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The Kachin Perspective on the Issue



Subject: The Kachin Perspective on the Issue of Nationhood

BURMA DEBATE
Nov/Dec. 1996

THE ISSUE OF NATIONHOOD

The Nation-State of Burma and the Victimization of Its Co-founders 


 By Maran La Raw, Pd.D. 

Maran La Raw is director of Kachinland Projects U.S.A. 
This paper was adapted from a report prepared for the Central Committee of
the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). 

In 1948, a collection of ethnic nations with very dissimilar backgrounds and
political experiences co-founded the Union of Burma. Each group began with
expectations and ambitions that were unique products of their political
culture and history. The era that began that year was to have initiated a
nurturing interlude when the new nation-state would cultivate unity, common
purpose and a national identity amicable to all co-founders. It did not
happen. Instead, the experiment with democracy floundered, and political
division became more strident. Into this seriously anemic state of affairs,
the military slithered. 
The questions that need to be asked today are what were the obstacles to
national unity prior to 1962, why they were there, and what measures would
now be necessary to overcome them? These issues will determine whether there
can be better prospects for the future or not. The difference between 1947
and 1996 is this: we can take up these questions in order to prepare for the
next era. 

Today, the junta policy persistently ignores the existence of minority
co-founding nationals. The junta's actions proclaim, without apology, Burman
hegemony. There is neither ambiguity nor subtlety, here. The current
government has set out to eradicate minorities in order to exclude them from
the national milieu. Age-old cultural groups and alliances are disallowed
today because they contradict hegemony by one group. 

What realistic chance is there that non-Burman co-founders will accept the
legitimacy of this version of the nation-state? The answer is obvious, and
so is the prognostication of what would likely occur. As in the past,
political division must be remedied by inclusion and equality, and by rights
to self- 
determination to maintain ethnic distinctness. Exclusion at gunpoint is
contrary to problem solving. Clearly, the problem will simmer and increase
in magnitude. 

Given this scenario, it is fundamentally important to have more than faith
in Burma's future. It is crucial to try to come to terms with past problems
and move ahead, to prepare a blueprint for the future. By itself, the future
will not produce a plan; it is up to those who want a future to do the
preparation. 

THE DAWNING OF MODERNITY

The year 1945 concluded with victory celebrations, manau, held at numerous
locations in Kachinland. At long last, the Japanese occupation forces had
been driven out of the hallowed Kachin homeland. Opposing the Japanese to
the bitter end had been costly for the Kachin. Jubilant voices now rang out,
but from amidst twisted and hollow remnants of catastrophic destruction of
property and disruption of life. Hopes for progress for an entire generation
of youth had been stripped away. 
For the leaders, it was time for making momentous decisions. The challenge
of envisioning a post-British Burma was at hand. Questions as to how and
where the Kachin would cast their lot, also what options existed for them
were before them. The year 1946 was more hectic as preparations got underway
for the historic Panglong conference with Bogyoke Aung San. 

Early in 1946, consensus was reached that the Kachin as a nation would join
the other peoples of British Burma as one of the equal co-founders of the
Union of Burma. A strong sense of national unity, equality, and
self-determination was imparted by Bogyoke Aung San in consultations that
led to the historic Panglong Agreement of 1947. To implement the visions
embodied in that Agreement had become the central objective of the Kachin. 

Kachin expectations were clear-cut, that when the Union of Burma came into
being, the process would begin from which a suitable and appropriate
nation-state model would evolve. And they believed that this nation-state
would be based upon the principles of democracy. All the ethnic national
groups were unequivocal in their conviction that the Union of Burma was
being co-founded by free and equal partners; that the Union wasn't emerging
fortuitously or haphazardly out of the exigency of postwar realignments.
They were repeatedly reassured that the Union would never be a platform for
hegemony by the majority. Assurances alone were never sufficient to dispel
lingering suspicions and fears; but the vision of this Union generated
enthusiasm and optimism. It was a fateful moment for the Kachin. 

The years 1948-1962, to the Kachin, were the years of involvement in
actively crafting a nationstate system that would be more equitable and
agreeable. The conviction was strong that reform was the key. This interim
had been foreseen. The effort, though demanding, was clearly mitigated by
the hope that they had in the future of the nation. Although the nation did
not yet have a nation-state organization agreeable to all co-founders,
confidence came from knowing that democratic processes and mechanisms were
already in place to provide the framework of reform. The system was being
given a chance. 

The coup d'etat by Ne Win's army ended that reform process. After 1962,
Burma's political experience was to undergo tempestuous changes; nationstate
models would now be arbitrarily and capriciously imposed by the ruling
junta. Under the current version, imposed by the SLORC (State Law and Order
Restoration Council), totally bizarre concepts of state are coupled with
repressive policies with unprecedented ferocity. Today's reality is the
effect produced by peremptory orders intended to benefit the rulers, instead
of the country and the people. 

Is the Burmese experience today still a political reform process? How can
nationhood, the nationstate and the rights and responsibilities of all
citizens be characterized at this time' 

THE TRAUMA OF WITNESSING

The years under the junta rule have witnessed worsening conditions, rampant
abuses of human rights, totally destructive exploitation of resources to
support an army of outrageous size, relentless persecution of political
dissent, and actions purposely designed to obliterate the cultures,
languages and homelands of ethnic min ties, the erstwhile "equal
co-founders" of the Union. The world has reacted and passed judgement the
junta. Its transgressions are strongly dis proved. With minor exceptions,
the SLORC is viewed as a pariah in the international community today. 

And yet, the world is clearly also traumatize the magnitude of brutality and
vindictiveness. junta's modes of operation -- intimidation, suppression and
subjugation, isolation --have not been effectively challenged. Outside
response has for the most part, been via the news media, or threats of
governments to impose sanctions, without the substance necessary to initiate
change and reform.

Political reform prospects appear daunting today. Activist movements appear
to concede the struggle for the present, presumably in order to concentrate
better on the struggle for the future. The inevitable result is that
prospects for change have become less focused, less certain, and less immediate.

SLORC's Opponents

It is frequently remarked that the opponents of the junta are many unrelated
elements pursuing political goals without any coordination of efforts, and
that they cannot mount a viable opposition.  As opposition has remained
ineffectual, the importance of the democratic experience of 1948 - 1962 has
become more remote, less meaningful, and effective in its grip on the
national psyche. A potential weapon of change is being lost through sheer
passage of time because the opposition not effectively been organized. 

Political division among the co-founding peoples of the Union of Burma has
been the cause of this incapacitation, that much is clear. Why is this
problem so pervasive and tenacious?  Understanding this question, and
beginning to work through it are paramount objectives today. It is the
challenge that planners for Burma's future must confront.

A Question of History?

A number of important questions lurk behind the visible aspects of the
struggle today.  We ask not 
only why political division hindered post-independence political integration
in Burma, but how pre-independence political experiences produced what have
become serious hindrances.  The point is not lost that these obstacles
created much of the chaos that led to dictatorship by the military.

Dictatorships and the Judgement of History

Does history treat dictatorships with kindness and understanding?  Will the
future hold sympathy,  garlands and accolades for the SLORC?  A  military
dictatorship is best viewed as a transitory phenomenon, in the manner that
certain weeds flourish briefly when the topsoil is freshly disturbed. But
there is a limit to how long topsoil is freshly disturbed, as against being
cultivated.  Sturdy plants inevitably displace the transient species.  This
order of succession of plant communities is immutable in nature.  

Ecosystem analogies are appropriate to understand the phenomena of the
SLORC, as its fate is also tied to the futures of disturbed conditions.  The
SLORC is ruthlessly repressive on people and exploitative on resources.  It
has uncontrolled growth.  If the SLORC machine were compared to the
thermodynamic phenomena, the primary characteristic would be that it is
extremely energy intense. The general rule is that the more energy intense
an occurrence is, the greater the problems of sustaining it will become, and
the shorter the expected life-span will tend to be. The SLORC phenomenon is
a turbulence or conflagration that is doomed to burn out and to completely
collapse on itself. This is absolutely inevitable. 

The inviolable laws of nature remind us that the SLORC will implode and it
is certain to leave behind unspeakable destruction and debris. That will be
the challenge for nation-builders. The country will need to be rebuilt upon
a new foundation. The pressing question is whether this new blueprint will
be better than the one of 1948. 

The problem of learning to avoid past mistakes that obstructed national
unity and common purpose, looms large today. Will history attest some day,
that in the winter of 1996, this problem was actually far more difficult and
ominous than that of the SLORC? It's a thought we must not fear or resist 

POST-SLORC RECONSTRUCTION 

Without national unity and common purpose, there can be no hope for success
in reconstruction; and without understanding the nature of past impediments,
unity and consensus cannot be built. This is the dilemma and the challenge.
We also need to overcome the weight of fifty years of mistakes, blundering,
hurt feelings and grievances. National unity and common purpose are on the
other side of this barrier. This weight can again be an unbearable burden,
but there is no choice, we must learn to transform past mistakes into a
better future. 

Political division has been the main obstacle to unity and common purpose in
the past. In part, this division stemmed from the diversified and often
unrelated pasts of the co-founders. The division has also been fueled and
fanned by the mistakes of the post-independence era. And yet, we have again
reached the threshold when these two components of our past must provide
insights, as well as political courage to produce plans wherein unified
nation-building can successfully occur. 

The question is whether the role-players are willing. After being pushed by
treacherous waters during the period between 1948 and 1996, can the once
free and equal co-founders be prevailed upon to shoulder the burden of
rebuilding this failed nation? 

A WIDESPREAD PHENOMENON

The phenomenon of political division and partition is widespread, and recent
histories of India, Pakistan, Korea, Germany, Vietnam, China, Ireland and
the Middle East, attest to that. It is believed that political division and
partition accounted for some of the greatest human tragedies in the
post-Second World War era. These outbreaks have been studied case by case,
and comparisons made. It has been said that if we do not learn from history,
we are doomed to make the same mistakes again. 
Many studies reveal that there are applicable analogies and comparisons from
case to case, that the problem of political division in Burma is neither
unique nor isolated. The possibility exists for a comparative analysis to
consider the situation in Burma which may enable us to deal more rationally
with the problems of the past. 

REFLECTIONS ON KACHIN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 

It  is with this hope that Kachin political history is now being analyzed. A
study is being conducted that will examine Kachin political objectives,
successes and failures, motivations and despairs, since 1948. Our goal is to
demystify our past problems. Kachinland Projects USA, the technical support
program of the Kachin Americans and Friends for Democracy and Human Rights
in Burma, has begun an analysis of the Kachin political experience leading
to 1996. This study is invited by the Central Committee of the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO). The objective is to try to actually learn
from history. While the effort will focus on the Kachin, it is hoped that
the lessons learned will also benefit other role-players in the saga of
post-war Burma.

MARAN BRANG SENG MEMORIAL ESSAYS 

The Central Committee of the KIO saw the value that a study such as this
would have, and expressed its desire to have one done. This body has been
the political arm of the Kachin reform movement since 1963; it is also
continuing the reform agenda that came out of the experience after 1948. 

Kachinland Projects USA will distribute this report as the "Maran Brang Seng
Memorial Essays on Kachin Political History and Analysis." 

ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN KACHIN POLITICAL HISTORY 

The basic aspects of the study are the framework for analysis, and the
objectives. The selection of a framework for analysis is important be cause,
ideally, it must also be appropriate for other indigenous peoples to use, as
well. The specific objectives of the study are: 

A. To present the Kachin political agenda, expectations and ambitions, as
they were in 1947; 
B. To explain why the Kachin came up with this political plan for the
future, i.e., the post-British era in Burma, and why this was necessary. 
C. To analyze what in the Kachin's previous experience and history (i.e.,
before the World War) motivated and undergirded this game plan. 
D. To discuss if the Kachin were satisfied with their situation by 1958, and
if they weren't, whether this meant that there were unwanted departures from
their plans of 1947. What are the details of this discontent, and which
aspects of the plan were believed to be unfairly thwarted? How did this come
about? 
E. To point out that in 1947, the Kachin carefully took stock of their
situation and came to the realization that there would have to be major
reform at the nation-state level, which they pursued. Military dictatorship,
however, aborted this effort. 
F. To speculate and assess the fate of the Kachin people. Now, in 1996 what
is the prognosis? 

HISTORY AND ITS LESSONS

Modern Kachin political history consists of four distinct eras: 
1) The era before Kachinland became part of British-Burma, to 1886.
2) The era of British-Burma, 1886-1947. 
3) The Union of Burma, 1948-1962. 
4) Burma under the dictatorship of the military, 1962-1996. 

The first era is important to understanding the Kachin as a highly organized
people with their own political history and territorial homeland. The
outlook and political desires of a people at a given point in history are
based on the experience and achievements leading to that moment. 

Era I illustrates characteristics of the Kachin; their emergence as a
cultural nation (kulturnation, in German), their acknowledged status as
one-people (einvolk); a distinctive language community, the vigor of the
political and cultural organizations of their society; and a clearly defined
territory or homeland (until the British challenged it). Technically, the
Kachin had reached the nation-state (staatsnation) status prior to
confronting the British, by virtue of their political behavior, by how they
perceived themselves, and by how they were interacting with other
nation-states (the British, King Bodawpaya, and Shan rulers). 

The second era saw the Kachin in a position to nurture and consolidate the
nationhood that emerged out of the previous era. Entry into an industrial
age also occurred, with emphasis on education and gradual de-emphasis on
traditional institutions.

It also saw two significant developments: first, "Kachin Hills" became part
of the geopolitical entity of British=Burma, and second, the Kachin did not
become a "minority people" of Burma under the British.  Their presence in
British-Burma was without effective political integration.  This is
extremely important in understanding their post-independence experience.

Era I and Era II inspired, legitimized, and made necessary the political
game plan of 1947.  The success or failure of the experience of 1948-1962
would be judged against this game plan.  To expect that they should have
aimed for less than they already had would be wrong.

Era III saw the political agenda of 1947 severely tested.  No successful
implementation of their plans took place and the Kachin felt that they were
denied the transition necessary to make adjusting to the new reality
successful.  Also, there was the emerging of the hegemony of the majority.
Most critically, the Kachin were, for the first time in their modern
experience, fast becoming a minority.  Psychologically, this is most
significant.  Understanding the effects of Era III is critically important
to understand what kind of future might be envisioned for the reconstruction
of the Union of Burma.

It is clear that the 1947 game plan is now perceived as allowing for a more
highly structured interpretation of "basic rights".
A. Inalienable rights by virtue of the Kachin nationhood, as before.
B.  Negotiable rights, mostly related to territoriality, resources, etc.
C.  Earlier rights that have become archaic, and need no longer be adhered
to, or contended, such as civil administration law replacing the Hilltribes
Regulation Acts, codified by the British.

The final era is characterized by highly destructive turbulence; its most
important effect will be the nullification of the Panglong Agreement as the
platform vision, agenda and goals.

Era IV witnessed the total abrogation of the Kachin political agenda of
1947, and the game plan in effect as late as 1965.  In terms of political
considerations, the Kachin are now back in the situation of 1945-1947.  The
investment of 1948-1962 is in total limbo, being taken captive by the
military dictators.  That investment may be reinstalled and political reform
pursued.  Or, the original free and equal co-founders may go their separate
ways.  These are the two options that lie ahead.  Any effort to influence
the course of history toward one or the other fate must be made today.

RESURGENCE OF ETHNICITY

There is enormous resurgence of ethnicity or nationalistic sentiment today
and the battle cry is chillingly conflictive.  There are Kachin in India
(Assam) and there are even more in China, and they continue to be one-
people, still a significant kulturnation with a dynamic social organization.

Lessons from history attest that this nation is unlikely to be stamped out.
The odds are that the problem will outlive the miliary dictatorship.
Comparative evidence from around the world suggest that political division
cannot be eliminated by discrimination and persecution and that the problem
of nationhood dos not go away just because the majority is unwilling to
accommodate minority rights.

WHAT NEXT?

The fact that advances in transportation and communication technologies
continue to make the world grow smaller, together with the fact that
economic management of resources continues to become more global, add other
potentially critical parameters to the equation of political division and
minority resistance.

History possesses massive evidence that SLORC cannot win this struggle.





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