGYA  REFUGEES  BY  REGULAR  VISITS TO THE ARAKAN STATE AND THE
        UNHCR PROJECTS ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THEIR SUCCESSFUL RESETTLEMENT.

The Fall of Manerplaw

4.71 If the ceasefires have made a significant difference in the  strategic
relations to Burma's north, the fall of manerplaw in January and the attack
on  Kawmoora have also had a profound effect on the balance of power in the
east. The Karen National Union was weakened by internal  divisions  between
the  Buddhist and Christian factions in December 1994 [65] a division which
the SLORC was able to both to promote and  exploit.  Complaints  with  some
apparent  validity by the Buddhist rank and file that the Christian leaders
had given themselves privileges  combined  with  anti-Christian  propaganda
fomented  by  the  SLORC  to  bring  about  the split. Teh formation of the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization  (DKBO)  and  the  Democratic  Karen
Buddhist  Army  (DKBA)  armed  and  backed  by  the SLORC army proved to be
overwhelming. Teh result has been to add 10,000 refugees to  the  camps  on
the  Thai  border.  The motivation has variously been seen as the desire to
defeat the main minority opposition to the regime but also  to  secure  and
open  the  area  to  development possibilities. Teh longer term effects may
well be pressure on the democracy movement  which  had  found  support  and
shelter in the Karen camps.

4.72  Despite htese seeming military victories, the hoped-for advantages to
trade and development will not  be  realised  unless  there  are  political
settlements  with  the  minorities.  At  the  last  meeting of the National
Convention in April 1995, the SLORC announced, wihtout  prior  consultation
with  the  groups  concerned, the creation of Self Administrative Zones for
ethnic minority groups, specifically for the Naga, the Da-nu, the Pa-o, the
Pa-laung, the Kokang and the Wa. Paradoxically, according to submissions to
the Committee, this  move  did  not  receive  unanimous  support  from  the
minorities  and  the  proceedings  of  the  Convention were suspended until
October. The minorities in question have moved to  form  a  colaition,  the
Peace  and  Democracy  Front,  which  is demanding the release of political
prisoners and a genuine National Convention and they have agreed to  mutual
support  in  the  event  of  an attack by the SLORC on one of their members
[66].

4.73 The Committee would argue that, despite the apparent  success  of  the
military   offensives  and  the  ceasefires,  none  have  produced  genuine
political settlements and  that,  unless  this  is  done  through  thorough
consultation with all the minorities, the peace will be short lived.

Conclusion

4.74  This  Committee  reiterates  the view it put in its last report on 'A
Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights', on  the
problems  that  arise  for states because of the demands by minority groups
for self-determination and independence. The Committee believes this  issue
alone  represents  one of the major security issues facing the world today.
It is particularly pertinent to the countries of the region where there are
numerous examples of pressure being  applied  to  central  governments  for
self-determination. In 1994, the Committee argued:

        that governments cannot maintain national cohesion by force and the
        continual  oppression  of  minorities.  It supports the proposition
        that effective and successful multi-racial/multi-ethnic states need
        to express their diversity in institutions and political structures
        which genuinely accommodate the aspirations  of  thier  minorities.
        Failure  to  make  that  accommodation,  and  worse,  the abuse and
        oppression  of  minorities,  gives  moral  force  to   claims   for
        independence and secession [67].

4.75 The Committee recommends that:

   18.  IN  RESPONDING  TO  DEMANDS  FOR  SELF  DETERMINATION IN BURMA, THE
        AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS ASEAN DIALOGUE  PARTNERS  INCLUDE  ON
        THEIR  AGENDA FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND BETWEEN
        HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS AS
        THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF ENSURING THE STABILITY OF THE STATE.

4.76 The problems associated with the border regions of Burma  are  complex
and longstanding. However they clearly illustrate the interconnectedness of
human  rights,  political  democracy,  peace, security and development. The
current Burmese regime is a source of instability in the region.  Its  lack
of  accountability  and  legitimacy  allows  for corruption and oppression;
there is no forum, independent of the  government,  to  bring  to  account,
consistently  and  impartially,  those  who,  through normal humanvenality,
abuse and oppress  their  fellow  citizens.  There  is  no  place  for  the
aspirations  of  minority  groups  who  have a well fouded suspicion of the
power of the majority to find expression. Corruption and violence appear to
be endemic and, so  long  as  they  exist,  they  encourage  the  evils  of
trafficking in arms, drugs and people and the outflows of refugees. Burma's
problems  then spill over into neighbouring countries and spread from there
to the wider world.

4.77 Therefore, it is in the interest of  our  region  and  Australia  that
there  should  be  a  solution  to  the  problems  Burma faces. Despite the
ceasefires and the  acclaimed  success  of  the  military  operations,  the
situation  on the borders continues ot be fragile and precarious. For there
to be a secure peace there must be a political solution to the  demands  of
the  border  peoples. This will necessitate proper, not token and selected,
representation at the National Convention. Without proper representation at
this  Convention  there  can  be  no  lasting  accommodation  in  the   new
constitution   of  minority  rights  and  little  likelihood  that  such  a
constitution will find long term acceptance, thereby  providing  the  basis
for stability in the country.

Footnotes:
---------
[41]  Mostly  Karen-55,000  and  Mon-10,000.  The numbers are fluid as more
refugees stream across the border when military activity increases  or  the
pressure on the villages to supply forced labour or porter increases.

[42] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade submission, p. S496.

[43] In-camera evidence, 5 May 1995, p.37.

[44] Australia-Burma Council submission, p. S291.

[45] See Chapters 2 and 5 of this report and the volumes of submissions and
evidence for details of these complaints.

[46]  Submission  to  the  JSCFADT  inquiry into Australia's relations with
Thailand, pp.S28-9.

[47] In-camera evidence, 5 May 1995, p.55.

[48] Tribal Refugee Welfare in South East Asia submission, p. S1

[49] AUSTCARE, 'The New World Order: Redefining Refugees',  17  June  1992,
p.61.

[50] Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 November 1994, p. 150.

[51] Evidence, 19 May 1995, pp. 165-66.

[52] Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 July 1994, p.26.

[53] Burma Support Group submission, p. S231.

[54] Evidence, 19 May 1995, pp. 173-74.

[55] Exhibit No 44, Human Rights Watch/Asia,' Burma: Entrenchment or Reform
? July 1995, p.17.'

[56]  Economic and Social Council, 'Report on the situation of human rights
in Myanmar, prepared by Mr Yozo Yokota, Special Rapporteur,  in  accordance
with  Commission  resolution  1993/73,  E/CN.4/1994/57,  16  February 1994,
para74 (h).

[57] Exhibit No 43, Lambrecht, Curt, 'The Return of the  Rohingya  Refugees
to  Burma:  Voluntary  Repatriation  or  Refoulment ?' The US Committee for
Refugees, March 1995, p. 4.

[58] ibid., p.5.

[59] Exhibit No  43.,  UNHCR  Information  Bulletin,  'Return  to  Myanmar:
Repatriating refugees from Bangladesh,' June 1995.

[60] ibid.

[61] Evidence 12 May 1995, pp.135-6.

[62] Evidence, 19 May 1995, p. 190.

[63] Details of these cases are given in Chapter 1.

[64] Exhibit No 44. Asia Watch op.cit. p.18

[65] Dr U Ne Oo submission, p. S664.

[66]  Overseas  Burma  Liberation  Front  and  International  Commission of
Jurists submission., pp. S708-09.

[67] Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,  Defence  and  Trade,  'A
Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, p.211.'

ENDS(4.49-4.77)\