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Burma Net News: June 8, 1996. #437
- Subject: Burma Net News: June 8, 1996. #437
- From: strider@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 07 Jun 1996 21:55:00
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Date: Fri, 7 Jun 1996 21:53:04 -0700 (PDT)
------------------------------ BurmaNet -----------------------------
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
The BurmaNet News: June 8, 1996
Issue #437
HEADLINES:
==========
AP : BURMA GETS PUBLIC ORDER DECREE
UPI : U.S. SEEKS ANTI-BURMA COALITION
WALL STREET JOURNAL : ASEAN PLAYS A RISKY CARD: BURMA
AP : BURMA'S MILITARY LEADERS PROHIBIT GATHERINGS AT
SUU KYI'S HOUSE
THE NATION: READING BETWEEN THE VITRIOL
INTELASIA : BURMA ,THE WORLD'S LARGEST HEROINE PRODUCER
MARK BAKER : AUSTRALIA'S BURMA STAND ATTACKED
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BURMA GETS PUBLIC ORDER DECREE
RANGOON, Burma (AP) Burma's military government Friday issued a
law banning all acts disturbing public order, making violators subject to
5-20 years imprisonment.
The order, announced on state radio and televison friday night, also
made unauthorized writing of a state constitution subject to the same
punishment.
The ``Law to prevent obstruction or opposition to the process of
national convention, systematic and peaceful transfer of power,'' was a
clear response to moves by the country's pro-democracy movement to
challenge the military's authority.
The law also said that any organization found in violation would be
suspended, dissolved or declared an unlawful organization.
Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi had earlier Friday announced plans
to hold her weekly meeting with supporters this weekend in defiance of a
prohibition from the military regime.
Suu Kyi left a message for reporters telephoning her home, delivered
by a supporter, saying, ``Please tell them I will proceed with the Saturday
lecture as usual.''
Last month after holding a party congress, her organization also
announced plans to write its own constitution, rejecting one being drafted
by a government organized convention that has been going on for three
years.
There was no immediate comment available from her or her party on
the announcement of the new law.
*****************************************
U.S. SEEKS ANTI-BURMA COALITION
WASHINGTON, June 7 (UPI) - The Clinton administration said Friday it
is seeking Asian partners to increase pressure on the military
government in Burma to end its anti-democratic practices.
The administration will soon dispatch an envoy to the region in
an attempt to build a stronger front against Burma's governing
junta, the State Department said.
"The Burmese government appears to be impervious to the feelings
and sentiments of its own people," said State Department spokesman
Nicholas Burns. "Perhaps it will respond more effectively if some of
its trading partners in the area and fellow Asian countries can be
organized in such a way to try to put more pressure on the Burmese
government."
Burns called on Burma's leaders to immediately release more than
100 political activists among 260 people arrested in recent weeks
for pro- democracy activities.
He also condemned an order banning Nobel Prize-winner Aung San
Suu Kyi from making her traditional Saturday address to supporters
from the gate of her home where she is kept under house arrest.
"Aung San Suu Kyi has a right, under international law and under
any reasonable standard of decency, to speak out about conditions in
her own country. She also has a right to expect that her compatriots
who were arrested over the last two weeks should be released from
government detention," Burns said.
The Clinton administration has recently increased its efforts to
build a broad coalition against Burma to bring political change to
the Southeast Asian country. It has been ruled by the military for
nearly four decades and remains one of the world's poorest despite a
large population and rich natural resource base.
Burns recently said the United States would consider imposing
unilateral sanctions on the country if the government, which calls
itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council, does not open
the political system. The administration already bans financial
assistance to Burma.
Few other countries have joined Washington in an anti-Burma
effort, but Burns said the administration would redouble its efforts
with the envoy's trip. The representative is due to be named early
next week.
"We would like now to try to work with some of our allied and
friendly governments in Asia to try to find a way to convince the
government of Burma to stop its pressure tactics," Burns said.
"(The envoy) will be dispatched to the region to try to see what
the United States can do to work with these and other countries in
the region to increase pressure on the Burmese government to act in
a civilized manner," he said.
Copyright 1996 United Press International. All rights reserved.
*********************************************
ASEAN PLAYS A RISKY CARD: BURMA
Wall Street Journal
By BARRY WAIN, June 7:
HONG KONG--The Burmese military has pulled off another coup
diplomatically. At the same time that the State Law and Order Restoration
Council is trashing the popular political opposition, Slorc is about to be
welcomed into the ranks of respected international organizations.
As expected, Burma will attend the annual meetings of the seven-member
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Jakarta in July as an observer,
upgraded from the status of "guest of the host country" of the past two
years. But surprisingly, it also will join the 19-member Asean Regional
Forum on security.
As a member of ARF, Burma will discuss regional hot spots with major
industrialized nations, in addition to its Asean neighbors. Those sitting at
the table will include stern critics of Rangoon's current crackdown on the
democracy movement, among them the U.S., Canada and Australia.
Burma's admission to ARF is bound to undercut any serious attempt to
punish Slorc, signaled by the U.S. when it announced recently that it would
appoint a special envoy to discuss a coordinated response with countries in
Asia and Europe. Washington indicates it is even considering sanctions, but
it will find that the higher priority for its Asian allies is the future of the
region's first and only body to deal with security problems.
It is worth taking the time to examine how this state of affairs came
about, because it explains some of the strong currents running in East
Asia. It also is a warning that any outside effort to temper Slorc's thuggish
behavior through engagement must necessarily be long term.
First, though, it needs to be said that ARF, formed only two years ago, is
evolving quite nicely, considering that the participants have no previous
experience in multilateral security dialogue. Most promisingly, China,
reluctant as recently as last year, is showing considerable enthusiasm for
the process.
Periodic European and American criticism that ARF is ineffective because
it cannot mediate in the divided Korean peninsula, the confrontation
between China and Taiwan, or the South China Sea, is misplaced. At this
stage, members are doing well to be discussing these sensitive subjects
collectively. Realistically, it will be years before they can establish a
conflict resolution mechanism.
ARF's progress is unlikely to be disrupted by Burma's entry, initially
embarrassing though it may prove to some Western governments. Indeed,
much more significant is the fact that India, a major military player, is
also joining, taking membership to 21.
Asean, spearheaded by Singapore, is primarily responsible for the
expansion taking place immediately. Although the association had made it
clear it wanted India and Burma included, the timing caught some other
members of ARF by surprise.
India, upgraded this year from sectoral to full dialogue partner of Asean,
has always been interested in ARF membership. Most countries accepted
that it would join eventually, but they were apprehensive that its
geopolitical weight and involvement in intractable nuclear and territorial
disputes with Pakistan might distract and destabilize ARF.
As for Burma, Asean flagged its intention to bring it within the
fold-almost certainly before 2000-by inviting Rangoon to a Southeast
Asia-10 summit last year. Among other things, Asean wants to offset
growing Chinese economic and strategic influence in Burma. But in the
past, Southeast Asian countries have been admitted to ARF only after they
were inside Asean.
The non-Asean states objected to the idea that a country's formal
relationship with Asean should automatically entitle it to enter ARF's
ranks. They argued for, and won, the right for full and equal participation
in all decisions.
At a crucial, unpublicized meeting in Yogyakarta on May 10 and 11,
senior officials unanimously adopted four criteria for membership, the
key one being impact and relevance to the security system of Northeast and
Southeast Asia. And on that basis they recommended that India and Burma
be admitted this year. Their foreign ministers will almost certainly
endorse the officials' decisions next month.
Two weeks ago, Burmese authorities arrested 262 delegates of Aung San
Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy as they gathered in Rangoon for a
party congress. The NLD can claim to speak for most of the country, since
it won over 80% of seats in a 1990 election whose results Slorc refused to
accept.
Whether the military was emboldened by Asean's initiative on its behalf
or oblivious to it, Slorc has continued attempting to humiliate Ms. Aung
San Suu Kyi in the crudest possible way. Coercing citizens to attend rallies
to denounce the NLD, the government, through its controlled media, has
called the democracy activists maggots, dupes and stooges.
While putting on a brave face and saying as little as possible about events
in Burma, Asean governments are praying that Rangoon will help them out
of a tight spot by easing up and continuing to release the detainees over the
next few weeks. Adding to their discomfort, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi has
criticized Asean for its policy of "constructive engagement" and repeated
her call that foreign aid and investment should await the introduction of
democracy.
Canada, Australia and the U.S. expressed reservations about Burma over
its human rights record at the Yogyakarta gathering. But in the end they
went along with the consensus on its joining ARF.
They can be counted on to voice concern in even stronger terms when ARF
assembles in Jakarta on July 23, a day after Asean's ministerial meeting
and immediately before Asean confers with its dialogue partners at the
Post-Ministerial Conference. But Burma's critics will be under strong
pressure from Asean representatives and others not to offend Rangoon and
possibly harm a still-fragile ARF.
India's admission still worries some analysts, who fret that Delhi will
introduce Kashmir and other disputes it has with Pakistan, causing ARF to
lose its focus. But Indian diplomats say they prefer to discuss these issues
bilaterally anyway and not "internationalize" them.
Asean officials have warned India not to use the forum to score points off
Pakistan. As an added precaution, Pakistan won't be admitted for many
years, if ever.
Inside sources say ARF has adopted an informal understanding to cap
membership for the time being. Even when that moratorium eases, a single
government that feels strongly can block an applicant, as admission must
comply with the new criteria and be approved unanimously. As it is,
several countries say privately that Pakistan isn't relevant to East Asian
security.
Despite the flap over membership, ARF is making steady headway, as
evidenced by a discussion in Yogyakarta of potentially sensitive subjects.
They included the nonaggression treaty and border agreement signed in late
April by Russia and China, tense relations between China and Taiwan, the
Koreas, the reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance and the contentious South
China Sea.
China has offered to co-chair, with the Philippines, an Intersessional
Support Group on Confidence Building Measures this coming year. CBMs go
to the heart of ARF's activities, involving increased transparency in
defense matters.
*********************************************
BURMA'S MILITARY LEADERS PROHIBIT GATHERINGS AT
SUU KYI'S HOUSE
By AYE AYE WIN Associated Press
Wall Street Journal: ASSK Rallies Banned
RANGOON, Burma -- Burma's military regime escalated a confrontation
Thursday with prodemocracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, prohibiting
weekend meetings outside her house that had become a rallying point for
dissent.
The ban comes after most foreign journalists have left after covering a
congress of Ms. Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, her biggest
political triumph since being released from six years of house arrest last
July.
The weekend meetings, held at the gates of Ms. Suu Kyi's ramshackle
compound in Rangoon, have swollen in the past two weeks as a result of the
congress, drawing up to 10,000 people at one point, more than four
times the usual number.
Opposition sources, insisting on anonymity, told the Associated Press that
authorities had contacted Aung Shwe, chairman of Ms. Suu Kyi's party, and
said the meetings would be banned beginning Saturday.
The ban would deprive Burmese with the courage to brave arrest of
practically their only chance to see Ms. Suu Kyi, who won the 1991 Nobel
Peace Prize for her nonviolent promotion of democracy.
For thousands more Burmese who listen to surreptitious tape recordings
made during the rallies, it would mean no longer hearing her calls for the
military to surrender the power it has held since 1962.
A senior government official, also speaking on condition of anonymity,
said Ms. Suu Kyi's party had abused the government's leniency in
permitting the public meetings.
The gatherings are technically illegal, violating bans on political
gatherings of more than 50 people that can be punished by two years in
prison.
Reaction from leaders of Ms. Suu Kyi's party was not immediately
available. Junior party members said the leaders were in a meeting but
expressed belief that the weekend gatherings would go ahead as planned.
A crackdown on the meetings had been feared for months. Commentaries in
state-run newspapers repeatedly indicated that the authorities could act at
any time.
The meetings began with about 400 people shortly after Ms. Suu Kyi's
release last year, increasing to 2,000 after the party quit a government
stacked convention drafting a new constitution that guaranteed power for
the military.
The regime has staged massive rallies around the country to counter
perceptions of support for Ms. Suu Kyi, but participants at one said that
they were told to go or pay a fine.
Meanwhile, opposition sources reported that 144 of the 262 people
rounded up in efforts to prevent the three-day congress were known to
have been freed from custody. About 20 detainees are believed to have
been transferred to a prison notorious for torture.
Only 18 delegates eluded arrest and attended the congress, which marked
the sixth anniversary of parliamentary elections overwhelmingly won by
the opposition. The ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council never
allowed Parliament to convene.
The junta came under harsh international media coverage for the mass
arrests, demonstrating its will to crush dissent while trying to stay afloat
by quietly cutting business deals with foreign companies eager to profit
by developing Burma's moribund economy.
The newspaper Bangkok Post reported Thursday that Burmese authorities
have tightened visa restrictions on journalists.
***********************************************
THE NATION: READING BETWEEN THE VITRIOL
June 7, 1996
Aung Zaw's article from June 7
Khin Nyunt has long been seen as the generals holding the key to
Burma's future. His recent proclamations, however, suggest a
hardening of his position. Aung Zaw analysts the implication for
the pro-democracy movement.
Lt Gen Khin Nyunt has long been considered a moderating force
among the top military leadership in Burma. According to many
non-Burmese and Burmese who have met him, he is bright, polite
and charming. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is among those
who have complimented his manner.
But in recent months, analysts in and out of Burma have noted
that the general seems to becoming more uncompromising.
On Saturday, the military intelligence chief assailed democracy
activists as "stooges of imperialists" and urged Burmese to crush
external and internal destructionists. His speech came shortly
after Suu Kyi held her party's first congress.
But will the people of Burma listen to Khin Nyunt?
Suu Kyi said she and her party members are determined to draft a
constitution and continue their struggle for a multi-party
democracy movement despite a warning from the junta that the
party will be banned if it does.
Lt Gen Khin Nyunt, once known in the international press as Burma's
'prince of evil', said in his speech that the tatmadaw [armed
forces] will never give up power. It was his strongest and most
clear-cut statement to date. Echoing Lt Gen Khin Nyunt's words
the state-owned press said that anyone thinking the armed forces
would surrender power "must be an idiot."
Residents in Rangoon who are sympathetic to the pro-democracy
cause said public outrage over Khin Nyunt's speech ran deep. "He
only makes more enemies," one said.
Khin Nyunt has a history of wavering on the issue of democracy in
Burma. After the 1990 general elections, which were won by Suu
Kyi's national League for Democracy, he repeatedly promised to
hand over power to elected representatives. He was also the one
who permitted a US congressman and a famous Burmese monk to see
Suu Kyi when she was under house detention.
Nonetheless, within the junta itself, there could be some
conflict about how to handle the country's resurgent democracy
movement.
Evidently, Khin Nyunt's recent vigorous speeches are not in line
with Senior Gen Than Shwe, chairman of the ruling junta
officially known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council
or Slorc.
In a speech in April, Than Shwe stated that the military did not
crave power or seek to control the state on a permanent basis. He
stressed: "The military should not hold on to state power
forever." But he did not say when the military take back from
current position.
The two speeches given by the two top generals seem to suggest
the junta leaders are divided over whether and when they should
give up power. If they do want surrender some power, the question
is, to who should it be given? Presumably, Suu Kyi is not their
choice.
"As Suu Kyi pushes for more conferences, gatherings and meetings
they [Slorc] will have to decide whether to reopen a dialogue
with her," a well-placed source in Rangoon said,
But the junta's immediate reaction seems to be to put off the
question for the immediate future. The military regime, it was
reported yesterday, has prohibited Suu Kyi from holding any more
weekend meetings with crowds outside her home.
Sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that
authorities contacted NLD chairman Aung Shwe earlier this week
and said the meetings would be banned beginning tomorrow.
Still, the junta cannot ignore Suu Kyi's popularity. "Seeing is
believing the leaders were evidently surprised to see thousands
of people turned up to support Suu Kyi and her party despite the
crackdown in recent weeks," said the Rangoon resident.
A businessman in Mandalay said, residents in the northern city
held several clandestine meetings recently to decide whether to
take political actions. "They are very excited," he said.
But the junta is unlikely to roll over and give in.
According to analysts in Rangoon and Bangkok, the military
intelligence chief is counting on Asean countries as he
understands the regional grouping is not going to rally around
Suu Kyi or her party. The Slorc leader knows his regime has
weighty backing. "It is not inside the country but outside, Japan
and Asean are Khin Nyunt's allies as they have stuck to the
constructive engagement policy," said one analyst.
Khin Nyunt's recent tough line has also been interpreted as mere
posturing by the intelligence chief whose rise to influence has
not followed the traditional army path.
Most previous military intelligence chiefs have found their days
in power short-lived and securing his own position has always
been a top priority for Khin Nyunt.
The security chief, who is close to strongman Gen Ne Win, became
the most prominent general after the military took power in 1988.
Initially, it was widely believed that Khin Nyunt and the senior
army leaders were at loggerheads. However, after seven years in
power, Khin Nyunt, appears to have removed most of his foes in
the army.
As recent minor reshuffle also indicates that he is expanding his
power base among the Slorc cabinet.
Khin Nyunt also has one clear advantage over most of the top
members of the Slorc, his age.
Most of the top generals are scheduled to retire as they are now
in their sixties but Khin Nyunt is just over 50.
"I believe he will become number one in the future," says one
senior Kachin leader who had met Khin Nyunt a few years back.
But before becoming a 'number one' in the country, Khin Nyunt
still needs to do a lot of homework.
One is to win the trust and love of the his countrymen. Most pro-
democracy activists and students dislike him as it was widely
believed that during the mass uprising in 1988 Khin Nyunt ordered
his intelligence units to create an atmosphere of anarchy in
order to pave the way for the military to take over.
But since 1994 when he shook hands with Suu Kyi, Khin Nyunt has
garnered more support at home and abroad. At that time, some
suggested Khin Nyunt would eventually become
Burma's de Klrek. But so far he has done little to reinforce such
thinking.
"There is no doubt he [Khin Nyunt] is powerful general but he
alone cannot make decisions," said a western diplomat Bangkok.
She said Slorc's current practice appears to be a collective
leadership system.
"If he begins to negotiate with the Suu Kyi-led opposition Khin
Nyunt will become a brave man over night but it could also be his
demise," the diplomat said, suggesting that there are many
generals and army officers who want to see the fall of Suu Kyi
and democracy movement.
In 1994 and 1995 after two highly-publicised meetings with the
Nobel Peace Laureate Khin Nyunt said, "Our meeting with Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi was based on ....or good will and good feelings......"
"We are like brothers and sisters we discussed things as though
we were in a family reunion," he said, adding that the meeting was
good for the country.
"Rangoon politics is strange," commented another western
diplomat. He said that although the Slorc refused to talk with
Suu Kyi no one should be surprised if they shake hands with her
the next day. Things in Burma, he said, are never predictable.
As if to support that line of thinking, a senior Slorc leader, Lt
Gen Kyaw Ba, said on Tuesday that talks with Suu Kyi were
possible if she stops criticising the military. At the same time,
the Slorc press stepped up attacks on Suu Kyi. Indeed, the mixed
signals suggest more disagreement among the generals.
US congressman, Bill Richardson who met Suu Kyi when she was
under house arrest once said: "I think the future of Burma will
be determined by two people: Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu Kyi."
If that is to be true, 'the brother' may have no choice but to
listen to his 'sister'. They may meet in the future but for now
they are not speaking the same language. (TN)
******************************************
BURMA ,THE WORLD'S LARGEST HEROINE PRODUCER
Searched and posted by JULIEN MOE [INTELASIA]
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
I BURMA
Burma remains the world's largest producer of opium and heroin. Burma
lacks both the resources and commitment to undertake effective drug
control and is likely to remain one of the world's major sources of
drugs for many years to come. In 1995 opium cultivation and production
rebounded after a slight decline due to poor weather in 1994. Opium
poppy cultivation covered 154,000 hectares and yielded 2,340 metric tons
of opium gum -- enough opium to produce 230 tons of heroin and satisfy
the U.S. heroin market many times over. There were few signs of
improvement in the government's counternarcotics performance during
1995. In early 1996 a two year offensive against the Mong Tai Army
(MTA, also know as the Shan United Army) of Khun Sa ended with the
Burmese Army occupation of the MTA headquarters. The Burmese, however,
have shown no willingness to use the opportunity brought about by their
cease-fire with the MTA to bring Khun Sa to justice or to take effective
action to suppress the heroin trade in the Shan state.
The drug trade in the Shan State continues virtually unchecked. Burmese
authorities lack the resources, the ability or the will to take action
against ethnic drug trafficking groups with whom they have negotiated
cease-fires. Groups known to be involved in the heroin trade, such as
the United Wa State Army and the Kokang militia, remain heavily armed
and enjoy complete autonomy in their base areas. Although the Burmese
Government claims that these groups have committed themselves to drug
control as part of their cease-fire agreements, the Burmese Government
has been either unwilling or unable to get these groups to reduce heroin
trafficking or opium cultivation.
Money laundering in Burma is also a growing problem and the laundering
of drug profits is thought by some analysts to have a wide-spread impact
on the Burmese economy. An underdeveloped banking system and lack of
enforcement against money laundering have created a business and
investment environment conducive to the use of drug-related proceeds in
legitimate commerce.
II. Status of Country
Burma continues to provide the bulk of the world's opium supply and is
the source of over 60 percent of the heroin seized on US streets. The
ethnic areas of Burma's Shan State, such as the Kokang and Wa
territories, produce most of Burma's opium. The State Law and Order
Restoration Council's (SLORC) cease-fire agreements with these drug-
trafficking armies have prevented the implementation of any meaningful
drug enforcement operations in areas under the control of ethnic armies.
As a result, these regions have become drug trafficking havens where
heroin is produced and trafficked without any risk. Leaders of these
drug-trafficking armies have benefited immensely from their good
relationships with the Rangoon regime; their businesses--legitimate and
illegitimate--have prospered. The top traffickers of these ethnic
groups are: U Sai Lin AKA Lin Ming-shing of the Eastern Shan State Army
(ESSA); Yang Mao-liang, Peng Chia-sheng, and Liu Go-shi of the Myanmar
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang Chinese); Pao Yu-chiang,
Li Tzu-ju, and Wei Hsueh-kang of the United Wa State Army (UWSA); and U
Mahtu Naw of the Kachin Defense Army (KDA). The SLORC has given these
ethnic traffickers significant political legitimacy and now refers to
them as "leaders of national races." Several major traffickers now
participate in the government's national constitutional convention in
the guise of ethnic leaders.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1995
Burmese counternarcotics efforts remained woefully inadequate in 1995, a
situation that has not changed fundamentally since 1989. The SLORC
steadfastly maintains that only peaceful economic development will bring
about a reduction in drug production and trafficking. Many of the major
drug trafficking insurgent groups have been at peace with the SLORC
since 1989 and the surrender of the Mong Tai Army in early 1996 brought
an end to the last major insurgency by an army involved in drug
trafficking. During the past six years there has been no progress in
reducing opium cultivation or in stopping the heroin-trafficking
activities of ethnic armies now considered part of the "legal fold."
The SLORC's development program seems more intent on expanding and
strengthening its political position in the border areas than in
countering the narcotics trade.
The Burmese Government continues to look to United Nations International
Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) assistance to bolster its own development programs in ethnic Wa,
Kokang, and Shan areas of the Shan State. Nevertheless, Burmese
The government also appeared intent on exerting greater control over UN
programs operating in the ethnic border areas. In the case of UNDCP,
the GOB has sought a say in UNDCP personnel assignments and has
restricted access by UNDCP personnel to project areas and leaders of
ethnic militias. The government has largely barred NGO involvement in
aid projects in these ethnic drug areas.
Policy Initiatives. The SLORC did not announce any new drug-control
policy initiatives during 1995. However, the Government continued to
implement its "northern border development program" which in part aims
to reduce and ultimately eliminate opium cultivation in the ethnic
border areas. This program was started in 1990 and refined in the
September 1994 unveiling of an eleven-year "Master Plan for the
Development of Border Areas and National Races." While large sums of
Burmese money reportedly have been allocated for development work in the
opium-producing areas of the Shan state, none of this aid has been
closely tied to reductions in poppy cultivation. In 1995, the UWSA
announced a unilateral plan to establish five "opium poppy-free zones"
in its area of control in order to bring about a gradual reduction of
opium cultivation. Though there is skepticism about the drug-
trafficking group's sincerity, the UNDCP hopes to test this purported
UWSA drug-control commitment through a planned five-year crop
substitution project due to start in mid-1996 in the Wa region.
Accomplishments. The government appeared to take fewer steps to counter
Burma's drug trade in 1995 than in other recent years. A counter-
insurgency campaign seen in the late dry season of February-April 1995
against Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) ended in a brokered peace in
January 1996. Although the details of the peace arrangement are not yet
clear, it seems the MTA will be allowed to operate as an ethnic militia
in the same manner that the UWSA and MNDAA continue to operate in other
parts of the Shan state. It is unknown what, if any, impact the end of
the fight against Khun Sa will have on the heroin trade.
The Burmese effort to seize drugs and arrest traffickers remains
disappointing: less than 100 kilograms of heroin and less than 1.1
metric tons of opium gum were seized by Burmese authorities in 1995.
This represents more than an 80 percent and 53 percent decline,
respectively, from 1994 seizures. Seizures of acetic anhydride
increased by 6 percent to 1,261 gallons. In one particularly large
seizure, Burmese military intelligence and police on May 24 seized 721.5
gallons of acetic anhydride entering Burma from China's Yunnan province
and bound for the MTA.
Burmese police, who account for the bulk of Burma's drug seizures,
appear to be targeting low-level drug violators -- seldom seizing more
than one kilogram of heroin at a time -- while avoiding major
traffickers who are responsible for much larger heroin shipments.
The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances law brought the
Burmese legal code into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention. As
such, the 1993 law contains useful legal tools for addressing money
laundering, the seizure of drug-related assets, and the prosecution of
drug conspiracy cases. However, these provisions remain largely unused
by Burmese police and judicial officials. Burmese authorities have been
slow to implement the law, and have targeted few, if any, major
traffickers. There have been few cases involving money laundering or
seizure of major assets acquired through drug crime. The Burmese
Government, however, continues to express its desire to give its
personnel better training and to make better use of its drug laws. In
November 1995, a UNDCP contractor visited Rangoon to conduct a legal
workshop for Burmese enforcement and judicial personnel.
Law Enforcement. The Burmese Government's coordinated drug enforcement
effort is led by the office of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse
intelligence, and the army. CCDAC now has 17 drug enforcement task
forces around the country, most located in major cities and along key
transit routes near Burma's borders with China, India and Thailand.
Though CCDAC and its task forces are responsible for the bulk of
narcotics seizures and arrests, the agency continues to suffer from a
lack of adequate resources. The UNDCP has provided various CCDAC units
with modest equipment and some training. DEA has also provided basic
drug enforcement training to CCDAC personnel. However, the SLORC's very
small budget allocations for narcotics enforcement do not give the
agency the resources needed to make a credible effort to combat Burma's
massive drug cultivation and trafficking problem.
Corruption. The SLORC's business relationships with some of Burma's top
narco-trafficking minority groups raise suspicion in the minds of some
observers that senior Burmese officials are profiting from narcotics
revenues. There is, however, no evidence that the Government, on an
institutional level or as a matter of policy, is involved in the drug
trade. But there are persistent reports that lower level officials,
particularly in the border regions, are involved in taking bribes in
return for ignoring drug smuggling. The lack of a vigorous enforcement
effort against money laundering leaves Burma vulnerable to the growing
influence of traffickers who will use drug proceeds in legitimate
business ventures, thereby gaining influence over investment and
commercial activities.
Agreements and Treaties. Burma is a party to the 1961, 1971 and 1988 UN
Drug Conventions. However, the Rangoon regime maintains its
reservations on two of the Convention's articles -- one on extradition
of Burmese citizens to third countries and one on the use of the
International Court of Justice to resolve disputes relating to the
Convention (articles 6 and 32, respectively). The United States does
not have a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with Burma. The
Burmese Government has disputed the continuing applicability of the US-
UK Extradition Treaty, which was accepted by the provisional Burmese
Government in 1947.
Cultivation and Production. Burmese opium production doubled with the
opium crop harvested in early 1989 -- the first crop harvested after the
SLORC's seizure of power. Since then Burma's output of opium has
remained at high levels -- near 2,300 metric tons per year. This is by
far the largest amount of opium produced in the world. The 1994 crop
saw a 21 percent decline in production due to poor weather during the
crop's growing season. In 1995, however, the crop rebounded, rising 18
percent to 2,340 metric tons. The bulk of Burma's opium cultivation
traditionally has been in the mountainous regions of the Shan plateau,
which extends the length of the Shan state, from the Chinese border to
the Thai border. Since 1989, however, cultivation has been expanding
into areas under at least nominal Burmese Government control on the west
bank of the Salween river. New cultivation has also been noted in the
Chin state, along Burma's border with India.
Drug Flow/Transit. Heroin is produced in large, relatively static
refineries well ensconced in ethnic enclaves protected by drug
trafficking armies in the Shan state. These labs, run by the ESSA,
MNDAA (Kokang), KDA, UWSA, and MTA, are out-of-bounds to Burmese law
enforcement and paramilitary efforts, under the terms of the SLORC's
cease-fire agreements with these drug militias. A growing amount of
methamphetamine is reportedly produced in labs co-located with heroin
refineries along the China and Thailand borders. Heroin produced by
Burma's ethnic groups is trafficked largely through the porous Chinese
and Thai borders, and to a lesser extent the Indian border. Though the
use of trafficking routes through China to move heroin to the
international market continues at a high level, Thailand remains the
primary route for Burmese heroin to exit Southeast Asia.
Traffickers continued a trend noted last year of moving a growing amount
of heroin through central Burma, often from Lashio, through Mandalay to
Rangoon or other seaports such as Moulmein, for seaborne export to
Singapore or Malaysia. Though some Burmese customs personnel in August
participated in a two-week U.S. Customs training course to help better
identify seaborne and airborne drug shipments, Burmese customs
registered no seizures of narcotics for all of 1995. Trafficking routes
leading through Kachin and Chin states and Sagaing division in northern
Burma to India continue to be used to a limited extent, but largely to
supply regional addict populations in India and Bangladesh. Acetic
anhydride, an essential chemical in the production of heroin, is
imported primarily from China and India and to a lesser extent from
Thailand.
US Policy Initiatives. Direct USG counternarcotics aid to Burma has
remained suspended since 1988, when the Burmese military brutally
suppressed the popular pro-democracy movement. Joint initiatives such
as an aerial eradication program, which had been effective in containing
the expansion of Burmese opium cultivation ended in 1988. Currently,
the USG engages the Burmese Government on a very limited level. DEA
shares drug-related information with the GOB and conducts joint drug
enforcement investigations with Burmese police and military personnel.
Various US agencies have twice joined Burmese counterparts in conducting
annual opium yield surveys in the mountainous regions of the Shan state.
Results from the surveys give both Governments a more accurate
understanding of the scope and magnitude of Burma's opium crop, which in
recent years has been the single largest component of the world's
illicit crop.
The U.S. Government continues to urge the SLORC to take serious steps to
curb Burma's runaway opium production and heroin trafficking.
Specifically, the Rangoon regime has been encouraged to:
--utilize more fully the money laundering and drug conspiracy tools of
Burma's new 1993 drug law in targeting major traffickers;
--target and destroy or confiscate heroin refineries in areas accessible
to Burmese security personnel;
--implement the counternarcotics components of its cease-fire agreements
with ethnic groups in drug producing areas, specifically pushing the
ethnic traffickers to reduce opium poppy cultivation;
--cooperate more fully with UNDCP and international NGOs in implementing
crop substitution and counternarcotics-related health projects.
Bilateral Cooperation. USG counternarcotics cooperation with the
Burmese regime will remain at a restricted level until there is progress
in the areas of human rights and political reform. DEA's liaison with
Burmese police and military -- conducted through DEA's three-man office
in Rangoon -- will continue at its limited level. In 1995, DEA
conducted one two-week training course on basic drug enforcement
techniques, and US Customs conducted a similar course on identifying and
seizing drug shipments.
The Road Ahead. The USG recognizes that no Burmese Government is
capable of effectively dealing with the country's huge drug trade alone.
Large-scale international aid, including developmental assistance and
law enforcement aid, will be needed to curb drug production and
trafficking. The SLORC will need to demonstrate a real commitment to
drug control before any meaningful progress in counternarcotics is
possible.
*****************************************************
AUSTRALIA'S BURMA STAND ATTACKED
[By Mark Baker, South-East Asia correspondent, Bangkok, Wednesday].
(06 June 96)
Thailand has attacked Australiafor attempting to push a tougher
stand against Burma's military regime at next month's meetings of the
seven-member Association of South-East Asian Nations.
The permanent secretary of the Thai Foreign Ministry, Mr Thep
Devakul, has warned Western governments not to try to make Burma's
membership of regional grouping conditional on democratic reforms.
Mr Thep said that both Australia and New Zealand were attempting
to set certain conditions on Burma's pending membership of the ASEAN
Regional Forum - the annual security dialogue between Asian governments,
which includes the US and Australia.
"The conditions are sought so Burma adopts a more lenient
attitude towards democratic groups with the country," said Mr Thep, who
has just returned from Canberra.
He said Western countries should take their own initiatives if
they wanted to press for political reform in Burma and not expect Asian
countries to take the lead. "ASEAN has its pride," he said.
The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Alexander Downer, has
signalled that Australia will raise its concerns about the latest
political crackdown in Burma during the next regional forum meeting,
which follows the annual ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in Jakarta next
month.
"It's an opportunity for a country like Australia to make the
points that we would like to make to the Burmese Government....about the
instability that is currently taking place," he said two weeks ago.
But Australian and New Zealand officials today denied attempts
were being made to set new condiitons on Burma's pending membership of
the regional forum.
A sopkeman for the Foreign Affairs Department in Canberra said
Australia had already indicated it "would not stand in the way" of an
emerging consensus on Burma joining the forum.
But Thailand's stand has serious rift over Burma in Jakarta
between ASEAN countries and their dialogue partner governments.
Both Japan and South Korea, who are also forum members have
stepped up their criticism of the Burmese regime after its renewed
threats against the democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the arrest of
more than 260 of her supporters.
Ms Suu Kyi has denounced as a failure ASEAN's policy of
"constructive engagement", under which member countries have continued to
develop commercial links in the hope that the military will moderate its
political policies.
*********************************************
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