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THE UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS SL
- Subject: THE UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS SL
- From: moe@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 22:51:00
Dear Folks,
I believe the following text is going to be of use as the US
Policy towards SLORC is still unchanged despite some events have
expired..I'll follow up with new reports on the US policy towards SLORC
as soon as they're available.
Sincerely,
Julien Moe
------------
Conditions In Burma And U.S. Policy Toward
Burma
Plan for Implementation of Section 570 of Conference Report 104-863 to
Accompany H.R. 3610 (Omnibus Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1997)
Submitted to the U.S. Congress, June 13, 1997
Released by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, August 21,
1997
U.S. Department of State
The people of Burma continue to live under a highly authoritarian
military regime that is widely condemned for its serious human rights
abuses. The military regime in Burma, the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC), has made no progress in the past six months
in moving toward greater democratization and little, if any, progress
toward fundamental improvement in the quality of life of the people of
Burma. The SLORC continues to dominate the political, economic and social
life of the country in
the same arbitrary, heavy-handed way that it has since seizing power in
September 1988 after harshly suppressing massive pro-democracy
demonstrations.
U.S. policy toward Burma seeks progress in three key areas -- democracy,
human rights and counter-narcotics. We have taken steps to pressure the
SLORC -- suspending economic aid, withdrawing GSP and OPIC, implementing
an arms embargo, blocking assistance from international financial
institutions, downgrading our representation to Charge, and imposing
visa restrictions on senior leaders and their families. We are engaged
in vigorous multilateral diplomacy to encourage ASEAN, Japan, the EU and
other nations to take similar steps and other actions to encourage
progress by the SLORC in these areas of key
concern. The EU recently imposed visa restrictions similar to ours and
is expected to withdraw GSP in March. In addition, Japan's suspension of
much of its bilateral aid program remains in force.
In addition, the President signed an Executive Order implementing a ban
on new investment by U.S. persons in Burma effective May 21, 1997. The
order prohibits persons from engaging in any of the following
activities:
-- entering a new contract that includes the economic development of
resources located in Burma; -- entering into a contract providing for the
participation in
royalties, earnings, or profits in the economic development of resources
located in Burma, without regard to the form of the participation;
-- facilitating transactions of foreign persons that would violate any
of the foregoing prohibitions if engaged in by U.S. person; and
-- evading or avoiding, or attempting to violate, any of the
prohibitions in the order.
Measuring Progress Toward Democratization
In the past six months the SLORC has shown no sign of willingness to
cede its hold on absolute power. The generals have continued to refuse
to negotiate with pro-democracy forces and ethnic groups for a genuine
political settlement to allow a return to the rule of law and respect
for basic human rights.
The SLORC claims that the military-dominated National Convention is an
appropriate forum for dialogue with the NLD and parties representing the
country's ethnic minorities. But the National Convention, a body
ostensibly tasked since 1993 with drafting a new constitution, is hardly
a democratic forum as currently structured. The Convention is
overwhelmingly made up of delegates hand-picked by the SLORC, which has
carefully stage-managed the proceedings and ignored even limited
opposition views. The NLD withdrew from the National Convention in
November 1995 because of the undemocratic nature of the institution and
was formally ejected by the SLORC in December. Despite having no legal
mandate, the SLORC appears determined to draft a constitution that would
ensure a dominant role for the military
forces in the country's future political structure. However, the
Convention has not met since mid-1996, and the SLORC's current plans for
the body are unclear.
The worsening narcotics situation in Burma reflects the SLORC's
disregard for the rule of law. Burma is the world's largest source of
illicit opium, and output increased by an estimated nine per cent in
1996 to 2,560 metric tons. Nevertheless, Burmese law enforcement actions
against producers and traffickers remain limited. Leading trafficker
Khun Sa, who "surrendered" to Burmese forces in early 1996, has never
been brought to justice. Even as heroin production remains high, Burmese
traffickers are also diversifying into methamphetamines, which are posing
severe problems for neighboring
states. As well, traffickers are increasingly investing in legitimate
sectors of the economy, and there is reason to believe that the
laundering of drug profits is having a substantial impact on the Burmese
economy.
Measuring Progress on Improving the Quality of Life
In the same way, in the past six months the Burmese people have seen
little progress in improving their quality of life. In fact, by many
indices, their quality of life has worsened. The SLORC's severe
violations of human rights have continued. There continue to be credible
reports, particularly from ethnic minority-dominated areas along the
Thai border, that soldiers have committed serious human rights abuses,
including extrajudicial killing and rape. Disappearances continue, and
members of
the security forces beat and otherwise abuse detainees. Arbitrary
arrests and detentions continue for expression of dissenting political
views. Several hundred, if not more, political prisoners remain in
detention, including 29 Members of Parliament elected in 1990.
The SLORC reinforces its rule via a pervasive security apparatus led by
military intelligence and sharply restricts basic rights to free speech,
press, assembly, and association. Political party activity remains
severely restricted. The activities of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi are
monitored and circumscribed by the regime. Since late September Aung San
Suu Kyi has been prevented from addressing party supporters in front of
her house, as the SLORC puts up blockades to prevent gatherings there.
In November the motorcade in which she was riding was attacked by a gang
of thugs encouraged by elements of the regime. Aung San Suu Kyi was not
hurt, though one NLD leader was slightly injured by broken glass.
In response to street protests by large groups of students in November
and December, the SLORC closed the nation's universities. Most remain
closed to prevent another outbreak of student protest. For three weeks
in December Aung San Suu Kyi did not leave her compound. Since late
December, she has been able to leave her compound after notifying
authorities of her destinations. She meets relatively often with
diplomats and supporters. Visitors are generally allowed to meet her at
her compound if authorities are notified in advance. She has held two
meetings of her supporters on her compound that were attended by 2,000
or more persons. NLD leaders have expressed strong concerns about SLORC
repression and have called for increased international pressure on the
SLORC, including sanctions.
In February the Burmese Army launched a full-scale assault on the forces
of the Karen National Union near the Thai border. Up to 12,000 Karen
were forced to flee into Thailand, the vast majority of them civilians,
including women, children and the elderly. Thousands of civilians were
forcibly conscripted to serve as porters for the Burma Army in its
offensive.Thousands of other citizens of Burma remain in exile because of
fear of
persecution and poor economic conditions. About 24,000 Rohingya Muslims
from Arakan state remain in camps in Bangladesh. A few thousand students
and dissidents remain in exile in Thailand. Approximately 100,000
individuals now reside in ethnic minority camps along the Thai-Burma
border, among them thousands of new arrivals driven out by army attacks
in the areas controlled by the Karen and Karenni ethnic minorities.
Burma is a poor country, with an average per capita income of only $600
to $800, even after adjusting for the relative purchasing power of the
Burmese currency. Progress on market reforms has been mixed and uneven.
Since 1988 the Government has partly opened the economy to permit
expansion of the private sector and to attract foreign
investment. Some economic improvement has ensued, but major obstacles to
economic reform persist. These include disproportionately large military
spending, extensive overt and covert state involvement in economic
activity, excessive state monopolization of leading exports, a bloated
bureaucracy prone to arbitrary and opaque governance, and poor human and
physical infrastructure. In addition, the SLORC does not have access to
external credit from the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank.
Money laundering in Burma is a growing problem, and the laundering of
drug profits is thought by some analysts to have a widespread impact on
the Burmese economy.
The Government restricts worker rights and uses forced labor on a
widespread basis. The use of porters by the army -- with attendant
mistreatment, illness, and even death for those compelled to serve --
remains a common practice. The military authorities continue to force
ordinary citizens (including women and children) to "contribute" their
labor on a massive scale, often under harsh working conditions, on
construction projects throughout the country. Some of these projects --
such as the moat of the Mandalay fort -- were undertaken to promote
tourism to the country. In the past year, the military has begun using
soldiers instead of civilians at certain infrastructure projects,
following the issuance of directives in 1995 to end the practice of
forced civilian labor. Child labor continues to be a serious problem.
As a largely underdeveloped country, Burma does not have some of the
extensive environmental problems affecting air and water quality that
plague many of its rapidly industrializing neighbors. However, with a
rapid population growth rate, the country faces increasing pressure on
environmental quality. Burma possesses the largest tracts of remaining
tropical forest in southeast Asia, though aggressive international
logging companies are eyeing these forests just as they are eyeing those
in other Mekong countries. Some NGOs have charged that Burma's teak
forests in the Thai-Burma border area are being rapidly destroyed by
clear-cutting and deforestation. Because of the severe restrictions on
EmbasSY travel to outlying parts of Burma, it is difficult to document
the
overall extent of the problem. Embassy officials have visited the
showcase Bago Yoma Forest 150 miles north of Rangoon. The Ministry of
Forest operates a research station and seed orchards in this area in
what appears to be an example of sustainable forestry.
The poor quality of life is also reflected in rising drug abuse. Burmese
estimates put the addict population at approximately 60,000, but UNDCP
and NGOs working in the health sector estimate the actual number is at
least five times that figure. Intravenous use of heroin is contributing
to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. Drug treatment services are not
reaching most drug users because of a lack of facilities and a lack of
properly trained personnel.
Development of a Multilateral Strategy
The goals of U.S. policy toward Burma are progress toward democracy,
improved human rights, and more effective counter-narcotics efforts.
Failing national reconciliation, Burma will not be able to address
systematically the many severe problems it faces, including narcotics
trafficking and abuse, a low level of education and poor economic
performance.
In recent months we have forged a vigorous multilateral strategy to seek
improvement in our key areas of concern. We consult about Burma
regularly and at senior levels with leaders of ASEAN nations, Japan, the
European Union, and other countries having major trading and investment
interests in Burma. These efforts have helped build and maintain strong
international pressure on the SLORC.
The key to progress toward democracy and human rights is, first and
foremost, a direct dialogue about the political future of the country
among the SLORC, the NLD, and the ethnic minorities. In all our public
and private messages to the SLORC, leaders of third countries and other
interested parties, we stress the importance of beginning such a
dialogue as the key to achieving significant progress in Burma. We work
closely with our friends and allies in Asia and Europe to press the
SLORC to begin dialogue. In response, leaders from ASEAN nations, Japan
and the European Union have urged the regime, both publicly and
privately, to move to dialogue with the democratic opposition.
In order to urge the SLORC to make progress in our areas of concern, we
have taken a number of steps -- suspending economic aid, withdrawing GSP
and OPIC, implementing an arms embargo, blocking assistance from
international financial institutions, downgrading our representation to
Charge, and imposing visa restrictions on senior regime leaders and
their families. We likewise have encouraged ASEAN, Japan, the EU and
other nations to take similar steps and other actions to encourage
progress by the SLORC in these areas of key concern. Many nations join
us in our arms embargo, including European countries, Canada, Australia
and Japan. The EU and Japan limit their assistance to Burma to
humanitarian aid. Our efforts in the international financial
institutions continue to be successful in blocking loans to the SLORC,
which is
probably the single most important form of pressure we have against the
regime. Since 1988 we have taken an active role in pressing for strong
human rights resolutions on Burma at the United Nations General Assembly
and the UN Human Rights Commission, as well as having worked vigorously
in the ILO to condemn the lack of freedom of association for workers and
the use of forced labor by the SLORC.
In November, at our urging, the EU and associated European states joined
us in imposing a ban on visas for high-level SLORC officials and their
families. In addition, the European Commission has recommended that the
European Union withdraw GSP trade benefits from Burma's agricultural and
industrial products because of forced labor concerns. EU Foreign
Ministers are
expected to adopt these recommendations in March, which would bring
European trade policy in line with the U.S. ban on GSP.
On several occasions in recent months, our embassies have made
high-level demarches to leaders in the ASEAN countries, urging them to
use their influence with the SLORC to press for positive change in
Burma. We have also raised with the ASEAN countries our concerns that
Burma not join that organization prematurely. ASEAN shares many of our
goals with regard to Burma, but we disagree on the means to achieve
those goals. ASEAN believes that "constructive engagement" of the SLORC
is the most effective way to promote positive change in Burma. We will
continue to raise our strong concerns with ASEAN and urge continued steps
to encourage
progress by the SLORC.
END OF DOC
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