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U.S.Policy Toward Burma unchanged



Conditions In Burma And U.S. Policy Toward
               Burma 

               Plan for Implementation of Section 570 of Conference Report
104-863 to
               Accompany H.R. 3610 (Omnibus Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year
1997)
               Submitted to the U.S. Congress, June 13, 1997
               Released by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
August 21, 1997
               U.S. Department of State 




The people of Burma continue to live under a highly authoritarian military
regime that is widely
condemned for its serious human rights abuses. The military regime in Burma,
the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC), has made no progress in the past six
months in moving toward
greater democratization and little, if any, progress toward fundamental
improvement in the quality of
life of the people of Burma. The SLORC continues to dominate the political,
economic and social life
of the country in the same arbitrary, heavy-handed way that it has since
seizing power in September
1988 after harshly suppressing massive pro-democracy demonstrations. 

U.S. policy toward Burma seeks progress in three key areas -- democracy,
human rights and
counter-narcotics. We have taken steps to pressure the SLORC -- suspending
economic aid,
withdrawing GSP and OPIC, implementing an arms embargo, blocking assistance
from international
financial institutions, downgrading our representation to Charge, and
imposing visa restrictions on
senior leaders and their families. We are engaged in vigorous multilateral
diplomacy to encourage
ASEAN, Japan, the EU and other nations to take similar steps and other
actions to encourage
progress by the SLORC in these areas of key concern. The EU recently imposed
visa restrictions
similar to ours and is expected to withdraw GSP in March. In addition,
Japan's suspension of much
of its bilateral aid program remains in force. 

In addition, the President signed an Executive Order implementing a ban on
new investment by U.S.
persons in Burma effective May 21, 1997. The order prohibits persons from
engaging in any of the
following activities: 

-- entering a new contract that includes the economic development of
resources located in Burma; 

-- entering a new contract providing for the general supervision and
guarantee of another person's
performance of a contract that includes the economic development of
resources located in Burma; 

-- entering into a contract providing for the participation in royalties,
earnings, or profits in the
economic development of resources located in Burma, without regard to the
form of the
participation; 

-- facilitating transactions of foreign persons that would violate any of
the foregoing prohibitions if
engaged in by U.S. person; and 

-- evading or avoiding, or attempting to violate, any of the prohibitions in
the order. 

Measuring Progress Toward Democratization 

In the past six months the SLORC has shown no sign of willingness to cede
its hold on absolute
power. The generals have continued to refuse to negotiate with pro-democracy
forces and ethnic
groups for a genuine political settlement to allow a return to the rule of
law and respect for basic
human rights. 

The SLORC claims that the military-dominated National Convention is an
appropriate forum for
dialogue with the NLD and parties representing the country's ethnic
minorities. But the National
Convention, a body ostensibly tasked since 1993 with drafting a new
constitution, is hardly a
democratic forum as currently structured. The Convention is overwhelmingly
made up of delegates
hand-picked by the SLORC, which has carefully stage-managed the proceedings
and ignored even
limited opposition views. The NLD withdrew from the National Convention in
November 1995
because of the undemocratic nature of the institution and was formally
ejected by the SLORC in
December. Despite having no legal mandate, the SLORC appears determined to
draft a constitution
that would ensure a dominant role for the military forces in the country's
future political structure.
However, the Convention has not met since mid-1996, and the SLORC's current
plans for the body
are unclear. 

The worsening narcotics situation in Burma reflects the SLORC's disregard
for the rule of law.
Burma is the world's largest source of illicit opium, and output increased
by an estimated nine per
cent in 1996 to 2,560 metric tons. Nevertheless, Burmese law enforcement
actions against producers
and traffickers remain limited. Leading trafficker Khun Sa, who
"surrendered" to Burmese forces in
early 1996, has never been brought to justice. Even as heroin production
remains high, Burmese
traffickers are also diversifying into methamphetamines, which are posing
severe problems for
neighboring states. As well, traffickers are increasingly investing in
legitimate sectors of the
economy, and there is reason to believe that the laundering of drug profits
is having a substantial
impact on the Burmese economy. 

Measuring Progress on Improving the Quality of Life 

In the same way, in the past six months the Burmese people have seen little
progress in improving
their quality of life. In fact, by many indices, their quality of life has
worsened. The SLORC's severe
violations of human rights have continued. There continue to be credible
reports, particularly from
ethnic minority-dominated areas along the Thai border, that soldiers have
committed serious human
rights abuses, including extrajudicial killing and rape. Disappearances
continue, and members of the
security forces beat and otherwise abuse detainees. Arbitrary arrests and
detentions continue for
expression of dissenting political views. Several hundred, if not more,
political prisoners remain in
detention, including 29 Members of Parliament elected in 1990. 

The SLORC reinforces its rule via a pervasive security apparatus led by
military intelligence and
sharply restricts basic rights to free speech, press, assembly, and
association. Political party activity
remains severely restricted. The activities of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi
are monitored and
circumscribed by the regime. Since late September Aung San Suu Kyi has been
prevented from
addressing party supporters in front of her house, as the SLORC puts up
blockades to prevent
gatherings there. In November the motorcade in which she was riding was
attacked by a gang of
thugs encouraged by elements of the regime. Aung San Suu Kyi was not hurt,
though one NLD
leader was slightly injured by broken glass. 

In response to street protests by large groups of students in November and
December, the SLORC
closed the nation's universities. Most remain closed to prevent another
outbreak of student protest.
For three weeks in December Aung San Suu Kyi did not leave her compound.
Since late December,
she has been able to leave her compound after notifying authorities of her
destinations. She meets
relatively often with diplomats and supporters. Visitors are generally
allowed to meet her at her
compound if authorities are notified in advance. She has held two meetings
of her supporters on her
compound that were attended by 2,000 or more persons. NLD leaders have
expressed strong
concerns about SLORC repression and have called for increased international
pressure on the
SLORC, including sanctions. 

In February the Burmese Army launched a full-scale assault on the forces of
the Karen National
Union near the Thai border. Up to 12,000 Karen were forced to flee into
Thailand, the vast majority
of them civilians, including women, children and the elderly. Thousands of
civilians were forcibly
conscripted to serve as porters for the Burma Army in its offensive. 

Thousands of other citizens of Burma remain in exile because of fear of
persecution and poor
economic conditions. About 24,000 Rohingya Muslims from Arakan state remain
in camps in
Bangladesh. A few thousand students and dissidents remain in exile in
Thailand. Approximately
100,000 individuals now reside in ethnic minority camps along the Thai-Burma
border, among them
thousands of new arrivals driven out by army attacks in the areas controlled
by the Karen and
Karenni ethnic minorities. 

Burma is a poor country, with an average per capita income of only $600 to
$800, even after
adjusting for the relative purchasing power of the Burmese currency.
Progress on market reforms
has been mixed and uneven. Since 1988 the Government has partly opened the
economy to permit
expansion of the private sector and to attract foreign investment. Some
economic improvement has
ensued, but major obstacles to economic reform persist. These include
disproportionately large
military spending, extensive overt and covert state involvement in economic
activity, excessive state
monopolization of leading exports, a bloated bureaucracy prone to arbitrary
and opaque governance,
and poor human and physical infrastructure. In addition, the SLORC does not
have access to
external credit from the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Money
laundering in
Burma is a growing problem, and the laundering of drug profits is thought by
some analysts to have a
widespread impact on the Burmese economy. 

The Government restricts worker rights and uses forced labor on a widespread
basis. The use of
porters by the army -- with attendant mistreatment, illness, and even death
for those compelled to
serve -- remains a common practice. The military authorities continue to
force ordinary citizens
(including women and children) to "contribute" their labor on a massive
scale, often under harsh
working conditions, on construction projects throughout the country. Some of
these projects -- such
as the moat of the Mandalay fort -- were undertaken to promote tourism to
the country. In the past
year, the military has begun using soldiers instead of civilians at certain
infrastructure projects,
following the issuance of directives in 1995 to end the practice of forced
civilian labor. Child labor
continues to be a serious problem. 

As a largely underdeveloped country, Burma does not have some of the
extensive environmental
problems affecting air and water quality that plague many of its rapidly
industrializing neighbors.
However, with a rapid population growth rate, the country faces increasing
pressure on
environmental quality. Burma possesses the largest tracts of remaining
tropical forest in southeast
Asia, though aggressive international logging companies are eyeing these
forests just as they are
eyeing those in other Mekong countries. Some NGOs have charged that Burma's
teak forests in the
Thai-Burma border area are being rapidly destroyed by clear-cutting and
deforestation. Because of
the severe restrictions on Embassy travel to outlying parts of Burma, it is
difficult to document the
overall extent of the problem. Embassy officials have visited the showcase
Bago Yoma Forest 150
miles north of Rangoon. The Ministry of Forest operates a research station
and seed orchards in this
area in what appears to be an example of sustainable forestry. 

The poor quality of life is also reflected in rising drug abuse. Burmese
estimates put the addict
population at approximately 60,000, but UNDCP and NGOs working in the health
sector estimate the
actual number is at least five times that figure. Intravenous use of heroin
is contributing to the rapid
spread of HIV/AIDS. Drug treatment services are not reaching most drug users
because of a lack
of facilities and a lack of properly trained personnel. 

Development of a Multilateral Strategy 

The goals of U.S. policy toward Burma are progress toward democracy,
improved human rights, and
more effective counter-narcotics efforts. Failing national reconciliation,
Burma will not be able to
address systematically the many severe problems it faces, including
narcotics trafficking and abuse,
a low level of education and poor economic performance. 

In recent months we have forged a vigorous multilateral strategy to seek
improvement in our key
areas of concern. We consult about Burma regularly and at senior levels with
leaders of ASEAN
nations, Japan, the European Union, and other countries having major trading
and investment
interests in Burma. These efforts have helped build and maintain strong
international pressure on the
SLORC. 

The key to progress toward democracy and human rights is, first and
foremost, a direct dialogue
about the political future of the country among the SLORC, the NLD, and the
ethnic minorities. In all
our public and private messages to the SLORC, leaders of third countries and
other interested
parties, we stress the importance of beginning such a dialogue as the key to
achieving significant
progress in Burma. We work closely with our friends and allies in Asia and
Europe to press the
SLORC to begin dialogue. In response, leaders from ASEAN nations, Japan and
the European
Union have urged the regime, both publicly and privately, to move to
dialogue with the democratic
opposition. 

In order to urge the SLORC to make progress in our areas of concern, we have
taken a number of
steps -- suspending economic aid, withdrawing GSP and OPIC, implementing an
arms embargo,
blocking assistance from international financial institutions, downgrading
our representation to
Charge, and imposing visa restrictions on senior regime leaders and their
families. We likewise have
encouraged ASEAN, Japan, the EU and other nations to take similar steps and
other actions to
encourage progress by the SLORC in these areas of key concern. Many nations
join us in our arms
embargo, including European countries, Canada, Australia and Japan. The EU
and Japan limit their
assistance to Burma to humanitarian aid. Our efforts in the international
financial institutions continue
to be successful in blocking loans to the SLORC, which is probably the
single most important form of
pressure we have against the regime. Since 1988 we have taken an active role
in pressing for strong
human rights resolutions on Burma at the United Nations General Assembly and
the UN Human
Rights Commission, as well as having worked vigorously in the ILO to condemn
the lack of freedom
of association for workers and the use of forced labor by the SLORC. 

In November, at our urging, the EU and associated European states joined us
in imposing a ban on
visas for high-level SLORC officials and their families. In addition, the
European Commission has
recommended that the European Union withdraw GSP trade benefits from Burma's
agricultural and
industrial products because of forced labor concerns. EU Foreign Ministers
are expected to adopt
these recommendations in March, which would bring European trade policy in
line with the U.S. ban
on GSP. 

On several occasions in recent months, our embassies have made high-level
demarches to leaders in
the ASEAN countries, urging them to use their influence with the SLORC to
press for positive
change in Burma. We have also raised with the ASEAN countries our concerns
that Burma not join
that organization prematurely. ASEAN shares many of our goals with regard to
Burma, but we
disagree on the means to achieve those goals. ASEAN believes that
"constructive engagement" of
the SLORC is the most effective way to promote positive change in Burma. We
will continue to
raise our strong concerns with ASEAN and urge continued steps to encourage
progress by the
SLORC. 

[end of document] 

Source:Dept of State