DAM LIES: ILLUSIONS, INSULTS & INJU

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DAM LIES: ILLUSIONS, INSULTS & INJURIES 

"When the opportunities offered by Ngamoeyeik irrigated area are fully
realized, local farm incomes will rise due to multiple cropping and
increased productivity...." 
	- Former State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] Agriculture and
Irrigation Minister, 2nd Lt. Gen. Myint Aung, 26 March 1995. 

"When people wanted water, they didn't give it, when they no longer wanted
water, they gave it!... After the paddy was flooded they didn't come and
see... it was all flooded and there was nothing more to be done. The paddy
was dead, dead." 
	- N.K, a 60-year-old farmer from the Ngamoeyeik irrigated area, August 1997.


Fundamental to the Burmese military regime's ongoing claim to legitimacy has
been a strong emphasis on agriculture and infrastructure development.
Government media takes every available opportunity to remind us that the
first of the nation's four economic objectives is: "Development of
agriculture as the base... of the economy...." This program stresses
development of multiple paddy rice crops annually, in conjunction with
secondary cash crops for domestic use and export, supported in turn by
improved agricultural techniques, irrigation and transport infrastructure
development. The state also places stress on its determination to maintain a
dominant role in shaping agrarian policy, regardless of what Burma's largely
agrarian population might have in mind.

Can a militarist autocracy design and implement a truly effective program
for agricultural transformation? The construction of a reservoir on the
Ngamoeyeik River, north of Rangoon, offers a good example for consideration.
The dam was opened amid the usual fanfare of ribbon cutting and balloon
releasing on 26 March 1995, and the state-run New Light of Myanmar gave the
inevitable account of the proceedings' minutiae. Following is an edited
extract from the report:

The Golden Jubilee of the Armed Forces Day, which falls on 27 March 1995,
was hailed with the inauguration of Ngamoeyeik Reservoir, Yangon [Rangoon]
Division, this morning [26 March).

The Minister for Agriculture delivered an address. He said:

"Since the construction of irrigation works and ponds constitutes a basic
investment in agricultural production to benefit following generations, the
state is establishing large, medium or small irrigation works according to
priority requirements. In 1994 a total of 67 works were completed

"Ngamoeyeik Dam is so far the largest irrigation project [undertaken by the
now defunct SLORC regime.) It is 75 feet [22.8 m/ high and 15,500 feet [4712
m] long with a storage capacity of 180,000 acre-feet. The length of the
distribution canals is 242 miles [ 389 km/ and for this 120 million cubic
feet [36.5 million cubic m] of earth were dug.

"Work was begun on 3rd November, 1992. The dam was completed in record time
due to the powerful contribution of 100,000 man days labor by Tatmadaw
[Armed Forces] personnel, who contributed labor together with the public in
the main tasks of the project.
"Ngamoeyeik Dam can irrigate 70,000 acres of land and 126,000 acres of crop
land in Yangon Division. A further 3,000 acres can be protected from flooding.

"I urge the local people to cooperate in maintaining this big dam for the
perpetual benefit of generations to come, and to coordinate the utilization
of the gathered waters for the greatest benefit to agriculture." 

About ten miles downstream from the dam is Sabutaung town. In contrast to
the preceding ministerial superlatives, a more sobering assessment of the
dam's impact was given recently by N.K., a 60-year-old farmer from
Sabutaung. Her home lies among open agricultural land, populated by farming
communities who for decades have put up with a miscellany of awkward
policies imposed by successive regimes. Traditionally, people in this area
produced a single paddy rice crop followed by a subsidiary crop of beans, or
some other produce requiring substantially less water and fertilization.
With the dam's completion, the authorities instructed the local farmers to
double-crop paddy, as adequate water supply would now be available for a
second harvest. (N.K. knows only "the authorities", devoid of their official
titles, reflecting the relationship between local people and the
administration. In this instance, those in charge of dam construction and
implementation were from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, and
those supervising the collection of grain quotas, Township Law and Order
Restoration Council officials.)

According to N.K., the irrigation program has to date been less effective
than the officials would have us believe. In August 1997, out of desperation
she left both her family and homeland to come and find work in Thailand.
Extracts from her statement portray the Ngamoeyeik irrigated area from a
ground-level perspective:

"Last year the authorities did things one way and this year it's another.
For two years they've chopped and changed like that and so the paddy crop
has failed.

"The villagers had to dig the dam and canals [without pay or other support].
I also had to go and hoe the ground. The work was enormously tiring. Then,
after we returned home in the evenings, they went and took video footage of
the work [for propaganda purposes - minus the unpaid civilian workhorse].
People had to go and do this work throughout the hot season, in March/April,
when it was really hot.

"The government made us construct the Ngamoeyeik Dam, then told everybody to
grow dry season paddy rice [the second crop]. At that time, some people were
still growing wet season paddy. Others had already finished the wet season
paddy and had planted beans and peanuts. The [Ministry of Agriculture and
Irrigation/ officials ordered that all the beans and peanuts be ripped up
[to make way for the second paddy crop]. So what can you do? That was just
about the last straw.

"The dry season paddy program started in the beginning of 1996. They didn't
provide seeds - we had to go and buy them. At first they didn't release
water [from the dam], as some people hadn't finished all of their wet season
crop. Then they announced that people had to begin sowing the dry season
paddy. For people to grow dry season paddy, they needed water, so the
government opened up the dam and way too much water poured out. The people
who hadn't finished their first crop had to rush out and gather it all up
quickly. Some called on the authorities to stop the water, saying, "What are
you doing? We can't even stay here anymore " [as the area was made
uninhabitable by floods]. The authorities answered, "If you can't stay, then
get out. As for us, we 're just following orders. "

"My son-in-law's land was flooded, and we had to hire a pump to get the
water out. The paddy went bad, and a lot died. My son-in-law has to give 80
baskets of paddy to the government [a quota based upon the land area sown,
for which about 50 percent of market value is paid]. He has about six acres
of fields, and if he could work the paddy problem-free he could get at least
200 baskets out of that area. This year [1997], the yield was only over one
hundred baskets. After all of his expenses, he had only about 60 baskets
left, which we took to the administration - the entire lot, and not a single
basket was left over. But the officials said, "This paddy grain is no good.
We don't want it, " and they made us take it all back.  He couldn't think
about this anymore, and went to get the whole lot milled. After about
another month, the government announced over loudspeakers [on cars] that
people who hadn't brought in grain of bad quality should go and give it
after all, but [by that time] we didn't have anything to go and give back to
them, [and so had to negotiate a standing debt to be made up in the next
year]. They came and took video footage of areas where the crop was good.
The stuff that didn't grow, they don't show - you can't say anything about that.

"Later, they cut off the water and the people who had begun growing the dry
season paddy saw it was drying up, so they complained to the authorities.
The officials said, "You farmers are hypocrites. When you request something
from us [for the water to be stopped] we give it to you, and then you
protest. We can't follow your whims anymore. " They said it's the farmers
who are inconsistent and don't do things right. So some villagers went to
break open [the stone and earth-fill wall of] the dam themselves. Then the
officials became angry and said "You must all relocate your villages " [as
punishment]. The villagers replied, "We can't plant paddy, so what will we
do? " The village heads [acting as community representatives] outlined their
case step-by-step, and eventually reached an understanding with the
officials. Anyway, we had to go and help repair the [damage the villagers
had done to the] dam - we nearly died doing that in the stinking hot weather!

"Nobody is producing enough grain. No farmer has enough to eat. This is what
I know from my own experiences and what I myself have seen."

N.K. identified a host of problems faced by the farmers. Different varieties
of apparently identical seeds had been mixed together in stocks purchased
from the government, so that once sown, plants began to grow at different
speeds and to different heights. The fertilizers available are overpriced
and poor-quality, so weeds and grasses are endemic. Different levels of the
administrative hierarchy issue contradictory orders. Many township
authorities cheat and manipulate farmers when collecting quotas, for
instance by reducing the weight, claiming that the grain is too heavily
laden with trash (gravel, grass, etc.) The list goes on. Such a panoply of
abuses doesn't suggest effective implementation of agricultural development
policies.

N.K.'s words speak louder than the official line. At Ngarnoeyeik, the
powers-that-be gave speeches about development and progress. For farmers
there it has spelled despair. However, the regime has placed much of its
credibility on these projects, and is very sensitive to any criticism.
Success is mandatory. In September 1997, a friend observed that one end of a
bridge across the Sittaung River, Pegu Division, had collapsed into rising
waters during the recent floods. Adjacent, a sign had been posted
"Photographs Prohibited". In an enviromnent where failure is not admitted in
the first place, problems can never be adequately addressed.

Ngamoeyeik hints at fallacy beneath arguments that a strong, authoritarian
regime will bring about socioeconomic progress. Inherent in an autocratic,
military dominated structure and top-down approach to development lie
endemic corruption, incompetence, and hierarchical bickering, regardless of
intentions. Bludgeoning the population with blunt public relations tools
serves no good purpose - reality is where the people are. They are acutely
aware of their stifling conditions. The authorities could probably get a lot
further by entering into dialogue and consultation with communities like
N.K.'s, rather than waiting until they become desperate enough to try to
demolish that which they themselves were forced to construct, as in this
instance. Yet, the lack of accountability and transparency reinforce a rigid
bureaucracy that seems neither capable of budging, nor willing to try.
	
The solutions to Burma's apparently intractable problems lie with the
people, and only a truly participatory process for transformation can
ultimately succeed. Genuine development, agrarian or otherwise, will occur
if and when the population has a sense of some control over the process.
Externally, pressure must be applied upon all parties involved to ensure a
process of genuine dialogue with, and accountability to, the people. All
else is mere propaganda.
nyah phay thwet

Burma Issues
January 1998

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