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BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OCT 95(6.



Subject: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OCT 95(6.27-6.43)

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/* -----------" BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, OCT 95 (6.27-6.43) "---------- */

CHAPTER SIX: (6.27 - 6.43)
*************************
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
IN BURMA (MYANMAR)     October 1995

CHAPTER SIX: ENGAGEMENT OF ISOLATION (6.27 - 6.43)
--------------------------------------------------

ASEAN - Constructive Engagement

6.27  ASEAN [14] is in an ideal position to encourage changes within Burma.
Burma whishes to join ASEAN and, apart from China  -  the  largest  trading
partner  - trade with ASEAN is the largest sector of Burma's foreign trade.
Moreover it is in the interests of ASEAN to ensure stability in the region.
Stemming the flow of refugees and curbing the  illegal  traffic  in  drugs,
women  and  illegal  immigrants would make a significant difference to long
term regional stability. All these activities have corrupting effects which
are economically and politically cancerous for the whole region.

6.28 ASEAN developed the policy of constructive engagement as a  result  of
the  distinction  which  south  east Asian countries choose to draw between
civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. It  is
a  reflection  of a long-standing unwillingness of any of the ASEAN members
to comment on what they  describe  as  internal  affairs  of  other  member
states; in essence, an unwillingness to take up human rights matters. It is
fulled  to  some  extent  by  fear  of  intervention  in thier own affairs.
Constructive engagement professes to  seek  changes  through  dialogue  and
through  contacts  both  political  and  economic,  reform through friendly
engagement; unfortunately there  often  appears  to  be  more  emphasis  on
engagement than reform.

6.29  Current  debate  about the role of ASEAN suggests that there is scope
for it to play a much more significant part in the political  and  cultural
development  of the region. At an international conference on the future of
the UN held in Melbourne in July 1995, participants from  the  region  that
ASEAN could and should make a greater contribution to regional development.
One  of  the  streams  of  the conference was on regionalism. They believed
there was scope in ASEAN  for  regional  security  dialogue,  for   a  more
concerted  effort  in  multilateral  trade  negotiations,  for  social  and
cultural interaction in such a way that ASEAN might address  the  needs  of
marginalised  groups and bridge the widening gap between rich and poor, for
ASEAN-wide approaches to environmental concerns and for  greater  attention
to human rights concerns. On this last matter, most relevant to Burma, they
noted  that there was a paucity of accessions to international human rights
instruments, no regional human rights system, a tendency to  over-emphasize
communitarian and economic rights at the expense of individual an political
rights  -  all  this  hesitation  a  reflection  of  ASEAN'S  own  internal
weaknesses and its external ambiguities [15].

6.30 The Korean Co-President of the Forum for  Democratic  Leaders  in  the
Asia-Pacific,  Kim  Dae-Jung,  also believes there is an important role for
ASEAN in these wider concerns. In relation to Burma he stated that:

        [I]t is  much  better  for  Asians  to  solve  this  problem  among
        ourselves.  Burma's neighbours should take the lead in organising a
        truly coordinated policy to bring the  country  out  of  isolation.
        Such  coordination  has  been  lacking  so  far,  and  could make a
        difference. Japan's role is important, and Tokyo should  not  renew
        aid  programs  or  encourage  large  scale  investment  until  real
        progress is made towards democratic reforms. If the situation  does
        not   improve,   several  levels  of  pressure  would  have  to  be
        considered. At a minimum, a code of  conduct  for  companies  doing
        business  in  Burma  should  adopted.  Other  options  such as a UN
        weapons embargo and trade sancitons should be among  the  tools  of
        the international community.

However he believed that:

        ASEAN's  role is central. Participation in ASEAN ..... is viewed as
        a valued prize. A prize that should not be  awarded  casually,  but
        earned through a commitment to principles such as democracy. ... It
        may  be  that  ASEAN is in the strongest position to set Burma on a
        course in this direction [16].

6.31 The Committee recommends that:

        THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO:
        (A) MAINTAIN THE CONSTRUCTIVE ASPECTS TO THEIR ENGAGEMENT POLICY BY
        PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA TOWARDS FURTHER REFORM -  THE  END
        TO FORCED LABOUR, THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL DETAINEES, DIALOGUE WITH
        AUNG  SAN  SUU  KYI AND THE LIBERALISATION OF THE PROCEDURES OF THE
        BURMESE  NATIONAL  CONVENTION,  ESTABLISHED  TO  DRAW  UP   A   NEW
        CONSTITUTION; AND
        (B)  THAT  THESE  REFORMS  SHOULD  PRECEDE  THE ENTRY OF BURMA INTO
        ASEAN.

6.32 The Committee also endorses the recommendation in Chapter  14  of  its
report  on Australia's relation with Thailand on the development across the
region of standards of justice and legal process.

Thailand

6.33 Thailand's role in relation  to  Burma  is  pivotal  but  it  is  also
ambivalent. It has provied sanctury for over ten years for the refugees and
democracy  activists  who  have  fled  over  the  border. It has encouraged
negotiations with the ethnic factions and urged the regime to release  Aung
San  Suu  Kyi,  a  matter for which it has claimed some credit. It has been
angered by incursions across its borders and the killing of its citizens by
the Burmese army. However it has dealt closely with the regime  in  Rangoon
[17],  profited  from  trade in logs [18], gems and drugs [19]. Thai police
have been complicit in the trafficking of  Burmese  women  and  girls  into
prostitution  into  Thailand  [20].  Since 1988 there has been a noticeable
turning away from support for the insurgents. In  the  last  twelve  months
Thai  officials  have  brought  pressure  to  bear on refugee groups in the
vicinity of the gas pipeline [21]. Dr Alan Smith argued in  his  submission
to the Committee that:

        To  some  extent  this ambiguity and inconsistency reflects changes
        occurring  in  Thailand's  own  political  situation,  the   normal
        see-sawing   between   governments,   but  between  democratic  and
        non-democcratic regimes as well. But it arises also out of the lack
        of foreign policy hegemony by any one agency. Often different  Thai
        agencies  appear  to follow contradictory policies reflecting quite
        different agency interests and values [22].

6.34 Dr Smith also saw a Thai/Chinese alliance influencing  marked  changes
in  the  SLORC's approach to the border questions. He believed that what is
perceived as a softening in the regime especially towards the ethnic groups
- the negotiation of ceasefires - is in  fact  a  more  strategic  move  to
minimise the demands for political change in Burma.

        The  initiative  appears  to have come from China and Thailand. The
        solution which these neighbours pressed  upon  the  SLORC  was  one
        which  would  provide  peace on their borders and the SLORC safe in
        Rangoon. Their part has been to persuade the SLORC  to  abandon  an
        all  out  military victory in favour of a ceasefire which would get
        the West off the SLORCs back  with  minimal  political  concessions
        from  the  SLORC. This would be achieved by squeezing the forces of
        the opposition between an ever growing SLORC military capacity  and
        an  increasingly  unaccommodating  political  stance from China and
        Thailand. The armed nationalities would be forced  into  separately
        negotiated   ceasefires   ...   which  would  have  the  effect  of
        politically neutralising the  ethnic  alliance  and  isolating  and
        crippling  its  democracy  movement  allies.  [Certainly] Thiland's
        pressure on the opposition groups has been gradually increased  and
        openly admitted [23].

6.35  As  far as the promotion of democracy in Burma is concerned, Dr Smith
characterises the Thai policy as 'destructive  engagement'.  The  committee
believes  it  is  in  Thailand's  interests  to  promote greater stability,
greater development and a reduction in the number  of  refugees  along  the
border  with  Burma  and  that  this can only be achieved through long term
political  solutions  incorporating  democratic  principles  in   the   new
constitution  of Burma. Transparency, accountability and the institution of
a rule of law in Burma would make the relationships between Burma  and  its
neighbours,  particularly Thailand, more predictable. It is the only way to
seem the outflow of refugees or to persuade the existing refugees to return
to Burma and it would assist in diminishing the damaging criminal  activity
- trafficking in women, children and drugs - which flourishes in conditions
of war and poverty.

6.36 Therefore the Committee recommends that:

    28. THE  AUSTRALIAN  GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT OF
        THAILAND TO TAKE UP THE ISSUE OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM WITH  THE  SLORC
        AS A MATTER OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

China - Strategic issues

6.37  Constructive  engagement  is  also  premised  on  the belief that the
isolation of the regime is dangerous in the vacuum it creates, particularly
where that vacuum has already allowed for the spread of significant Chinese
influence into Burma. The  influence  encompasses  commercial  interests  -
trade  and  investment,  arms supply, possible strategic bases, immigration
and tourism and a trade outlet for Chinese  goods  from  Yunnnan  porvince.
This  influence  has  become  so  marked  that it has created anxiety about
China's intentions vis a vis the region.

6.38 It has been estimated that cross border trade over the last ten  years
through  YUnnan and Mandalay has risen from $US15 million to $US800 million
in 1994[24]. An estimated 800,000 Chinese visited Burma in 1994.  China  is
the  chief  source  of cheap consumer goods in Burma. Chinese businesses in
Mandalay abound. The cross-border drug trade  also  involves  many  Chinese
smugglers  and  dealers.  Burmese identity papers can be obtained for a few
hundred dollars [25]. China  also  gives  aid  to  Burma  in  the  form  of
concessional  finance  and  infrastructure  projects;  however there are no
reliable figures for the amounts involved. The Australian  Embassy  advised
that the amounts were significant and had a strong commercial bias [26].

6.39 Mr Bertil Lintner argues that if 'trade is one way for China to expand
southward,  arming  the Burmese military is another'[27]. The trade in arms
is described by Mr Lintner as ongoing. He quotes a resident of the town  of
Ruili.  'In  October [1994], more than 500 trucks crossed the bridge. Some,
meant as transports for the Burmese army, were empty; others carried  small
arms  as  well as rocket launchers. The deliveries took place at night. The
whole area was sealed off as the trucks  went  across'[28].   As  with  all
statistics  relating  to  Burma,  it  is difficult to be precise about arms
expenditure as a percentage of the national budget. Estimates presented  to
the  Committee  have  varied  between 35 and 50 per cent. AusAID quoted the
UNDP Human Development Report which shows that SLORC spent  222  %  of  the
combined  health  and  education budget on militaray expenditure in 1990/91
[29]. China has supplied Burma with over  $US1.2  billion  worth  of  arms,
locking  Burma into Chinese weapon systems. Moreover the Committee was told
that 'some of  these  arms  go  beyond  the  traditional  counterinsurgency
internal  security equipment which they have concentrated on the past. They
have taken delivery of anti-aircraft guns, interceptor aircraft  and  heavy
tanks.'[30]  The  size  of  the  Burmese  army  compared to the size of its
population is itself a matter of some concern in the region.

Table 6.1: Comparison of Military Strength
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASEAN countries            Population *             Size of Armed Forces
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brunei                     285,000                  4,400

Indonesia                  200,410,000              276,000

Malaysia                   19,283,000               114,500

Phillippines               69,809,000               106,500

Singapore                  2,859,000                54,000

Thailand                   59,510,000               256,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential New Members
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Burma                      44,277,000               400,000 (note1)

Cambodia                   10,265,000               88,500

Laos                       4,702,000                37,000

Vietnam                    73,104,000               572,000
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  The  Military  Balance,  International  Institute  for   Strategic
Studies, London, October 1994.

Note 1: U.S. Embassy estimate.

*Population figures: The world Almanac Bock of Facts, 1995
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Exhibit No 1, Burma Debate, Vol 11 No 3 June/July 1995, p.16.

6.40  Mr  Selth,  an  analyst  from  the  Department  of  Defence, told the
Committee that the  buld  of  the  equipment  came  from  China  -  fighter
aircraft,  ground attack aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, small arms
ammunition, military communication equipment and  anti-aircraft  artillery.
Burma also bought a range of equipment from other sources - helicopters and
vehicles  from  Poland,  ground  attack  aircraft and patrol boats from the
former Yugoslavia  and  reports  of  sales  from  Singapore,  North  Korea,
Czechowlovakia, South Africa, Isreal and Belgium. Mr Selth pointed out that
arms  sales  were  not  a  particularly public process, often going through
private brokers or  third  countries,  and  quantities  were  difficult  to
ascertain  [31]. The range of countries which, directly or indirectly, have
supplied the SLORC illustrate the difficulties of enforcing embargoes.

6.41 China has also assisted in the upgrading of the Burmese navy and that,
plus suspicions that Burma has established on Coco Island  in  the  Andaman
Sea   intelligence  survelliance  installations,  equipment  which  may  be
operated in part by Chinese technicians, has  alarmed  regional  countries,
particularly  India  [32].  The Department of Defence believed however that
India's concerns were being allayed  to  some  extent  by  Burma's  growing
interest in ASEAN.

         If  you spead to people in India, you will find there is obviously
         a range of views: some people are  very  concerned  about  China's
         influence  in  Burma; other people, including those at an official
         level, are more cautious in their statements. [But] there are some
         concerns, particularly cautious in their statements.  [But]  there
         are  some  concerns,  particularly given China's relationship wiht
         Pakistan, China's relationship with Nepal and China's relationship
         with Bangladesh. If China  were  to  develop  a  partnership  with
         Burma,  I am sure there are people in India who would be concerned
         about a potential encirclement of India by a  potentially  hostile
         China [33].

6.42  Massive arms purchases by Burma have a significant impact on regional
security byt they must also be seen as a misdirection of funds in a country
desperately in need of improving its  infrastructure  and  alleviating  the
poverty  of  its  people.  They  should  therefore  be an inhibition on the
allocation of development assistance. The Overseas  Development  Assistance
Charter  of  the  Japnese  Government which requires the Government to 'pay
full attention the export and import of arms by ODA-recipient countries' is
a pragmatic policy recognising teh distortions to national expenditure that
development assistance  can  create  in  recipient  countries.  It  targets
governments  which  rely  on overseas development assistance while allowing
huge amounts of government spending to go into military expenditure  or  to
be siphoned off by individuals through corruption. It is a policy worthy of
attention  and  application  because  it  seeks  to make governments give a
priority to their own development needs.  Burma  of  course,  even  in  the
absence  of  aid, has nevertheless chosen to buy arms at the expense of the
social and economic development of the people. Goven this record, it  would
appear  to  be  unlikely  that  such a regime without significant political
change would  contribute  more  to  its  own  development  if  large  scale
development assistance were reintroduced.

6.43 The Committee recommends that:

    29. THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA

        (A) TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ITS CONCERN TO THE GOVERNMENT
        OF CHINA ABOUT CHINA'S SUPPLY OF ARMS TO BURMA;

        (B)  URGE  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  JAPAN  TO  CONTINUE  TO  PRESS  THE
        GOVERNMENT OF CHINA ABOUT THE SIZE AND NATURE  OF  ITS  ARMS  SALES
        INTERNATIONALLY; AND

        (C) IN THE LIGHT OF JAPAN'S OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE CHARTER
        AND ITS AID PROGRAM WITH CHINA,

        (D)  REMIND  THE  SLORC  THAT  THE  LEVAL  OF ARMS EXPENDITURE IS A
        SIGNIFICANT INHIBITION IN  THE  WILLINGNESS  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL
        COMMUNITY TO RESUME DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.

Footnotes:
---------
[14]  ASEAN  is  currently  made  up  of  six countries: Brunei, Indonesia,
malaysia, the  Philippines,  Singapore  and  Thailand.  Laos  has  observer
status.  Cambodia,  Vietnam  and  Burma are seeking entry, which would make
ASEAN 10.

[15] See papers from conference on the United Nations: Between  Sovereignty
and Global Governence ? La Trobe University, July 2-6 1995.

[16]  Kim  Dae-Jung,  Asians  Must  Take the Lead with Burma, Burma Debate,
Vol.11, No.3 June/July 1995, p. 10.

[17] Thailand's commercial intersts in Burma are the largest of  the  ASEAN
countries.

[18]  Within  three  months  of  the SLORC coming to power, 18 Thai logging
companies  gained  43  two  year  and  three  year  concessions  in  Burma,
reportedly  contributing  $US112  million  to  SLORC's  annual  income from
foreign logging businesses. Exhibit No. 5.

[19] See Chapter 4.
[20] See Chapter 4.

[21] Refugee groups report that Thai military and civilian authorieies have
driven the Mon and Karen refugees from the area. In January 1994 7,400  Mon
refugees from the Loh Loe camp were forcibly relocated, the majority to the
Burmese  side of the border. It was these refugees who fled back across the
border in July 1994 when  the  Burmese  military  attacked  the  Halockhani
refugee camp.

[22]  Yawnghwe, H, SLORCs ceasefire talks, Bangkok Sunday Post, 27 February
1994, pp. 19, 26. Quoted from Dr Alan Smith submission, p. S451.

[23] Dr Alan Smith submission, pp. S 542-543.

[24] Bertil Lintner, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 December 1994, p.22.

[25] Michael Hirsh and Ron Moreau, Newsweek, from  the  Bulletin,  20  June
1995, p.59.

[26] AusAID submission, p. S513.

[27] Bertil Lintner, op.cit. p.23.

[28] ibid., p.23.

[29] AusAID Submission, p. S505.

[30] Evidence, 17 August 1995, p. 298.

[31] Evidence, 17 August 1995, p. 300.

[32] Bertil Lintner, op.cit. p.23.

[33] Evidence, 17 August 1995, p. 301.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Above materials are reproduction from the findings of Human Rights
Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade of the Parliament of Australia, published in October 1995.
Anyone wishing to inquire about the book may contact Ms Margaret
Swieringa, Secretary, Human Rights Sub-Committee, Parliament House,
Canberra A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA.
Best regards, U Ne Oo.
ENDS(6.27-6.43)\