ACFOA Report, Take 2

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Date: Tue, 2 Apr 1996 07:41:56 -0800 (PST)

[This report was recently distributed but with some of the 
recommendations missing.  This is the complete text of the ACFOA 
report.  Sorry for the duplication.---strider]



Repatriation 
of Burmese Refugees 
from Thailand 
and Bangladesh

A briefing paper


ACFOA 
in collaboration with the 
Burma NGO Forum


 

March 1996




Production





Contents


							Page

Executive summary and recommendations				3


Introduction									6



Section one: the UNHCR Rohingya repatriation ? Bangladesh


1.1	Forced labour in Arakan State					8


1.2	Concerns about information flows and
	the voluntary nature of repatriation					10


1.3	Legal conditions of the Rohingya?s repatriation			12



Section two: refugees in Thailand


2.1	Repatriation of the Mon refugees from Thailand			13


2.2	Karen refugees								16


2.3	Burmese students and asylum seekers in Thailand			17


Maps:
20

a. Burmese border camp locations in Thailand
b. Moulmein district resettlement sites
c. Ye River resettlement sites 
d. Mergui district resettlement sites
e. Tavoy district resettlement sites



Executive summary and recommendations

There have been serious problems with the UNHCR repatriation of the Rohingya
refugees from Bangladesh Burma between 1992-96. NGO concerns have included:
refoulment by the Bangladesh Government; UNHCR?s lack of  transparency and
information sharing; the continuation of forced labour and other conditions
of persecution which caused the Rohingya to flee; the minimal capacity of
UNHCR to monitor the welfare of returnees.

Recent cease-fires between the SLORC and some ethnic groups, combined with
warming business relations between the SLORC and Thailand have led to
measures for the repatriation of the 91 000 Mon and Karen refugees in
Thailand. Forced labour continues inside Burma and the SLORC-backed bandit
attacks on refugees camps aim at terrorising  them so that they will return.
Under these conflicting conditions, Mon repatriation is beginning, without
UNHCR involvement, with no assurance of its voluntary nature, with no
capacity to monitor the welfare of refugees and with no NGO assistance.

The arrest of Burmese in Thailand, including persons of concern to UNHCR,
continues unabated.


ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum recommend that:

1)	cessation of forced labour is a pre-condition of repatriation.

2)	the Australian Government reviews carefully its participation in future
repatriation processes where conditions of forced labour have not totally
ceased.  

3)	UNHCR and NGOs must have a widespread presence amongst returnees, the
freedom to move and interview returnees  and ability to monitor the safety
of returnees in a thorough and ongoing manner. 

4)	the Australian Government supports Recommendation No.17 of the  JSCFADT
committee?s Report on Human Rights and the Lack of Progress Towards
Democracy in Burma which states that: 

Australian diplomatic representatives and officers from AusAID make a
specific evaluation of the repatriation and resettlement of the Rohingya
refugees by regular visits to Arakan State and the UNHCR projects
established to ensure their successful resettlement.

5)	UNHCR and NGOs work closely on the issue of repatriation to ensure
conditions of safety and  a fully informed, voluntary return and adequate
reintegration assistance. A closer partnership between ACFOA, its member
agencies and UNHCR?s regional office would be welcomed to deal with such issues.

6)	UNHCR maintains transparency and regular consultation with donor
governments and relevant NGOs about the repatriation of all refugees from
Burma. UNHCR should provide evaluation reports on the Rohingya repatriation
to donor governments and involved NGOs. 

7)	the Australian Government maintains scrutiny on repatriations to which it
contributes funds and continues to seek information from a variety of
participants.

8)	ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum will continue to monitor the repatriation
process and inform Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and AusAID
of concerns.

9)	the Australian Government should practice quiet diplomacy with regional
nations particularly India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Islamic members of
ASEAN such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei; and push for change on the
SLORC's racist 1982 Citizenship Act during the 1996 ASEAN meeting at
Jakarta. A focus should be on the  persecution of Rohingyas in Burma of
which there is ample documentation in recent Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch Asia reports.

10)	ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum will seek to raise the issue of
persecution with regional NGOs including the Indonesian NGO Forum on
Indonesian Development (INFID) during 1996. 

11)	the Australian Government  support Recommendation No. 16 of the JSCFADT
Report on Burma which states:

the Australian Government endorses the call of the UN Rapporteur for the
revision of the 1982 Citizenship Law to eliminate the creation of second
class citizenship, especially for the Rakine (sic) Muslim people.

16)	the Australian Government requests the Thai Government to take
protective measures at the refugee camps to prevent any further attacks by
the DKBO/SLORC.

17)	the Australian Government opposes any forced repatriation of the Mon,
Karen and the Karenni.

18)	the Australian Government expresses its willingness to the Thai
Government to continue funding NGOs assisting the Mon, Karen and Karenni
until they express their belief that it is safe to return home.

19)	the Australian Government uses parliamentary and diplomatic channels to
pressure for the immediate release of the 12 students who remain in
detention at the Special Detention Centre (SDC);

20) a.	the Australian Government increases numbers in the Special Assistance
Category for people from Burma residing in Thailand (presently 200) with the
possibility of decreasing the intake from Rangoon (presently 500); 

21)	the Australian Government raises the issue of  ill-treatment of Burmese
asylum seekers in Thai detention centres with the Thai Government.











































Introduction

This document has been prepared by ACFOA in collaboration with the Burma NGO
Forum in anticipation of the repatriation of Burmese refugees in Thailand.
ACFOA and the Forum believe there are serious concerns surrounding  this
proposed repatriation which Australian NGOs and the Australian Government
should be aware of and be prepared to tackle. ACFOA and the Forum remain
concerned about the current repatriation of  Rohingya refugees from
Bangladesh and see parallels in the situations of both groups.

Repatriation of Burmese refugees in Thailand has become more likely given
the signing of cease-fires between ethnic insurgent groups and the SLORC
military junta in Burma.   It is the prospect  of  the imminent repatriation
of Mon refugees, in the wake of a cease-fire signed in June 1995, which is
causing concern amongst NGOs. The UNHCR representative Mr Blatter, who led
negotiations with the SLORC on the Rohingya repatriation from Bangladesh met
with the SLORC recently to discuss the possibility of UNHCR involvement with
the Mon repatriation. However no agreement was reached and the SLORC and
Thailand have made a bilateral agreement to repatriate the 90 000 Burmese
refugees in Thailand ?as soon as Burma is ready?. 

The Mon National Relief Organisation has expressed fears about the voluntary
nature of the repatriation and this indicates that there may be a difference
between the political leadership of the Mon and those responsible  for
refugees.  In a letter dated 1 August 1995 to Thai National Security Chief
Charan Kullavanija, the New Mon State Party  (NMSP) leader Nai Shwe Kyin
stated, that 18 000 refugees in temporary camps would be repatriated to nine
new villages in the Tavoy Mergui districts, and to Ben Ree area and Three
Pagoda Pass. The refugees would be resettled at the rate of 3 000 a month
starting before the end of the 1995. This repatriation is now expected to
start by April 1996. Disturbingly, Nai Shwe Kin made no mention of
international monitoring, cessation of forced labour demands,  voluntary
repatriation, cross border assistance or access for NGOs in assisting
repatriation.   

The Mon National Relief Organisation has called for:

-the establishment or identification of a proper independent monitoring body
which can ensure the safety of the refugees before, during and after
repatriation; and
-the provision of  cross border resettlement relief assistance for the Mon
refugees for a period of at least one year (or until they can subsist on
their own). 

The Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) has repeated these calls stating:

The situation inside Burma from where these refugees come and to which they
would eventually return, is still turbulent. There is no guarantee for their
safety nor for their general well being. ...Until and unless ...an
independent monitoring body can truthfully say in all certainty that it is
safe for the refugees to go back, the Karen Refugee Committee appeals to the
Royal Thai Government...and to the international community for the privilege
to remain in the Karen refugee camp in Thailand. 

It is these issues of  safety, monitoring  and access that ACFOA and the
Forum wish to address in this paper.

There  have been serious concerns raised by NGOs about the repatriation of
the Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Arakan State in Burma and a number of
lessons can be drawn from this repatriation which are relevant to the safety
of the  Mon, Karen and Karenni refugees.



























Section one: the UNHCR Rohingya 
repatriation ? Bangladesh


1.1	Forced labour in Arakan State:

Forced labour was one of the main reasons for the exodus of  260 000
Rohingyas from Burma in 1991-92, and  it continues to be a nation-wide
practice  under the SLORC. UNHCR were unsuccessful in negotiating a
cessation of forced labour demands in Arakan State for the Rohingyas, and
settled for a reduction  to four days a month per family. 

Recently the SLORC has reiterated that all  labour is paid for under its
regulations ? rules which have existed since 1990.   UNHCR has looked
hopefully at this statement as an indication of  a  reduction of  demands
and regarded it as a sufficient assurance to allow the repatriation to
continue.  In recent correspondence to ACFOA, a UNHCR official at Dhaka
claimed: 

Compulsory labour, which is the main reason for the influx  of  refugees
into Bangladesh..., has been abolished and communal labour will be paid;
 ...(further the) relocation of population program has been discontinued. 

Despite UNHCR's assertion, the UN Special Rapporteur to Burma in his January
1995 report has continued to document ongoing forced relocations in 1994 and
1995,  as have human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch Asia.  Refugee testimony continues to  overwhelmingly
suggest that forced labour in rural areas is  endemic and ?payment? never
occurs.  Indeed local battalions  continue to sap community finances and
food  where they are stationed and commit human rights abuses while making
forced labour demands.

UNHCR's acceptance of the SLORC assurances and its limited ability to
monitor forced labour demands or failure to explain how it might distinguish
between ?paid communal labour? and coercion remain serious issues of
concern.   There is  no explicit means for UNHCR to  monitor the SLORC's
adherence to their assurance, although UNHCR report they are active in
investigating any abuses brought to their attention. Outside areas where
UNHCR have a presence, (there are 25 UNHCR officials in Arakan) there are no
independent means of monitoring or ameliorating forced labour demands. UNHCR
is due to withdraw from the completed repatriation  program in early 1997.
There are currently only two foreign NGOs with programs in Arakan. Neither
possess a mandate  to monitor forced labour conditions.  Ongoing labour
demands and attendant abuses continue in Arakan State: two Rohingyas were
executed by firing squad  in Arakan for refusing to  work on a military
project in July  and   thousands of villagers were forcibly relocated in the
first half of 1995. 

ACFOA  and the Burma NGO Forum believe that repatriation should not be
occurring  while forced labour remains ? at UNHCR's admission, a current
practice in Arakan State.  Human Rights Watch Asia in its  July 1995 Report
on Burma also labeled the UNHCR repatriation ?unacceptable?  for this reason
and states:

The UNHCR does not reveal how it will ensure that such mistreatment does not
recur, given that it does not have free access to all parts of Buthidaung,
nor how the periods of labour will be monitored.  

ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum repeat their earlier  request to AusAID to
visit Arakan State, to ascertain the welfare of returnees and investigate
the nature of forced labour demands upon the population.  ACFOA and the
Burma NGO Forum support the recommendation of the JSCFADT committee that:

Australian diplomatic representatives and officers from AusAID make a
specific evaluation of the repatriation and resettlement of the Rohingya
refugees by regular visits to Arakan State and the UNHCR projects
established to ensure their successful resettlement.   

ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum reiterate that unless such visits are
regularly undertaken ?we will have only half the picture of the repatriation
process?. 

Recommendations:

1)	Cessation of forced labour is a pre-condition of repatriation.

2)	The Australian Government review carefully its participation in future
repatriation processes where conditions of forced labour have not totally
ceased.  

3)	UNHCR and NGOs must have a widespread presence amongst returnees, the
freedom to move and interview returnees  and ability to monitor the safety
of returnees in a thorough and ongoing manner. 

4)	ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum  back Recommendation No.17 of the  JSCFADT
committee?s Report on Human Rights and the Lack of Progress Towards
Democracy in Burma  that: 

Australian diplomatic representatives and officers from AusAID make a
specific evaluation of the repatriation and resettlement of the Rohingya
refugees by regular visits to Arakan State and the UNHCR projects
established to ensure their successful resettlement.   


1.2	Concerns about information flows and the voluntary nature of 	repatriation:

The repatriation process has been fraught with difficulty  from the outset.
UNHCR withdrew from the process in December 1992, in protest at the
Government of Bangladesh?s (GOB) use of coercion and lack of respect for the
voluntary nature of the  repatriation. In  May 1993, a  Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between the UNHCR and the GOB to allow the UNHCR to
carry out its mandate. However in December 1993, the UNHCR announced plans
for mass repatriation of the refugees and since July 1994  abandoned
individual interviews with family heads and replaced them with mass
registrations and information sessions.  

UNHCR maintained that these information sessions, some of which are
conducted over a loud speaker in the camps were adequate.  Medecins Sans
Frontieres (MSF), on behalf of NGOs working on the border with the
Rohingyas, and  also the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR),
alleged that these information sessions provided an inadequate level of
information to the refugees and that refugees report feeling confused and
pressured to leave.   

In March 1995, MSF conducted a survey of 15 camps and found that 65 per cent
of refugees interviewed were unaware of  their right/possibility of
deferring repatriation; 63 per cent did not want to repatriate; 49 per cent
believed it to dangerous to talk because of fears of repercussions from the
GOB authorities. 

UNHCR refutes these concerns and maintains that the repatriation is voluntary.  

ACFOA raised its concerns about the allegations contained in the MSF and
USCR report with AusAID, UNHCR and the JSCFADT Burma Inquiry. ACFOA and the
Burma NGO Forum appreciate AusAID's efforts in investigating NGO concerns
and the sending of an officer to Bangladesh and look forward to AusAID's
assessment.

ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum feel that many of the issues raised by MSF and
the USCR should not have arisen. They could have been tackled earlier if
UNHCR had engaged in regular dialogue with NGOs working with the Rohingya
and collaborated with them to resolve issues of informing returnees of their
rights. During 1995, UNHCR  modified its information practices in line with
suggestions made by NGOs on the Bangladesh border.

If there is one lesson to be learnt about the Rohingya repatriation it is
that clear communication and transparency are essential. The UNHCR reports
to donor countries (including  Australia) did not indicate that there were
concerns or problems about the repatriation. It was not until July 1995 that
AusAID was informed about problems by ACFOA, some ten months after they were
first voiced by MSF. 

It is beholden on UNHCR to  provide  complete and regular briefings to the
Australian Government and other donors and urge AusAID to require a  regular
flow of information  from  UNHCR and a variety of NGO sources. This is
essential, as detailed information about conditions inside Burma and refugee
camps is always going to be in short supply and possibly contradictory. It
is not sufficient to listen to one voice. 



Recommendations: 

5)	UNHCR and NGOs work closely on the issue of repatriation to ensure
conditions of safety and  a fully informed, voluntary return and adequate
reintegration assistance.  A closer partnership between ACFOA, its member
agencies and UNHCR?s regional office would be welcomed to deal with such issues.

6)	UNHCR maintains transparency and regular consultation with donor
governments and relevant NGOs about the repatriation of all refugees from
Burma of all refugees from Burma.  UNHCR should provide evaluation reports
on the Rohingya repatriation to donor governments and involved NGOs. 

7)	The Australian Government maintains scrutiny on repatriations to which it
contributes funds and continues to seek information from a variety of
participants.

8)	ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum continue to monitor the repatriation
process and inform DFAT and AusAID of concerns.


1.3	Legal conditions of the Rohingya's repatriation

A March 1995 UNHCR  statement in Geneva justified repatriation on the
grounds that the Rohingya  ?are no longer singled out by any form of
discrimination as a matter of policy.?  UNHCR's  position contradicts the
report of the  UN Special Rapporteur for Myanmar (Burma) who noted in his
report to the United Nation?s Commission on Human Rights of 12 January 1995
(E/CN.4/1995/65) that the 1982 Citizenship law is applied in a manner which
discriminates against the Rohingya. The Australian Government should be
aware of this lack of consensus between the two UN bodies on this issue. 

The 1982 law effectively denies the Rohingya citizenship rights and if
registered, they are accorded a second class status along with ethnic
Indians and Chinese and denied places in education and the public service.
Until the mid-sixties the Rohingya were part of the ethnic makeup of Burma,
but this status was lost as Ne Win's regime became increasingly
chauvinistic against  Muslims, Indians and Chinese.

UNHCR's position is to agree with the SLORC that ?Most Muslims of Rakhine
state (around 700 000 people) are not entitled to citizenship under
Myanmar's citizenship laws.'    Further, UNHCR maintains  that prior to
fleeing, only a ?few returnees?  were citizens. These are all questionable
assertions.

UNHCR does not acknowledge the persecution of the Rohingya by the military
during  the Government's 1979  census registration.  In 1979 300 000
Rohinghya fled to Bangladesh and it is little wonder that  upon their
return, they did not submit themselves to the 1982 Citizenship registration
campaign.


Recommendations:

9)	The Australian Government should practice quiet diplomacy with regional
nations particularly India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Islamic members of
ASEAN such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei,  and push for change on the
SLORC's racist 1982 Citizenship Act during the 1996 ASEAN meeting at
Jakarta. A focus should be on the  persecution of Rohingyas in Burma of
which there is ample documentation in recent Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch Asia reports.

10)	ACFOA and the Forum will seek to raise the issue of persecution with
regional NGOs including the Indonesian NGO grouping INFID during 1996. 

11)	ACFOA and the Forum call on the Australian Government to support
Recommendation No. 16 of the JSCFADT Report on Burma which states:

the Australian Government endorses the call of the UN Rapporteur for the
revision of the 1982 Citizenship Law to eliminate the creation of second
class citizenship, especially for the Rakine (sic) Muslim people.


Section two:  refugees in Thailand


2.1	Repatriation of the Mon refugees from Thailand

On June 29 1995, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the New Mon State
Party (NMSP) and the SLORC.  As part of the agreement, all 18 000 Mon
refugees presently residing on the Thai-Burma border or inside Thailand
would be repatriated back to Burma. The first stage of the repatriation has
begun with Mon refugees being moved across the border to displaced persons
camps just inside Burma.  Resettlement further inside Burma will occur in
the next few months.

ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum strongly oppose any move towards a forcible
repatriation of the Mon on the border. We are concerned that the recent
cease-fire agreement signed by the NMSP, the political and military wing of
the Mon, does not necessarily reflect  a willingness on the part of the
refugees themselves to return to Burma. Following the signing of the
agreement, the Mon National Relief Committee (MNRC) expressed surprise and
disdain at the lack of any meaningful conditions placed on a repatriation
agreed to under the present cease-fire agreements. Senior UNHCR staff in
Bangkok have also expressed concern regarding the willingness of refugees to
return.  

Recent Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Asia reports make it
clear that the root causes of the displacement of the Mon still exist. The
reports document how forced labour is being used in the construction of many
roads and tourist resorts in preparation for Visit Myanmar Year in 1996.
There is documentation that the joint venture project between the SLORC, the
US company UNICAL and the French oil conglomerate TOTAL, to build a gas
pipeline through the Mon State, will displace tens of thousands of villagers
and requires using them for forced labour and a number of them as porters
for military units guarding the project.   Recently, construction on the Ye
to Tavoy railway has resumed, again with the use of forced labour. On a
recent fact finding mission by the Southeast Asian Information Network
(SAIN), it was discovered that there were between 30 000-60 000 civilians
being forced by the Burmese military  to labour on the railroad.  SAIN also
found many of those working on the railroad were children, with some as
young as eight being forced to work.

However, if the repatriation of the Mon is to go ahead, the human rights
violations which occurred in the earlier repatriation of the Rohingya must
not be repeated.  A planned repatriation process must be established to ensure:

· there is no further repression or discrimination; 
· the repatriation of all refugees is voluntary; 
· that the rights of  refugees are clearly explained to them; 
· the  returnees? situation is monitored and there is accurate information
made available to concerned parties; and
· there is financial assistance in resettlement.

Under the present cease-fire agreement, no reference is made to a role for
either UNHCR or an NGO in the repatriation. It is unclear who would be
responsible for the monitoring, logistics or any cross-border assistance to
returnees. ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum see the involvement of both UNHCR
and NGOs as essential if the repatriation is to be both voluntary and
returnees human rights are to be protected.

The first part of this report highlighted many of the problems involved in
the Rohingya repatriation. Two key issues resulted in refugees? human rights
being violated: firstly, the lack of effective monitoring of returnees in
Arakan State, particularly at the beginning of the repatriation. Secondly,
accurate and full information from UNHCR was unavailable.
ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum believe that if there is not to be a
repetition of the human rights abuses experienced in the repatriation of the
Rohingyas, then representatives from both UNHCR and at least one NGO must
have open access to all returnees so as to both monitor and report on their
ongoing situation. The Rohingya repatriation  showed that monitoring and
reporting on the condition of returnees cannot be successfully left to the
one organisation which is directly involved in negotiating with the SLORC on
the logistics of the repatriation. UNHCR often withheld many of their
concerns regarding the situation of returnees and the ?voluntariness? of the
repatriation, as they tried to ensure open channels remained between
themselves and the SLORC so as not to threaten the repatriation itself.

In preparation for the Mon repatriation, we see it as essential that all
refugees receive accurate information informing them of the present
situation inside Mon state and what their rights are. If this information is
to be effectively distributed and meaningful to the refugees then the Mon
National Refugee Committee must be included in the process.

A further danger ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum foresee, following the
signing of the cease-fire agreement, is that Thailand may end its extension
of humanitarian protection to Burmese asylum seekers. Thai authorities are
anxious to close the refugee camps along their border and may well see the
cease-fire agreement as the end to any obligation they have in offering
protection to Burmese asylum seekers. The obvious danger  behind this is
that the root causes and human rights abuses which forced many of the
Burmese to originally flee to Thailand, are still occurring. We believe it
is essential that Burmese who are being persecuted at the hands of  the
Burmese military are able to continue to seek asylum inside Thailand.


Recommendations:

12)	the Australian Government pressure both the SLORC and the Thai
government to allow UNHCR access to the camps along the border and to those
returning to Mon State;

13)	the Australian Government pressure both the SLORC and the Thai
Government to allow an independent NGO access to the camps and returnees,
to provide  cross border assistance and accurate and updated information on
the situation of returnees;

14)	the Australian Government, with previous recommendations about forced
labour in mind, increases funding to NGOs assisting the Mon during the
period of repatriation;

15)	the Australian Government continues to ask the Thai Government to offer
protection to Burmese refugees who are fleeing persecution inside Burma;
the Australian Government through relevant international forums continue to
urge Thailand to accede to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.


2.2	Karen refugees

By November 1995, there were 73 168 Karen refugees living in camps along the
Thai Burma border.  During 1995, the number of Karen refugees in Thailand
increased by 10 000 as many villagers fled Burma following the breaking of
the cease-fire by the SLORC and attacks against KNU strongholds in January
1995. Nevertheless, the actual number of camps has decreased as thousands of
houses and storage facilities were burnt to the ground after the attacks on
the Karen refugee camps in April and May 1995 by the SLORC backed Karen
militia:  the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organisation (DKBO). The purpose of
the SLORC/DKBO attacks has been to terrorise the refugees into returning to
Burma. The Thai authorities ordered that the more vulnerable camps be
consolidated into larger camps for security. Presently, the population of
Mae Lae camp, the largest on the border, is over 30 000 and spreads along a
three kilometer section of the border.

The situation along the border has become increasingly precarious as the
November to April dry season begins. The DKBO and  the SLORC are regularly
crossing into Thailand and clashing with Thai police and Burmese refugees.
On 23 September last 1995, DKBO troops entered Shoklo camp kidnapping a
number of refugees and taking them back to Burma. It is believed at least
one of them has subsequently been killed.   On  3 December, the DKBO again
entered Shoklo camp kidnapping camp leaders and killing a Karen pastor. Most
recently on 26 December 1995, DKBO soldiers violated Thai sovereignty and
attacked Karen refugee camps, again including Shoklo. 

These attacks clearly show that the DKBO continue to harass and instigate
fear within the camps.  As they try to force the refugees back into Burma
and away from the international community?s eyes, the SLORC also hopes that
these attacks will lead to Thailand hastening the return of the refugees to
Burma. The dry season is the time the Burmese military  carry out their main
military offensives. The concern is that there could again be serious
artillery attacks on the refugee camps by the DKBO and the SLORC.  The
Burmese military continues to have units stationed on the shores of the
Salween river where they are clearly visible from refugee camps on the Thai
side of the river. 

The immediate future of the Karen refugees depends not only on the SLORC?s
annual offensive, but also hinges on the political climate between Thailand
and the SLORC.  Thai authorities are wanting all refugees to return to Burma
as soon as possible and many Burma commentators  believe that Thailand would
not need any real excuse to begin  returning refugees.  In April last year,
General Wimol Wongwanich stated:

If we were not afraid of being criticized by the world  community on
humanitarian grounds and if it would not give this country problems, then
this army chief would take only one week to push them all out, regardless of
how many hundreds of thousands of Karens were now in the country. 

Karen and Mon refugee groups recently expressed  fears that the growing
economic cooperation between Bangkok and Rangoon with the gas pipeline
project and the expanding timber and fishery industry will occur at the
expense of their welfare. 


Recommendations:

16)	the Australian Government requests the Thai Government to take
protective measures at the refugee camps to prevent any further attacks by
the DKBO/SLORC.

17)	that the Australian Government opposes any forced repatriation of the
Mon, Karen and the Karenni.

18)	that the Australian Government expresses its willingness to the Thai
government to continue funding NGOs assisting the Mon, Karen and the Karenni
until they express their belief that it is safe to return home.


3.	Burmese students and asylum seekers in Thailand 

Following the 1988 uprising in Burma, many of the pro-democracy activists,
including many students, fled to the Thai-Burma border and later into
Bangkok for protection. Around 2 000 students live in Bangkok.  The students
have always been seen by the Thai authorities as 'trouble-makers' and have
been arrested and detained as illegal immigrants. They are often held in
detention centres for indefinite periods of time and forcibly returned to
Burma. Thailand has never signed the 1951 Convention relating to refugees or
the 1967 Protocol and consequently, has no obligations under international
law to recognize refugees seeking asylum in their country.  Burmese students
are recognised as ?persons of concern? to UNHCR but this status provides no
protection from the Thai authorities.

Over the last two and half years the Australian Government has generously
provided a humanitarian program to assist in the resettlement of many of
these students from Bangkok to Australia. 200 places were provided for this
Special Assistance Category in 1995-96. The program has been and continues
to be a lifeline for many of the students. The Australian Government should
be applauded for its ongoing commitment to the welfare of Burmese dissidents
in Thailand. 

However, the implementation of the program has proven difficult. Thai
authorities have restricted many of the activities of the foreign embassies
and UNHCR in assisting the students. The Ministry of Interior in Thailand
has demanded  that all students recognised as UNHCR ?persons of concern? are
held, away from foreign embassies, in a ?safe area? near Ratchburi, two
hours south west of Bangkok near the Thai/Burma border.  Students must enter
the camp to apply for third country resettlement.  Overcrowding is occurring
at the camp which contains 800 Burmese and has insufficient accommodation. 

There are three primary issues ACFOA and the Burma NGO Forum are concerned
about in relation to the students and the other pro-democracy activists in
Thailand:

· The ongoing arrests and detention of students, held without charge,
including 12 at the Special Detention Centre (SDC, also known as the
Bangkaen Police Training School) in Bangkok. Over 100 have been held at SDC
in the past two years. Three of the 12 students have now been detained for
over three years, while the other nine have been held for a year as
punishment for an earlier peaceful protest at the Safe Area. The physical
and mental health of many of them is very poor since medical assistance has
been disrupted by the authorities: one of the students died from cerebral
thrombosis in June 1995. For Australian sponsors under the SAC program,
these are the students in the greatest need of resettlement, yet it is not
possible to reach them.
 
· UNHCR Thailand?s increasing rejection rate of students as ?persons of
concern?. Following the fall of  the Karen bases of Kawmoora and Manaplaw at
the beginning of 1995,  many high profile students who are wanted by the
SLORC, were forced from Burma into Thailand and came to Bangkok seeking
protection. UNHCR is rejecting many of these students. The reasons are still
unclear, however it has been suggested that pressure from the Ministry of
Interior in Thailand is increasing, and curtailing UNHCR?s role. UNHCR has
curtailed its living allowance to registered students and now repeats the
Thai line that the students must go to the Safe Area. Students are
understandably reluctant to comply as they suspect that they may be forcibly
repatriated to Burma from this camp, at a future date, as occurred with 300
students in another dentention centre  in March 1989.  Physical and verbal
abuse of students by Safe Area guards is common and relations remain tense.
Overcrowding at the camp (currently 800 people) and lack of options for the
future is fueling the rise of mental depression, illness and drug dependency
amongst some students.
 
· The Thai police have cracked down on many of the students and other
pro-democracy activists during recent ASEAN consultation in Bangkok. Many of
these arrested students have been put in the Immigration Detention Centre
(IDC) in Bangkok in overcrowded conditions. These students are not being
sent to the Safe Area because it is full and are in danger of being
repatriated. In December 1995, Amnesty International recently released an
urgent action calling for the release from IDC of 25 Burmese asylum seekers
arrested on the last week of November 1995, including a 75 year old senior
writer at the Burmese opposition newspaper the New Era Journal. 


Recommendations:

19)	the Australian Government uses parliamentary and diplomatic channels to
pressure for the immediate release of the 12 students who remain in
detention at the SDC;

20) a.	the Australian Government increases numbers in the Special Assistance
Category for people from Burma residing in Thailand (presently 200) with the
possibility of decreasing the intake from Rangoon (presently 500).

21)	the Australian Government raises the issue of ill-treatment of Burmese
asylum seekers in Thai detention centres particularly the ?Safe Area?.


Australia Council for Overseas Aid, Human Rights Office
124 Napier St, Fitzroy, Melbourne VIC 3065, Australia
tel: +61 3 9417 7505, Burma Officer: 9417 7238
fax: +61 3 9416 2746
email: acfoahr@xxxxxxxxxxx     WWW: http://www.peg.apc.org/~acfoahr