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Fly in the Ointment
- Subject: Fly in the Ointment
- From: ausgeo@xxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 18 Jun 1997 05:39:00
Fly in the Ointment
(Far Eastern Economic Review)
Asean's decision to make Burma, Cambodia and Laos members from July will
present multiple dilemmas for the grouping itself and for its relations with
the West.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Murray Hiebert in Kuala Lumpur, Nigel Holloway in Washington and Michael
Vatikiotis in Bangkok
------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 12, 1997
F or Asean, the real work is only just beginning. The grouping's decision to
embrace Burma despite protests over human-rights abuses along with Cambodia
and Laos was only the first step. Now it faces the more formidable task of
integrating the new members into a 10-nation bloc and managing its relations
with the rest of the world.
Asean won't have to wait long for its first challenge. American Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright and several European foreign ministers all of whom
opposed Burma's admission will hold talks with their Asean counterparts in
Kuala Lumpur in late July, a day or two after the new members are admitted.
The presence of the Burmese could put the Western foreign ministers in a
ticklish position.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who announced the May 31
decision to admit the new members, tried to avoid giving the impression that
Asean was thumbing its nose at the West. It was not a signal. We signal to
nobody, he told journalists at the end of an Asean foreign ministers' meeting
in Kuala Lumpur.
But in an apparent attempt to limit the scope for dispute, Badawi said Asean
would not assign the new members dialogue partners with nonmember nations. The
United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and
South Korea hold a series of dialogues with Asean members after the bloc's
annual meeting. The decision not to give the new members dialogue partners
will tend to marginalize them and essentially make them second-string members
of Asean, at least for several years.
Another hurdle is the Asia Europe summit in London next year. The British
government bars visas to Rangoon's military leaders, which means a dispute may
arise over whether Burma will be allowed to attend the summit. A senior
European diplomat in Bangkok says the European Parliament is also unlikely to
amend the EU's protocol with Asean to recognize Burma's membership in the
grouping. This could complicate future dealings between the two blocs.
Other countries such as Canada and Japan provide aid to Asean but refuse or
restrict bilateral assistance to Burma. Asean, however, doesn't allow donors
to exclude any of its members from aid programmes for the grouping. But no
Canadian politician will risk signing an agreement with Slorc, predicts Abdul
Razak Baginda, head of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. (Slorc stands
for the State Law and Order Restoration Council, Burma's ruling military
junta.) Integration of the new members into Asean could prove equally
daunting. Admission is easy, says Razak. But when the hullabaloo ends will the
new members be able to send personnel to 280 meetings a year? Observers
believe this will be easier for Burma, which has more English speaking
diplomats, than poorer, smaller Laos and Cambodia.
Economic cooperation could pose additional problems. Badawi said the three new
members would be given 10 years from January 1998 to comply with the
tariff-reduction schedule mandated by the Asean Free Trade Area, or Afta. The
other members have until 2003 to lower tariffs on 98% of their traded goods to
below 5%. Vietnam, which joined Asean in mid-1995, has been given until 2006.
Asean's membership explosion could also result in internal political tensions.
It will be more difficult to maintain the cohesion of 10 disparate countries,
says Lee Poh Ping, an international-affairs specialist at the University of
Malaya. He points out that Asean's six older members are more developed and
have long practised market economics, whereas Burma, Cambodia and Laos have
long been isolated from international markets. There's bound to be a clash of
cultures, Lee says.
Burma's growing economic and military ties with China could be one of the
first tests for an enlarged Asean. China is very close to Myanmar, says
another analyst in Kuala Lumpur, using the military leadership's name for
Burma. If the Spratlys become a problem, he says, referring to islands in the
South China Sea claimed by China and several Asean members, what will
Myanmar's position be?
Burma did nothing to help Asean rebut American opposition in the run up to the
foreign ministers' meeting. In recent months, Rangoon has restricted the
activities of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and detained more than 300
members of her National League for Democracy, most of whom were only released
on June 3. In a videotape smuggled out of Burma just before the Asean meeting,
Suu Kyi said that Asean membership would make Rangoon's military leaders even
more obdurate and oppressive.
Asean officials insist that their decision to embrace Burma had nothing to do
with giving Rangoon a good-housekeeping seal of approval. Instead, they say,
it is a continuation of their policy of constructive engagement, which
emphasizes economic cooperation and downplays political issues.
And what if the human-rights situation in Burma worsens after its Asean
membership? Now that Myanmar will be a member of Asean, Asean's policy of
constructive engagement, which we will continue to pursue, will be more
effective, I hope, Malaysia's Badawi told journalists.
The three countries will be formally admitted at an Asean foreign ministers'
meeting hosted by Malaysia in July. Observers say this year, the 30th
anniversary of Asean's founding, provided a convenient peg for expanding
membership. It's very symbolic, says Razak. If you have no fixed criteria for
admitting new members, you have to fall back on certain events.
Washington had been working behind the scenes for months to persuade Asean
governments to proceed slowly on Burma's admission. On April 25, State
Department spokesman Nicholas Burns told reporters that the U.S. was trying to
use our influence to make the point that Burma should be given a stiff message
that it is not welcome. His words provoked a strong reaction from Asean,
prompting Washington to soften the wording of its opposition by acknowledging
that membership was a matter for Asean to decide.
Analysts and diplomats differ on the impact of Washington's lobbying efforts
on Asean's decision to admit Burma. A senior Asean official says American
opposition was only a minor consideration. He says delaying the decision until
December, as some had suggested, was ruled out because it wouldn't have made
the issue any less sensitive.
Others believe Washington's tactics speeded up Rangoon's admission. The
attempt by the U.S. to pressure Asean got the opposite result, says Razak of
the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. Asean became more resolved to unite
Southeast Asia.
In the U.S., analysts downplay the extent of the damage. Some argue that the
American cause was lost because Washington hadn't tried hard enough to
coordinate its Burma policy with Asean. The Clinton administration could have
done better working with Asean by saying: ÔWe will delay sanctions if you
delay membership,' says Douglas Paal of the Asia-Pacific Policy Centre, an
independent think tank.
A Democratic staffer in the House says that some American congressmen may ask
Secretary of State Albright to boycott the Asean meeting in Kuala Lumpur in
July. But even though she described Slorc as an ugly acronym for an ugly
government in 1995, most analysts believe she will attend because of the
importance Washington places on its ties with Asean.
Still, no one expects the criticism of Rangoon to end after it joins Asean.
Asean countries made a big mistake, but this is by no means the end of the
battle over Burma or the end of our relations with Asean, says a Republican
congressional aide in Washington.
Since the decision on the new members, American officials have stressed that
Washington and Asean have the same objectives with regard to Burma, but differ
on how to achieve them. According to John Dinger, a State Department
spokesman, We now look to Asean to use its good offices to urge the Slorc to
seriously address our mutual concerns and urge the Slorc to enter into a
productive dialogue with democratic forces in Burma.
Robert Manning of the Progressive Policy Institute, a Washington think tank,
believes that U.S. Asean relations will be tense for a while, but foresees no
long-term damage. When push comes to shove and they dial 911, who're they
gonna call? he asks. America is Asean's only option, he says.
Singapore's ambassador to Washington, Chan Heng Chee, puts it differently: The
U.S. sees Asean as an important strategic friend. Now the Asean-10 is
Southeast Asia and it's inconceivable that the U.S. would not want a
relationship with Southeast Asia. We share a congruent interest in maintaining
peace and stability.