Thailand's Revised Approach, from s

[brelief@xxxxxxx]

Subject: Thailand's Revised Approach, from soc.culture.burma

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Newsgroups: soc.culture.burma
Date: 17 Jun 1996 20:47:47 GMT
Thailand's Tentative Pro - Active Policy toward Burma 
Chao-Tzang,  June 1996
Fax:(604)525-6924   Tel: (604)525-6908
   
   The report by Kavi Chongkittavorn on Thailand's tentative
change from "constructive engagement" to a "pro-active" (meaning,
hopefully, a more balanced) stance, is to be applauded.
   Especially encouraging is Bangkok's declared position against
any action which might  "disrupt the democratization and national
reconciliation process" in Burma, as is Bangkok's recognition of
Aung San Suukyi as a force that guarantees "long-term stability
inside the country".
   It is hoped that the Thai government and leaders will take a
lead in getting ASEAN which, presumable, is still indecisive on
democratization and reconciliation (an obvious key to both future
stability in Burma and the prosperity of the region), to "get its act
together".
   There is, after all, no reason for ASEAN leaders and
government to oppose national reconciliation and democratization
in Burma.  This is because SLORC is also in favor of the above - -
judging from its pronouncement (and claims).
   It seems that all that is now needed, really, is for ASEAN
leaders to explain to both parties in Burma -- the junta (backed by
guns) and the NLD (backed by majority of Bama and non-Bama
people) -- what is meant, fore mostly, by the term "national
reconciliation", and how they should go about to achieve it.
   The task is actually easier than it looks because one party, the
NLD, seems to already understand what the term means. This is
evident from the repeated calls by Aung San Suu Kyi for dialogue
with the region, and as well her willingness to talk with other
political groups and non-Bama leaders in the country.
   Provided, therefore, that ASEAN leaders are themselves not
opposed to national reconciliation in Burma, this process can be
initiated within a few weeks.
   It cannot be that ASEAN leaders do not want national
reconciliation in Burma. The only reason for the opposition of some
ASEAN leaders to initiating the process -- if that is the case --
might be one of "face". Having "not interfered" on the  side of the
wronged, and having "interfered" on behalf of the other party with
inflow of investment to, among other reasons, bolster that party's
image as the "champion" of "free market development", ASEAN
leaders have indeed created the problem of "face".
   However, although "face" is very important in the culture
context, ASEAN leaders are presumably all wise and upright men,
in addition to being very cosmopolitan and sophisticated.
Moreover, they all presumably are community - oriented, moral
leaders. Such being their stature and character, it is hoped that
concern with "face" will not push them to abdicate their sense of
what is the right thing to do.
   As a matter of fact, an even-handed "interference" in Burma
would bolster the stature of ASEAN leaders, and truly give make
them world - class leaders.
   Further, a pro - active ASEAN stance toward Burma would
prove to West and those skeptical and critical of the depth and
moral soundness of "Asian values", that it is not merely empty talk,
or a beautiful tapestry put up to hide grotty, grubby going- ons
behind the scene.
   Indeed, it is now time to prove to the world, and skeptics, that
"Asian values" which ASEAN-Asian leaders subscribe to, is not
interior to, and is as humane as democratic values espoused by the
West.  In this respect, how ASEAN leaders deal with open and
gross injustice and oppression in Burma will be most crucial. 
Burma has become an arena where the humanity and the worth of
"Asian values" will be proved, or as the case may be, disproved.
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