The BurmaNet News - 15 January, 199

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"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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The BurmaNet News: January 15, 1998
Issue #913

Noted in passing:

On the AIDS crisis in Burmese prisons?.
"This is an urgent situation." - Dr. Sein Win
(see THE BOSTON GLOBE: BURMA: FOES RISK AIDS AS PUNISHMENT)

HEADLINES:
==========
SCMP: SLAVE SQUADS 'AWAIT DEPORTED WORKERS'
ABSDF MEDIA RELEASE: LT.GEN. SEIN AUNG DIES IN RANGOON
THE BOSTON GLOBE: BURMA: FOES RISK AIDS AS PUNISHMENT
THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR: MINISTER FOR H&T ARRIVES
THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR: OVER 25,000 ACRES OF POPPY
BURMA DEBATE: SLORC'S "INTEL-NET" (Part 11)
BKK POST: PLAN TO LET ALIENS WORK IN ONLY 13 PROVINCES
THE NATION: FINANCIAL CRISIS HITS CROSS-BORDER TRADE
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SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST: SLAVE SQUADS 'AWAIT DEPORTED WORKERS'
January 14  1998
by William Barnes in Bangkok 

Hundreds of Burmese workers forced back home because of Thailand's economic
crisis have been press-ganged into the Army or forced labour squads, it was
claimed yesterday.

Thousands more faced the same fate, Burmese exiles and international
refugee officials said.

Thailand last week threatened to kick out half a million illegal workers a
year to make jobs for unemployed Thais.

Hundreds were said to have already been arrested and deported, especially
from the border area around Mae Sot.

But the Burmese junta has reportedly set up several reception centres to
screen returnees - including a large camp just a dozen kilometres from the
Thai border town, north-west of Bangkok.

"The plan is to pick the best people out for the Army and turn most of the
other able-bodied people over to the forced labour squads," said Aung Naing
Oo, the foreign affairs spokesman for the All Burma Students Democratic Front.

Burma opposition groups argue that many of the so-called economic migrants
- most being ethnic minorities - are at least at equal risk of persecution
as the country's official refugees.

"There is no question about it. Most of these people are genuinely in danger
if they go back. They will end up somewhere where they really don't want to
be," said Mr Aung Naing Oo.

"But there is nothing we can do. We understand the problems the Thais have
got. They are classified as economic migrants."

The military regime openly admits that forced labour - "voluntary
contributions" - is an integral part of its economic plans in the face of
scant foreign investment.

Many of the repatriated workers - forced to flee abroad to find a job - are
likely to be building roads running from the border into the Burmese
heartland.

Others may be forced into uniform as part of the military regime's increase
in the size of its armed forces in order to crush any civilian resistance to
its rule and suppress the myriad ethnic rebellions.

Yet it can only pay most of its soldiers a pittance for fighting hardened
rebels with only their feet for transport.

Although there are now Burmese working in low-paid jobs all over the world,
Thailand has borne the brunt of the exodus, with estimates of up to a
million trying to live off the country's underground economy.

Meanwhile, the 110,000 Burmese living in refugee camps along the border
appear safe, at least for now.

*************************************************************

ABSDF MEDIA RELEASE: OUSTED SPDC ADVISORY BOARD MEMBER-LT.GEN. SEIN AUNG
DIES IN RANGOON
January 14, 1998
 
On January 9, 1998,Lieutenant-General Sein Aung, a founding member
of the Burmese military's State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) and an ousted member of the State Peace and Development
Council's (SPDC) Advisory Board, died at Mingaladon military
hospital in the north of Rangoon. 
  
According to informed sources in Rangoon, Lt-Gen. Sein Aung died of
cancer of the colon. He was 68 year old.
  
Lt.-Gen. Sein Aung joined the Burmese army in 1950 and became a
commissioned officer after graduating from class 10 of the
Officers' Training School. He served as the commander of the
Burmese Army's infamous Division 77 and as the commander of the
Northeast Region Military Command.
  
Lt.-Gen. Sein Aung was the head of the Special Operations Bureau-1
before the 1988 democracy uprising. He subsequently became a member
of the SLORC when it was formed in September 1988, and was
appointed Minister of the two ministries of industry. He was later
appointed Minister of Industry-1 after the SLORC's ministerial
reshuffle on January 29, 1992. 
  
With the renaming of the SLORC to the SPDC in November 1997,
Lt.-Gen. Sein Aung was appointed to the 14-member SPDC Advisory
Board. However, on December 10 the Advisory Board was abolished and
Lt.-Gen. Sein Aung lost his position, along with the other 13
generals on the board. 
  
Sources in Rangoon have also told the ABSDF that although Lt.-Gen.
Sein Aung was not included in the arrests of former generals on
charges of corruption, he was being watched by Military Intelli-
gence Service personnel.
  
All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)
For more information please call 01-654 4984.

************************************************************

THE BOSTON GLOBE: BURMA: FOES RISK AIDS AS PUNISHMENT
January 11, 1998
by Dennis Bernstein and Leslie Kean

Burma's military junta has locked up more than 1,000 pro-democracy 
activists in recent years. Long prison sentences under harsh conditions 
are debilitating enough, but another threat in the cellblocks is 
helping the government eliminate its opposition: AIDS.

The case of Ye Teiza and 12 other imprisoned students provides a 
graphic example of a new form of oppression. In 1991, the teenagers had 
political tattoos removed by crude procedures that could ultimately 
cost them their lives. Ye Teiza said he and others from the All-Burma 
Basic Education Students Union were tortured for an hour as their 
pro-democracy tattoos were blackened with large needles dipped in ink 
normally used to mark pigs.

He said the same blunt needles were used on all 13 of them, in a 
jail where AIDS runs unchecked and is on the rise.

``It was very bloody,'' said Ye Teiza, who now lives in Thailand. 
``Every time the needle was stuck in, a drop of blood would come out,'' 
he added, saying he was kicked and abused if he moved. ``It was so 
painful that, as they were removing the tattoos, about five or six 
people had to hold us down on the floor to keep us still. We could not 
see our friends when they were having their tattoos removed, but we 
could hear each others' cries.''

Ye Teiza worries that the needle session may yet prove fatal. 
``At the time, I was so focused on the pain that the possibility of 
catching AIDS did not cross my mind.  But as soon as it was over, I 
realized that I could have caught AIDS. Sometimes I worry so much about 
AIDS that I cannot sleep at night.''

Former Burmese political prisoners living in Thailand, Australia, 
Norway, England, and Japan reported in dozens of independent interviews 
that AIDS is raging in Burma's prisons, and that the authorities are 
allowing it to spread. Many former prisoners believe that government 
officials, using improper medical procedures and punishments that 
expose inmates to HIV, are in effect using the disease as a weapon. 
Several prominent activists have already died from such exposure.

Burma's AIDS epidemic is now one of the worst in the world.  The 
military government's reported involvement in the heroin trade has 
sparked dramatic increases in intravenous drug use and triggered an 
explosion in documented HIV/AIDS cases that medical authorities say is 
out of control.

According to the World Health Organizaton, in 1996 more than 
500,000 Burmese out of 45 million were HIV positive, a rate of more 
than 1 in 90. Syringes are illegal, so shooting galleries flourish 
where needles are shared by dozens of people. Sixty to 70 percent of 
addicts are HIV positive.

Nowhere in Burma is the problem more acute than in the prisons, 
which are breeding grounds for AIDS and other deadly diseases. ``For 
political prisoners, Insein jail is like Auschwitz,'' said Moe Aye, a 
student at the Rangoon Institute of Technology who was recently 
released after six years of imprisonment for pro-democracy activities. 

``They've been using the fear of needles as a weapon to threaten and 
intimidate us.''

Moe Aye said that demands for medical care and hospital visits 
for the sick once were an important point of contention with prison 
authorities, as desperate prisoners sought a few days of respite in the 
hospital. That has changed. ``The needles and the syringes there are 
greatly feared by the people in prison,'' he said.  Nobody wants to 
risk contracting HIV.''

But Thaung Tun, deputy chief of Mission at the Embassy of Myanmar 
(Burma) says disposable needles are now readily available to 
authorities. ``I don't see why they would want to use the same needles 
on prisoners,'' Thaung Tun said in an interview. ``This is a charge 
that has not been  proven.'' Anecdotal evidence, however, is strong.

``To reuse needles and to subject prisoners to a serious threat 
of HIV constitutes cruel and inhumane treatment and violates prisoners' 
basic rights,'' said Joanne Mariner, associate counsel for Human Rights 
Watch. ``The United Nations has recognized these standards as 
authoritative as to how governments should be treating prisoners.''   
Mariner said the Burmese government is ``being dangerously negligent 
with regard to a deadly disease and is almost aggressively trying to 
spread the disease.''

Thar Nyunt Oo, a medical student and union activist, was sent to 
Insein jail for his political activities in the early 1990s. He said in 
a recent interview from Thailand that confinement with an HIV-infected 
prisoner is regularly used as punishment. ``There are some political 
prisoners who were punished for protests by being put together with HIV 
infected prisoners, tuberculosis prisoners, or lepers.'' He said these 
criminal prisoners are allowed to ``do what they want'' with political 
prisoners.

In 1991, Moe Zaw Oo, a member of the youth wing of the elected 
National League for Democracy party, refused to have a serious boil 
lanced by an untrained medical worker in Insein jail, and demanded to 
be seen by a doctor. When the prison doctor arrived, Moe Zaw Oo said 
the doctor warned him that ``If you continue to complain I'll send you 
to the hospital . . . and there are many HIV-positive patients'' there.

U Hla Than was elected to Parliament in 1990 as the National 
League for Democracy representative from the Coco Islands. When the 
military junta nullified the election results and refused to turn over 
power to the victors, it sentenced Hla Than to 25 years' hard labor for 
attempting to form a provisional government. After spending five years 
at Insein - including time in a military dog area - he learned after 
donating blood to a bank that he was HIV positive. He died at Insein in 
1996 at age 52. About 30 other elected members of Parliament remain in 
prison.
	
U Win Tin, 67, a prominent journalist serving a 21-year sentence, 
also was kept in a dog cell for a time. He suffers from several 
debilitating medical conditions, including a heart ailment, and is at 
risk of AIDS at Insein jail.

A US government official said the death of U Hla Than from AIDS 
was one of the first confirmed casualties of the practice of needle 
sharing by doctors in the prisons. 

Two prominent pro-democracy activists from the People's 
Progressive Party, U La Myint and U Kin Sein, have also died of AIDS 
contracted while serving time at Insein. ``While I was in prison, U 
Khin Maung Nyunt, the People's Progressive Party chairman, was put in 
the room where HIV/AIDS patients were kept,'' said Ko Aung, a former 
prisoner. ``He died later in prison.''

It is impossible to know how many deaths are attributable to AIDS 
since most prisoners are not given autopsies. Thet Hmu, then a student 
activist, met U Hla Than in prison in 1990, and eventually helped Hla 
Than's family with his funeral. ``I saw many people die in the six 
years in Insein. I cannot remember all of their names,'' Thet Hmu said.

Like many former prisoners, Thet Hmu lives with the fear that he, 
too, may have been given a death sentence. ``In Insein jail hospital, 
most of the injections are given by criminal addicts,'' he said. ``In 
our cell, four people were very sick so someone came and injected 
penicillin into all four of us with a single syringe.''

Dr. Chris Beyrer, director of Johns Hopkins Fogarty International 
AIDS Training Program and an authority on AIDS in Southeast Asia, has 
studied the spread of the virus in Insein jail in the context of the 
AIDS emergency across Burma. Beyrer confirmed that needles are not 
typically sterilized in prison hospitals. ``The prisons are horrific 
and deadly,'' he said.

Beyrer, one of the few Western members of the Myanmar Medical 
Association, Burma's equivalent of the American Medical Association, 
said an even greater risk is the practice that killed U Hla Than: The 
authorities routinely take blood from prisoners for the Rangoon blood 
bank, without sterilizing equipment. 

The UN Special Rapporteur, mandated to report on human rights and 
the prisons in Burma, has not been allowed into the country since 1995. 
Amnesty International is also barred.

Dr. Sein Win, prime minister of Burma's government in exile, 
said, ``Since these reports are now coming out, it is time that the 
military government allow organizations such as the United Nations, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, and Amnesty International to 
inspect the prisons in Burma. This is an urgent situation.''

*************************************************************

THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR: MINISTER FOR H&T ARRIVES BACK FROM PHILIPPINE
14 January, 1998 (abridged)

YANGON,13 Jan - Minister for Hotels and Tourism Maj-Gen Saw Lwin arrived
back here after attending ASEAN Tourism Forum held in Cebu, the
Philippines, from 9 to 12 January.

Members of Myanmar delegation Director-General of Directorate of Hotels and
Tourism U Khin Maung Lat and General Manager U Htay Aung of Myanma Tourism
Services participated in the coordination meeting of ASEAN tourism
organizations on 9 January.

On 10 January, Minister Maj-Gen Saw Lwin attended ministerial level
coordination meeting and discussed cooperation in regional tourism programmes.

The minister attended ASEAN Tourism Exhibition on 11 January. Philippine
President Mr Fidel Ramos delivered a speech on promotion of tourism in the
region and development.

A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in regional tourism was signed
by the ministers in the presence of President Ramos.

In the afternoon, Minister Maj-Gen Saw Lwin observed showrooms at the ASEAN
Tourism Exhibition. Altogether six showrooms of tour operators of Myanmar
were put on display at the exhibition.

On the way home, Myanmar delegation dropped in Singapore on 12 January and
met staff of Myanmar Embassy.

*************************************************************

THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR: OVER 25,000 ACRES OF POPPY PLANTATIONS DESTROYED
IN SHAN STATE
14 January, 1998

YANGON,13 Jan - As the government is expediting narcotic drugs eradication
drive, members of the Defence Services Intelligence Units and those of
Myanmar Police Force led by Tatmadaw columns carrying out security duty
manually destroyed more than 25,000 illicit poppy plantations in northern,
southern and eastern Shan State from 6 November 1997 to 5 January 1998.
They did so in cooperation with the local people.

In the North-East Command area, 4,363 acres of poppy plantations were
destroyed in Hsenwi Township, 6,863.914 acres in Kutkai Township, 4,363
acres in Namtu Township, 27.25 acres in Lashio Township, 42 acres in Muse
Township, 557 acres in Mongkoe area, 200 acres in Namhkham Township,
1,645.77 acres in Hopang Township, 100 acres in Hsipaw Township, 1,390
acres in Kunlong Township, 2,162.08 acres in Laukkai area and 3,406.7 acres
in Tangyan Township. Twenty acres of poppy plantations were destroyed at
Monhtaw/Monhta area in the Triangle Region Command area and 419.51 acres in
Pinlaung Township in the Eastern Command area. Altogether 25,560.224 acres
of illicit poppy
plantations were destroyed. 

Tatmadaw columns continue to expose and destroy illicit poppy plantations.

*************************************************************

BURMA DEBATE: SLORC'S "INTEL-NET" BURMA'S 
INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS (Part 11)
Vol. IV, No 4
September/October 1997 (Posted without notes or figures)
by  Andrew Selth

An excerpt from a Working Paper published by the Strategic ~ Defense
Studies Center of the Australian National University, Canberra, June 1997.
The author is a former Visiting Fellow of the Center and the author of
Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces Since 1988.

Military Intelligence Under the SLORC

The Ne Win regime's preoccupation with its own survival has long consumed
precious resources and distracted the DDSI/MIS from pursuing its purely
military intelligence functions. This situation remains under the SLORC,
but it would appear that some effort has been made in recent years to
rectify the situation. The regime seems to have accepted, for example, that
unless the Tatmadaw can command better strategic and operational
intelligence capabilities, then it will remain vulnerable to both external
and internal military threats. While the SLORC has managed to negotiate
cease-fire agreements with almost all major insurgent groups (the Karens
being the notable exception), tensions are still high and the potential
remains for widespread fighting to break out again. There have already been
serious clashes, for example, with Wa and Karenni insurgent groups. Also,
the SLORC is still nervous about possible foreign military intervention in
Burma's affairs, and there are tensions with Burma's western and eastern
neighbors. Perhaps more importantly, unless the Tatmadaw's operational
intelligence capabilities are improved, all the new arms and equipment it
has acquired since 1988 will lack proper direction and coordination, and
thus fail to realize their full potential. 

Under the SLORC, Burma's SIGINT effort is still managed by the Directorate
of Signals which, like the DDSI, is part of the Defense Ministry's General
Staff Department. International interceptors are reportedly the
responsibility of specialist units based in the Defense Ministry compound
in Rangoon, and are derived from larger Tatmadaw communications facilities
at Mingaladon and Hmawbi, and possibly the large military communications
station in Taunggyi. Once again, it is difficult to obtain reliable
information, but there is evidence to suggest that the scope of Burma's
strategic SIGINT operations has been widened in recent years. In addition
to foreign radio traffic, Burma now seems able more easily to monitor radar
and other electronic emissions emanating from outside the country. There
have been persistent reports, for example, that China has provided Burma
with a range of sophisticated electronic warfare equipment as part of a
broader plan to upgrade its own SIGINT capabilities in the region.  Most
attention has focused on China's apparent role in establishing or upgrading
a signals intercept station on Great Coco Island in the Andaman Sea. There
have been several reports that, since, 1992, this base has boasted a
50-metre-high antenna and sensitive equipment capable of picking up not
only radio and radar transmissions from ships in the vicinity, but also
electronic emissions (ELINT) from missile tests at the Indian Defense
Research and Development Laboratory in Hyderabad.  

A number of other sites for new SIGINT stations have apparently been
mooted. For example, there have been numerous reports over the past few
years that Burma has been approached by China to install (or at least
upgrade) signals intelligence equipment at several places around the
Burmese coast. Once operational, this equipment would provide China (and
presumably Burma as well) with a comprehensive electronic surveillance
coverage of the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal.  One well-informed
Burma- watcher has stated that the Burmese have come under pressure from
the Chinese to permit the PRC's intelligence services access not only to
Hainggyi and Great Coco islands (which are the places most often
mentioned), but also to Ramree Island and Zadetkyi Island along the
southern coast. The latter is considered particularly sensitive as it is
located off Kawthaung, Burma's southernmost point, and therefore close to
the strategically important Malacca Straits.

Other possible sites of interest to the Chinese include Kadan Island, off
the Burmese coast near Mergui, and Heinze Island north of Tavoy. It has
been suggested that China wishes to build new facilities or improve old
Burmese facilities on all these islands, with a view to conducting SIGINT
operations against other regional countries.

To support these claims, observers have cited reports of bilateral military
agreements between the two countries. The most recent appears to have been
negotiated in October 1996, and finalized in early 1997. According to the
Far Eastern Economic Review, it specifically covers the exchange of
intelligence on 'threats to their respective countries' end Chinese
training for Burmese personnel in 'signals intelligence in coastal areas.'

The full extent of China's involvement in Burma's intelligence improvement
program, however, is very difficult to determine. Even greater uncertainty
surrounds China's efforts to establish or use signals intelligence
facilities around Burma's coastline to spy on other regional countries.
While some of the reports on this subject are quite convincing, others are
much less so, and most have yet to be confirmed by independent sources.
There would appear to be certain benefits to Burma in permitting China at
least some of the access it desires, particularly if both countries share
the product from SIGINT operations conducted from Burmese territory. Yet
some caution needs to be exercised over the extent to which Burma can be
seen as an agent of the Chinese in this field. Given Burma's fierce
independence and lingering suspicions of China's longer term strategic
intentions, it is unlikely that the SLORC would permit China all the access
that it wants. Nor can any Chinese military presence be considered
permanent, whatever the apparent benefits of current intelligence-sharing
arrangements.

In addition to possible Chinese assistance, there have been reports of the
SLORC purchasing considerable quantities of electronic and communications
equipment from several other suppliers, including Singapore, Russia and
possibly Israel. It would be remarkable if none of it was related to
intelligence collection or dissemination in some way. In particular,
Singapore and Israel are suspected of providing signals interception and
encryption equipment to DDSI, with training packages.  Also there is good
reason to believe that the SLORC has acquired some equipment, possibly from
Singapore's Defense Technology Group, to protect Burmese communications
from interception bye hostile agencies. China, Thailand and India, for
example, are all reported to monitor official Burmese radio traffic on a
regular basis.  The international interest in Burma generated by
developments since the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations could have also
prompted greater attention from the signals intelligence services of other
countries. There are persistent rumors in Rangoon, for example, that at
least one other member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has been
conducting SIGINT operations against Burma since the SLORC developed closer
military relations with China.  If this is the case, then it would probably
be known to the Burmese, who would have a strong interest in keeping their
communications secret. Under the SLORC, the military regime has clearly
retained a capability to monitor, record and transcribe open-source
short-wave radio transmissions to Burma. The SLORC's interest in these
broadcasts was graphically demonstrated in l990, when the regime published
Skyful of Lies: B.B.C., VO.A.: Their Broadcasts and Rebuttals to
Disinformation.  This 285-page book reproduced the texts of almost all the
news broadcasts made by the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] and VOA
[Voice of America] in August 1988 about the political unrest then sweeping
Burma. The SLORC not only complained bitterly about what it saw as
'interference in Burma's internal affairs' by these radio stations (and by
implication their host countries) but the regime also lodged protests with
the Indian government over broadcasts made by All India Radio. These too
were highly critical of the Tatmadaw's brutal response to the widespread
pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988. As part of its wider intelligence
effort, the DDSI keeps comprehensive dossiers on all staff working for the
BBC, VOA and AIR Burmese-language programs. These dossiers contain details
about their past employment, family backgrounds and assumed political
sympathies.

Despite several attempts over the past 50 years, the Burmese government
does not appear to have been able to develop a capability regularly or
effectively to jam offending radio broadcasts. For example, there have been
several clandestine broadcasting ventures since 1948, including the Karen
insurgents 'Radio Kawthulay,' the Parliamentary Democracy Party's
'Patriotic Youth Front Radio,' and the CPB's clandestine 'voice of the
People of Burma.'  Yet few of these stations appear to have been subject to
consistent or successful jamming operations. In late 1995, however, the
SLORC attempted to jam Burmese-language programs produced by the BBC and
the Voice of America, probably using the one-kilowatt transmitter at
Taunggyi operated by the Defense Forces Broadcasting Unit.  It is also
possible that at the same time jamming was directed against the opposition
'Democratic Voice of Burma,' from which 1995 has been broadcast by Radio
Norway.  These attempts were only partly successful, however, and did not
last very long, possibly because of the negative publicity these actions
generated. It is possible that the Tatmadaw has only recently acquired the
technical capability to jam multiple radio broadcasts and has not yet
mastered it, or been able to generate sufficient power to implement it
effectively.

In addition to these at the strategic level, there has also been an effort
to improve the Tatmadaw's SIGINT capabilities in the field. Each Regional
Command has its own smaller receivers and direction finders, under the
supervision of signals specialists outposted from Rangoon. Such officers
are also posted to each of the country's 11 mobile Light Infantry
Divisions, and every Infantry battalion has a signals section able to
conduct basic intercepts. In recent years it appears that the equipment and
technical advice available to these officers has been significantly
upgraded.  In April 1997, for example, the Far Eastern Economic Review
reported the presence of
a 'six-wheeled truck with wireless antennae, evidently a mobile signals
intelligence facility near Loa Htwe, near the Thai border. The truck was
apparently monitoring traffic between United Wa State Army insurgent units.
The report went on to say that 'the intelligence it picks up is shared with
the Chinese' and speculated that Chinese experts were present at the site
to train Burmese operators.  The SLORC's ability to intercept and record
insurgent radio traffic was graphically revealed in 1995. In a 28-part
story entitled 'whither KNU,' published in the state-controlled newspaper
New Light of Myanmar, the SLORC quoted numerous radio conversations between
Karen insurgents, many of them verbatim. Some details of these
conversations could have been fabricated, but the series gave several other
important clues to the Tatmadaw's substantial SIGINT capabilities.

It would be expected that, if the Burma Army was making such an effort to
improve its SIGINT capabilities in order to intercept insurgent radio
traffic, then it would also try harder to protect its own tactical
communications. Indeed, this is likely to have occurred, possibly with the
help of China or other friendly countries. It would appear, however, that
Burmese COMSEC is still poor. Certain military codes and ciphers seem to
have remained unchanged for long periods, and others can clearly still be
broken. Reporting on a visit to the Karen front line in 1990, for example,
the journalist Peter Mitchell stated that: Radio intercepts were a valuable
source of intelligence to the Karen, as they had broken the Burmese code
some years earlier.

Other observers too have remarked on the continuing capacity of various
insurgent groups to intercept and read Burma Army communications, including
those transmitted in code.

Since 1988 the Burma Air Force has taken delivery of a wide range of new
communications equipment (mainly radars and radios from China) and it is
likely that some at least are being used for intelligence- gathering
purposes. The BAF reportedly operates both 'Radar Regiments' end
'electronic Battalions,' both of which probably have a SIGINT role. BAF
personnel from these units are posted not only to major airfields, such as
Mingaladon, Hmawbi and Myitkyina, but also to strategic sites around the
country's periphery, like Namhsan, Kutkai and Loi Mwe.  These facilities
seem to be
devoted largely to air traffic control and early warning, but probably also
serve as electronic listening posts for the intelligence services.

The Burma Navy has always had a rudimentary SIGINT capability, based on its
larger ships and shore stations (including Great Coco Island).  Since,
1988, however, the navy has taken delivery of a number of new vessels
(mainly Hainan and Houxin class patrol boats from China) which carry much
more sophisticated electronic equipment than the Burma Navy has had in the
past. It is also likely that, if the funds become available, the Burma Navy
will take delivery of two or three Chinese frigates. All these vessels will
permit the navy to make a much greater contribution to the SLORC's
increased intelligence collection efforts.

Burma has long possessed a modest capability to produce and intercept
overhead imagery (IMINT). After independence, for example, the Burma Air
Force could take aerial photographs from cameras fixed under its converted
fighter and transport aircraft, and later the BAF acquired more stable
platforms like the Beechcraft Queen Air.  The Cessna 550 Citation purchased
by Ne Win as a VIP transport in 1982 has also been used for aerial survey
work and could be used for military purposes if required.  

There is some evidence too that the BAF has employed its Fairchild Hiller
FH-227 and F-27 Fokker Friendships for surveillance, and it is likely that
these aircraft have been used to collect imagery of insurgent-held areas.
The SLORC also seems to have used overhead imagery to monitor the
activities of Thai logging firms granted concessions to exploit Burmese
teak reserves.  While no information on the subject is publicly available,
the SLORC has probably taken steps in recent years to improve this
capacity, possibly with the assistance of friendly and technologically more
advanced countries like
China and Singapore. There has also been speculation that the SLORC's
intelligence-sharing arrangements with the Chinese may include the
provision of satellite imagery, but this cannot be confirmed.75 For
counterinsurgent operations in jungle or heavily wooded areas, the imagery
provided by aircraft may be more suitable. In any case, if it is required,
good satellite imagery is now available from commercial sources, and it is
possible that the Tatmadaw has taken advantage of this development to build
up its photographic coverage of the country.  The cost of such material
would be a factor, but intelligence is likely to be given a high priority
for Burma's scarce foreign exchange.

Burma and Intelligence

Burma's intelligence apparatus has always been an integral part of the
country's government and society. After independence the Nu administration
looked to the BSI to enforce standards of behavior among government
officials and to regulate official transactions. The CID, SID and Detective
Department not only helped the Police Force maintain law and order but also
exercised certain intelligence functions. The armed forces needed to
develop military intelligence capabilities in order to fight the numerous
insurgent groups which challenged the authority of the central government
and, at one stage, even threatened to cause the collapse of the Union. All
these intelligence capabilities were significantly strengthened during the
period of the military 'caretaker' government, as Ne Win and the Tatmadaw
sought to impose greater control over what they saw as a dangerously
undisciplined society which threatened to squander the results of their
sacrifices.  After the 1962 coup, the military regime was given free rein
to develop an intelligence apparatus which not only supported military
operations but ensured that any challenge to continuing military rule would
not go unnoticed.

While the elements of this apparatus were in many cases technically
civilian, military intelligence was always dominant. As Robert Taylor has
pointed out,'Military intelligence [has] served as a means of social
control throughout the existence of independent Burma.'  Under U Nu's
democratic government, the Tatmadaw's critical security role and close
involvement in pacification programs gave it considerable influence over
people and events throughout the country. Even from this early period,
Burma Army officers held most senior positions in the Police Force (and
thus controlled the
police intelligence agencies). After 1958, and to an even greater extent
after the 1962 coup, members of the armed forces, were appointed to senior
positions in the government and the bureaucracy. This ensured, among other
things, that all the country's intelligence and specialized security
agencies were effectively placed under military control. After the
establishment of the Military Intelligence Service in 1958 (which later
became the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence), Ne Win and the
military hierarchy had a powerful instrument through which to exert almost
total control over the country and its citizens. Bertil Lintner has
described the MIS around this time as 'a secret police that served to
preserve the power of Ne Win, his family and the ruling elite.'

Throughout the Revolutionary Council and BSPP [Burma Socialist Programme
Party] periods, Burma's intelligence apparatus was synonymous with military
intelligence. The MIS not only expanded in size, but also in the scope of
its operations. It first duplicated, then dominated all the country's other
intelligence agencies. Under the control of the NIB, the DDSI/MIS became
the means by which the regime attempted to detect and stamp out any
opposition to continued military rule. It acquired almost unlimited powers,
which it exercised with ruthless determination. Its officers tended to be a
breed apart. As Rodney Tasker wrote in 1983, they were often:

men of the world compared with other more short-sighted, dogmatic figures
in the Burmese leadership. They were able to travel abroad, talk freely to
foreigners and generally look beyond the confines of the current regimen

Indeed, so powerful did the DDSI/MIS become, that on several occasions it
as seen to constitute a threat to the regime itself. Repeated purges of the
military intelligence leadership may have helped to reduce this threat, but
they also contributed to a number of serious intelligence failures. The
most obvious was the inability of the regime to foresee the widespread
pro-democracy demonstrations which occurred in 1988, or to predict the
outcome of the 1990 general elections.

Under the SLORC, even greater reliance has been placed on the country's
military intelligence apparatus. Despite the fact that the CPB insurgency
collapsed in 1989, and cease-fire arrangements have been negotiated with
most other major insurgent groups, the resources devoted to the DDSI/MIS
have greatly increased. This effort seems aimed at stamping out any
challenge to continued military rule, through an overwhelming monopoly of
information about military, political, economic and social developments in
the country. This all-encompassing surveillance includes the armed forces,
and even extend to those expatriates and foreigners abroad who maintain an
active interest in Burmese affairs. Attention has also been given to the
purely military aspects of Burma's intelligence apparatus. At the strategic
level, the SLORC seems to have benefited from agreements with the Chinese
(and perhaps others) for the provision of modern equipment and the exchange
of intelligence product. At the operational level too, the armed forces
have benefited from new equipment, training and advice. It remains to be
seen, however, how effectively these new assets are employed. Unless they
can be translated into real intelligence capabilities, then the SLORC will
be unable to reap full value from all the new weapons systems which it has
acquired over the past nine years.

The costs to Burma of this massive intelligence effort are impossible to
calculate, but they must be considerable. Every country has legitimate
intelligence requirements, but the SLORC's allocation of scarce resources
(including precious foreign exchange) to the blanket surveillance of the
entire population inevitably means that other critical areas of Burmese
society, like education and health services, suffer the consequences. Human
rights issues aside, serious questions must also be raised about the
stability and ultimate survival of a system which depends to such an extent
on its security services. This is particularly the case, given the regime's
obvious intelligence failures since the massive popular unrest in 1988, and
the extent to which it feels obliged to monitor dissent within the armed
forces themselves. It would be a grim irony if the Tatmadaw was able
successfully to improve its purely military intelligence capabilities, only
to lose power through its inability to predict internal unrest or even to
prevent the establishment of a democratic civilian administration, of the
kind clearly preferred by most Burmese.

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BKK POST: PLAN TO LET ALIENS WORK IN ONLY 13 PROVINCES
January 14, 1998
by Penchan Charoensutthiphan

REPATRIATION CENTRE COULD BE ESTABLISHED

Alien workers will be allowed in only 13 border provinces before
their repatriation under the Labour and Social Welfare Ministry's
operational plan to crack down on illegal foreign labour.

Permanent Secretary Phan Chantaraparn said the ministry's plan to
repatriate foreign workers would go to a subcommittee tackling
the problem of foreign labour chaired by Deputy Prime Minister
Bhichai Rattakul for consideration on Thursday, and to a panel to
ease unemployment chaired by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai on
Monday.

Under the plan, the ministry will allow aliens to work only in
Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, Tak, Kanchanaburi, Ranong, Chanthaburi,
Trat, Sa Kaew, Mukdahan, Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, Ubon
Ratchathani and Surin.

It will seriously crack down on illegal employment of alien
workers, and set up a centre to repatriate aliens without valid
work permits.

Aliens will not have their work permits renewed, and all renewals
made before the implementation of the ministry's plan will be
scrapped.

The ministry will oversee aliens at their workplaces and seek to
replace them with Thais, while immigration police will crack down
on illegal  immigrants outside workplaces.

The ministry will also propose a special committee to formulate
policies to control employment of foreigners and illegal
immigrants and set up a system to keep coordination among
relevant agencies.

Out of 986,889 illegal immigrants in Thailand, 809,307 are
working without permits.

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THE NATION: FINANCIAL CRISIS HITS CROSS-BORDER TRADE
January 14, 1998  
by Achara Pongvutttham

TAK - The region's financial crisis has affected border trade
between Thailand and Burma that has already been hurt by chrome
border conflicts and changes in Rangoon's border trade policy.

According to a senior commerce official, cross border trade
between Thailand and Burma has shrunk by more than 90 per cent,
down from Bt500 million a month to Bt30 million in December of
last year.

"Exports to Burma in December recorded their lowest value ... in
a decade due to trade difficulties and foreign currency shortage
problems," Commerce Ministry permanent secretary Sompol
Yiatphaibool said.

Problems facing exports to Burma were identified last week at a
meeting between local traders and ministry officials.
The ministry is on a mission to boost exports to earn foreign
currency because of the economic downturn.

The drive to increase the Burmese-Thai border trade, however, may
hit stumbling blocks in the on-going border dispute between the
countries, problems related to border regulations and political
changes in Burma.

The region's financial woes have also resulted in the deep
weakening of the baht as a trading force.

Realistically, Thailand faces more difficulty in its cross border
trade with Burma than ever before.  The Burmese military junta
changed its name from the State Law and Order Restoration Council
to the State Peace and Development Council in mid-November.  One
of the SPDC's feat moves was to crack down on corruption among
border officials.

The council made existing trade and tax rules tougher to prevent
corruption involved in the collection of import and export
tariffs.  They are to introduce a rule making it mandatory to
make goods payments in US dollars in the near future.

A private pier owner in Tak said Burmese importers, forced to
shoulder the higher tariff burden, have been ordering a smaller
volume of Thai goods lately.

"Previously, my warehouse was full of products destined for Burma
but now it is depleted by half,' he said.

Traders also complain of their goods being blocked by officers at
Burmese checkpoints.

Border officials are only allowing in trucks carrying necessary
industrial goods such as construction materials while consumer
goods are denied entry.

Traders say Burma is trying to bolster its currency - currently,
Bt1 is worth about 5.9 kyat - to five kyat to the baht to give
the country a leg up amid the regional currency crisis.

Traders at the meeting said the opening of the Thai-Burmese
Friendship Bridge had not encouraged more official trading
between the countries but instead had promoted smuggling.  The
increase in illegal trading, they said, was prompted by the high
entrance fees levied on,, both sides of the bridge.

The unsettled dispute over Koh Chang Puek in the Moei River is
another problem hampering border trade.

Komson Oppasathavorn, president of the Thai Gem and Jewellery
traders Association said a commission of representatives of the
public and private sectors will meet soon with Burmese official
to solve these problems.

Thailand will urge Burma to reconsider a ban on 28 export
products such as teak, petroleum, jewellery, weapons, shrimp,
silver, diamonds and rubber.

Sompol said unless these problems and the lower purchasing power
of Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia in the wake of the economic crisis
were solved, Thailand could lose border trade exports worth
approximately Bt60 billion a year.

The border trade with the four countries accounts for more than
25 per cent of Thailand's Bt200 billion trade industry.

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