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SLORC'S "INTEL-NET" BURMA'S INTELL



SLORC'S "INTEL-NET"

BURMA'S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS

By  ANDREW SELTH

from BURMA DEBATE
Vol. IV, No 4
September/October 1997

(Posted without notes or figures)


Military Intelligence Under the SLORC

The Ne Win regime's preoccupation with its own survival has long consumed
precious resources and distracted the DDSI/MIS from pursuing its purely
military intelligence functions. This situation remains under the SLORC, but
it would appear that some effort has been made in recent years to rectify
the situation. The regime seems to have accepted, for example, that unless
the Tatmadaw can command better strategic and operational intelligence
capabilities, then it will remain vulnerable to both external and internal
military threats. While the SLORC has managed to negotiate cease-fire
agreements with almost all major insurgent groups (the Karens being the
notable exception), tensions are still high and the potential remains for
widespread fighting to break out again. There have already been serious
clashes, for example, with Wa and Karenni insurgent groups. Also, the SLORC
is still nervous about possible foreign military intervention in Burma's
affairs, and there are tensions with Burma's western and eastern neighbors.
Perhaps more importantly, unless the Tatmadaw's operational intelligence
capabilities are improved, all the new arms and equipment it has acquired
since 1988 will lack proper direction and coordination, and thus fail to
realize their full potential. 

Under the SLORC, Burma's SIGINT effort is still managed by the Directorate
of Signals which, like the DDSI, is part of the Defense Ministry's General
Staff Department. International interceptors are reportedly the
responsibility of specialist units based in the Defense Ministry compound in
Rangoon, and are derived from larger Tatmadaw communications facilities at
Mingaladon and Hmawbi, and possibly the large military communications
station in Taunggyi. Once again, it is difficult to obtain reliable
information, but there is evidence to suggest that the scope of Burma's
strategic SIGINT operations has been widened in recent years. In addition to
foreign radio traffic, Burma now seems able more easily to monitor radar and
other electronic emissions emanating from outside the country. There have
been persistent reports, for example, that China has provided Burma with a
range of sophisticated electronic warfare equipment as part of a broader
plan to upgrade its own SIGINT capabilities in the region.47 Most attention
has focused on China's apparent role in establishing or upgrading a signals
intercept station on Great Coco Island in the Andaman Sea. There have been
several reports that, since, 1992, this base has boasted a 50-metre-high
antenna and sensitive equipment capable of picking up not only radio and
radar transmissions from ships
in the vicinity, but also electronic emissions (ELINT) from missile tests at
the Indian Defense Research and Development Laboratory in Hyderabad.  

A number of other sites for new SIGINT stations have apparently been mooted.
For example, there have been numerous reports over the past few years that
Burma has been approached by China to install (or at least upgrade) signals
intelligence equipment at several places around the Burmese coast.49 Once
operational, this equipment would provide China (and presumably Burma as
well) with a comprehensive electronic surveillance coverage of the Andaman
Sea and the Bay of Bengal.  One well-informed Burma- watcher has stated that
the Burmese have come under pressure from the Chinese to permit the PRC's
intelligence services access not only to Hainggyi and Great Coco islands
(which are the places most often mentioned), but also to Ramree Island and
Zadetkyi Island along the southern coast. The latter is considered
particularly sensitive as it is located off Kawthaung, Burma's southernmost
point, and therefore close to the strategically important Malacca Straits.
Other possible sites of interest to the Chinese include Kadan Island, off
the Burmese coast near Mergui, and Heinze Island north of Tavoy. It has been
suggested that China wishes to build new facilities or improve old Burmese
facilities on all these islands, with a view to conducting SIGINT operations
against other regional countries.

To support these claims, observers have cited reports of bilateral military
agreements between the two countries. The most recent appears to have been
negotiated in October 1996, and finalized in early 1997. According to the
Far Eastern Economic Review, it specifically covers the exchange of
intelligence on 'threats to their respective countries' end Chinese training
for Burmese personnel in 'signals intelligence in coastal areas.'

The full extent of China's involvement in Burma's intelligence improvement
program, however, is very difficult to determine. Even greater uncertainty
surrounds China's efforts to establish or use signals intelligence
facilities around Burma's coastline to spy on other regional countries.
While some of the reports on this subject are quite convincing, others are
much less so, and most have yet to be confirmed by independent sources.
There would appear to be certain benefits to Burma in permitting China at
least some of the access it desires, particularly if both countries share
the product from SIGINT operations conducted from Burmese territory. Yet
some caution needs to be exercised over the extent to which Burma can be
seen as an agent of the Chinese in this field. Given Burma's fierce
independence and lingering suspicions of China's longer term strategic
intentions, it is unlikely that the SLORC would permit China all the access
that it wants. Nor can any Chinese military presence be considered
permanent, whatever the apparent benefits of current intelligence-sharing
arrangements.

In addition to possible Chinese assistance, there have been reports of the
SLORC purchasing considerable quantities of electronic and communications
equipment from several other suppliers, including Singapore, Russia and
possibly Israel. It would be remarkable if none of it was related to
intelligence collection or dissemination in some way. In particular,
Singapore and Israel are suspected of providing signals interception and
encryption equipment to DDSI, with training packages.  Also there is good
reason to believe that the SLORC has acquired some equipment, possibly from
Singapore's Defense Technology Group, to protect Burmese communications from
interception bye hostile agencies. China, Thailand and India, for example,
are all reported to monitor official Burmese radio traffic on a regular
basis.  The international interest in Burma generated by developments since
the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations could have also prompted greater
attention from the signals intelligence services of other countries. There
are persistent rumors in Rangoon, for example, that at least one other
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been
conducting SIGINT operations against Burma since the SLORC developed closer
military relations with China.  If this is the case, then it would probably
be known to the Burmese, who would have a strong interest in keeping their
communications secret.
Under the SLORC, the military regime has clearly retained a capability to
monitor, record and transcribe open-source short-wave radio transmissions to
Burma. The SLORC's interest in these broadcasts was graphically demonstrated
in l990, when the regime published Skyful of Lies: B.B.C., VO.A.: Their
Broadcasts and Rebuttals to Disinformation.  This 285-page book reproduced
the texts of almost all the news broadcasts made by the BBC [British
Broadcasting Corporation] and VOA [Voice of America] in August 1988 about
the political unrest then sweeping Burma. The SLORC not only complained
bitterly about what it saw es 'interference in Burma's internal affairs' by
these radio stations (and by implication their host countries) but the
regime also lodged protests with the Indian government over broadcasts made
by All India Radio. These too were highly critical of the Tatmadaw's brutal
response to the widespread pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988. As part of
its wider intelligence effort, the DDSI keeps comprehensive dossiers on all
staff working for the BBC, VOA and AIR Burmese-language programs. These
dossiers contain details about their past employment, family backgrounds and
assumed political sympathies.

Despite several attempts over the past 50 years, the Burmese government does
not appear to have been able to develop a capability regularly or
effectively to jam offending radio broadcasts. For example, there have been
several clandestine broadcasting ventures since 1948, including the Karen
insurgents 'Radio Kawthulay,' the Parliamentary Democracy Party's 'Patriotic
Youth Front Radio,' and the CPB's clandestine 'voice of the People of
Burma.'  Yet few of these stations appear to have been subject to consistent
or successful jamming operations. In late 1995, however, the SLORC attempted
to jam Burmese-language programs produced by the BBC and the Voice of
America, probably using the one-kilowatt transmitter at Taunggyi operated by
the Defense Forces Broadcasting Unit.  It is also possible that at the same
time jamming was directed against the opposition 'Democratic Voice of
Burma,' from which 1995 has been broadcast by Radio Norway.  These attempts
were only partly successful, however, and did not last very long, possibly
because of the negative publicity these actions generated. It is possible
that the Tatmadaw has only recently acquired the technical capability to jam
multiple radio broadcasts and has not yet mastered it, or been able to
generate sufficient power to implement it effectively.

In addition to these at the strategic level, there has also been an effort
to improve the Tatmadaw's SIGINT capabilities in the field. Each Regional
Command has its own smaller receivers and direction finders, under the
supervision of signals specialists outposted from Rangoon. Such officers are
also posted to each of the country's 11 mobile Light Infantry Divisions, and
every Infantry battalion has a signals section able to conduct basic
intercepts.63 In recent years it appears that the equipment and technical
advice available to these officers has been significantly upgraded. In April
1997, for example, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported the presence of
a 'six-wheeled truck with wireless antennae, evidently a mobile signals
intelligence facility near Loa Htwe, near the Thai border. The truck was
apparently monitoring traffic between United Wa State Army insurgent units.
The report went on to say that 'the intelligence it picks up is shared with
the Chinese' and speculated that Chinese experts were present at the site to
train Burmese operators.  The SLORC's ability to intercept and record
insurgent radio traffic was graphically revealed in 1995. In a 28-part story
entitled 'whither KNU,' published in the state-controlled newspaper New
Light of Myanmar, the SLORC quoted numerous radio conversations between
Karen insurgents, many of them verbatim. Some details of these conversations
could have been fabricated, but the series gave several other important
clues to the Tatmadaw's substantial SIGINT capabilities.

It would be expected that, if the Burma Army was making such an effort to
improve its SIGINT capabilities in order to intercept insurgent radio
traffic, then it would also try harder to protect its own tactical
communications. Indeed, this is likely to have occurred, possibly with the
help of China or other friendly countries. It would appear, however, that
Burmese COMSEC is still poor. Certain military codes and ciphers seem to
have remained unchanged for long periods, and others can clearly still be
broken. Reporting on a visit to the Karen front line in 1990, for example,
the journalist Peter Mitchell stated that:
Radio intercepts were a valuable source of intelligence to the Karen, as
they had broken the Burmese code some years earlier.

Other observers too have remarked on the continuing capacity of various
insurgent groups to intercept and read Burma Army communications, including
those transmitted in code.

Since 1988 the Burma Air Force has taken delivery of a wide range of new
communications equipment (mainly radars and radios from China) and it is
likely that some at least are being used for intelligence- gathering
purposes. The BAF reportedly operates both 'Radar Regiments' end 'electronic
Battalions,' both of which probably have a SIGINT role. BAF personnel from
these units are posted not only to major airfields, such as Mingaladon,
Hmawbi and Myitkyina, but also to strategic sites around the country's
periphery, like Namhsan, Kutkai and Loi Mwe.  These facilities seem to be
devoted largely to air traffic control and early warning, but probably also
serve as electronic listening posts for the intelligence services.

The Burma Navy has always had a rudimentary SIGINT capability, based on its
larger ships and shore stations (including Great Coco Island).  Since, 1988,
however, the navy has taken delivery of a number of new vessels (mainly
Hainan and Houxin class patrol boats from China) which carry much more
sophisticated electronic equipment than the Burma Navy has had in the past.
It is also likely that, if the funds become available, the Burma Navy will
take delivery of two or three Chinese frigates. All these vessels will
permit the navy to make a much greater contribution to the SLORC's increased
intelligence collection efforts.

Burma has long possessed a modest capability to produce and intercept
overhead imagery (IMINT). After independence, for example, the Burma Air
Force could take aerial photographs from cameras fixed under its converted
fighter and transport aircraft, and later the BAF acquired more stable
platforms like the Beechcraft Queen Air.  The Cessna 550 Citation purchased
by Ne Win as a VIP transport in 1982 has also been used for aerial survey
work and could be used for military purposes if required.  There is some
evidence too that the BAF has employed its Fairchild Hiller FH-227 and F-27
Fokker Friendships for surveillance, and it is likely that these aircraft
have been used to collect imagery of insurgent-held areas. The SLORC also
seems to have used overhead imagery to monitor the activities of Thai
logging firms granted concessions to exploit Burmese teak reserves.  While
no information on the subject is publicly available, the SLORC has probably
taken steps in recent years to improve this capacity, possibly with the
assistance of friendly and technologically more advanced countries like
China and Singapore. There has also been speculation that the SLORC's
intelligence-sharing arrangements with the Chinese may include the provision
of satellite imagery, but this cannot be confirmed.75 For counterinsurgent
operations in jungle or heavily wooded areas, the imagery provided by
aircraft may be more suitable. In any case, if it is required, good
satellite imagery is now available from commercial sources, and it is
possible that the Tatmadaw has taken advantage of this development to build
up its photographic coverage of the country.  The cost of such material
would be a factor, but intelligence is likely to be given a high priority
for Burma's scarce foreign exchange.

Burma and Intelligence

Burma's intelligence apparatus has always been an integral part of the
country's government and society. After independence the Nu administration
looked to the BSI to enforce standards of behavior among government
officials and to regulate official transactions. The CID, SID and Detective
Department not only helped the Police Force maintain law and order but also
exercised certain intelligence functions. The armed forces needed to develop
military intelligence capabilities in order to fight the numerous insurgent
groups which challenged the authority of the central government and, at one
stage, even threatened to cause the collapse of the Union. All these
intelligence capabilities were significantly strengthened during the period
of the military 'caretaker' government, as Ne Win and the Tatmadaw sought to
impose greater control over what they saw as a dangerously undisciplined
society which threatened to squander the results of their sacrifices.  After
the 1962 coup, the military regime was given free rein to develop an
intelligence apparatus which not only supported military operations but
ensured that any challenge to continuing military rule would not go unnoticed.

While the elements of this apparatus were in many cases technically
civilian, military intelligence was always dominant. As Robert Taylor has
pointed out,'Military intelligence [has] served as a means of social control
throughout the existence of independent Burma.'  Under U Nu's democratic
government, the Tatmadaw's critical security role and close involvement in
pacification programs gave it considerable influence over people and events
throughout the country. Even from this early period, Burma Army officers
held most senior positions in the Police Force (and thus controlled the
police intelligence agencies). After 1958, and to an even greater extent
after the 1962 coup, members of the armed forces, were appointed to senior
positions in the government and the bureaucracy. This ensured, among other
things, that all the country's intelligence and specialized security
agencies were effectively placed under military control. After the
establishment of the Military Intelligence Service in 1958 (which later
became the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence), Ne Win and the
military hierarchy had a powerful instrument through which to exert almost
total control over the country and its citizens. Bertil Lintner has
described the MIS around this time as 'a secret police that served to
preserve the power of Ne Win, his family and the ruling elite.'

Throughout the Revolutionary Council and BSPP [Burma Socialist Programme
Party] periods, Burma's intelligence apparatus was synonymous with military
intelligence. The MIS not only expanded in size, but also in the scope of
its operations. It first duplicated, then dominated all the country's other
intelligence agencies. Under the control of the NIB, the DDSI/MIS became the
means by which the regime attempted to detect and stamp out any opposition
to continued military rule. It acquired almost unlimited powers, which it
exercised with ruthless determination. Its officers tended to be a breed
apart. As Rodney Tasker wrote in 1983, they were often:

men of the world compared with other more short-sighted, dogmatic figures in
the Burmese leadership. They were able to travel abroad, talk freely to
foreigners and generally look beyond the confines of the current regimen

Indeed, so powerful did the DDSI/MIS become, that on several occasions it
was seen to constitute a threat to the regime itself. Repeated purges of the
military intelligence leadership may have helped to reduce this threat, but
they also contributed to a number of serious intelligence failures. The most
obvious was the inability of the regime to foresee the widespread
pro-democracy demonstrations which occurred in 1988, or to predict the
outcome of the 1990 general elections.

Under the SLORC, even greater reliance has been placed on the country's
military intelligence apparatus. Despite the fact that the CPB insurgency
collapsed in 1989, and cease-fire arrangements have been negotiated with
most other major insurgent groups, the resources devoted to the DDSI/MIS
have greatly increased. This effort seems aimed at stamping out any
challenge to continued military rule, through an overwhelming monopoly of
information about military, political, economic and social developments in
the country. This all-encompassing surveillance includes the armed forces,
and even extend to those expatriates and foreigners abroad who maintain an
active interest in Burmese affairs. Attention has also been given to the
purely military aspects of Burma's intelligence apparatus. At the strategic
level, the SLORC seems to have benefited from agreements with the Chinese
(and perhaps others) for the provision of modern equipment and the exchange
of intelligence product. At the operational level too, the armed forces have
benefited from new equipment, training and advice. It remains to be seen,
however, how effectively these new assets are employed. Unless they can be
translated into real intelligence capabilities, then the SLORC will be
unable to reap full value from all the new weapons systems which it has
acquired over the past nine years.

The costs to Burma of this massive intelligence effort are impossible to
calculate, but they must be considerable. Every country has legitimate
intelligence requirements, but the SLORC's allocation of scarce resources
(including precious foreign exchange) to the blanket surveillance of the
entire population inevitably means that other critical areas of Burmese
society, like education and health services, suffer the consequences. Human
rights issues aside, serious questions must also be raised about the
stability and ultimate survival of a system which depends to such an extent
on its security services. This is particularly the case, given the regime's
obvious intelligence failures since the massive popular unrest in 1988, and
the extent to which it feels obliged to monitor dissent within the armed
forces themselves. It would be a grim irony if the Tatmadaw was able
successfully to improve its purely military intelligence capabilities, only
to lose power through its inability to predict internal unrest or even to
prevent the establishment of a democratic civilian administration, of the
kind clearly preferred by most Burmese.


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