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DASSK AND DIALOGUE IN BURMA.



/* Written 4 Jun 6:00am 1997 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* ------------------" DASSK and Dialogue "------------------ */

THE DIALOGUE IN BURMA CANNOT BE HELD WITHOUT AUNG SAN SUU KYI
*************************************************************
There has been report of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi offering to stay out of
dialogue in Burma; possibly in the notion that SLORC might make compromise
with National League for Democracy in the absence of DASSK. I believe that
such an offer of DASSK to stay out of dialogue is not in the best interest
of the democracy movement. One reason for that is the National League for
Democracy has always been identified, both inside and outside of the
country, with the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. In addition to that,
she appears to be the most knowledgeable person regarding with
democratization amongst current Executive Committee of NLD. It therefore
will be inappropriate for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to take a relatively
unassuming role in the dialogue.

DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN NLD AND MOVEMENT
**********************************************************
It is well known to all of us of the struggle of National League for
Democracy and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Among the three founders of NLD - U
Aung Gyi, U Tin Oo(Executive) and Daw Aung SAn Suu KYi - notably U Aung
Gyi had withdrawn from party when things were getting difficult. It is Aung
San Suu Kyi and the current NLD-EC who deserve the credit for maintaining
the momentum and organization of the party. It must be noted that
maintaining an opposition party - The NLD - under a very repressive regime
like SLORC is by no means a small task. The courage and discipline of MPs
as well as EC leadership are, therefore, most remarkable.

Her leadership role in the democracy movement, although may be repetitive
to some other writings, also need to be clarified. The leaders like Aung
San Suu Kyi are mostly referred to in politics as the "visionary leaders".
Firstly, to her choice of resistance to the military junta - the
non-violent struggle. As I recalled, there was skepticism about such kind
of resistance to military regime in 1989-1990, both by the Burmese and
foreigners. Many Burmese, of course, heard of Gandhi and the non-violent
resistance. However the majority at that time do not really believe
such method can make a change or simply don't know how to start a struggle.
I myself, at that time a Ph.D. student at the Adelaide University and
intensely interested in, but an "on-looker" to the democracy movement, do
not have enough knowledge about such struggle and simply do not believe
that such method may bring a change to Burma.

The first surprise to us was the election result of 27-May-1990. We know,
at that time, Burmese people do not support the military regime. However,
to yield such an un-ambiguous message of disapproval of SLORC by the
Burmese people in such a way is quite unbelievable (at least, to me).
This has led me to conclude that the result must be attributed to the
non-violent method.

The superiority of such non-violent struggle over an armed resistance
is clearly shown by such election result. The 1990 election result has made
military junta illegitimate and has removed the military regime's
legitimacy (Note here: the term 'legitimacy' is used in positive sense, as
in the cases of governments in the democratic societies.). It is obvious
that if the Burmese people were to stage a full-scale armed struggle
beginning in 1988, they wouldn't achieve that much within two years.
With this evaluation, I began to believe that there must be something of
credible forces within such non-violent struggle.

Aung San Suu Kyi's choice of non-violent struggle is also quite timely for
post-Cold War period. In Cold War politics, it might have been possible to
search for military support to oust such regime. However, in the post-Cold
War, the non-violent struggle seems to be the only way forward.(Her ideals
and underlying motives in choosing non-violent method at that time in 1988
being reflected in the note by Philip Kreager in book "Freedom From Fear".
As things turned out, the Cold War has ended soon after the 1988-events of
Burma, and the World's Politics appears to become more in favour of
a non-violent struggle for Burma.)

Her distinguished contribution to the Burma democracy movement in broader
context is of the writings of the book, "Freedom From Fear". Her writings
in these book are not only of inspirational to many democracy activists,
but also shed some light on how one can tread the path of non-violence.
According to my perceptions, the two distinguished essays in that book,
"In Quest of Democracy" and "Freedom From Fear", have adequately given one
to the answers of where and how to start a non-violent struggle.

GRASSROOTS SUPPORTS TO THE MOVEMENT IS IMPORTANT
************************************************
A frequent response amongst the pro-democracy activists to whom I come
into contact with in regards to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's leadership is total
and unconditional support. It is, of course, helpful to give such support;
but, in my personal view, a more informed and active support by grassroots
to leadership are much more helpful. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself may be a
"visionary". However, in a struggle, the grassroots people must be able to
formulate plans so as to serve that vision. It is not healthy to be relying
too much on the leadership on actions; the grassroots supports groups must
make their own initiatives and take responsibility for every and any
action. This will also ease pressures regarding the task of decision-making
of the political leadership. The best way to do that is to increase
communication & discussion among the groups and to stick to implementing
best policy available.

The co-operation amongst grassroots support groups, especially outside the
country, is the most important factor in carrying out the struggle. Making
own initiatives and having sought co-operations amongst grassroots groups
can also be considered as a form of "Self-empowerment". From a small
local-refugee advocacy group to a larger political body, such as NDF, one
must try to make own initiative and sought co-operation amongst colleagues
and supporters. By observing the campaigns carried out in recent period, it
can be noted that we - the grassroots groups - are in a good form in such
cooperations.

WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK
*************************
The support from international community is also important. We must
continue to urge substantive actions from the United Nations and United
States. It is up to the major powers to put substantive pressure on SLORC
if and when they considered to be appropriate and ready. In the meantime,
the National League for Democracy should be urged to prepare itself to
develop into the best form of a government. Prodemocracy forces outside of
the country can contribute valuable part in this regards: such as promoting
transitional economic policies, alternative constitution etc. Hopefully,
people who have the competence to do the work come out of the crowd.

POWER MUST BE CONSOLIDATED
**************************
Not surprisingly, current situation of the National League for Democracy
and SLORC in Power is quite similar to period of 1944-47, the AFPFL
requesting from the British to transfer state power. General Aung San wrote
in his "The Burma Challenge, 1946" with regards to power transfer as:

        "The climax of every Revolution is the transfer of power. .....
        power is not a thing to be seized today, and lost tomorrow. It must
        be firmly held and consolidated."

General Aung San's note ended with one notable advice: there can be no such
thing as 'Revolution in one-stroke', i.e. things can only be done one step
at a time. It is the time for the NLD to begin consolidating its power.

One psychological barrier for these NLD-ECs for consolidation of power is
Burmese distaste for power combined with politeness. Burmese people
especially do not like the 'power-mongers' and therefore some of NLD-EC/MPs
may be reluctant to be seen as 'power-greedy'. However, these NLD-ECs
should be more assertive in assuming their mandated role as elected
representatives who must taken charge of the state power.

One other criticism frequently put forward by SLORC is Aung San Suu Kyi's
marriage to a Briton. Such an issue - not that important to most Burmese -
might have come into consideration in normal circumstances. However, current
situation is a most extra-ordinary circumstances and therefore Aung San Suu
Kyi should ignore such criticism from SLORC. Burmese people want to see
Aung San Suu Kyi serving them in a government, whilst Suu Kyi cannot change
her marriage to a Briton; No Burmese wanted SLORC members to be in the
government, whilst army personnel may have to be included in government -
these are the kind of compromises that one must contemplate at this moment.

With best regards, U Ne Oo.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
ASEAN FACES TOUGH DECISION ON BURMA
30.5.97/THE NATION
YINDEE LERTCHAROENCHOK

RANGOON'S INTRANSIGENCE HAS PUSHED THE REGIONAL GROUPING FURTHER
OUT ON A LIMB, YINDEE LERTCHAROENCHOK WRITES.

When Asean foreign ministers begin their meeting tomorrow in
Kuala Lumpur to finalise the admission of Burma, Cambodia and
Laos into the regional grouping, they will find Burma's
membership the most problematic.

Although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has responded
positively-to Burma's bid to join the economic and political
bloc, its members are finding it increasingly difficult to
justify their association with the intransigent Burmese junta and
their decision to grant it membership this year.

The ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council's (Slorc)
latest crackdown on the opposition National League for Democracy
(NLD) could not have come at a worse time and is a big
embarrassment for Asean.

The news of the nationwide arrests of NLD MPs, members and their
family members - more than 300 in total - broke on May 21, just
one day after US President Bill Clinton signed into force an
executive order imposing economic sanctions against Burma, and
exactly 10 days before the crucial Asean meeting.

The sweeping crackdown took place less than two weeks after the
May 7 to 10 visit to Burma of UN special envoy Alvaro de Soto, an
assistant secretary-general for political affairs who was in the
country to facilitate national reconciliation and dialogue.

Along with the clampdown, Slorc also tried to block the NLD from
holding a congress to commemorate the party's ignored landslide
victory in the May 27,1990 general elections and to work out its
political programme and activities.

Although Asean members have played down any impacts from the
American economic sanctions on their relations with Slorc, they
are aware that Burma could become an unwelcome source of
confrontation between the grouping and its Western dialogue
partners, especially the US.

They are also concerned that Washington's broadly-written
economic sanctions could have far-reaching implications and might
affect American participation in regional projects that extend
from a third country to Burma.

With rising domestic opposition to Burma's admission, Asean
governments know that their peoples are becoming more intolerant
of Slorc's repressive behaviour and its aggression which is
extending beyond Burma's border.

In Thailand, the public was shocked by the unexpected deployment
of Burmese troops to protect the Burmese dredging of a disputed
islet on the Moei River. Although top Thai officers promptly
intervened to resolve the crisis, Burmese and Thai troops were at
one time facing off just a few metres apart.

They are also upset that Slorc has been indifferent to the
resettlement of hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants in
Thailand - the largest Burmese community outside Burma whose
presence has been a heavy financial? economic and social burden
for the Thai public.

In Malaysia, the powerful Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement (Abim)
has accused Slorc of harassing Burmese Muslim communities to the
extent of "ethnic cleansing" and of practising religious
discrimination against Islam.

Abim?, whose founder and former president is the current acting
prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, has condemned Slorc for the
alleged demolition of more than 30 mosques and other Muslim
properties throughout Burma since March 16 this year.

Abim secretary-general Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman called on his
government to review its constructive engagement policy with
Burma and to delay the country's entry into Asean.

Foreign diplomats in the Burmese capital and in Bangkok share a
similar opinion that as the regional and international pressure
mounts, and with Burma's mismanaged economy on the verge of
collapse, Slorc is acting and reacting more irrationally.

They believe that some Asean countries are well aware that
Burma's premature membership in Asean in the absence of
democratic and human rights improvements could become a
liability and no an asset for the grouping and could further
alienate it from its key Western dialogue partners, especially
the US and the European Union.

Slorc's intransigence, and refusal to compromise and open a
dialogue with the NLD, stems from the tacit political and
economic support it has secured over the years from key 'regional
powers Asean, China and Japan, as well as their pledges of non
interference.

Obviously, the regime is betting that it can, like in May last
year when more than 260 NLD activists were arrested, survive the
current international backlash against its crackdown on the NLD.

According to well-informed diplomatic sources, Slorc has retained
"a very tough stance" on nearly all issues, particularly the
refusal to hold talks with the NLD.

Although the regime has agreed to let UN human rights envoy to
Burma Rajsoomer Lallah visit the country "soon" - probably in
September - and has already started talks with the Geneva-based
International Committee of the Red Cross on the reopening of its
office in Rangoon, it has refused to budge on other issues.

The sources pointed out that the latest crackdown on the NLD was
Slorc's reply to NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi's latest peace
initiative. In her recent proposal to Slorc, the Nobel Prize
laureate agreed to stay out of any NLD dialogue with the ruling
generals.

Suu Kyi has assured Slorc that the NLD was not seeking power and
that the dialogue could be "unconditional?? and "secret" and be
"talk about talk", "talk about agenda" or "talk about modality".

She agreed that she would stay out of the talks and let other top
NLD leaders - U Kyi Maung? U Tin Oo and U Aung Shwe - participate
in them. Asean countries have been informed of Suu Kyi's latest
peace overture, according to the sources.

Interestingly, while the NLD seemed to have softened its stance
for the sake of national reconciliation, Slorc has- toughened its
stance and increased its suppression of the democratic
opposition.

Sources said Slorc had, during the recent meeting with UN envoy
de Soto? blamed the NLD and Suu Kyi for the two tragic bombings
in December and April that killed a number of innocent people
including the eldest daughter of a top Slorc general.

Slorc's ignorance and disrespect of the Burmese and international
calls for political reform and compromise should not go
unnoticed. Moreover, its repressive behaviour and aggression
against its people and Burma's neighbours should be punished and
not rewarded with Asean membership.

*****************************************************************