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Burma in Thai Foreign Policy [2/2]



>From, Burma  Research Journal Vol 1 No 1   (Rainy Season)

          Burma in Thai Foreign Policy  (continued, part 2 of 2)
                                             Kanbawza Win

Constructive Engagement

     The Thai perspective of itself as a centre for the development of
mainland Southeast Asia has a great consequence on the Burmese people -
otherwise the Burmese would be living in a free and democratic Burma.
The urge to involve Burma in its vision underpins Thailand's policy of
"Constructive Engagement" with the repressive Burmese military junta.
This policy was later expanded to include the rest of the ASEAN nations
at the insistence of the Thai government. The Thai are so engrossed in
their goal that they have no option left but to follow the policy of
appeasement to the Burmese. The Thai perspective is that the Western
style public denunciations of the Burmese regime would compel it to dig
in its heel to save face and would reduce the prospects for democratic
change. Anand called "Constructive Engagement " the "Thai Way", and Arsa
Sarasin deflected Western criticism by accusing the Bush administration
of "double standards," citing its efforts to maintain a relationship
with China after the Tiananmen Square incident - that, according to the
Thais, was no different from their "Constructive Engagement" with the
genocidal Burmese regime.

     With the Thais' promotion, "Constructive Engagement" became an
ASEAN policy in 1992 despite the strain caused by Burma's expulsion of
170,000 Rohingyas Muslim into Bangladesh.  Malaysia and Indonesia seemed
posed to break with Thailand over its policy of Constructive Engagement
as their government came under pressure from domestic Islamic opinion.
Indonesian foreign Minister Ali Alatas declared that the Burmese
regime's actions undermined regional stability, and his Malaysian
counter part Abdullah Badawi claimed that the issue was no longer a
domestic problem for Burma. The Malaysian government in particular was
prompted by the youth wing of UMNO to condemn the Burmese Military
junta. Had the West not taken up the issue, opinion within ASEAN could
conceivably have split over this issue between supporters and opponents
of Thailand's policy over Burma. As it was James Baker and Douglas Hurd
called for sanctions against Burma during the ASEAN Post Ministerial
Conference in July 1992 and  ASEAN was therefore compelled to
demonstrate its  unity. The ASEAN countries closed ranks with Thailand
and rejected the West's demand for condemnation of the Burmese junta.
Paradoxically Abdullah Badawi described Burma as a friend who has gone
astray and who one day might join the regional association.

     Constructive Engagement has been upheld by the Chuan government
despite initial expectations that it would be rejected. Before he was
appointed foreign minister, Prasong Soonsiri revealed a critical
attitude in relation to the Burmese junta and claimed that Thailand
should offer support and encouragement to the Burmese people, but his
position changed subsequently as he refused to allow the establishment
of the Burmese opposition government better known as NCGUB (National
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma). His justification is that
Thailand should not isolate its neighbur, Burma.  The Chuan
administration justification was that the position of dissidents in
Rangoon had improved after Saw Maung was replaced by General Than Shwe
as head of SLORC. Moreover, in January 1993, the military inaugurated a
Constitutional Convention which involved representatives from all social
groups in Burma including the minorities. The Convention remained in
session throughout 1993 as the Junta attempted to obtain endorsement by
its representatives to give the military a leading role. When Prasong
Soonsiri visited Rangoon to participate in the first meeting of the
Thai-Burma joint commission in September 1993, he described the
incarceration of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as an internal matter.  In fact
the general view of the Thai government is that democracy cannot be
imposed on Burma and that it should be allowed to develop naturally.
Surin Pitsuwan who has championed the cause of democracy on other
occasions, emphasized the importance of Constructive Engagement as a
means of bringing about democratic change in Burma through incentives.

     Thus it was evidence that, in the context of the Thai foreign
policy, Burma becomes an important part and there seems to be four
factors that underlie it. First Burma has a role in Thailand's regional
vision as part of the Southeast Asian community which Thai leaders
intend to promote. Chatichai declared it a land bridge for trade between
southern China and the Indian ocean. The settlement of the Cambodian
issue brought forward the next task, which was the integration of Burma
into mainstream Southeast Asia. Chuan Leekpai has characterized Thailand
as a bridge by which that might be accomplished.  That is why Thailand
sponsored Burma's membership in the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1993
until Mahathir objected. Thailand invited U Ohn Gyaw, SLORC's foreign
minister, to the 1994 meting at the Shangrila Hotel in Bangkok.
Membership in ASEAN is considered to be a carrot for the military regime
to improve its human rights record, which, according to Thailand, will
work more effectively than any big stick the West may wield.
     Secondly Thailand is concerned about the security of Burma, given
the view that a sudden and precipitous collapse of the military regime
there could have detrimental consequences. The disintegration of Burma
into its constituent ethnic groups would be, from the Thai perspective,
the result of an all too hasty insistence upon democratization in a
country whose experience with democracy has not been encouraging. The
collapse of the state of Burma would undermine security not only along
the Thai border but also for the whole of ASEAN  and the likely
beneficiaries would be Burma's two giant neighbours China and India, in
which case Southeast Asia would become an arena of Sino-Indian rivalry.
Even without the above scenario, border security is a justification for
Thailand's policy, as its border with Burma is 2,400 kilometres in
length of which only 58 kilometres have been demarcated according to the
1868 British-Siam border treaty. Thailand has tried very hard to avoid
border clashes with the Burmese Junta of the kind that occurred in 1992
which had every potential to escalate. A battalion of Burmese troops
occupied Hill 491 in an attempt to outflank the KNU headquarters at
Manerplaw; the Thai military threatened to attack and only through
intervention of that kind it was stopped. A cease-fire and the mutual
withdrawal of forces was arranged, prompting the Thai foreign Ministry
to claim that Constructive Engagement provided the framework for the
defusing of a border conflict.

     The third factor of the Constructive Engagement is trade.
Previously, at the time when Thailand was faced with the Vietnamese
problem in Cambodia, it had to rely on the Karen to take care of the
rear guard and openly supported the Karens as a buffer against Rangoon,
providing them with weapons and allowing them to use Thai territory. Now
the situation has changed. When Army Commander Chavalit visited Rangoon
soon after the Burmese crisis, Bangkok established trading relationships
with the Burmese military junta. In April, a Burmese military delegation
visited Bangkok and established a liaison office here. Then the Thai
military acted as an intermediary between Rangoon and North Korea over
the deliveries of ammunition from North Korea to Burma, an indication
that there is a converging interests between the two militaries.  The
Burmese reciprocated by granting 48 logging concessions to 30 Thai
companies. However, soon the Burmese junta pressured Thailand and gave
notice in June 1993 that these contracts would be reviewed and claimed
that the Thais had gone beyond their allotted quotas of felling trees.
Thailand faced similar pressure over fishing concessions. The facade was
that the Thais had hosted the visit of eight Nobel Peace Prize-winners
who had campaigned for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but in
reality the Burmese military attache secretly told their Thai
counterparts that Thai support for the ethnic minority groups and pro
democracy students must end or otherwise these contracts and economic
concessions would not be renewed.  This hit the nail on the head and
Thailand seriously began to cut off the arms supplies to all the groups
under the Democratic Alliance of Burma and began to arrest all the
Burmese dissidents seeking refuge in Thailand. Threats to cut off
provisions were also made. This finally is one of the major causes of
the future fall of Manerplaw and other Karen bases and effectively
sealing the dissidents as a military threat..

     The last point, but not the least is one which no Thai nationalist
would dare to admit (or would be taken as an insult), is that the Thai
army is very much afraid of Burmese military might. In spite of modern
arms and ammunitions in which they far supersede the Burmese, yet when
it come to actual fighting, the Thai army knew too well that they could
not match the well experienced and battle hardened Burmese troops. This
was amply demonstrated when the Thai army suffered at the hands of
ill-equipped Laotian troops in a border clash. Even during the height of
the Cambodian crisis, when the Vietnamese troops were a few kilometers
inside Thailand, the Thai army just gave covering fire and had to call
on the KNU troops to mop up the well entrenched Vietnamese. What's more,
the Burmese army had been fighting for the last forty years. Besides the
Burmese military junta has been trying to find an external enemy to
divert the attention of the population and to rally the people to its
side. It is a favorite trick of every unpopular dictatorship, even with
limited means to try on this adventure. Besides there is the historical
factor and whatever the conditions the Burmese generals are convinced
that they could take on Thailand at any time they choose. Hence the
appeasement policy, and thus the Thai generals sacrifice of the Burmese
ethnic groups and the Burmese dissidents who are fighting for democracy,
human rights and autonomy at the altar of friendship with the Burmese
junta. Meanwhile it will be the people of Thailand living in the border
areas who will continue to bear the brunt of the Burmese army
encroachment.

     The Thai policy of Constructive Engagement with Burma has become a
political issue within Thailand reflecting the conflict over values in
foreign policy. The regional vision of making Thailand the Golden Land
and the gateway to prosperity as espoused by Thai leaders demands an
accommodation of existing regimes in mainland Southeast Asia. First it
was the Khmer Rouge and now the SLORC. This explicitly means that
Thailand will support the status quo, so, in a way, is saying to the
Burmese pro democracy movement  "Hey! You better forget about democracy
and human rights in Burma."

     However democratization in Thailand has attained a certain stage
where it demands that foreign policy conform to domestic values and that
Thailand should cease supporting the Khmer Rouge and SLORC. Every one
can witness that Constructive Engagement benefits the Burmese military
junta while it suppresses the pro democracy movement. It also does not
give incentives to change or to democratize. House foreign Affairs
spokesman Sutham Saaengprathum declared that Thailand's trade with Burma
enables the military regime to purchase more weapons and prolong the
military rule. The liberal press of Thailand has been scathing and
points out that five years of Constructive Engagement has given SLORC
the confidence to carry on their brutal suppression of the Burmese
people.  The Bangkok Post, in its editorial, has said that Constructive
Engagement has not resulted in a better Burma.  Trade with Burma is seen
as plundering Burma's resources while deforestation by Thai companies in
Burma river catchment areas is affecting water supplies to Thai
villages. The democratic forces of Thailand clearly sees that the social
basis for democracy in Thailand will always be uncertain and unstable
unless foreign policy and domestic values are aligned, and that a
government pursuing Constructive Engagement with Burma cannot be very
committed to democratic values domestically. But the most important of
all is that the Thai are earning the wrath of the Burmese people.
Previously the people of Burma sympathize with the Thai for what the
Burmese monarch had done to Thailand but now they understand the very
nature of Thailand in their treatment to their sons and daughters who
have taken refuge in Thailand.

Epilogue

     Thus in the contemporary foreign policy of Thailand, there was
doubtless an important psychological need for the civilian leadership to
declare its liberation from the security approach to foreign policy as
defined by the military. No doubt Thailand's foreign policy has
undergone far reaching changes that reflect the country's transition
from a middle ranking state dependent upon external allies for its
security to a regional economic power in its own right. It is a policy
that gives expression to pride of economic achievement in which previous
relationships with ASEAN or external powers have to be adjusted as a
consequence. However, several problems still exist that will require
attention in the coming years. The national security imperative that
dominated Thailand's foreign policy after all these years still need to
be eliminated and will surely continue to be a factor in Thai regional
policy though on a diminished way. Burma will be the main focus of the
Thai politics and the Burmese issue will be the main force that will
influence decision making. Thai military contact with the Khmer Rouge
and SLORC will continue to be maintained whatever the rhetoric. But one
thing that is vividly evident is that the idea of regional centre for
development in the southeast Asia mainland is not supported or justified
by economic trends. Thai business has revealed that it is more
interested in China than investing in Cambodia or Burma or even Vietnam
not to mention Laos. Despite that talk of a land bridge for Indochina,
Thailand had invested only $ 50 million in Vietnam - far below
Singapore's $ 150 million or Hongkong's $ 420 million. This lack of Thai
interest is due to historical antipathy and a much greater interest in
larger China market. Moreover the expansion of the southern Chinese
economy and its greater integration with ASEAN economies could remove
all basis for talk of a distinctive status for Thailand. Mainland
Southeast Asia may become integrated into a wider network of
cross-cutting economic ties linking China, Singapore, Hongkong including
Thailand. In that case Thailand will be just one of the economic centre
for mainland Southeast Asia. So in view of that trend,  Thai policy
makers should review their dream of the Golden Land, the hub of
Southeast Asia which had a great consequence on the people of Burma and
might as well rethink the "Constructive Engagement." policy, and think
of the long term consequence - when Burma will eventually become
democratic one day.



BRJ  Vol 1 No 1
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