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LETTER TO SEC-GEN KOFI ANNAN (29/4/



Subject: LETTER TO SEC-GEN KOFI ANNAN (29/4/97)

/* Written 5 May 6:00am 1997 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* -----------" Letter to Sec-Gen.Kofi Annan (29/4/97) "----------- */

LETTER TO THE U.N.SECRETARY-GENERAL KOFI ANNAN
**********************************************
Dr U Ne Oo
48/2 Ayliffes Road
St Marys SA 5042
Australia

April 29, 1997.

Mr Kofi Annan
Secretary-General of United Nations
United Nations Headquarters
New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A.

Dear Secretary-General:

Re: The vist of U.N.Envoys to Burma on 7-10 May 1997.
-----------------------------------------------------
I am encouraged to learn that you will be sending a Special Envoys to
Burma, at the recommendation of recent Commission on Human Rights, to
initiate a dialogue between the Military Government of Burma, National
League for Democracy and the representatives of ethnic nationalities. I
believe that the continuing attention to Burma situation by the United
Nations and international community are very important to bring a
democratic change to Burma and also to solve the human rights and
humanitarian problems in Burma. Therefore, I respectfully urge the United
Nations and international community to continue putting forward their best
efforts to implement the Commission REsolution and, particularly, to
initiate a dialogue in Burma. Following is the submission to you of my
personal views on current situation in Burma that might help to solve the
problems.

1. Division within the SLORC: There has been recent reports ofn internal
division within the SLORC-leadership regarding with the issue of engaging
in a dialogue with the National League for Democracy. Some political
division within SLORC, reportedly, has also been in existence with regards
to ceasefires and ethnic nationality's issues since late 1994 (A copy of
letter attached for information). Although there appeared to have been such
a division within Burma military regarding with federal solution for Burma
in the past, I believe that people inside Burma now are more informed and
having enough exposure about a future federal Burma. The members of elected
National League for Democracy and, especially, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have
supported in principle about the federal solution to the ethnic nationality
problems. It is evident that the elected representatives and ethnic
resistance groups are now politically united on the issue of future federal
union for Burma.

I believe that the SLORC-leadership currently are politically isolated not
only from the international community but also from the Burmese military
rank-and-files. The existing division in SLORC is confined to few top
leaders of SLORC and it is much more of personal in nature. Thus, a
dialogue can be achieved by putting substantive pressure on SLORC
collectively or individually - as the situation required.

2. Representatives of Ethnic Nationalities: I beleve that the National
Democratic Front (NDF), an umbrella group of ethnic freedom fighters, is
most appropriate body to enter into dialogue with teh Burmese military. Out
of the listed 15 rebel groups in the attached statement, those mainly are
the members of National Democratic Front, only one prominent group - the
Karen National Union - has not yet signed ceasefire agreement with the
SLORC. However, according to the statement made by the Ethnic Nationalities
Seminor on 15-January-1997, all existing groups wanted to participate in a
tripartite dialogue and in drawing up of the Federal Constitution.

3. The National Convention: The SLORC has stated on occassion that the
existing National Convention as appropriate forum for dialogue. On
November-1995, the National League for Democracy withdrew its participation
from the SLORC-sponsored National Convention because of the undemocratic
work procedures in that Convention. The U.N. Envoys should bring back the
NLD into the National Convention in exchange for SLORC allowing the full
participation of National Democratic Front in the Convention and also of
making appropriate changes to the Convention's work procedures. It should
also be noted that the participation of NDF in such dialogue may
automatically lead to a conclusion of ceasefire between the Karen National
Union and Burmese army. Please also note that the ethnic nationalities
organizations particiaption in the Convention and dialogue will certainly
pave the way for solving Burma's refugee problem.

4. The role of military in politics: The SLORC insists that the military
must have a leading role in future politics. While such proposition for
military to have a leading role is totally unacceptable, as a measure of
political necessity the participation of military in politics could be
arranged. The SLORC leadership sometime have suggested that 25 percent of
military personnel to be allocated in the Parliament. Arrangements can be
made, for example, one military personnel assigned to every four electorate
and give an equal voting power in the Parliament as one elected
representative. The proposition must also be made to phased-out such
participation of military personnel over a certain period - say, for
example, within 4-terms (16-years). It should be noted that the younger
military officers in Burma, in contrast to current SLORC-leadership, are
more educated and therefore their contribution to the administration of
Burma can be quite valuable.

5. The transfer of power: The United Nasions and international community
should push for certain deadline - say, two years period - for the
completion of the Constitution. The U.N. should offer to supervise in
writing the federal Constitution.

In order to discharge their mandated duties, the members of parliament
elected in 27-May-1990 election must be able to serve in the first term of
government after the new Constitution is completed. Local by-elections may
be held for the MPs who were deceased in the period leading to the forming
of the government.

6. Federal structure of government: The ethnic nationality groups have the
desire to work with the federal system of government. True, it is quite
complex, historically, to examine the nature of ethnic rebellion in Burma.
I however believe that the existing rebellion can be interpreted as of
arising from the long term neglect to the minority areas by Burman
dominated central governments and political inequality suffered by the
minority people. Appropriate measures should be made in new constitution to
redress this problem: such as a separation of power be made between Federal
and State governments; the State governments are to be given, for example,
the responsibility for health, education, development and local economy;
the Federal government is to be taken charge of defence, foreign affairs,
etc. This will help to solve the ethnic nationality problems in the long
term.

Currently, the ethnic nationality groups are mostly in the form of armed
resistance groups. They will certainly need to develop themselves to become
political parties that are fit to form a local government. After a
nationwide ceasefire is implemented and the dialogue has started, the
ethnic nationality groups should take certain steps to disarm and
demobilize their troops. These tasks must be done with the assistance of
the United Nations and international community. It is quite possible that
such transformation for ethnic resistance groups may take a little longer
than writing constitution.

7. Alternative programme: Given the SLORC's record of breaking its promises
made at the U.N. forums, there are doubts about the SLORC negotiating with
the opposition. There is a possibility that the SLORC delegation had made
the ivitation for U.N. Envoys simply to reduce the mounting pressure at the
Commission. Therefore, an alternative programme need to be carried-out in
case of the dialogue do not occur as planned.

Clearly, the SLORC nowadays do not have the support of people of Burma and
majority of military rank-and-file. To my assessment, the SLORC can exist
as a government simply because of there is no alternative political entity.
In other words, the legitimacy of SLORC can be removed by promoting an
alternative government. To this effect, certain efforts can be made to
raise the profile of National League for Democracy. The National League for
Democracy should be encouraged to officially assign, as a first step in
that effort, its representatives to the United Nations and various
countries. There have already been the members of parliament elects
residing at the various parts of the globe and they can therefore be
assigned to such duty.

The other alternative is to make a forceful removal of the SLORC
leadership. Though that option seems to be a rather small possibility, the
United Nations and international community can certainly direct their
efforts to such a resolve. I will continue to appeal to the United Nations
Security Council and especially to the Government of the United States to
give such pressure on SLORC should this current initiative for dialogue
fails.

In closing, I thank the Secretary-General, [Assistant]-Secretary-General
for Political Affairs and Commission on Human Rights for your kind
attention to Burma matters. We are interested to know the outcomes of
current U.N.efforts and therefore we'll appreciate the U.N.Envoys informing
about their visit to Burma to the public media.

Yours respectfully and sincerely
Sd. U Ne Oo.

Copy to:
--------
1. Hon. Madeleine Albright, U.S.Secretary of State, United States
Department of State, Washington D.C. 20520, U.S.A.

2. Mr Alvaro de Soto, Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs,
United Nations New York N.Y. 10017, U.S.A.

3. Ms Sadako Ogata, U.N.High Commissioner for Refugees, Palias des Nations,
Case Postale 2500, CH - 1211 GEneva 2 Depot, Switzerland.

4. Hon. Rajsoomer Lallah, Special Rapporteur for HUman Rights in Myanmar,
c/- Centre for Human Rights, Palias des Nations, CH - 1211 Geneva 10,
Switzerland.

5. Hon. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Parliament
HOuse, Canberra ACT 2600 for information.

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