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The BurmaNet News, September 11, 19
- Subject: The BurmaNet News, September 11, 19
- From: strider@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 10 Sep 1997 23:58:00
------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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The BurmaNet News: September 11, 1997
Issue #818
HEADLINES:
==========
BKK POST: HELICOPTER SEARCH
KNPP: SITUATION REPORT NO. 5
KNU: PRESS RELEASE NO. 53/97
THE ECONOMIST: COOK'S ORDER
BKK POST: BURMESE DAZE
KYODO: JAPANESE EMBASSY ANNOUNCES FLOOD RELIEF
THE NATION: PTT TARGETS VILLAGE HEADS
BURMANET: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: ASSESSING ASEAN
ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW BOOKS ON BURMA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
BKK POST: HELICOPTER SEARCH
September 10, 1997
200 more troops join hunt
Tak - The two-week-old search for a missing army helicopter was yesterday
reinforced by the addition of another 200 soldiers as the search moved to
the mountains of Umphang district of this province bordering Burma. The
search team began scouring Umphang on Monday. In the preceding weeks it
combed the adjoining Phop Phra district and the area opposite the district
in Burma for the wreckage of the copter and its four occupants, presumed
dead, but without success.
The Jet Ranger helicopter with Lt Chanvej Kiddee and Lt Adisak Pongpes, the
pilots, and two passengers, Anek Panchaeng and Sgt Krisda Thamsorn, went
missing on August 28 while flying over Phop Phra and Umphang districts in a
rainstorm.
***************************************
KNPP: SITUATION REPORT NO. 5
September 10, 1997
THE GOVERNMENT OF KARENNI
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND INFORMATION
KARENNI
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION COMMITTED BY SLORC
Human rights violations continued by the Slorc troops of LB No. (102), LB
No. (261) and LIB No. (426) in Karenni. The said troops have been forcing
hundreds of local people of Mawchi, Karenni, and prisoners from different
parts of Burma to act as porters without payment since the end of July 1997.
Recently, about one hundred villagers of Dee Maw So town, Dee Maw So
Township, were arrested and tied up, and then loaded to Pasaung town. Those
who were seized were forced to carry supplies and ammunition from Pasaung
town to the area, where they have been operating military offensive against
innocent Karenni people. Many of those forced to act as porters have been
subjected to torture and ill-treatment if they could not carry loads of
supplies and ammunition. Others who were seized as porters have been
extrajudicially killed if they attempted to escape or were enable to carry
their loads. Those who were seriously sick were left to dead beside roads.
Conditions of the porters are often harsh, in many cases amounting to cruel,
inhuman treatment. The porters have been subjected to ill-treatment,
receiving inadequate food. The Porters are receiving only one meal per day
while they are forced to carry heavy loads. The porters are forced to walk
through rocky areas and mountainous areas. Those who are sick are also
forced to continue to carry their loads. So far about 50 porters have died
of sickness, tiredness and starvation. Most of them were shot to dead by the
military (SLORC) according to Zaw Win, private soldier of LB No. (102) and
one sergeant (requested not to use his name) of LB No. (261), 27 years old
who have recently surrendered to the Karenni Army and some porters who
escaped to the Karenni controlled area. Prisoners of Mg Sein, Thaung Htay,
Win Kyaw, Than Naing and Mg Naing were among the deaths.
On August 23, 1997, husband Saw Kalo, 58 years old, and wife Naw Moo, 50
years old, were arrested in Lo Po village of No. (2) District by a Slorc
troops of LB (102) under the command of Sein Hlaing (unknown position). The
troops killed the husband. The wife Naw Moo died after being repeated raped
by the troops.
The said three units if Slorc troops have so far destroyed about one
hundred acres of planted rice paddy which belonged to a number of villages
of No. (2) District.
Conditions of villagers in No. (1) District, who were forced to move to
Slorc relocation sites on 7 July 1997, have been getting from bad to the
worst. Villagers are dying of sickness and starvation every day especially
in Sha Daw relocation site. The dead numbers of children have already
reached to over one hundred.
______________________________________________________
Battle News
On 7 September 1997, 6 Slorc soldiers of LIB No. (336) and LIB No. (421)
were killed by Karenni land mines which laid in Ywa Thit area, east of
Bawlake, and Hway Aw Lay area, BP-11 area.
10 September 1997
************************************************
KNU: PRESS RELEASE NO. 53/97
September 10, 1997
win1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
OFFICE OF THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
KAREN NATIONAL UNION
KAWTHOOLEI
Press Release No. 53/97
Regarding SLORC 1997 Military Offensive against KNU
September 10,1997
Nyaung-lay-bin District
* 11.8.97: Troops from SLORC LIB 706 came to Maladaw village of Mone
township and arrested villagers Saw Poe Tha, Saw Maung Pway and Maung Pyi
Than, without reason, and fined them 500 Kyat each. On the same day, the
troops arrested 4 Burmans in the village, who were on a visit, and fined
them 100 Kyat each. The troops also confiscated the villagers' rice.
Toungoo District
* 8.8.97: Troops from SLORC LIB 706 came to Play-hsa-lo village in
Tan-ta-bin township and looted the villagers of 3 pigs, 66 chickens, 7
ducks, 10 baskets of rice, 25 viss of durian jam, 300 durian fruits, 25 viss
of beetle nuts, 5 viss of tobacco, 16 rice pots, 5 thermos flasks, one
watch, one radio, 10 rain coats, 20 shirts, 6 blankets, 2 mosquito nets and
15,000 kyat of cash.
* 16.8.97: Troops from SLORC IB 73 and LIB 701 seized 300 Baw-ga-li
villagers including children, women and the aged. On 17.8.97, LIB 701
troops similarly seized 90 Gor-the-doe villagers. Starting from 18.8.97,
these 390 villagers were forced to carry supplies to Nor-soe front line
camp, every day. At last report on 21.8.97, the villagers were still being
held and forced to work. Forced labor by the SLORC military has left the
villagers with no time to work for their livelihood.
Pa-an District
* 13.8.97: Troops from SLORC IB 24 came to Naw-der-kee village
of Hlaing-bwe township and looted 1,100 Baht from villager, Saw Du and 3,000
Bath worth of clothes and a jade stone valued at 7,000 Baht from villager,
Par Beh.
* 26.8.97: Troops from SLORC IB 24 came to Tee-kray village of Hlaing-bwe
township and killed and ate a pig of the villagers.
In rural areas, the Karen civilians have to face a great hardship and much
distress as the SLORC troops are ransacking and destroying their villages,
forcing them to work like slaves in front-line areas, at the military camps
and on economic projects and extorting inordinately large amount of money.
(Translated, printed and distributed by the Karen Information Center)
***************************************************
THE ECONOMIST: COOK'S ORDER
September 6 1997
BANGKOK --MEMBERS of the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN,
knew there would be a price to be paid for admitting Myanmar in July to full
membership of their well-regarded club. But they may not have
guessed that they would have been faced with it so soon.
Mahathir Mohamad, the 71-year-old prime minister of Malaysia, recently
back from a two-month holiday but evidently none the mellower for it,
thinks ASEAN countries should boycott the next summit of the Asia-
Europe Meeting, which is due to take place in London next April. The
meeting is designed to bring together heads of government of the European
Union, China, Japan, South Korea and most of ASEAN in a bid to give
relations between the two blocks some of the substance enjoyed in Europe-
America and America-Asia ties. Dr Mahathir, however, has a bone to pick
about Myanmar.
The new British foreign secretary, Robin Cook, speaking in Singapore
after a tour of four ASEAN countries, made it clear that Myanmar would
not be invited to the London meeting. European sanctions against
Myanmar introduced recently include a ban on visas for its officials.
Mr Cook spelt out the rationale for the sanctions. The ruling military junta
"is not only a deeply repressive regime," he said, "but it is also a deeply
irresponsible regime in that it is one of the few governments in the world
whose members are prepared to profit out of the drugs trade rather than to
seek to suppress the drugs trade."
Mr Cook had said much the same a few days earlier in meetings with
Malaysia's foreign minister, Abdullah Badawi, and the deputy prime
minister, Anwar Ibrahim. From those and other meetings in the region Mr
Cook gained the impression that ASEAN governments share many of his
concerns, even if they choose to represent them in a more emollient,
"Asian" way.
But Dr Mahathir sees matters differently. Discrimination against Myanmar
means discrimination against ASEAN," he tartly observed. "You may find
other countries in ASEAN also deciding not to attend."
The Malaysian leader has some experience of boycotts. Only in the past
year have ties with Britain seemed back on track after the "buy British last"
campaign he launched in his outrage over British press coverage of aid and
arms deals. Before that, the target was Australia. His reaction to Mr Cook
was just what the junta in Myanmar was hoping for. "It's one for all and all
for one," enthused a Myanmar official.
Maybe. Officials of other ASEAN countries note that membership of the
Asia-Europe Meeting is not automatic for members of either ASEAN or
the EU, but is decided by consensus. After Dr Mahathir's remarks, the
ASEAN countries will have to decide whether the interests that prompted
members such as Singapore to push for the first Asia-Europe summit
should be subordinated to solidarity with the Myanmar junta.
*******************************************
BKK POST: BURMESE DAZE
September 10, 1997
A traveller recently returned from Burma reports a mini-renaissance in the
publishing industry, with several new magazines on the stands, some of
them even mildly entertaining.
One such publication carried a colourful cover photograph of Slorc
chairman Than Shwe playing golf at Pagan. His caddie was a very
attractive young woman bedecked in gold. Gen Than Shwe's wife did not
appreciate the artistic merit of the photograph. The magazine is no longer
in business.
Elsewhere, a publishing house issued a Burmese translation of Alice in
Wonderland. The censors got around to it belatedly, and were heard to be
scratching their heads about a .passage describing birds walking around in
circles. The guardians of public decency decided that some people might
draw parallels between the birds (which became extinct) and ... well, you
know.
Result: Alice doesn't live in Rangoon anymore.
************************************************************
KYODO: JAPANESE EMBASSY ANNOUNCES FLOOD RELIEF DONATION
September 8, 1997
Yangon, Sept. 8 Kyodo -- The Japanese Government will donate
materials and cash totaling nearly 150,000 U.S. dollars for flood victims
in Myanmar, the Japanese embassy said in a press release Monday.
Emergency flood relief includes 11.75 million yen (98,000 dollars)
worth of relief materials and a cash grant of 50,000 dollars, it said.
"According to the recent report compiled by the UN disaster management
team, the unusually heavy rainfalls in the last week of July 1997 caused
flash floods in many parts of Myanmar, particularly in Mon state, Bago and
Ayeyarwaddy divisions, resulting in the loss of lives and materials," the
statement said.
Material assistance includes blankets, sleeping mats, electric torches
and batteries, towels, soap and detergents.
********************************************
THE NATION: PTT TARGETS VILLAGE HEADS
September 10, 1997
Kamol Sukin
IN AN effort to gain support for its controversial Yadana gas pipeline
project, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) has changed its public
relations strategy and is now trying to win over kamnan and villages heads
instead of the affected villagers.
But environmental activists warn that the new tactic will only aggravate
ongoing conflicts between the PTT and Kanchanaburi villagers, who are
suffering as a direct result of the pipeline construction.
Songkiat Thansamrit, director of PTT's public relations department, said his
department has developed two new strategies - a campaign for the villagers
to protect the remaining forest and to provide them with alternate occupations.
"To save money during the economic crisis, we will only pay for what is
necessary. We've decided to only deal with the provincial authorities in
regards to general environmental awareness, instead of focusing on the
doubts surrounding the project," he said. 'We will contact the provincial
authorities, such as kamnan and village heads and then they can explain our
project to the villagers."
According to the plan, the PTT will organise training courses for the
village heads and ask them to speak at seminars organised by opponents of
the pipeline.
Songkiat said the PTT will continue to try and create an understanding with
the affected villagers who oppose the project, but that it is not of
priority to the company
"The environmental groups don't understand that we've done our best. We
would like to stop the project temporarily for the debates but it's just not
possible because we would have to compensate the developers if we fail to
finish the pipeline on time," Songkiat said.
Suraphol Duangkhae, deputy secretary-general of the Wildlife Fund Thailand,
said PTT's new plan would ensure that significant, necessary questions about
the project would be left unanswered.
"Not everything is known about the project because the PTT only provides
general information. Instead of directly answering questions, PTT officials
only say 'please trust us and we'll do our best'. That is not enough," he said.
"We need a lot of necessary information for our monitoring system, such as
who are the contractors for each part of the construction, what are the
details of the contracts and what environmental protection measures are
included in the contracts?"
Suraphol said the PTT had hired former activists from Ramkhamhaeng
University to promote the project among the villagers.
***********************************************
BURMANET: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN BURMA - ASSESSING ASEAN POLICY
September 9, 1997
BurmaNet Staff
At an international conference held in Bangkok from August 20 - 23 1997
academics and journalists discussed "Economic and Political Dimensions of
Constructive Engagement in Asia". The moral dimensions of constructive
engagement naturally also surfaced during the course of the conference.
Below are excerpts selected from several of the papers presented at the
conference and a brief analysis by BurmaNet. The selections highlight the
evolution of constructive engagement and non-interference in Southeast Asia,
breeches of policy by ASEAN members in pursuing bilateral relations with
Burma, and recommendations for a future policy of constructive intervention.
Amitav Acharya contextualizes the birth of the doctrine of
non-interventionism, enshrined in ASEAN policy during the Cold War era.
Rather than portraying non-interference as consonant with 'Asian cultural
values', Acharya demonstrates that it was a response to outside threats.
The threats to sovereignty faced by ASEAN members have clearly shifted over
the past three decades, thus posing the question of whether or not ASEAN's
policy has undergone a corresponding shift to accommodate change in the post
Cold War era.
--BurmaNet
--------------
SOVEREIGNTY, NON-INTERVENTION, AND REGIONALISM
Amitav Acharya
Associate Professor of Political Science at York University
"No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate
subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent
overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in
another State."
Excerpts from UN General Assembly Resolution, 23 3 (XX), 23 December,
1965.
The doctrine of non-intervention is a corollary to the principle of
sovereignty. Imperialism and colonisation led to the globalisation of the
European state-system, with the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention forming the basis of statehood in what came to be known as
the Third World. The salience of the doctrine of non-interference in
Southeast Asia's state-system predates the founding of ASEAN in 1967. It
was the key principle behind the Afro-Asian summit at Bandung. Non-
communist countries were enthusiastic proponents of the doctrine at the
UN through the 1960s and 1970s. This not only reflected the general
concern of the Non-Aligned countries against superpower interference in
the Third World, it was also inspired by a more pressing need to counter
the threat of subversion (primarily communist-backed) in the region. Few
regions provided more case studies in which the violation of the doctrine of
non-intervention was at stake than Southeast Asia in the postcolonial era.
The 1960s were a time when the governments of North and South Vietnam,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia all complained of being
subjected to foreign interference in a variety of ways including, as a Thai
delegate to the UN General Assembly debates on non-intervention put it,
"verbal intimidation, infiltration, and subversive activities directed and
supported from outside."
Not surprisingly therefore, the doctrine lay at the heart of ASEAN
regionalism and was reaffirmed in all the major political statements of
ASEAN from the very outset. The founding Bangkok Declaration of 1967 called
upon Southeast Asian states to "ensure their stability and security from
external interference in any form or manifestation". This injunction was
intended to apply not only to interference by extra-regional powers,
including the big powers such as the US, Soviet Union, and China, but also
by the Southeast Asian countries in the affairs of their own neighbours.
In operational terms, the obligations imposed by ASEAN's doctrine of non-
interference on its members have had four main aspects: (1) refraining
from criticising the actions of a member government towards its own
people, including violation of human rights, and from making the domestic
political system of states and the political styles of governments as a basis
for deciding their membership in ASEAN; (2) criticising the actions of states
which are deemed to constitute a breach of the non-interference principle;
(3) denying recognition, sanctuaries, or other forms of support to any rebel
group seeking to destabilise or overthrow the government of a
neighbouring state; (4) providing political support and material assistance
to member states in their campaign against subversive and destabilising
activities.
Such a policy does not necessarily mean that ASEAN will oppose the use of
force by a government against its own people. This policy is not as much a
departure from the past as was originally interpreted by some analysts. It
upholds the view that while human rights abuses in a member country are not
a matter for foreign commentary or interference, overthrow of established
governments is a threat to the security interests of ASEAN.
-------------------
BurmaNet:
Thus constructive engagement means engaging with the regime in power; the
means by which power was obtained are irrelevant. This view was
substantiated by Mahathir Mohammad's careless remark that if 5 million
Burmese citizens were killed by the junta ASEAN would consider delaying
membership. Clearly, stability is a primary concern for ASEAN members,
particularly for those nation-states with shared borders.
In the next section Silverstein catalogues violations of the doctrine of
non-interventionism by ASEAN members in their bilateral relations with
Burma. The doctrine was breached due to national security concerns, the
desire for economic gain, and concern over the fate of Burmese Muslims.
----------------------
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH BURMA: HAS IT WORKED IN THE PAST? WILL IT WORK
IN THE FUTURE?
Josef Silverstein
Professor Emeritus, Rutgers University
[Following SLORC's seizure of power] neither ASEAN nor its members
individually joined the outcry against SLORC nor halted trade. Although as
a group ASEAN followed its doctrine of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other nations, it left it to each member state to relate to Burma
as it saw fit. Almost immediately, Singapore found a new market for the
sale of weapons which Burma used in its war against the ethnic minorities.
Two weeks after SLORC's announcement of a new economic open-door policy and
the promulgation of a foreign capital investment act on November 30, 1988,
Thailand's Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Gen. Chavalit, visited Rangoon and
met with Gen. Saw Maung, leader of SLORC.
There was no talk of "constructive engagement" and non-interference in the
internal affairs of another nation when Gen. Chavalit agreed to Gen. Saw
Maung's request for help in repatriating Burma students who had fled to
Thailand for sanctuary because they feared brutal and inhumane reprisal from
SLORC for their part in the summer demonstrations. The Burma General
responded by granting logging concessions to forty Thai companies, many with
military connections, in the border regions where the Burma army was engaged
in its latest drive to suppress ethnic minorities resistance.
The capture of the forest areas allowed the Thai leaseholders to replace
traditional logging practices with machine intensive methods as selective
gave way to clear cutting. By the end of 1993, the Thai loggers had
despoiled so much of the forests in their drive to extract teak logs, SLORC
canceled all but four contracts in order, belatedly, to save the forests in
the leased areas.
By initially ignoring Burma military intrusions onto Thai territory and
allowing Burma military units to attack Karen border strongholds from there,
Thailand became involved directly in Burma's civil war and gave the Burma
army an important advantage over its enemies. In May 1989, during a Burma
military operation inside Thailand, its armed forces shelled the Thai
village of Ban Wangkaew, destroying two hundred houses and killing several
people.
Following the 1990 election victory of the party of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and
the overwhelming defeat of the party backed by SLORC, the military rulers
issued Declaration 1/90 on July 27, 1990 defining and justifying its right
to rule and its refusal to transfer power to the NLD. Again, while most of
the nations in the West, Japan, and India protested, Thailand and the other
ASEAN nations continued their silence.
It was at the Post-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991
that ASEAN embraced the policy of constructive engagement for dealing with
Burma. In rejecting the U.S. call for the ASEAN nations to support its
policies toward Burma, the Thai Foreign Minister, Arsa Sarasin, said that
ASEAN would adopt a policy of constructive engagement toward Burma and would
not interfere in its internal affairs.
Before the year ended, ASEAN became involved in another Burma matter: the
mistreatment and expulsion of Burma Muslims (Rohingas) from their villages
and lands in western Burma by SLORC who denied their rights and citizenship.
ASEAN was divided over how to deal with the situation... Malaysia's Foreign
Ministry summoned the Burma Ambassador on March 10, 1992 and protested the
treatment of the Rohingas. The Foreign Minister issued a statement saying,
"we believe the time has come for a firm stand to be taken as there seems to
be no slackening of attacks on Muslims." Even after an agreement was
reached between Burma and Bangladesh on the return of Rohingas who could
prove citizenship, Malaysia opposed extending an ASEAN invitation to Burma
to attend the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila. When the meeting ended,
the Malaysian Foreign Minister said, "It is their [SLORC's] desire to come
out from isolation but they will have problems if their credentials on human
rights and freedom are bad."
In 1992, and again a year later, Thailand played an important role in the
internal affairs of Burma. In the earlier year, SLORC publicly announced
that it was going to defeat the Karens and capture their headquarters,
Manerplaw, by March 27--Burma Armed Forces Day--and end their long
rebellion... Early in the fighting the Karens, short of ammunition and
unable to purchase and receive any from their usual sources in Thailand,
feared they might not be able to hold their headquarters... Early in March,
Thailand suddenly allowed ammunition to cross the border and made it
possible for the Karen to continue holding back the Burma army. On the 23rd
of March, SLORC declared a unilateral cease-fire without achieving their
promised goal, leaving their enemy intact and in place. Thailand's changed
policy toward the contesting forces was crucial to this outcome.
Thailand became even more involved in SLORC's war against the ethnic
minorities in 1993. Following an agreement with SLORC leader Gen. Khin
Nyunt, the Thais suddenly and without warning closed their country to
transit by Burma ethnic minorities and members of the National Coalition
Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). The NCGUB leaders were abroad
attending the UNGA meeting in New York and were unable to return to their
headquarters inside of Burma.
By this action, the Burma military rulers hoped to separate the NCGUB from
the minorities, cut off contact the Burman and minorities leaders had with
the outside world, halt the remaining illegal trade at the border and end
the civil war. Thailand hoped that by helping SLORC against its enemies, it
would see a reopening of border trade on a regularized basis once all
fighting ended.
Meanwhile, other ASEAN members have pursued bilateral relations with Burma
in a manner consistent with the ASEAN interpretation of constructive
engagement: Singapore and Malaysia have become two of the largest investors
in Burma with hotel construction, department stores and other projects,
largely aimed at serving and profiting from tourism. They and Indonesia
have invested in clothing factories, taking advantage of the low paid
workers and low-tech machinery investment necessary for quick startup,
recovery of investment and profits. Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines
have invested in resource extraction and tourist related projects.
Foreign investment, contrary to the claims of SLORC and the members of
ASEAN, is not neutral... If there is supposed to be a trickle-down effect of
money into a widening pool of people, it has not occurred after nearly a
decade of SLORC-managed open economy and foreign investment.
----------------------
BurmaNet:
'Constructive engagement' is a rationalization selectively invoked by ASEAN
governments to defend a policy of continued economic engagement. In
reality, ASEAN member nations have intervened in Burma's "internal affairs"
in an inconsistent fashion as different issues assume priority at different
times. When Muslim states refused to comment on the pleas by Burmese
Muslims to recognize their plight under SLORC in 1997 it was a reversal of
the earlier Malaysian policy of condemning the junta's human rights
violations. Thai policy toward Burma has oscillated between supporting
Karen refugees and a buffer zone against Burma to tolerating incursions of
Burmese military on Thai soil for the purpose of attacking Karen refugee
camps.
Many observers commented that the real reason behind ASEAN's desire to bring
Burma rapidly into the fold was Burma's increasing dependence on China. We
can only analyze the effectiveness of their maneuver in the long term
future, but at the moment Chinese investment is continuing apace, as is the
flow of Chinese arms into Burma. China also lauded ASEAN's move in
flaunting Western nations. In the wake of Burma's admission and the
collapse of the baht, China was one of the first countries to offer to
contribute to an aid package for Thailand. In the future, if relations
between the East and the West are polarized over Burma, we may actually see
ASEAN moving closer to China's orbit.
--------------------------
Adnan, an observer of ASEAN process and policy making, advocates policy
reform, pro-active constructive intervention, and a perhaps idealistic but
noble "human agenda" for ASEAN. The objectives Adnan outlines can be used
as a yardstick to measure progress, or the absence thereof, in Burma.
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
INTERVENTION OR INDIFFERENCE?
Abdul Rahman Adnan
Director, Institute for Policy Research (IKD), Malaysia
In the past, advocates of Southeast Asian regionalism have generally
emphasised the nation-state as the point of reference and the achievement
of its security as the measure of progress. Now, at the threshold of the
twenty-first century, the achievement of national and regional resilience is
such that the survival of Southeast Asian nation-states is no longer such a
critical issue.
Thus, while the nation-states continue to be crucial frameworks and
mechanisms for providing physical security and well-being, the process of
community-building requires a shift of focus to the people, from appraising
progress solely in terms of survival and stability of the nation-state, to
measuring it more in terms of the human predicament...we need to pursue
a "human agenda".
[following are excerpts from Adnan's suggestions]
- peace at all levels, international, regional and domestic. Peace for the
people is not only the absence of war, but also involves the presence of
positive conditions, supportive of security of life and property at all
levels and conducive to mutually beneficial exchanges among nation-states
and peoples.
- the promotion of open market mechanisms... without state intervention
except when it is necessary to ensure fair play and to protect those who
cannot protect themselves... It also requires massive investment in human
resources development as a source of longer-term growth and prosperity.
- the need to safeguard and to enhance the dignity of the human
person by the rule of law, traditional values, and provision of opportunities
for education and employment. People empowerment is the key, and every
effort should be made to promote the individual's capacity to participate in
the various political social and economic processes taking place in the
community and society.
- the need for more just, equal, tolerant and caring societies,
where the poor, the underprivileged, the disadvantaged and the diverse
cultural groups can receive protection and assistance, where their basic
requirements of food, shelter, clothing, healthcare and education are met,
and where there is respect for political rights and the accountability of
governance.
Implementing the human agenda will require a new policy of "constructive
intervention".
----------------------
Another ASEAN observer, Djiwandono, also advocates ASEAN policy which takes
account of more universal human rights values.
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
J. Soedjati Djiwandono
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
I am, however, for one, concerned over the possibility that ASEAN's
reticence on Myanmar is basically due to a tacit recognition that its own
records on human rights, at least with respect to some of its member states,
are not particularly brilliant. Indeed, the ASEAN states themselves should
first put their own houses in order. Who are we, then, to criticise the
Myanmarese?
If, however, "constructive engagement" should not imply turning a blind eye
to what goes wrong, nor burying our heads in the sand, pretending as though
everything was fine and in good order, then it needs to be clearly
translated into policy. In pursuing a policy of constructive engagement
towards Myanmar, not only should ASEAN take into account its possible impact
on its relations with the USA and the European Union on pragmatic
considerations, but it should also maintain its credibility and
respectability in the international community by adhering to certain
internationally accepted standards and norms of behaviour.
This, however, must be made unmistakably clear to the Myanmarese regime. It
is not that ASEAN should try to teach the Myanmarese a lesson on how to
manage their internal affairs. But a clear expression of common concern
would precisely reflect our sympathy and understanding as fellow Southeast
Asians. And more importantly, despite our imperfections, just as the rest
of the world, we Southeast Asians should demonstrate our commitment to
universal values in the common interest of humankind.
The promotion of good governance and the establishment of a civil society
marked by democratic pluralism, equality and justice for everyone, and
respect for basic human rights, which often relate to domestic stability or
instability, are problems that are common to all the ASEAN member states.
Concern with and attention to such common problems may be translated into a
common or at least co-ordinated policy and form part of security
co-operation, be it on bilateral or multilateral basis, in addition to
exchange of views, information and experience on such matters. This would
give the policy of constructive engagement its real value.
--------------------------
BurmaNet:
In response to Hun Sen's seizure of power and the collapse of the coalition
government in Cambodia, Anwar Ibrahim outlined a new policy of pro-
active involvement. The new policy was named "constructive
intervention", and entails the following:
(1) direct assistance to firm up electoral processes
(2) an increased commitment to legal and administrative reforms
(3) the development of human capital
(4) the general strengthening of civil society and the rule of law
The application of these policies, devised for Cambodia, to Burma would be
welcomed by the majority of the population and the international community.
However, the financial stakes in Burma in terms of resources, a
government-disciplined labour force, and potential market, are much higher
than in Cambodia. Since 1988 ASEAN members have been solidifying political
and economic ties in Burma by engaging in joint venture projects with SLORC,
therefore the regional grouping is less likely to interfere. However, where
interference would lead to greater transparency and economic stability in
Burma ASEAN investors would themselves benefit. ASEAN is already
encouraging the regime to implement reforms.
Now that Burma has been admitted to ASEAN it is unlikely that the group will
be expelled. Therefore the task for opposition groups and international
observers is to ensure that any changes wrought by constructive engagement
or intervention are genuine steps toward democracy, rather than mere
cosmetic changes. So far investment has marked a period of growth without
real development. The recent talk between U Aung Shwe and the SLORC is
another good example of cosmetic improvement. Aung San Suu Kyi was not
included thus the NLD does not consider the talks "dialogue", and ASEAN
cannot claim credit.
Supporters of democracy are concerned that Burma's ASEAN membership and a
continued policy of constructive engagement may impede rather than assist
progress towards democracy.
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ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW BOOKS ON BURMA
September 10, 1997
"Burma : The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society (St. Antony's Series)"
by P. B. R. Carey
List: $65.00
Subjects: Burma; Politics and government; 1948-; Foreign relations;
Ethnic relations; Contemporary Politics - Asia; Ethnic
Politics; POLITICS/CURRENT EVENTS; Asia - Indochina
Publisher: St Martins Pr (Short)
Binding: Hardcover
Expected publication date: September 1, 1997
ISBN: 0312174225
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Gender Ideology and Psychological Reality : An Essay on Cultural
Reproduction"
by Melford E. Spiro
List: $30.00
Subjects: Sex role; Burma; Gender identity; Ethnopsychology;
Interpersonal relations; Sociobiology; PSYCHOLOGY;
Anthropology - Cultural
Publisher: Yale Univ Pr
Binding: Hardcover
Expected publication date: September 1, 1997
ISBN: 0300070071
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