10/8/96:BURMA TRANSITION - WRONG WA

[uneoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Subject: 10/8/96:BURMA TRANSITION - WRONG WAYS AND BAD EXAMPLES

/* Written 10 Aug 6:00am 1996 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* ----------------" Burma's transition "-------------------- */

BURMA TRANSITION: WRONG WAYS AND BAD EXAMPLES

In December 1993, the SLORC leaders paid visit to Indonesia, reportedly to
gain a first-hand impression of the Indonesia's so called "dual function"
role for the army. After 3 years of failed trials to introduce such role
for the army on its constitution making efforts, the SLORC recently turned
to the Philippines for advice on "how a transition from dictatorship to
democracy may be made".

While it may be helpful to look for some examples, these both cases
do not necessarily give a suitable model for Burma. The Indonesia's
"dual function" role for army has, undoubtedly, some elements of political
liberalization that seem to accomodate people's views. However, today's
Burmese population require much more political liberalization than
the Indonesian model can provide. Therefore, it is not surprising to see
that even the SLORC sponsored convention has failed to endorse the
"leading role for military" in future Burma's politics.

In the Philippines, people's power revolution had brought down the
government and given ways to democracy. Though the final result may be
desirable, it is not always have to have a popular revolution of the
sort to change a government. Certainly, there are much more suitable
models that can be found for Burma's transitions.

A notable difference to above two examples to Burma situation is that
in Burma we have the elected representatives that recognized by United
Nations as legitimate leaders of Burma. It is therefore advantageous
to build a transitional model that is inclusive of these elected leaders.

One possible option for the transition period is the South
African model. A transitional administration, known as Government of
National Unity, was formed to function with white minority government and
majority black leaders led by Nelson Mandela.

South Africa in December 1991, a forum known as CODESA - Convension for a
Democratic South Africa - was convened. The white minority government,
political parties including the main opposition organization, the African
National Congress, laid out the foundation for future Democratic South
Africa. The outside observers, such as the United Nations, European
Community and Organization of African Unity, were also present at the
CODESA. One notable fact about CODESA is that the South African
people and organizations by themselves have sorted out the political
differences at the convention. The United Nations, etc, play their role
strictly as outside observers. It did not take extra-ordinarily long time
to complete convention: on early February-93 a transitional arrangement -
the Government of National Unity - was agreed upon and the South Africa's
first multi-party, non-racial election date was announced on June-93.

In the case of Burma, a significant difference to above case will be the
election of 27-May-1990. The result of the 1990-Election must be fully
respected, or at least being incorporated, in the future transitional
arrangements.

CHILDISH EXCUSES

It helps nobody in making such childish excuses as "SLORC have
been making dialogue since 1993": it may only irritate the public. The
SLORC leaders - and its propaganda - favourite choice, "BURMA AS BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA" also seem to be an irrelevant example. One notable
difference between the Bosnia and Burmese population is that in Burma we
do not have the same kind of "ethnic hatred" that may generate such
conflict. To day, the continuing ethnic conflicts in Burma are result of
political inequality between Burman and ethnic minorities. Burma's
ethnic rebels, exception to drug lords, cannot mount armed conflict
to the level of regional destabilization. Most importantly, the political
agenda as well as the focus for the Burma's ethnic rebel are much clear:
everybody wants a genuine federal union; and all for the support of Aung
San Suu Kyi and building Burma's democracy. It therefore that, if Burma
been unfortunately destabilized, the trend is not going towards to that of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The danger that present to Burma came from and within the army. The closer
international examples are those of Somalia or Liberia. In Somalia, the
central administration breakdown in January 1991; dozens of warlords sprunged
up and fight for territory. In Liberia, the dictator Samuel Doe regime was
successfully ousted by the rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia(NPFL)
in 1989. Although the Doe regime had collapsed under attack, the NPFL
was unable to consolidate power and half a dozen armed factions emerged.
The senseless fightings continues until today. As we read recent Karen
Human Rights Groups reports and seeing the behaviour of the Burmese soldiers,
it make much more sense of these dangers.

The Liberia example give us the need for Burma democrats to build the
democratic institutions and to consolidate even before any transfer of
power can take place.

DIALOGUE IS ONLY SOLUTION

Contrary to what was said in public media about the stability of SLORC,
the weakness of SLORC can be seen simply by looking at their Cabinet.
The 60 member Cabinet(36 Ministers + 24 Deputies) is as a result of
insecurity of SLORC leaders. The SLORC leadership do not dare to dismiss or
demote anyone of its Cabinet members: an open dissension by one member may
have domino effects. Over the years, the regional military commanders who
became powerful also had to be "kicked up-stairs" and be given Minister
posts in order to neutralize the threat to central administration.

SLORC refusing to talk to opposition NLD is not only posing danger to
itself, but also to the entire Burma's population and the region. Recent
initiative to include Burma into ARF is not providing legitimacy to
SLORC, but it should be interpreted as the ARF's recoginition of the
situation in Burma as potential threat to the region. SLORC leaders must
fully understand this fact and co-operate with international community
in solving the problems. -- U Ne Oo.
___________________________________________________________________
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!          http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/~uneoo              !
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	ASIA: MILITARY REGIME HOLDS FIRST REGULAR NEWS CONFERENCE
BURMA
   RANGOON, Aug 1 AP - In the first of a promised series of monthly
news conferences, the military government told reporters today that
pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi's party would not be allowed
to help write a new constitution.
	   The National League for Democracy led by Suu Kyi walked out of a
convention to write a new constitution last November, claiming it
was stacked in favour of the government. Officials said today that
convention rules would not allow the party to return.
	   Asked when the regime might open a dialogue with Suu Kyi, winner
of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw indicated
that no talks were imminent. Suu Kyi has sought a dialogue since
she was freed in July 1995 from six years of house arrest.
	   "Dialogue began in 1993 at the National Convention," Ohn Gyaw
Gyaw  said. "The NLD boycotted the National Convention of their own
will."
	   Ohn Gyaw was one of several officials from the State Law and
Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, to attend the first monthly
briefing promised by authorities at the urging of local reporters
for foreign news organisations. They should be held the first of
every month.
	   The meetings reflect the government's apparent desire to improve
its image after international criticism greeted a harsh crackdown
of Suu Kyi's followers in May. But the regime may also feel more
confident since last month's induction of Burma - also called
Myanmar - as an observer to the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, a coup in the junta's quest for legitimacy.
	   Information Minister Lieutentant General Aye Kyaw, who presided
at the news conference, told reporters the meetings with the media
would set the record straight, accusing the Western press of
"wrong, incomplete and inaccurate reports about Myanmar."
	   Asked why no Western journalists were present, a senior military
officer, Colonel Thein Shwe, replied that notice had been short but
that the news conference was not limited to non-Western reporters.
	   "It is open to all journalists and I hope to see more foreign
journalists at the next news conference," Thein Shwe said.
	   The last news conference held by SLORC officials was May 23, at
the height of a roundup of hundreds of Suu Kyi's supporters to stop
a conference marking the sixth anniversary of parliamentary
elections that pro-democracy candidates overwhelmingly won. The
SLORC never honoured the result.
	   The SLORC succeeded an earlier military regime in 1988, putting
down street protests that saw Suu Kyi, daughter of independence
hero Aung San, emerge as the country's leading democracy advocate.
	   The regime held weekly news conferences after the takeover, but
their frequency became fewer and fewer. Since the end of 1990, the
press was summoned only occasionally for briefings.
	   Aye Kyaw met with Burma's foreign correspondents club July 11
and complained about "some negative reports." Journalists replied
that their job would be eased if the government would hold regular
briefings.
	   Today's meeting was held at the headquarters of state radio and
television before 17 Burmese citizens who work for foreign news
outlets, a Chinese and some Japanese journalists, and press
attaches from various embassies, including the United States,
Britain and France.
	   AP jv