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BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OCT 95(6.
Subject: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OCT 95(6.27-6.43)
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/* -----------" BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, OCT 95 (6.27-6.43) "---------- */
CHAPTER SIX: (6.27 - 6.43)
*************************
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
IN BURMA (MYANMAR) October 1995
CHAPTER SIX: ENGAGEMENT OF ISOLATION (6.27 - 6.43)
--------------------------------------------------
ASEAN - Constructive Engagement
6.27 ASEAN [14] is in an ideal position to encourage changes within Burma.
Burma whishes to join ASEAN and, apart from China - the largest trading
partner - trade with ASEAN is the largest sector of Burma's foreign trade.
Moreover it is in the interests of ASEAN to ensure stability in the region.
Stemming the flow of refugees and curbing the illegal traffic in drugs,
women and illegal immigrants would make a significant difference to long
term regional stability. All these activities have corrupting effects which
are economically and politically cancerous for the whole region.
6.28 ASEAN developed the policy of constructive engagement as a result of
the distinction which south east Asian countries choose to draw between
civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. It is
a reflection of a long-standing unwillingness of any of the ASEAN members
to comment on what they describe as internal affairs of other member
states; in essence, an unwillingness to take up human rights matters. It is
fulled to some extent by fear of intervention in thier own affairs.
Constructive engagement professes to seek changes through dialogue and
through contacts both political and economic, reform through friendly
engagement; unfortunately there often appears to be more emphasis on
engagement than reform.
6.29 Current debate about the role of ASEAN suggests that there is scope
for it to play a much more significant part in the political and cultural
development of the region. At an international conference on the future of
the UN held in Melbourne in July 1995, participants from the region that
ASEAN could and should make a greater contribution to regional development.
One of the streams of the conference was on regionalism. They believed
there was scope in ASEAN for regional security dialogue, for a more
concerted effort in multilateral trade negotiations, for social and
cultural interaction in such a way that ASEAN might address the needs of
marginalised groups and bridge the widening gap between rich and poor, for
ASEAN-wide approaches to environmental concerns and for greater attention
to human rights concerns. On this last matter, most relevant to Burma, they
noted that there was a paucity of accessions to international human rights
instruments, no regional human rights system, a tendency to over-emphasize
communitarian and economic rights at the expense of individual an political
rights - all this hesitation a reflection of ASEAN'S own internal
weaknesses and its external ambiguities [15].
6.30 The Korean Co-President of the Forum for Democratic Leaders in the
Asia-Pacific, Kim Dae-Jung, also believes there is an important role for
ASEAN in these wider concerns. In relation to Burma he stated that:
[I]t is much better for Asians to solve this problem among
ourselves. Burma's neighbours should take the lead in organising a
truly coordinated policy to bring the country out of isolation.
Such coordination has been lacking so far, and could make a
difference. Japan's role is important, and Tokyo should not renew
aid programs or encourage large scale investment until real
progress is made towards democratic reforms. If the situation does
not improve, several levels of pressure would have to be
considered. At a minimum, a code of conduct for companies doing
business in Burma should adopted. Other options such as a UN
weapons embargo and trade sancitons should be among the tools of
the international community.
However he believed that:
ASEAN's role is central. Participation in ASEAN ..... is viewed as
a valued prize. A prize that should not be awarded casually, but
earned through a commitment to principles such as democracy. ... It
may be that ASEAN is in the strongest position to set Burma on a
course in this direction [16].
6.31 The Committee recommends that:
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO:
(A) MAINTAIN THE CONSTRUCTIVE ASPECTS TO THEIR ENGAGEMENT POLICY BY
PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA TOWARDS FURTHER REFORM - THE END
TO FORCED LABOUR, THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL DETAINEES, DIALOGUE WITH
AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND THE LIBERALISATION OF THE PROCEDURES OF THE
BURMESE NATIONAL CONVENTION, ESTABLISHED TO DRAW UP A NEW
CONSTITUTION; AND
(B) THAT THESE REFORMS SHOULD PRECEDE THE ENTRY OF BURMA INTO
ASEAN.
6.32 The Committee also endorses the recommendation in Chapter 14 of its
report on Australia's relation with Thailand on the development across the
region of standards of justice and legal process.
Thailand
6.33 Thailand's role in relation to Burma is pivotal but it is also
ambivalent. It has provied sanctury for over ten years for the refugees and
democracy activists who have fled over the border. It has encouraged
negotiations with the ethnic factions and urged the regime to release Aung
San Suu Kyi, a matter for which it has claimed some credit. It has been
angered by incursions across its borders and the killing of its citizens by
the Burmese army. However it has dealt closely with the regime in Rangoon
[17], profited from trade in logs [18], gems and drugs [19]. Thai police
have been complicit in the trafficking of Burmese women and girls into
prostitution into Thailand [20]. Since 1988 there has been a noticeable
turning away from support for the insurgents. In the last twelve months
Thai officials have brought pressure to bear on refugee groups in the
vicinity of the gas pipeline [21]. Dr Alan Smith argued in his submission
to the Committee that:
To some extent this ambiguity and inconsistency reflects changes
occurring in Thailand's own political situation, the normal
see-sawing between governments, but between democratic and
non-democcratic regimes as well. But it arises also out of the lack
of foreign policy hegemony by any one agency. Often different Thai
agencies appear to follow contradictory policies reflecting quite
different agency interests and values [22].
6.34 Dr Smith also saw a Thai/Chinese alliance influencing marked changes
in the SLORC's approach to the border questions. He believed that what is
perceived as a softening in the regime especially towards the ethnic groups
- the negotiation of ceasefires - is in fact a more strategic move to
minimise the demands for political change in Burma.
The initiative appears to have come from China and Thailand. The
solution which these neighbours pressed upon the SLORC was one
which would provide peace on their borders and the SLORC safe in
Rangoon. Their part has been to persuade the SLORC to abandon an
all out military victory in favour of a ceasefire which would get
the West off the SLORCs back with minimal political concessions
from the SLORC. This would be achieved by squeezing the forces of
the opposition between an ever growing SLORC military capacity and
an increasingly unaccommodating political stance from China and
Thailand. The armed nationalities would be forced into separately
negotiated ceasefires ... which would have the effect of
politically neutralising the ethnic alliance and isolating and
crippling its democracy movement allies. [Certainly] Thiland's
pressure on the opposition groups has been gradually increased and
openly admitted [23].
6.35 As far as the promotion of democracy in Burma is concerned, Dr Smith
characterises the Thai policy as 'destructive engagement'. The committee
believes it is in Thailand's interests to promote greater stability,
greater development and a reduction in the number of refugees along the
border with Burma and that this can only be achieved through long term
political solutions incorporating democratic principles in the new
constitution of Burma. Transparency, accountability and the institution of
a rule of law in Burma would make the relationships between Burma and its
neighbours, particularly Thailand, more predictable. It is the only way to
seem the outflow of refugees or to persuade the existing refugees to return
to Burma and it would assist in diminishing the damaging criminal activity
- trafficking in women, children and drugs - which flourishes in conditions
of war and poverty.
6.36 Therefore the Committee recommends that:
28. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT OF
THAILAND TO TAKE UP THE ISSUE OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM WITH THE SLORC
AS A MATTER OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
China - Strategic issues
6.37 Constructive engagement is also premised on the belief that the
isolation of the regime is dangerous in the vacuum it creates, particularly
where that vacuum has already allowed for the spread of significant Chinese
influence into Burma. The influence encompasses commercial interests -
trade and investment, arms supply, possible strategic bases, immigration
and tourism and a trade outlet for Chinese goods from Yunnnan porvince.
This influence has become so marked that it has created anxiety about
China's intentions vis a vis the region.
6.38 It has been estimated that cross border trade over the last ten years
through YUnnan and Mandalay has risen from $US15 million to $US800 million
in 1994[24]. An estimated 800,000 Chinese visited Burma in 1994. China is
the chief source of cheap consumer goods in Burma. Chinese businesses in
Mandalay abound. The cross-border drug trade also involves many Chinese
smugglers and dealers. Burmese identity papers can be obtained for a few
hundred dollars [25]. China also gives aid to Burma in the form of
concessional finance and infrastructure projects; however there are no
reliable figures for the amounts involved. The Australian Embassy advised
that the amounts were significant and had a strong commercial bias [26].
6.39 Mr Bertil Lintner argues that if 'trade is one way for China to expand
southward, arming the Burmese military is another'[27]. The trade in arms
is described by Mr Lintner as ongoing. He quotes a resident of the town of
Ruili. 'In October [1994], more than 500 trucks crossed the bridge. Some,
meant as transports for the Burmese army, were empty; others carried small
arms as well as rocket launchers. The deliveries took place at night. The
whole area was sealed off as the trucks went across'[28]. As with all
statistics relating to Burma, it is difficult to be precise about arms
expenditure as a percentage of the national budget. Estimates presented to
the Committee have varied between 35 and 50 per cent. AusAID quoted the
UNDP Human Development Report which shows that SLORC spent 222 % of the
combined health and education budget on militaray expenditure in 1990/91
[29]. China has supplied Burma with over $US1.2 billion worth of arms,
locking Burma into Chinese weapon systems. Moreover the Committee was told
that 'some of these arms go beyond the traditional counterinsurgency
internal security equipment which they have concentrated on the past. They
have taken delivery of anti-aircraft guns, interceptor aircraft and heavy
tanks.'[30] The size of the Burmese army compared to the size of its
population is itself a matter of some concern in the region.
Table 6.1: Comparison of Military Strength
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASEAN countries Population * Size of Armed Forces
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brunei 285,000 4,400
Indonesia 200,410,000 276,000
Malaysia 19,283,000 114,500
Phillippines 69,809,000 106,500
Singapore 2,859,000 54,000
Thailand 59,510,000 256,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential New Members
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Burma 44,277,000 400,000 (note1)
Cambodia 10,265,000 88,500
Laos 4,702,000 37,000
Vietnam 73,104,000 572,000
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, October 1994.
Note 1: U.S. Embassy estimate.
*Population figures: The world Almanac Bock of Facts, 1995
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Exhibit No 1, Burma Debate, Vol 11 No 3 June/July 1995, p.16.
6.40 Mr Selth, an analyst from the Department of Defence, told the
Committee that the buld of the equipment came from China - fighter
aircraft, ground attack aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, small arms
ammunition, military communication equipment and anti-aircraft artillery.
Burma also bought a range of equipment from other sources - helicopters and
vehicles from Poland, ground attack aircraft and patrol boats from the
former Yugoslavia and reports of sales from Singapore, North Korea,
Czechowlovakia, South Africa, Isreal and Belgium. Mr Selth pointed out that
arms sales were not a particularly public process, often going through
private brokers or third countries, and quantities were difficult to
ascertain [31]. The range of countries which, directly or indirectly, have
supplied the SLORC illustrate the difficulties of enforcing embargoes.
6.41 China has also assisted in the upgrading of the Burmese navy and that,
plus suspicions that Burma has established on Coco Island in the Andaman
Sea intelligence survelliance installations, equipment which may be
operated in part by Chinese technicians, has alarmed regional countries,
particularly India [32]. The Department of Defence believed however that
India's concerns were being allayed to some extent by Burma's growing
interest in ASEAN.
If you spead to people in India, you will find there is obviously
a range of views: some people are very concerned about China's
influence in Burma; other people, including those at an official
level, are more cautious in their statements. [But] there are some
concerns, particularly cautious in their statements. [But] there
are some concerns, particularly given China's relationship wiht
Pakistan, China's relationship with Nepal and China's relationship
with Bangladesh. If China were to develop a partnership with
Burma, I am sure there are people in India who would be concerned
about a potential encirclement of India by a potentially hostile
China [33].
6.42 Massive arms purchases by Burma have a significant impact on regional
security byt they must also be seen as a misdirection of funds in a country
desperately in need of improving its infrastructure and alleviating the
poverty of its people. They should therefore be an inhibition on the
allocation of development assistance. The Overseas Development Assistance
Charter of the Japnese Government which requires the Government to 'pay
full attention the export and import of arms by ODA-recipient countries' is
a pragmatic policy recognising teh distortions to national expenditure that
development assistance can create in recipient countries. It targets
governments which rely on overseas development assistance while allowing
huge amounts of government spending to go into military expenditure or to
be siphoned off by individuals through corruption. It is a policy worthy of
attention and application because it seeks to make governments give a
priority to their own development needs. Burma of course, even in the
absence of aid, has nevertheless chosen to buy arms at the expense of the
social and economic development of the people. Goven this record, it would
appear to be unlikely that such a regime without significant political
change would contribute more to its own development if large scale
development assistance were reintroduced.
6.43 The Committee recommends that:
29. THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA
(A) TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ITS CONCERN TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF CHINA ABOUT CHINA'S SUPPLY OF ARMS TO BURMA;
(B) URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE
GOVERNMENT OF CHINA ABOUT THE SIZE AND NATURE OF ITS ARMS SALES
INTERNATIONALLY; AND
(C) IN THE LIGHT OF JAPAN'S OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE CHARTER
AND ITS AID PROGRAM WITH CHINA,
(D) REMIND THE SLORC THAT THE LEVAL OF ARMS EXPENDITURE IS A
SIGNIFICANT INHIBITION IN THE WILLINGNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO RESUME DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.
Footnotes:
---------
[14] ASEAN is currently made up of six countries: Brunei, Indonesia,
malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Laos has observer
status. Cambodia, Vietnam and Burma are seeking entry, which would make
ASEAN 10.
[15] See papers from conference on the United Nations: Between Sovereignty
and Global Governence ? La Trobe University, July 2-6 1995.
[16] Kim Dae-Jung, Asians Must Take the Lead with Burma, Burma Debate,
Vol.11, No.3 June/July 1995, p. 10.
[17] Thailand's commercial intersts in Burma are the largest of the ASEAN
countries.
[18] Within three months of the SLORC coming to power, 18 Thai logging
companies gained 43 two year and three year concessions in Burma,
reportedly contributing $US112 million to SLORC's annual income from
foreign logging businesses. Exhibit No. 5.
[19] See Chapter 4.
[20] See Chapter 4.
[21] Refugee groups report that Thai military and civilian authorieies have
driven the Mon and Karen refugees from the area. In January 1994 7,400 Mon
refugees from the Loh Loe camp were forcibly relocated, the majority to the
Burmese side of the border. It was these refugees who fled back across the
border in July 1994 when the Burmese military attacked the Halockhani
refugee camp.
[22] Yawnghwe, H, SLORCs ceasefire talks, Bangkok Sunday Post, 27 February
1994, pp. 19, 26. Quoted from Dr Alan Smith submission, p. S451.
[23] Dr Alan Smith submission, pp. S 542-543.
[24] Bertil Lintner, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 December 1994, p.22.
[25] Michael Hirsh and Ron Moreau, Newsweek, from the Bulletin, 20 June
1995, p.59.
[26] AusAID submission, p. S513.
[27] Bertil Lintner, op.cit. p.23.
[28] ibid., p.23.
[29] AusAID Submission, p. S505.
[30] Evidence, 17 August 1995, p. 298.
[31] Evidence, 17 August 1995, p. 300.
[32] Bertil Lintner, op.cit. p.23.
[33] Evidence, 17 August 1995, p. 301.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Above materials are reproduction from the findings of Human Rights
Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade of the Parliament of Australia, published in October 1995.
Anyone wishing to inquire about the book may contact Ms Margaret
Swieringa, Secretary, Human Rights Sub-Committee, Parliament House,
Canberra A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA.
Best regards, U Ne Oo.
ENDS(6.27-6.43)\