The BurmaNet News, September 10, 19

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------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------       
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"       
----------------------------------------------------------       
   
The BurmaNet News: September 10, 1997          
Issue #817
  
Noted in Passing:

If any villagers returned to pick fruit or harvest rice to ward off starvation 
on their new junta-approved but foodless land, they were shot on sight.

-the situation in Shan state for villagers subjected to forced relocations
[see South China Morning Post: Don't Harm Civilians, Rebels Told]

HEADLINES:          
==========   
BURMANET: VIRUS HOAXES
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF BURMA: STATEMENT
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST: DON'T HARM CIVILIANS
SCMP: RANGOON SHOT DOWN HELICOPTER: CLAIM 
ALTSEAN: DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI VIDEO INTERVIEW
REUTER: UNOCAL: ALMOST READY TO EXPLOIT 
BKK POST: BURMA RELIEF
BKK POST: BURMESE WORKER KILLS FACTORY OWNER
WATERSHED: KAWTHOOLEI AND TEAK: KAREN FOREST
ANNOUNCEMENT: AUNG SAN SUU KYI IN REALVIDEO
ANNOUNCEMENT: LEE AND ARROW CO. BOYCOTT
NEW ENGLAND BURMA ROUNDTABLE: SEPTEMBER MEETING 
BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

BURMANET: VIRUS HOAXES
September 9, 1997

BurmaNet would like to ask burmanet subscribers to stop posting ?virus
warnings? on burmanet-l.  Viruses CANNOT be transmitted in the text
of e-mail messages.  

Viruses CAN be transmitted in attached files, but only if you save and run
(open) those files.  If you receive an attachment from someone you don?t
know, you can run a virus check before opening the file.  Or just delete it.

Thank you,
BurmaNet Editor

*********************************************************** 

DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF BURMA: STATEMENT
September 9, 1997

Statement of the Democratic Alliance of  Burma 

A meeting of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Alliance of Burma
(DAB) was held on September 5 to 7, 1997. The following resolutions were
made in the meeting:

1. In light of the current situation in Burma, the DAB resolves to continue
striving for increased solidarity between the democratic forces and the
ethnic nationalities. The people of Burma are currently suffering extreme
hardship as a result of the oppressive rule of the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) and the SLORC-controlled market economy, and the
DAB resolves to support them in every way possible in their struggle against
the SLORC. 

2. The DAB upholds fully the spirit of the Mae Thaw Rah Hta Agreement, which
calls for the ethnic nationalities to unite with the democratic forces led
by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in struggling against the military dictatorship, and
calls for tripartite talks between the ethnic nationalities, the democratic
forces and the SLORC to solve the country's problems and lead to the setting
up of a federal union. The agreement was significant in its unification of
the various ethnic nationalities, and the DAB commends the groups that are
sticking resolutely to this agreement. We will cooperate with them fully to
struggle against the SLORC.

3. The DAB strongly condemns the repeated acts of lawlessness, torture and
other human rights violations committed by the SLORC in the border areas and
in Central Burma. The DAB is gravely concerned at the effects of the
unbridled corruption, religious divisions and racist killings spawned by the
SLORC.  

4. The SLORC has used cunning persuasion and force in its attempts to crush
the revolutionary forces, but the DAB remains committed to withstanding and
exposing such trickery. The DAB will continue striving towards its goal of a
country free from military rule, where justice, human rights and prosperity
prevail. 

5. The DAB appreciates the support given by foreign countries, in particular
the USA and EU members, in giving economic and political pressure to the
SLORC. The DAB calls on all these countries to give further pressure to the
SLORC to hold tripartite talks with the democratic forces led by Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and the ethnic nationalities.

6. Tripartite talks will be a first step in opposing the military
dictatorship and establishing democracy, peace and a federal union. The DAB
calls on the people of Burma to help bring about the talks by opposing the
SLORC's National Convention and boycotting the SLORC in any way possible.
The time is ripe for this. 

For tripartite talks,
Unity of the oppressed
And democracy!


Executive Committee
Democratic Alliance of Burma
September 9, 1997 

*********************************************

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST: DON'T HARM CIVILIANS, REBELS TOLD 
September 10, 1997
by William Barnes in Bangkok 

The leader of a rebel war being fought across the vast Shan state has told 
supporters not to take out their bitterness against the ruling military on 
ethnic Burmese.
The warning comes two months after about 25 Burmese civilians were dragged
from two ordinary passenger buses, herded away and shot.
No one has owned up to the attack, which smacks of retaliation for brutal 
attempts to crush independence fighters by the State Law and Order
Restoration Council.
"Wherever we go, it is imperative that we refrain from any act of injustice 
towards the people and abstain from any form of racial discrimination," said
Yord Serk, in recent orders to his Shan United Revolutionary Army.
"When we meet good and just civilian Burmese nationals, we should tell them
that we are not brutal soldiers like the junta troops and that it would be
advisable for them to return to Burma proper for their own safety."
Shan human rights monitors have reported that the bus massacre whipped the
junta's Army into an even uglier mood than usual. They are said to have
killed some 400 people over the following month alone.
These figures are impossible to verify. But even before the bus incident,
Shan refugees fleeing across the border into Thailand routinely told of
whole villages being uprooted at a few hours' notice to try to break support
for the insurgents.
If any villagers returned to pick fruit or harvest rice to ward off starvation 
on their new junta-approved but foodless land, they were shot on sight.
The refugees have also repeatedly complained that the Burmese Army has been
selling off their land to Chinese and Burmese newcomers.
Even in his short public warning, Yord Serk painted a dismal picture of life
in the Shan state.
"The situation has become chaotic and many people are on the verge of 
starvation, robbers are rampant and there are several armed groups, some
with no identity, that roam the highways."
The Shan resistance leader added: "In the end, justice will certainly 
prevail."
A Rangoon-based diplomat argued that the depth of the bitterness in this 
little-known war showed how fragile was the "peace" claimed by the junta.
"They use raw military muscle to keep the minorities under control where
they can," the diplomat said.
"But how can there ever be real peace without a political settlement that
even begins to address the minorities' concerns?"

**********************************************

SCMP: RANGOON SHOT DOWN HELICOPTER: CLAIM 
September 10, 1997
by Robert Horn of Associated Press in Bangkok 

A Thai army helicopter which disappeared near the Burmese border last month
was shot down by the Burmese Army, dissident students said in Bangkok yesterday.
They said the four-man crew was killed in the crash.
Naing Aung, chairman of the All Burma Students Democratic Front, said rebel
units at the border had intercepted the information via Burmese army radio
transmissions.
Spread along the mountainous border, the Front's armed units share bases
with the Karen National Union, an ethnic group fighting the military
Government in Rangoon.
Despite nearly two weeks of searches by hundreds of soldiers and civilians
on the Thai side of the border, no trace has been found of the surveillance 
helicopter and crew, which disappeared on August 28.
A Thai army officer said the last radio contact with the helicopter was 
shortly after 1 pm as it flew near Umphang inside Thai territory, 350 
kilometres northwest of Bangkok.
The officer said he did not believe the helicopter had been shot down
because it was flying at an altitude of 2,130 metres, which is beyond the
range of ground fire.
Weather was bad and the crew reported poor visibility, so an accident was
most likely, he said.
But Mr Naing Aung said the intercepted radio messages indicated the
helicopter had strayed over a portion of Burmese territory jutting into
Thailand, near the mouth of the Salween River.
Burmese battalion commanders radioed Rangoon for permission to shoot down
the helicopter, he said.
And because of the rapid response needed, they did not bother to encode the
transmission.
"It will be okay, we will honour you," the Rangoon command reportedly replied.
Burmese and some Thai military officials had speculated Karen rebels might
have shot down the helicopter.
But Mr Naing Aung said that was impossible: "The insurgents don't control
that area any more. It is controlled by the Burmese Army.
"If we're lying, then why haven't the Thais been able to find any wreckage?"
Burmese military authorities did not respond to the students' allegations.
In the past, Rangoon has accused the Karen and the Front of trying to sour 
relations between Burma and Thailand.
Burmese army units have crossed the border several times to sack refugee 
camps.

---------------------------------------
[excerpts from related article]
THE NATION: DISSIDENT SAYS BURMA DOWNED THAI HELICOPTER
September 10, 1997

Thai authorities, particularly the Defence and Foreign Affairs ministries
and security agencies, have not, confirmed nor denied the Burmese
dissident's statements.

The provincial Army units recently suspended an almost two week search for
the jet helicopter.

"Two Burmese army captains, Thein Lwin and Kyaw San, led the shooting. They
used G3 automatic rifles and as well as machine guns that could shoot down
aircraft," [Naing Aung] said.

The Burmese side even went to the crash site a few days later and dismantled
the helicopter, he added.

The same Burmese dissident said Rangoon believed that the Thai helicopter
was a surveillance craft and had intruded into Burmese airspace on a secret
mission.

A senior Thai security source yesterday argued that the Thai-Burmese border
line was still unclear pending demarcation. "The Thai helicopter did not
intrude into Burmese airspace or land, as the area is still in question," he
claimed.

If the report of the shooting is accurate, the source said, Thailand should
have received a warning from the Burmese beforehand, according to
international practice.

************************************************

ALTSEAN: DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI VIDEO INTERVIEW
September 9, 1997

MEDIA RELEASE
SUU KYI: NO ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT WITHOUT POLITICAL CHANGE

Bangkok, Tuesday: - In her first interview since June, Burmese democracy
leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that Asean's help was needed to improve the
political situation in her country in order to allow an economic
take off.

"I do not think that there can be real economic progress without
democracy. The economy is going downhill. There isn't the kind of
accountable transparent government that is necessary to make an economic
success out of an open market system.

"I think the Asean countries have now realised they are not going to get
the economic benefit that they'd hope to get out of Burma ? if they want
economic improvement in Burma, they've got to help the political
situation to improve. I think they should let Burma know what they think
is necessary for the economy to take off," said Ms Suu Kyi who is
Secretary General of the National League for Democracy (NLD) which won 82%
of the seats in Burma's last elections.

Ms Suu Kyi also clarified that the July meeting between NLD Chairman U
Aung Shwe and General Khin Nyunt, Burma's military intelligence chief,
was not a dialogue.  Ms Suu Kyi said that the meeting, held days before
the Asean Ministerial Meeting, was held to allow Burma's military
regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc), to repeat
accusations against Ms Suu Kyi and the party.

In the recent interview contained in a 17-minute video "Asean, NLD and
political dialogue in Burma - an interview with Aung San Suu Kyi", the
democracy leader also spoke animatedly and with humour, about her recent
illness, the party's desire for political dialogue, the Slorc's
harassment of the NLD, a Slorc general's "green card" speculation and
her commitment to the people of Burma.

The video "Asean, NLD and political dialogue in Burma - an interview
with Aung San Suu Kyi", is available in VHS PAL format for US$10 from
ALTSEAN-BURMA (Alternative Asean Network on Burma).

ENDS

For more information, please contact ALTSEAN-BURMA at tel: ++ 66 2 275
1811, fax: ++ 66 2 693 4515 or email <altsean@xxxxxxxxxx>.

A L T S E A N - B U R M A
ALTERNATIVE ASEAN NETWORK ON BURMA
*tel: [662] 275 1811/693 4515 *fax: [662] 693 4515 *e-mail: altsean@xxxxxxxxxx

*****************************************

REUTER: UNOCAL: ALMOST READY TO EXPLOIT FROM BURMA'S YADANA FIELD GAS PIPELINE 
September 9, 1997

         BANGKOK, Sept 9 (Reuter) - Construction on the Yadana gas
pipeline from Burma to Thailand is 60 percent complete and deliveries
should begin next July, a senior Thai energy official said on Tuesday.
         Piti Yimprasert, president of state-run Petroleum Authority of
Thailand's natural gas section, said construction of the project which 
would move gas from the offshore Burmese Yadana field overland to 
Thailand was now 60 percent completed.
         The 16.5 billion baht ($471.43 million) project was slightly behind
an earlier schedule as PTT had been forced to seek approval from the Office
of Environmental Policy and Planning before construction could 
resume.
         The hitch followed protests from environmentalists that a section
of the project might harm flora and fauna in the area.
         However, Piti said in a statement that he expected gas deliveries
could begin in mid-July 1998.
         The length of the pipeline from Yadana into Thailand will be 699-km
(434.08-mile).
         The project will initially provide 325 million cubic feet per day
(mmcfd) of natural gas to Thailand. Under the 30-year contract, the 
supply will increase to 525 mmcfd in 1999.
         Yadana's gas in place is estimated to be over five trillion cubic feet.
         PTT Exploration and Production Plc, a unit of PTT, holds 25.5
percent interest in the field, Unocal 28.26  percent, Total SA 31.24 percent
and Burmese state-run oil firm Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise 15 percent.

*************************************

BKK POST: BURMA RELIEF
September 9,1997 

Japan will give $150,000 worth of relief aid to Burma, which has been 
badly hit by floods since late July.

****************************************************

BKK POST: BURMESE WORKER KILLS FACTORY OWNER
September 9, 1997

Mae Sot - An elderly Taiwanese businesswoman was stabbed to death by a
Burmese worker at a garment factory here yesterday.

Police found the blood-strained body of Yib-Ngor Saeyab, 80, at the 
canteen of SCP Garment Co. She had many knife wounds.

According to eyewitnesses, Mrs Yib-Ngor, the factory owner, was killed by
Maung Thoo, 27, who fled by crossing the Moei River to Myawaddy.

No valuables were reported lost.

Police have sought cooperation from the Myawaddy authorities to help 
arrest the suspect.

*******************************************************

WATERSHED: KAWTHOOLEI AND TEAK: KAREN FOREST MANAGEMENT ON THE THAI-BURMESE
BORDER
Vol 3, No. 1 July ? October 1997 [abridged]
By Raymond Bryant

The Karen state of Kawthoolei has been heavily dependent on teak 
extraction to fund the Karen National Union struggle against the Burmese 
military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). 
Raymond Bryant explores the social and economic structure of Kawthoolei, 
and the way in which resource extraction was more than simply a source of 
revenue?it was also an integral part of the assertion of Karen sovereignty.

In late January 1995 the Karen National Union (KNU) suffered a major
military defeat when Mannerplaw?its headquarters near the Thai-
Burmese border since 1974?was captured by the Burmese army. In 
subsequent days, KNU leaders fled to Thailand in a move that appeared to 
mark the end of the KNU's 47-year struggle against the Burmese state. As 
Mannerplaw (which means "Field of Victory") was reduced to ashes, so too 
were the hopes of those who believed in Kawthoolei?the Karen Free State 
proclaimed by KNU President Saw Baw U Gyi in June 1949. The world's 
longest running insurgency had seemingly run its course.

Forests as a source of refuge

>From the start, the forests have been crucial to Karen political and
military efforts insofar as they have served as a source of refuge from the
Burmese army. Except during the first years of the insurgency, the Karen
have been involved in an unequal struggle with a much larger and better
equipped military adversary. The trend in the fighting between the 
Burmese army (tatmadaw) and the Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNLA, previously the Karen National Defence Organization) has been a 
gradual retreat of the KNLA from central Burma to the remote border area. 
Confronted by the superior fire-power of the tatmadaw, the KNLA have 
used the forests strategically as a source of refuge in which to regroup and 
replenish supplies. In doing so, the KNLA have relied on local Karen for 
food, directions, recruits and intelligence about the tatmadaw. In the early 
1950s, Karen forces took refuge in the Pegu Yoma forests, but 
subsequently shifted east into the more inaccessible hills along the 
Burmese- Thai border.

The Burmese army has long sought to undermine the role of the forests as 
a source of refuge for the KNLA. A primary goal has been to cut the 
KNLA off from villagers through the Four Cuts (pya ley pya) campaign. 
Under this counter-insurgency campaign (which aims to cut links to local 
food, funds, intelligence and recruits), local Karen were forcibly removed 
from their villages and resettled in army-controlled settlements. Initially 
focused on the Pegu Yoma forests, the campaign was continued by the 
tatmadaw in the border region. In addition to forced resettlement, the 
Burmese army has press-ganged Karen into service on the front line as 
porters. Between 1989 and 1993, the State Law and order Restoration 
Council (SLORC)? the military junta ruling Burma since 1988?also 
supported clear-cut logging along the border. Other than providing the 
junta with revenue (and denying revenue to the KNU, as discussed below), 
such logging also removed forest in contested areas, thereby eliminating 
strategic military cover for the KNLA.

Forests as a source of livelihood

The forests have also provided an important source of revenue to the KNU,
making an essential contribution to Kawthoolei state finances.

The role of the forests as a central part of the livelihood strategies of
individual Karen farmers has persisted in the post-colonial era. Just as in
pre-colonial and colonial times, Karen farmers since 1948 have pursued
forest-based agrarian practices, at least in the more remote regions of
Kawthoolei. Nevertheless, the ability of individual farmers to earn a
livelihood from the forests has been progressively eroded in recent decades.
To some extent, this may be linked to population growth among the Karen.

However, it is the growing intrusion on the lives of Karen farmers of the
Burmese civil war that is the main cause of declining forest livelihoods. To
begin with, the war has resulted in the displacement of thousands of Karen
formerly living in the Irrawaddy and Sittang River deltas or adjacent hills.
There are over 70,000 Karen refugees from Burma living in Thai refugee 
camps along the border alone, with many more displaced within Burma. 
Some internally displaced Karen have cleared forest for agriculture, 
thereby putting added pressure on residual forests. Further the war itself 
has shifted over the years, such that by the 1980s it was largely centred on 
the border area, disrupting local farming practices and forcing many Karen
farmers to flee or face an advancing Burmese army infamous for 
perpetrating human rights abuses on the Karen. Karen farmers have thus 
been unable to avoid being caught up in the fighting between the tatmadaw 
and the KNU.

The significance of the forests as a source of livelihood has often been as
great to the KNU as it has traditionally been to individual Karen farmers.
Significantly, a Kawthoolei Forestry Ministry was created in 1950?only 
one year after the start of the insurgency. Using Karen foresters trained 
under the British, the ministry was established on colonial lines with a 
hierarchy of posts ranging from guards and rangers in the field, through 
district and headquarters conservators, and on up to the minister. The 
forests of Kawthoolei were divided into districts, within which reserved 
forests were created?notably where teak was abundant.

The forests were a significant but not a crucial source of revenue to the
KNU in the 1950s. The reasons for this reside in the political and 
economic context of the early years of the insurgency. The need for 
revenue to buy arms was then limited, as arms were still plentiful after the 
Second World War. During the early 1950s, the KNLA was one of the 
most powerful insurgent armies in Burma?in 1949 it controlled much of 
the Irrawaddy and Sittang River delta areas, including the outskirts of 
Rangoon. The revenue base of Kawthoolei was also wider at this stage than 
in later years.

Considerable revenue was obtained from agriculture and mining as well as
from forestry throughout the extensive territory then controlled by the 
KNU. Finally, in terms of forestry itself, there was little work that was
initially required as the KNU was able to seize logs left in the forest or
at timber depots by the departing British in 1948.

This relatively favourable situation had ended by the mid 1950s. As the
Burmese army advanced, the Karen were cut off from revenue, first in the
Irrawaddy and Sittang deltas and subsequently in the adjoining hills. In
November 1953, for example, the Burmese army captured the mines at 
Mawchi?a significant source of revenue to the Karen at that time. 
Following the coup d'etat of March 1962 which brought General Ne Win to 
power, the advance of the tatmadaw into hitherto KNU-controlled areas 
continued, and by the 1970s Karen forces were largely confined to the 
Thai-Burmese border. As the territory controlled by the KNU contracted so 
to did the range of opportunities available to Karen leaders for earning a 
livelihood.

An illicit border trade in natural resources and consumer goods partly
concealed the growing financial plight of the Kawthoolei state. This trade
linking Burma and Thailand via KNU-controlled areas developed during 
the 1960s and 1970s as a response to the catastrophic economic policies of 
Ne Win's Burmese Way to Socialism, which drove much of the Burmese 
economy underground. Teak, cattle, rice, rubber, gems and even 
archaeological artifacts were transported from Burma to Thailand while 
televisions, videos, cosmetics and other consumer goods were dispatched in 
the other direction. The KNU served as an intermediary in this trade, 
imposing a five per cent tax on all goods passing through Kawthoolei.

For many years, the KNU thus had easy access to funds with which to buy
military equipment.  However, there were evident dangers associated with
dependency on the border trade. The adoption of a pro-market economic 
policy in Rangoon could undermine the trade. A change in policy by the 
Thai authorities?for example, as a result of a desire for closer links with
Burma?would also jeopardize the KNU controlled trade. Finally, the
development of alternative trade routes?notably along the Burma-Chinese
border? might result in a drying up of the trade through KNU territories.

To the misfortune of the Karen state, since 1988 all three of these
possibilities have become realities. It is in the context of such
uncertainty that the importance of the forests as a source of revenue to the
KNU becomes apparent. Of the revenue available to the Kawthoolei state,
forest revenue (mainly derived from teak extraction) was one of the
important sources over which it had some control. Another, tin mining, 
was significant in the 1970s but collapsed with the price of tin in the early
1980s. Not surprisingly, therefore, the forest sector assumed growing
political and economic importance to the KNU from the 1960s.

The importance of the forests was reflected in the growing power of the
Forestry Ministry. From only a handful of foresters in the 1950s and early
1960s, the ministry had become a key pert of the Karen state by the 1980s.
In 1994, there were 463 forest officials at work in Kawthoolei's forest
districts, with additional staff at Mannerplaw. Field offcials were
responsible for reforestation and wildlife protection, but their main task
was to monitor teak extraction. Just under two-thirds of the 5,000 teak logs
annually extracted in the early 1990s came from Pazpu district.

The importance of the teak industry is reflected in the power of the
Forestry Minister Saw Aung San, who was appointed to the post in 1980, 
and who was second only to General Bo Mya and Prime Minister Saw Ba 
Thinn in terms of political power within the KNU in the early 1990s. 
Although the KNU has never published revenue data, forest earnings were 
understood to constitute most of total state revenue in 1994.

Given the importance of the forests to the KNU, the SLORC's decision to
grant logging concessions all along the border to Thai firms in early 1989
was a serious blow to the KNU. As much as 18,800 square kilometres were
alienated by the SLORC to Thai loggers who invariably enjoyed close links 
to senior Thai military officers. Many of the Thai logging concessions were
located in KNU- controlled territory. However, as the loggers were 
supported by the Thai military, there was little that the KNU could do to 
stop their advance into Karen forests without risking completely alienating 
the Thai state?something that a KNU weakened by military setbacks was 
scarcely in a position to do.

The KNU was forced to acquiesce in this deal between the SLORC and the 
Thai state.  The end result was that logging restrictions originally imposed 
by Kawthoolei's Forestry Ministry to ensure sustainable forestry were 
waived. Indeed, between 1989 and 1993 (when the SLORC terminated the 
Thai logging deal) the KNU permitted over cutting as part of a desperate 
attempt to maintain forest-based revenues in the face of SLORC's efforts to 
cut the KNU's income of US$40-80 per cubic metre (m3) of teak timber. At 
the same time these companies were also paying the SLORC US$80 per 
m3 on the same timber. Unable to cut the KNU off from this trade, the 
SLORC cancelled the Thai logging concessions in 1993.

Yet the KNU were badly weakened by this teak war. Teak over cutting 
resulted in widespread deforestation in the logging concessions as Thai 
loggers extracted more timber than was allowed under the terms of their 
contracts. Further, logging outside designated areas was ubiquitous as 
loggers took advantage of the political turmoil along the border to extract 
extra timber free of charge.  Illegal logging has persisted despite the 
SLORC's termination of border logging in December 1993, aided by the 
network of logging roads built in 1989-93. As a result, the border forests 
upon which the KNU relied have been largely depleted, undermining a key 
element of an already declining Karen resource base. Even before the fall 
of Mannerplaw in early 1995, therefore, Kawthoolei's finances were in 
difficulty..

The teak war also weakened the legitimacy of the Kawthoolei state in as 
much as the KNU had long based part of its local and international appeal 
on sustainable forest management. As the next section highlights, forests 
have always been at the heart of Karen identity. Yet here was a state 
purporting to represent the Karen people that had sanctioned the 
destruction of wide areas of Kawthoolei's forest. It is a measure of the sheer 
desperation of Karen leaders that, in order to maintain forest revenue, they 
were prepared to destroy the forest resource on which Karen culture itself 
was based.

Forests as a source of identity

In addition to its political and economic rationale, the SLORC-engineered
assault on the border forest also resonates with cultural meaning. An
attempt to undermine the military and financial advantages derived by the
KNU from the forests, this assault simultaneously attacked the foundations
of Karen national identity. As the forests have always been an integral part
of Karen identity, their large-scale elimination after 1988 has had cultural
as well as political and economic significance.

Traditionally, lowland Burmese and Thais viewed the Karen as an integral
part of the forests?the former called them "the wild cattle of the hills,"
whereas the latter classified the Karen as "wild animals." The British held
similar views. Colonial missionaries, for example, considered the Karen to
be a primitive people ("noble savages") at home in their forest habitat.
Colonial foresters, meanwhile, acknowledged the Karen's detailed forest
knowledge (at the same time as they decried their allegedly destructive
methods of shifting cultivation). Indeed, the introduction of the taungya
forestry system noted earlier reflected a British desire to harness that
knowledge to the teak-centred forestry management then being introduced 
in Burma's forests.

Certainly, Karen refugees from the Irrawaddy and Sittang deltas do not fit
the popular image of the Karen as a forest people. Karen from the deltas
often differ from their hill brethren in terms of religion, education and
forest knowledge. Yet, even for the delta Karen, the forests resonate with
meaning. Thus, the forests in which they took refuge are a reminder of the
historical origins of the Karen people, symbolized most vividly in the many
Karen myths and prophecies that are set in the forests. Even among the
Christian Karen from the deltas, the notion of the Karen as a lost tribe of
Israel wandering in the forests (first suggested by colonial missionaries)
serves as a powerful symbolic reinforcement of the link between the forests
and Karen identity.

The insurgency reinforced the role of the forests in Karen culture. As
noted, they have served as a source both of refuge and of livelihood for the
KNU throughout the struggle. Many senior political and military leaders 
have lived in the forests for more than 30 years, and a new generation has 
been born in Mannerplaw and other forest strongholds. In as much as these 
Karen have made the forests their home in exile they have become forest 
dwellers. Karen refugees have kept alive memories of their previous urban 
existence (reinforced by satellite TV as well as journeys to Bangkok by the 
elite). However, as their fate has been linked to the forests now for nearly 
50 years, these Karen have been de-urbanized?in other words, they have 
become a "forest people."

The territory the Karen called the "Flower Land" has already been changed
beyond recognition. A hitherto forested landscape has been converted in 
many areas into an environmentally degraded and treeless territory as a 
result of indiscriminate logging. The SLORC's plans to build a series of 
dams on the Salween River and its tributaries near and along the border (to 
meet Thai electricity demands) will further alter the landscape. With this 
loss of the forests, the Karen have been denied refuge, livelihood and even 
a cultural referent.

In asserting a sovereign Kawthoolei, the KNU posed a challenge that the
Burmese state (indeed any state) could scarcely ignore. For Kawthoolei to 
be born, the old Burma would have to die?something which Burmese 
politicians (whatever their other differences) have always refused to 
countenance. As a result, the Karen have been fighting a Burmese state 
which not only possesses superior military capabilities, but which also 
enjoys the tacit support of a world of nation states anxious to avoid any 
alteration of political boundaries. Even western states which condemn the 
brutality of the Burmese state have refrained from sanctioning the 
alteration of Burma's boundaries. In this regard, the lack of international 
recognition for Kawthoolei over the past 50 years is eloquent testimony to 
the futility of Karen efforts to overcome the consensus over sovereignty 
issues among the community of nations. That alternative solidarity has 
been shown outside this community demonstrates the limits to 
internationalism among nation states.

Indeed, the fact that SLORC has been able to brutally suppress the Karen
insurgency without serious opposition from any outside power is a 
reminder of the overwhelming priority that the international community 
continues to attach?even in the New World Order?to political 
sovereignty.

Watershed is published three times a year by TERRA 
409 Soi Rohitsuk, Pracharajbempen Rd.
Huay Khwang, Bangkok 10320
Thailand
E-mail <terraper@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://www2.gol.com/users/brelief/Index.htm

**********************************************

ANNOUNCEMENT: AUNG SAN SUU KYI IN REALVIDEO
September 9, 1997

The full videotape address of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to the United Nations
Human rights Commission has been posted at Burmasong in RealVideo. There are
four segments concerning the repression of the NLD, the human rights
situation in Burma, the refugee situation on the border, and an appeal for
support from the international community.

The audio portion is in English.

The URL is:

http://users.imagiware.com/wtongue/assk2.html

A number of audio files in RealAudio are also posted on this page in
English and Burmese.

*******************************

ANNOUNCEMENT: LEE AND ARROW CO. BOYCOTT
September 9, 1997

BOYCOTT THE LEE CO. and ARROW SHIRT CO. FOR BURMA

	Both companies failed to respond to the democratic government 
of Burma in exile (NCGUB), which asked them to withdraw 2 months ago 
(7/97), citing the killings, torture, gang-rape, forced labor and
relocation, etc., under Burma's military dictatorship SLORC.  All companies
in Burma must form joint ventures with the SLORC, thus becoming business
partners with a regime consistently criticized by the UN, U.S., Amnesty
International, AFL-CIO, and the Sierra Club, among others. 
	Workers are no exception to the SLORC's abuses.  A BBC hidden 
camera revealed that sweatshops run by Burma's junta pay only $1/day 
for an excessively long workday.  The International Labor Organization has
repeatedly condemned the SLORC for prohibiting unions and collective
bargaining; any labor organizing is crushed by military force, as was the
1995 Dae Woo garment factory sit-down strike near Rangoon. 
	Remind Lee and Arrow Shirt that industry leaders Levi Strauss, 
Eddie Bauer, Liz Claiborne, and Ralph Lauren withdrew, and that you will
boycott them until they do. Clothing constitutes the bulk of U.S. imports
from Burma; most of the SLORC's share of profits is converted into arms and
ammunition.

		FAX, WRITE, PHONE:

212 984-8925 fax		913-384-0190 FAX
(tel: 212 984-8930)		913-384-4000 PHONE             
CEO Bryan Marsal                       	Pres. Terry Lay         
Arrow Shirt Co.                          	The Lee Co.               
48 W. 38 St.                              	POB 2940 
NYC 10018                                	Shawnee Mssn, KS 66201

************************************************

NEW ENGLAND BURMA ROUNDTABLE: SEPTEMBER MEETING 
September 8, 1997

Welcome Back Students!!!

1. September Roundtable Meeting: Tuesday, September 16, 6:30pm

Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, 130 Prospect Street, 
Cambridge.  Take the red line to Central Square T stop, or the Number 1 
bus. The UUSC office is on the corner of Prospect and Harvard streets, a 2-
block walk from Central Square. Use the buzzer outside the front door to 
gain entry into the building; take the elevator to the first floor.

For more information or update on Massachusetts law contact:
Simon Billenness
* for the New England Burma Roundtable *
c/o Franklin Research & Development Corporation / 711 Atlantic Avenue /
Boston MA 02111
phone: 617-423-6655, extension 225 / Email: sbillenness@xxxxxxxx

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BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST

BurmaNet regularly receives enquiries on a number of different 
topics related to Burma. If you have questions on any of the 
following subjects, please direct email to the following volunteer 
coordinators, who will either answer your question or try to put you 
in contact with someone who can:

Campus activism: 	zni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Boycott campaigns:        ai268@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx     
Buddhism:                    Buddhist Relief Mission:  brelief@xxxxxxx
Chin history/culture:        [volunteer temporarily away]
Fonts:                  		tom@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
High School Activism: 	[volunteer needed]
History of Burma:            zni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
International Affairs: 	 Julien Moe: moe@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Kachin history/culture:      74750.1267@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Karen history/culture: 	Karen Historical Society: 
102113.2571@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Mon history/culture:         [volunteer needed]
Naga history/culture: 	Wungram Shishak:  
z954001@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Burma-India border            Aung San Myint: 
aungsan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Pali literature:            	 "Palmleaf":  c/o burmanet@xxxxxxxxxxx
Pipeline Campaign       	freeburma@xxxxxxx
Resettlement info:	refugee_help@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Rohingya culture		volunteer needed
Shan history/culture: 	Sao Hpa Han: burma@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shareholder activism:       simon_billenness@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Total - France		Dawn Star: cd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
Tourism campaigns:      	bagp@xxxxxxxxxx     "Attn. S.Sutcliffe"   
volunteering: 		refugee_help@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
World Wide Web:              FreeBurma@xxxxxxxxx

Geographical Contacts:
Massachusetts		simon_billenness@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

[Feel free to suggest more areas of coverage]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FREE BURMA WEB PAGES:

http://FreeBurma.org

This single page serves only as an easy to remember URL and departure
point to resources promoting the establishment of democracy in Burma.
Please write to FreeBurma@xxxxxxxxx to add a site or for further
information." - Glen, system administrator

FREE BURMA COALITION:

to get involved in the Free Burma Coalition, send a message to:
zni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  

or visit their homepage, accessible through: http:// FreeBurma.org

There is also an e-mail list-server especially for Free Burma activists


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