US STATE DEPT: BURMA (PT 1)

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U.S. Department of State
 
Burma Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997
 
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January 30,
1998.
 
PART 1 (POSTED IN 2 PARTS FOR EASY DOWNLOADING)
 
                                   BURMA
 
Burma continued to be ruled by a highly authoritarian military regime. The
military Government known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) seized power in September 1988 after harshly suppressing massive
prodemocracy demonstrations. In November the SLORC announced that the
military Government had been renamed the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC). The regime is headed by armed forces commander General Than
Shwe and composed of top military officers. Retired dictator General Ne
Win, whose idiosyncratic policies had isolated Burma and driven the country
into deep economic decline, may continue to wield considerable influence.
The judiciary is not independent of the executive.
 
The SLORC permitted a relatively free election in 1990, but it failed to
honor the results--which were an overwhelming rejection of military
rule--and cede power to the victorious prodemocracy forces. Instead, the
SLORC attacked the coalition of winning parties and their leaders through
intimidation, detention, and house arrest, and redoubled efforts to
consolidate and perpetuate its rule. In 1993 the SLORC established the
"National Convention," a body ostensibly tasked with drafting a new
constitution. The SLORC carefully handpicked the delegates, overwhelmingly
made up of military officers, and stage-managed the constitutional
convention's proceedings, ignoring even limited opposition views. Although
the National Convention has not been reconvened since 1996, the military
government appears determined to draft a constitution that will ensure a
dominant role for the military services in the country's future political
structure.
 
The Government reinforces its firm military rule with a pervasive security
apparatus led by the military intelligence organization, the Directorate of
Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI). Control is buttressed by selective
restrictions on contact with foreigners, surveillance of government
employees and private citizens, harassment of political activists,
intimidation, arrest, detention, and physical abuse. The Government
justifies its security measures as necessary to maintain order and national
unity. However, most major insurgent groups have reached individual
accommodations with the SLORC in recent years, which provide varying levels
of stability and autonomy from central government control. Members of the
security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
 
Burma is a poor country, with an estimated average per capita income of
$200 to 300 per year on an exchange rate basis and $700 to $900 on a
purchasing-power-parity basis. Primarily an agricultural country, it also
has substantial mineral, fishing, and timber resources. Since 1988 the
Government has partly opened the economy to permit expansion of the small
private sector and attract foreign investment. Some economic improvement
has ensued, but major obstacles to economic reform persist. These include
extensive overt and covert state involvement in economic activity, state
monopolization of leading exports, a bloated bureaucracy prone to arbitrary
and opaque governance, corruption, poor human and physical infrastructure,
and disproportionately large military spending.
 
The Government's longstanding severe repression of human rights continued
during the year. Citizens continued to live subject at any time and without
appeal to the arbitrary and sometimes brutal dictates of the military
dictatorship. Citizens do not have the right to change their government.
The SLORC has given no sign of a willingness to cede its hold on absolute
power. There continue to be credible reports, particularly in ethnic
minority-dominated areas, that soldiers committed serious human rights
abuses, including extrajudicial killings and rape. Disappearances
continued, and members of the security forces beat and otherwise abused
detainees. Prison conditions remained harsh. Arbitrary arrests and
detentions continued for expression of dissenting political views. Many
hundreds--if not more--political prisoners remained in prison, including
approximately 31 parliamentarians elected in 1990. Since May 1996, at least
340 persons have been arrested and imprisoned for political reasons, and
may remain in prison at year's end. The judiciary is subject to executive
influence, and the Government infringes on citizens' rights to privacy.
 
The SLORC maintained and at times intensified its restrictions on basic
rights of free speech, press, assembly, and association. Political party
activity remained severely restricted. Although the authorities recognize
the chief opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), as a
legal entity, they prevented the party from conducting normal day-to-day
political activities. The Government closed many party offices throughout
the country with no apparent legal justification. The regime refused to
recognize the legal political status of key NLD party leaders, such as its
General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi and the two party cochairmen, and it
severely constrained their activities through security measures and
threats. The regime stopped a party conference held on May 27 to mark the
seventh anniversary of the 1990 elections by the use of physical restraints
on NLD party members. The authorities detained or threatened to detain as
many as 300 Members of Parliament-elect (M.P.?s-elect) and party activists
from outside Rangoon to deter attendance. They also progressively tightened
restrictions imposed in late 1996 on Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom to leave
her compound and her ability to receive visitors. Although the Government
eased restrictions on NLD gatherings in September that allowed the party to
hold a congress marking the ninth anniversary of its founding, this action
was only temporary, as authorities blocked subsequent meetings.
 
The SLORC's repression of the NLD continued with the forcible closure of
NLD offices upcountry and harassment of NLD members for petty offenses. It
forced NLD members to work as military porters and arrested and convicted
NLD supporters of political crimes, especially those associated personally
with Aung San Suu Kyi.
 
The Government imposed restrictions on certain religious minorities. In
March the authorities did little to halt attacks on Muslims by Buddhist
monks. The authorities initially did little to stop the rioting, and in
some cases stood by and watched the looting of Muslim property, although
they did deter physical harm to Muslims themselves. An estimated 42 mosques
were damaged or destroyed throughout the country. The Government restricted
freedom of movement. Thousands of citizens fled army attacks against
insurgents, and remained in refugee camps in Thailand at year's end.
Discrimination against women and ethnic minorities, violence against women,
trafficking in women and girls, and widespread adult and child prostitution
are problems. The Government restricts worker rights, bans unions, and uses
forced labor for public works and to produce food for military garrisons.
The forced use of citizens as porters by the army--with attendant
maltreatment, illness, and even death for those compelled to
serve--remained a common practice. The Government did not enforce 1996
military directives to cease the practice of forced civilian labor, and the
practice remains widespread. Child labor is also a problem. The use of
forced civilian labor on projects appeared to decrease.
 
 
 
During the SLORC's antiinsurgency operations, military forces were
responsible for arbitrary killings, rape, village relocations, the
destruction of homes and property, and forced labor inflicted on ethnic
minorities.
 
Insurgent forces committed numerous abuses, including killings, rapes, and
other atrocities.
 
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
 
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
 
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
 
There continued to be many credible reports of brutality and the killing of
civilians by soldiers, particularly in areas dominated by ethnic
minorities. Brutal treatment by soldiers also caused deaths among those
impressed as military porters in areas held by ethnic insurgents. In
February soldiers detained approximately 50 NLD leaders and members from
Toungoo in Rago Division. Of this group, 14 persons were forced into
porterage; three persons reportedly died as a result. In May in Bago
Division, soldiers detained a group of 36 NLD members from Kyaukyi. Eight
persons were taken as porters; one of them died while working as a porter.
The Government's general disregard for human rights has created a climate
that is clearly conducive to such abuses.
 
The military forces disregard the safety of noncombatants, and thousands of
refugees continue to flee into neighboring Thailand.
 
Various insurgent groups also committed extrajudicial killings.
 
b. Disappearance
 
As in previous years, private citizens and political activists continued to
"disappear" temporarily, for periods ranging from several hours to several
weeks. DDSI officials usually apprehended individuals for questioning
without the knowledge of their family members. In many, although not all
cases, they released them soon afterward. Such action was usually intended
to prevent free political expression or assembly. At the same time, large
numbers of persons continued to be forcibly seized by soldiers for
porterage or related duties, often without the knowledge of their family
members. The whereabouts of those conscripted, as well as of prisoners
transferred for labor or porterage duties, remain unknown.
 
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
 
The authorities routinely subjected detainees to harsh interrogation
techniques designed to intimidate and disorient. The most common forms of
mistreatment were sleep and food deprivation coupled with around-the-clock
questioning; some detainees were also kicked and beaten. Political
detainees were held incommunicado for long periods. Credible reports
continue that prisoners are forced to squat or assume stressful,
uncomfortable, or painful positions for lengthy periods.
 
There continued to be credible reports that security forces subjected
ordinary citizens to harassment and physical abuse. The military forces
routinely confiscated property, cash, and food, and used coercive and
abusive recruitment methods to procure porters. Those forced into porterage
or other duties faced extremely difficult conditions and mistreatment that
sometimes resulted in death (see Section 1.a.). There were many reports
that soldiers raped women who were members of ethnic minorities.
 
Prison conditions remained harsh. The regimen at Insein Prison near Rangoon
remained extremely harsh including the lack of exercise, mosquito nets, and
reading materials for some prisoners, poor nutrition, inadequate medical
care, and the use of solitary confinement and "doggie cells," (small
enclosures that remind citizens of kennels used during World War II) as
punishment. A small number of prominent political prisoners were housed in
separate bungalow accommodations on the prison compound. All prisoners were
usually permitted to receive medicine as well as supplemental food brought
by their families during 15-minute visits permitted every 2 weeks, although
there are occasional reports that guards demand bribes for that privilege.
 
Conditions for political prisoners were reported to be much harsher at some
upcountry locations than in Rangoon; Thayet and Thayawaddy prisons are
cited most often in this regard. In April the authorities transferred
approximately 150 prisoners--including 59 NLD members--from Insein to
upcountry prisons. The inevitable consequence for most prisoners of the
transfer from Rangoon was additional hardship in the form of reduced access
to family support, food, medicine, and clothing. However, there have been
reports that prison conditions for a number of political prisoners improved
late in the year.
 
U Tin Shwe (Monywa), a former NLD central executive committee member, died
in Insein prison on June 8. A founding member of the NLD, Tin Shwe had been
arrested in 1990 and was serving an 18-year sentence when he died of heart
disease at age 68. After receiving cardiac treatment at Insein Hospital in
April, his family asked the authorities to allow specialists to see Tin
Shwe outside the prison; however, authorities denied permission. After
prolonged deterioration, he died in custody, the sixth NLD member to die in
prison since 1988. In September the authorities did provide timely medical
treatment to NLD founding member U Win Tin, Aung San Suu Kyi's cousin, Cho
Aung Than, Dr. Aung Sint, and three other political prisoners at Rangoon
General Hospital.
 
The Government does not permit prison visits by human rights monitors.
 
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
 
There is no provision in the law for judicial determination of the legality
of detention. The SLORC routinely practiced arbitrary arrest and
incommunicado detention. Prior to being charged, detainees rarely had
access to legal counsel or their families and political detainees have no
opportunity to obtain release on bail. Political detainees are held
incommunicado for long periods. Even after being charged, detainees rarely
have benefit of counsel.
 
As in 1996, the authorities carried out a campaign of detention and
intimidation to prevent the NLD from holding a party conference. Prior to
the NLD's planned celebration on May 27 to mark the seventh anniversary of
the 1990 election, the SLORC detained more than 300 NLD Members of
Parliament-Elect (M.P.'s-Elect) and activists outside Rangoon and
threatened others to prevent them from attending the event. Although the
authorities subsequently released all the detainees, their detentions
violated the NLD's right as a legal party to hold a political gathering
(see Section 2.b.).
 
In February the authorities arrested four prominent NLD M.P.'s-Elect--all
of whom are medical doctors--on charges that appeared designed to harass
them because of their affiliation with the NLD. One doctor, who is also a
party organizer for Rangoon Division, was jailed for 40 days on charges of
operating a clinic without a license; eventually he was able to prove that
he had applied for a license. While charges against the physician and two
of his colleagues were later dismissed for lack of evidence, another
physician with ties to the NLD was convicted on a suspected false charge of
"negligent homicide" and sentenced to 4 years in prison. He had given an
injection to a vagrant who ignored his advice to seek immediate treatment
in a hospital and subsequently died.
 
The military forces forcibly seized citizens to serve as porters during
military operations; at times the brutal treatment that they suffered
caused the death of such persons (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.).
 
Forced exile is not used as a method of political control. However in 1990,
when the SLORC refused to recognize the results of the elections and
pressured successful candidates to resign, some candidates, as well as
thousands of political activists, responded by going into exile rather than
face threats.
 
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
 
The judiciary is not independent of the executive. The SLORC names justices
to the Supreme Court who, in turn, appoint lower court judges with the
approval of the SLORC. Pervasive corruption further serves to undermine the
impartiality of the justice system.
 
The court system, as inherited from the United Kingdom and subsequently
restructured, comprised courts at the township, district, state, and
national levels. Throughout the year, the Government continued to rule by
decree and was not bound by any constitutional provisions providing for
fair public trials or any other rights. Although remnants of the
British-era legal system were formally in place, the court system and its
operation remained seriously flawed, particularly in the handling of
political cases. Unprofessional behavior by some court officials, the
misuse of overly broad laws, and the manipulation of the courts for
political ends continued to deprive citizens of the right to a fair trial
and the rule of law.
 
Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public trial and to
be represented by a defense attorney, were generally respected, except in
political cases that authorities deemed especially sensitive. Defense
attorneys are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses, but their
primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to obtain the shortest
possible sentence for their clients. Most court proceedings are open to the
public. However, in political cases, trials are held in courtrooms on
prison compounds and are not open to the public. In these instances,
defense counsel appears to serve no purpose other than to provide moral
support, since reliable reports indicate that verdicts are dictated by
higher authorities.
 
The arrest and conviction of three associates of Aung San Suu Kyi
illustrates the opaque nature of the judicial process under the SLORC
regime, which denies defendants in political cases the right to a fair
public trial. In June the SLORC arrested Cho Aung Than, his sister Nge Ma
Ma Than, and her husband, Myint Swe. Authorities tried and sentenced them
to 10 years in prison on charges of "unlawful association" and of allegedly
having assisted foreigners (representatives of nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's)) in transferring money to Aung San Suu Kyi. Cho Aung
Than and Nge Ma Ma Than are Aung San Suu Kyi's cousins. A fourth alleged
coconspirator, Myo Aung Thant, was also sentenced to 10 years'
imprisonment, in addition to life imprisonment for alleged involvement in
terrorist attacks. These included a package bomb killing of the daughter of
SLORC official Tin Oo in April. The closed and opaque judicial process in
these cases cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of the proceedings.
 
In December the SLORC commuted the sentences of those prisoners serving
terms longer than 10 years. Approximately 60 students and political
prisoners arrested between 1988 and 1992 had their sentences reduced,
making them eligible for release within the next few years.
 
There are unconfirmed estimates of as many as 1,000 political prisoners.
Since May 1996, at least 340 political prisoners have been arrested; most
remain confined. Of the total, 93 are students, 18 are NLD
parliamentarians-elect, and 229 are NLD members, supporters, and activists.
Of this total, 52 students, all the parliamentarians-elect, and 110 NLD
members and supporters have been tried and sentenced. The status of the
remaining persons in custody is not known.
 
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
 
The military authorities ruled unchecked by any outside authority, and the
State continued to interfere extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of
private citizens. Through its extensive intelligence network and
administrative procedures, the Government closely monitored the travel and
activities of many citizens, particularly those known to be politically
active. Authorities sometimes enter homes during night hours to check
registration documents of occupants as a form of monitoring personal
movements. Security personnel selectively screened private correspondence
and telephone calls and conducted warrantless searches of private premises
and other property. At times the Government attempted to jam foreign radio
broadcasts, and citizens were generally unable to subscribe directly to
foreign publications (see Section 2.a.). Government employees are generally
required to obtain advance permission before meeting with foreigners.
 
The military services forced citizens-including women and children-to work
as military porters under harsh conditions (see Sections 1.a, 1.b., and
1.g.).
 
To make way for commercial or public construction, and in some cases for
security reasons, the SLORC continued to move people out of cities to
peripheral new town settlements, although on a smaller scale than during
the early 1990's. While facilities in some of these areas have improved
over time, residents targeted for displacement continued to be given no
option but to move, usually on short notice. The military authorities also
continued the widespread and frequent practice of forcible relocation of
rural villages in ethnic minority areas in response to security concerns.
This practice was particularly widespread and egregious in the Shan, Kayah,
and Karen states, where tens of thousands of villagers were displaced or
herded into smaller settlements in strategic areas.
 
In a number of urban areas, residents were compelled to cede land for
road-widening projects approved without any public consultation or
endorsement. Other long-term city residents were required to cede land for
commercial redevelopment and were compensated at only a fraction of the
value of their lost homes. For example, the Government forced residents in
the Hledan market area of Rangoon to relocate to make way for an apartment
complex without paying compensation for their homes; residents were given
the option to buy new apartments outside the city. In rural areas, military
personnel at times confiscated livestock and food supplies. The armed
forces also forcibly relocated many villages and citizens during its
campaign against insurgents (see Section 1.g.).
 
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law In Internal
Conflicts
 
For nearly 5 decades, the army has battled diverse ethnic insurgencies.
These ethnic minority insurgent groups have sought to gain greater
autonomy, or in some cases, independence from the dominant ethnic Burman
majority. In 1989 the SLORC began a policy of seeking cease-fire agreements
with most ethnic insurgent groups along the borders.
 
Following the breakdown of its cease-fire with the separatist Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP) in 1995, the army began an offensive in
1996 against the KNPP that continued through year's end. As part of its
campaign to deny the guerrillas local support, the military forces forcibly
relocated hundreds of villages and tens of thousands of Karenni civilians.
In central and southern Shan state, the military forces continued to engage
the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), a remnant of Khun Sa's
narcotics-linked former Mong Tai Army, and began a campaign of relocation
against the villagers in the region. Many thousands have been forced to
move from their villages. There are credible reports of retaliatory
killings, rapes, and other atrocities committed by the army against
civilians.
 
The Karen National Union (KNU) is the largest single insurgent group that
continues to fight against central government rule. In January the fourth
round of cease-fire talks between the KNU and the SLORC broke down. In
February the army launched an offensive that pushed the KNU out of its last
strongholds in Karen state. The KNU lost control of most of its former
territory along the Thai border. As a result, over 20,000 Karen civilians
fled to Thailand.
 
In conjunction with the military's campaigns against the Karen, Karenni,
and Shan insurgents, it was standard practice for the military forces to
coerce civilians into working as porters in rural areas in or near combat
zones. According to testimony collected by international human rights NGO's
from refugees, the men--and sometimes women and children as well--who were
forced to labor as porters often suffered beatings and, on occasion, died
as a result of their mistreatment by soldiers (see Sections 1.a, 1.b., and
1.c.). There were reports that soldiers raped female members of ethnic
minorities in contested areas.
 
In the regions controlled by insurgent groups engaged in narcotics
trafficking, civilians were reliably reported to have been subjected to
forced labor as well by those groups.
 
Antigovernment insurgent groups were also responsible for violence,
including the deployment of land mines that caused both civilian and
military deaths. The SURA insurgents committed retaliatory killings, rapes,
and other atrocities against civilians.
 
END OF PART 1