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In Focus: Burma. Written by Philip

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<H2 ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="mansmall.gif" HSPACE=20 HEIGHT=87 WIDTH=65 ALIGN=ABSCENTER><FONT COLOR="#000000">U.S.
Foreign Policy In Focus<IMG SRC="ipsmall.gif" HSPACE=20 HEIGHT=87 WIDTH=62 ALIGN=ABSCENTER></FONT>
</H2>

<P><B><I>A Project of the Institute for Policy Studies and the Interhemispheric
Resource Center</I></B> </P>

<H2 ALIGN=CENTER><FONT COLOR="#800040">In Focus: Burma</FONT></H2>

<CENTER><P><I>Volume 2, Number 43 (Full text)</I></P></CENTER>

<P>Editors: Martha Honey (IPS) and Tom Barry (IRC)<BR>
Written by Philip S. Robertson Jr., Social Change and Development Program,
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.</P>

<H3>Key Points</H3>

<UL>
<LI>The SLORC military junta is a world-class human rights abuser condemned
by the UN every year since 1989. </LI>

<LI>Foreign investors continue to play a critical role in providing financial
backing for SLORC. </LI>

<LI>SLORC continues to refuse to recognize the results of the 1990 elections,
overwhelmingly won by Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy
(NLD).</LI>
</UL>

<P>Springing from obscurity to America?s editorial pages, college campuses,
city councils, and state legislatures, Burma has emerged as a major foreign
policy issue. A nonaligned, economically autarkic, one-party state under
harsh military rule since 1962, Burma has metamorphosed into a test case
for action on several fronts: human rights in Southeast Asia, international
trade relations and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the growing worldwide
heroin epidemic, and the role of foreign investors in supporting dictatorships.
Part of the reason is that many observers view Burma as nothing less than
a fight between good and evil. On one side is the democracy movement led
by 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of modern
Burma?s founding father. On the other is a military junta called the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The fight even encompasses the
name of the country: the democracy movement calls it Burma, while SLORC
insists on Myanmar. </P>

<P>SLORC came to power in September 1988 by commanding the Tatmadaw (Burmese
army) to smash a nationwide democracy movement, which it did by gunning
down more than 3,000 protesters in Rangoon and thousands more in smaller
cities and towns. The latest UN Commission on Human Rights resolution criticized
SLORC for ?extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, death in custody,
torture, arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention, absence
of due process of law, severe restrictions on freedom of opinion, expression,
movement, assembly, and association, including portering for the military.?
President Clinton?s order imposing sanctions against Burma cited SLORC?s
?deepening pattern of severe repression? against the democracy movement.
</P>

<P>The People?s Republic of China (PRC)?SLORC?s closest ally and primary
diplomatic and financial supporter?has included $1.8 billion in military
equipment for SLORC?s military modernization drive. The Tatmadaw aims to
field a 500,000-man army, one of the largest in Southeast Asia. Western
and Asian multinationals have moved to strike deals with the generals who
control Southeast Asia?s most resource-rich country. American corporations
led by energy companies like Texaco, Unocal, and Arco were among the first
foreign companies to invest in SLORC-controlled Burma. Most foreign investments
are made with government ministries or entities like the Union of Myanmar
Economic Holdings (UMEH), controlled by active-duty and retired military
officers. </P>

<P>Attempting to legitimize its rule, SLORC organized a multiparty election
on May 27, 1990. Despite restrictions on key opposition political leaders,
the move turned out to be a huge miscalculation. Suu Kyi?s NLD won a landslide,
taking 392 of 485 seats in the Parliament. The official military party
won just 10 seats. SLORC refused to honor the results of the election and
began a systematic effort to destroy the NLD. Currently, 24 NLD MPs are
serving long-term jail sentences, 68 MPs have been dismissed by SLORC,
43 have been forced to resign, three MPs have died in prison, and another
28 are in exile. In November 1996, Suu Kyi was the target of a rock-throwing,
baton- swinging mob organized by SLORC and an affiliated organization?the
Union and Solidarity Development Association (USDA)?that Suu Kyi has compared
to Hitler?s brownshirts.</P>

<P>SLORC has consolidated control over ethnic areas long outside the effective
authority of any previous central government. Employing the infamous ?Four
Cuts? strategy designed to cut off insurgents from food, funds, intelligence,
and recruits, the Tatmadaw?s scorched-earth tactics have been as effective
as they have been devastating. The coercive relocations of hundreds of
villages have turned ethnic areas into free-fire zones in which heavily
armed SLORC battalions, using civilians as forced porters and minesweepers,
have wreaked havoc. Over 100,000 refugees have fled to Thailand, where
(without UN recognition) they remain vulnerable to forcible repatriation
by the Thai army. SLORC continues to vilify Suu Kyi as a foreigner (her
husband is British) and to call for the annihilation of ?destructive elements,?
a code phrase for the NLD.</P>

<H3>Problems With Current U.S. Policy </H3>

<P><B><I>Key Problems</I></B></P>

<UL>
<LI>The Clinton administration?s recent embrace of economic sanctions arose
from political pressure by Congress and grassroots activists.</LI>

<LI>The current U.S. sanctions are inadequate because they only ban new
investments, allowing most existing projects to continue unimpeded. Yet
the administration opposes selective purchasing initiatives enacted by
individual U.S.states and towns. </LI>

<LI>Burma accounts for over 60% of the heroin on America?s streets, and
evidence points to complicity in trafficking by SLORC.</LI>
</UL>

<P>In 1995, worsening human rights conditions prompted a bipartisan coalition
led by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) to press for immediate, mandatory
economic sanctions against Burma. Suu Kyi and the NLD supported this move,
but the effort did not please the White House or the State Department,
both intent on preserving diplomatic flexibility. The McConnell amendment
failed under the weight of presidential opposition and business lobbying
after the White House encouraged Senators Cohen (R-ME) and Feinstein (D-CA)
to formulate a compromise with plenty of loopholes. The resulting economic
sanctions only banned new U.S. investment and required presidential initiative.
</P>

<P>The predictable attitude of the Clinton administration backing into
a tough Burma policy rather than leading was that of a reluctant participant.
Following the arrests of hundreds of student demonstrators in December
1996, Suu Kyi called for the imposition of sanctions. As Texaco and Arco
signed contracts giving SLORC millions in ?signing fees,? the U.S. dallied
in response to what even U.S. diplomats described as the ?rolling repression?
in Rangoon. Even with a notorious human rights abuser like SLORC, with
whom the U.S. has fairly minimal commercial ties (total bilateral trade
in 1996 was $139.8 million), the inherent inclination of the Clinton administration
to encourage trade was difficult to overcome. </P>

<P>Only in April 1997, when displeasure on Capitol Hill was again heating
up, did the Clinton administration finally announce its intentions to fulfill
the letter of the law. A flurry of business deals took place as another
month passed before an executive order was issued to implement the sanctions.
Employing presidential statutory authority under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the order bans investment, actions to facilitate
investment (including that by foreign nationals), and attempts to evade
the prohibitions. But all investment contracts signed before May 21, 1997
are legal. In an attempt to hold U.S. business accountable, the International
Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) in conjunction with Burmese dissidents has filed
a lawsuit against Unocal for human rights violations stemming from its
partnership with SLORC. </P>

<P>U.S. grassroots activists have recognized that real economic pressure
lies in using U.S. market power as a purchaser of products to effect change.
Selective purchasing campaigns to convince states, cities, and towns to
pass laws prohibiting the purchase of goods and services from American
and foreign companies operating in Burma have now passed in Massachusetts
and 14 cities, including New York City, San Francisco, and Oakland. Selective
purchasing bills have been introduced in the legislatures of Connecticut,
Texas, and California. The European Union (EU) has called these measures
WTO-illegal and in mid-July 1997 initiated consultations with the U.S.
that could lead to proceedings before a WTO dispute panel. Rather than
supporting trade restrictions on moral or national security grounds (as
it has done with Cuba), the Clinton administration has pressured state
regulators to reconsider and has intimated that the states are violating
agreements signed by the U.S. Trade Representative. </P>

<P>This reluctance is even harder to understand now that it is clear that
SLORC is profiting from collaboration with narcotraffickers. The State
Department?s top antinarcotics official concludes, ?SLORC has been part
of the problem, not the solution?. Another State Department report notes
that in 1996, Burma?s ?export of opiates alone appear to be worth as much
as all legal exports.? The U.S. government estimates that 60% of the heroin
on America?s streets is Burmese. Burma?s banks can accept foreign currency
deposits of any size with no questions asked, as long as a 10% tax is paid.
But the Clinton administration has failed to formulate a regional strategy
to combat the narcotics that threaten both the U.S. and Burma?s neighbors.
</P>

<P>The U.S. policy to urge wider support for economic sanctions has also
been weak. A public announcement of efforts to lobby the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) played into the hands of those who contend
that outsiders shouldn?t dictate to ASEAN, making a tough sell even tougher.
More importantly, the U.S. has failed to make support for sanctions a major
issue with potential colleagues Australia, Canada, and key European nations.
As a result, the ASEAN policy of constructive engagement toward SLORC,
primarily composed of commercial links and noninterference in politics,
has not been significantly challenged by the wider international community.
ASEAN even decided to assuage Burma?s international pariah status by accepting
it as an ASEAN member in July 1997.</P>

<H3>Toward a New Foreign Policy </H3>

<P><B><I>Key Recommendations</I></B></P>

<UL>
<LI>The U.S. needs to expand efforts to delegitimize SLORC internationally
and must work with allies to apply economic and political pressure on the
junta.</LI>

<LI>The U.S. should ensure that ASEAN understands that admitting Burma
as a member will have strong negative impacts on certain aspects of U.S.-ASEAN
relations.</LI>

<LI>The U.S. should defend ?selective purchasing? initiatives against international
pressure branding these measures as illegal under the WTO.</LI>
</UL>

<P>ASEAN?s decision to admit Burma as a member creates important policy
challenges for the U.S., the EU, and ASEAN. Encouraged by ASEAN recognition,
SLORC may assume a freer hand in cracking down on its internal opponents.
Yet student demonstrations in December 1996, riots in Mandalay (Burma?s
second largest city) in March, and NLD resistance in May indicate that
SLORC is trying to keep the lid on a population that is passionate in its
opposition to military rule. </P>

<P>U.S. policy correctly urges an internal tripartite dialogue (as advocated
by the unprecedented Mae Tha Raw Hta agreement) in which representatives
of all of Burma?s ethnic groups called for talks between SLORC, the NLD,
and ethnic leaders. This call, echoed by the international community, has
fallen on deaf ears. Washington lacks the unilateral leverage to persuade
the recalcitrant SLORC to come to the table. The U.S. needs to pursue a
two-track strategy of seeking to more thoroughly delegitimize the SLORC
regime internationally while devising a mix of incentives and penalties
to prod ASEAN to strive for a regime change in Burma. </P>

<P>ASEAN members fear that browbeating SLORC will simpy enhance China?s
influence in Burma. But ASEAN fails to differentiate between the regime
and the people of Burma. Highly dependent on China?s arms, trade, and support
at the UN, SLORC has already placed its bets. It has granted the PRC access
to the Indian Ocean and has signed a military-training agreement for China?s
People?s Liberation Army (PLA) to train 300 Burmese officers. But these
actions have further diminished SLORC?s legitimacy. </P>

<P>Among the Burmese, there is widespread suspicion and fear of China,
which was the imperial power in the region until Western colonization in
the mid-1800s. Recently an influx of Chinese businessmen from Yunnan province
into the northern city of Mandalay together with a flood of cheap Chinese
exports forcing local crafts people and producers out of business have
increased anti-Chinese sentiment.</P>

<P>New Chinese initiatives and alliances with the SLORC have also angered
many Burmese while indicating a move away from the rigorous nonalignment
that has characterized modern Burmese foreign policy. In dealing with ASEAN,
the U.S. should be proactive in addressing concerns about rising PRC influence
in Burma while pointing out that a democratic Burmese government with popular
support would have little incentive to continue SLORC?s special relationship
with the PRC. The U.S. could stress to ASEAN that Burma as an independent
ally (rather than a Chinese client regime) would no doubt be preferable
in internal ASEAN councils. If ASEAN wishes to continue its ?constructive
engagement? policy with Burma, it should be willing to establish clear
indicators of progress toward political dialogue such as the end of human
rights abuses and the beginning of discussions with the democratic forces
led by the NLD. </P>

<P>Washington must develop a comprehensive strategy to further delegitimize
SLORC in the international arena. The U.S. should call a session of the
UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning Burma?s continued failure
to transfer power to the winners of the 1990 election, forcing China to
protect its client on the international stage (and further undermining
SLORC?s independence). Washington should warn ASEAN that it will not cooperate
with an SLORC-led Burma in ASEAN?s councils. Partly out of concern of Chinese
strategic objectives in the region, many ASEAN countries favor continuing
strong U.S. military links with the region. The U.S. could let it known
that strong ASEAN support for SLORC would jeopardize these U.S. military
links. In particular, the U.S. should use this pressure and other types
of policy leverage to discourage any further warming of relations between
Burma and Thailand. The U.S. should urge Thailand to allow UN Human Rights
Commission (UNHCR) access to refugees on the Thai-Burmese border, and Washington
should provide the necessary extra funding at the UN to make this effort
possible.</P>

<P>The U.S. should continue its policy of blocking loans and assistance
to Burma from the World Bank/IMF and should pressure the Asian Development
Bank to hold the line as well. Congress should finish its job and pass
immediate bilateral sanctions to close the new-investment loophole of the
Cohen-Feinstein amendment. On the local level, the U.S. government should
accede to the oncoming wave of more democratic, grassroots participation
in foreign policy and immediately cease efforts to discourage selective
purchasing by states and cities. The Clinton administration should inform
the EU that the U.S. will use the issues of drugtrafficking and Chinese
domination to claim a legitimate national security exemption at the WTO.
</P>

<P>Finally, the U.S. must widen the international coalition against SLORC.
It must make the argument that the impact of the flood of heroin and cheap
amphetamines from Burma affects not only the U.S. but neighboring Asian
countries as well. HIV/AIDS is out of control in Burma, spread by the regular
intravenous drug use of 4% of Burma?s male population. The Burmese drug
crisis affects Thailand too. According to Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok,
750,000 Burmese are now residing in Thailand. </P>

<P>Different nations can play different roles in interacting with SLORC,
as Japan and the U.S. already do in a good cop, bad cop routine. But the
U.S. must use its influence in the international community to promote a
comprehensive policy of economic pressure and political persuasion that
will result in negotiations leading to a restoration of democratic rule
in Burma based on the results of the 1990 elections. </P>

<H3>Sources for more information</H3>

<P><B><I>World Wide Web</I></B></P>

<P><B>Free Burma Coalition</B> <BR>
<A HREF="http://www.sunsite.unc.edu/freeburma/introduction.html";>http://sunsite.unc.edu/freeburma/introduction.html</A>
</P>

<P><B><I>Organizations</I></B></P>

<P><B>Free Burma - No Petro-dollars for SLORC</B> <BR>
c/o International Rivers Network <BR>
1847 Berkeley Way <BR>
Berkeley, CA 94703 <BR>
Voice: (510) 848-1155 <BR>
Fax: (510) 848-1008 <BR>
Email: <A HREF="mailto:freeburma@xxxxxxx";>freeburma@xxxxxxx</A> </P>

<P><B>Human Rights Watch/Asia <BR>
</B>485 Fifth Ave. <BR>
New York City, NY 10017-6104 <BR>
Voice: (212) 972-8400 <BR>
Fax: (212) 972-0905 <BR>
Email: <A HREF="mailto:hrwnyc@xxxxxxx";>hrwnyc@xxxxxxx</A> <BR>
Website: <A HREF="http://www.hrw.org/research/burma";>http://www.hrw.org/research/burma</A>
</P>

<P><B>International Labor Rights Fund <BR>
</B>110 Maryland Avenue, NE <BR>
Washington, DC 20002 <BR>
Voice: (202) 544-7198 <BR>
Fax: (202) 544-7767 <BR>
Email: <A HREF="mailto:laborrights@xxxxxxxxxxx";>laborrights@xxxxxxxxxxx</A>
</P>

<P><B>National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB)</B> <BR>
Representation Office/U.S. <BR>
815 15th St. NW, Ste. 910 <BR>
Washington, DC 20005 <BR>
Voice: (202) 393-7342 <BR>
Fax: (202) 393-7343 <BR>
Email: <A HREF="mailto:ncgub@xxxxxxxxxxx";>ncgub@xxxxxxxxxxx</A></P>

<P><B>Open Society Institute Burma Project <BR>
</B>888 7th St., Ste. 1901 <BR>
New York City, NY 10106 <BR>
Voice: (212) 887-0632 <BR>
Fax: (212) 489-8455 <BR>
Website: <A HREF="http://www.soros.org/burma.html";>http://www.soros.org/burma.html</A>
</P>

<P><B>U.S. Department of State</B> <BR>
Burma Desk Officer <BR>
East Asian and Pacific Bureau <BR>
Washington, DC 20520 <BR>
Voice: (202) 647-7108 <BR>
Fax: (202) 647-3069 </P>

<P><B><I>Publications</I></B></P>

<P>Dennis Bernstein and Leslie Kean, ?People of the Opiate,? <I>The Nation</I>,
December 16, 1996. </P>

<P>Bertil Lintner, <I>Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948</I>
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). </P>

<P>Martin Smith, <I>Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity</I>
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1991). </P>

<P>Alan Clements and Leslie Kean, <I>Burma?s Revolution of the Spirit</I>
(New York City, NY: Aperture Books, 1994). </P>

<P>U.S. State Department, <I>Foreign Economic Trends Report: Burma</I>
(Washington, DC, June 1996).</P>

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<P>Last updated July 1997. </P>

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