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5/1/98:PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN BURM (r)
- Subject: 5/1/98:PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN BURM (r)
- From: enmasse_1@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 15 Apr 1998 18:53:00
Hi,
Thanks for the re-posting. I remember reading it sometimes back. I have
no doubt about the level of efforts one would have put into this kind of
work. But, I cann't remember hearing anything happening along this line
so far, except a report coming out from Manila that there wwre some
low-level discussions going on between the Opposition and the SPDC.
Since then there were no confirming news about that from the SPDC
itself.
Only news I've heard are some news about the "New Elections" to be held
in Burma and very recently (on 14 April'98) ,I remember reading a
posting in which Than Shwe was reportedly saying that Army would not
like to hang on to power indefintely. Nobody knows how long it's going
to be. It has been 36 years already.
So,if I am allowed to speak my mind here, I feel very much that no real
progress from the side of SPDC will be forthcoming given the kind of
enthusiasm that SPDC was showing in this endeavour despite a deal to let
them (SPDC) keep the "Excecutive Power".
Everyone knows that the country has suffered enough from the military
rule in Burma. The students who were always at the forefront of any
protest movement in Burma are the one to suffer the most in any
situations, whether they live inside or outside their own country until
the country is back on its road to democracy. It's time we think about
them. They have no future, no hope. The Universities were closed since
1996. Since 1988, a lot of students, who were forced out of the country
and surviving in the Burmese jungles and along Thai boarders with little
of no help from anyone to bring them back into the country. I don't care
if this kind of initiative comes from NLD or SPDC. We need to do settle
this problem first. i.e First, they should be pardoned and brought all
of them back into the legal fold. (That; SPDC should be able to do
easily if Kung Sa can be allowed to live in Rangoon.) Secondly, SPDC
must make plans to re-open all Universities as soon as possible.
The bottom line is: "If we can't get SPDC to the agreement of doing this
good deed first, we should not go ahead with the proposal of
power-sharing endeavour". This will be a good test for all of us, rather
than wasting our time for nothing concrete. We will have to start even.
This will prove SPDC bears no grudge to no one; they meant what they
said and in retrospect they deserve the same.
Min Kyaw Minn
================
>Date: 14 Apr 1998 23:51:56
>Reply-To: Conference "reg.burma" <burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>From: uneoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: 5/1/98:PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN BURMA(REPOSTED WITH RECOMMS.)
>To: Recipients of burmanet-l <burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>
>From daemon Sat Jan 17 13:19:22 1998
>/* Written Sat 17 Jan 11:00am 1998 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in
igc:reg.burma */
>/* ---------------" Transitional Phase and Pros..."----------------- */
>
>To: Our Friends on Internet
>Date: 5 January 1998
>From: Dr U Ne Oo,18 Shannon Place, Adelaide SA 500, AUSTRALIA.
>**************************************************************
>
>THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN BURMA
>********************************************************
>I. A Proposal for Interim Administration in Burma
>-------------------------------------------------
>The current political climate in Burma suggests that the transition to
>democracy will best be achieved by forming an interim administration
>consisting of the representative-elects of the May 1990 election and
the
>ruling military authorities. A period of 2--3 years, for example,
should
>be considered as a transitional period before a complete transfer of
power
>to the democratically elected government of May 1990 can be made.
During
>this transitional period, the elected parliament of May 1990 may
operate
>as a form of {\ Legislature} and may focus its activities on (1)
writing
>a federal constitution with full participation of the entire population
of
>Burma, especially of the ethnic nationalities; (2) institutionalising
>democracy and democratic practices within Burmese society and (3)
>promoting appropriate economic and social policies for a future
democratic
>Burma. Burma's ruling military authorities, the State Peace and
>Development Council (SPDC/SLORC)[1] should retain the {\ Executive
>Power} in this transitional period. By separating and sharing the
>governmental powers, the military authorities and civilian opposition
will
>certainly overcome the current political impasse in Burma and also lay
a
>good ground for future democratic government[2].
>
>/*--**--**--**--**--**--**--**--**--**--**--*/
>
>Following is the proposed form of Burma's interim administration:
>
>(i) A period of 2--3 years should be considered as a transitional
period,
>and an interim administration should be formed;
>
>(ii) The SPDC/SLORC Cabinet may retain the Executive Power, and the
>current Chairman of SPDC/SLORC, General Than Shwe, may be allowed to
>remain as the Head of State, in this interim period;
>
>(iii) The elected parliament of May 1990 will operate as a Legislature
and
>the Central Executive Committee of National League for Democracy,
>primarily, will run the Legislature;
>
>(iv) Appropriate committees under the Legislature should be set up to
>carry out various tasks, including the writing of a democratic federal
>constitution, during the interim period;
>
>(v) To achieve coordination between the Legislature and Executive, the
>delegates of military authorities, such as the advisory group of
>SPDC/SLORC (nb:there were unconfirmed reports of SPDC/SLORC dissolving
the
>advisory group soon after the formation of SPDC.), may be included in
>various committees of the Legislature;
>
>(vi) By the end of the interim period, a referendum should be held to
>approve the constitution. The decision should also be made by the
>Executive and Legislature to hold by-elections to replace
>missing/deceased/retired representatives. The transfer of power to the
>elected representatives should be made at the end of the interim
period.
>
>II. Forces of Change on the SPDC/SLORC
>-------------------------------------
>There are various factors contributing towards recent internal
structural
>changes of the ruling military junta. Following are believed to be the
>pressures that forced the military in Burma to change:
>
>(A) The recommendations by Human Rights Special Rapporteur which
>subsequently endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly have
>substantially contributed to the change.} The Special Rapporteur, in
>particular, has highlighted the illegitimacy and non-constitutionality
of
>SLORC administration in his report (see A/52/484 recom.(e)) as:
>
> (e) Constitutionality and the rule of law should be
> re-established, and SLORC orders and decrees should no
> longer be the basis of law. All laws rendering
> violations of human rights legitimate should be repealed
> immediately, and all laws should be given due publicity.
> The principle of no-retroactivity of penal laws should
> be respected in all circumstances;
>
>The UN General Assembly endorsement of these recommendations implies
that
>SLORC can no longer remain as a `legitimate body' to make laws(decrees)
>and to enforce these laws. The announcement of the new ruling body, the
>State Peace and Development Council, can be seen as Burmese military
>authorities making a defensive move against this UN General Assembly
>resolution. It is worth noting that SLORC changed its name as SPDC on
15th
>November 1997, as soon as the Special Rapporteur's recommendations were
>made public. (The Special Rapporteur's report was made public on
Internet
>on 14th November.) The internal division within SLORC that led to calls
>for greater cohesion among ruling generals has also been a contributing
>factor.
>
>(B)Financial difficulties that the SLORC government is facing have also
>been a significant factor.} According to a recent Economist
Intelligence
>Unit report(3rd quarter, August 1997), SLORC's foreign exchange reserve
>was down to USD 117 million in May 1997. Because of the current
financial
>crisis in ASEAN region, SLORC has no prospect of securing loans and
grants
>from its neighbours. Inflation of local currency, {\ the Kyat}, and
>rising prices of basic commodities within Burma have also been putting
>pressure on SLORC.
>
>(C) SLORC illusion of political support from ASEAN countries has come
to
>an end.} Since 1993, SLORC in some way has been looking to ASEAN
countries
>for solidarity against the West. However, ASEAN's position on Burma is
>becoming clearer since the July 1997 admission of Burma as its member.
>Many ASEAN countries, privately and publicly, have expressed concerns
>about the situation in Burma. The initiatives by Presidents Fidel Ramos
>and Suharto are also making SLORC clear about the necessity for change.
>The Australian government has also sent a special envoy to express its
>views. The European Union is taking a particular stand against the lack
of
>dialogue and reconciliation in Burma. All of these actions are adding
up
>to exert psychological pressure upon SLORC, leading to the recent
internal
>change within the military junta.
>
>(D) Mounting pressure on SLORC by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
>and the Commission on Human Rights about the situation of refugees in
>Thailand has also been a significant factor.} Because of the recent
>leadership change in Thailand, the Burmese military now has less reason
to
>hope for solving the refugee problem in Thailand by means of
``bilaterally
>arranged forced repatriations''.
>
>III. Win-Win Solution to the Problem
>------------------------------------
>The UN General Assembly's resolution, 52/137, undoubtedly has created
an
>environment conducive to political negotiations in Burma. The
resolution
>enhances the legitimacy of the National League for Democracy for
>negotiation. The current SPDC/SLORC position of avoiding negotiation
with
>NLD has also been weakened by this resolution.
>
>SPDC/SLORC's principal interests are (1) to retain the current
(executive)
>position of government and (2) to receive some form of international
>recognition: SPDC/SLORC particularly wishes to ease tension with the
>United Nations. Apart from their greed for power, Burmese military
>authorities, nevertheless are also wishing to positively contribute to
>reconstruction and development of the country. These facts can be
>considered as the primary basis in conducting negotiation with
SPDC/SLORC.
>
>The National League for Democracy, on the other hand, is mandated to
>administer a democratic government and to build a democratic society.
It
>specifically has the legitimate right to govern the country in
accordance
>with the result of May 1990 election. Only because the military junta
in
>Burma refuses to transfer state power, the elected representatives are
to
>carry out the next practical task of realising the democratic rights of
>Burmese people step by step. A balanced position of realising the
>democratic rights of Burmese people and the political reality should be
>considered.
>
>A possible solution is to form a transitional administration with an
>{\Executive Branch} from SPDC/SLORC and a {\ Legislature } of simplest
>form from elected representatives. It should also be made clear,
>especially to SPDC/SLORC, that such a transitional arrangement is done
by
>the authority of elected representatives. SPDC/SLORC must also be made
>aware that the wellbeing of such a transitional administration depends
on
>the cooperation of both parties---the {\ Executive} and the
>{\Legislature}.
>
>IV. The Legislature: Structure, Operation and Authority
>-------------------------------------------------------
>{\ A Legislature} is an official rule-making body for a given political
>system. In most democratic countries, the entire body of democratically
>elected parliament, however, does not operate purely as a
>{\Legislature}. The United States Congress, for example, also selects
an
>additional body, such as Senate, for legislative functions.
>
>{\ The Executive} is part of the governmental system which implements
>decisions. In some democratic countries, e.g. UK and Australia, the
>executive are recruited from Parliament. In some other democratic
systems,
>such as the United States of America, the executive are appointed by
the
>President. The Executive and the Legislature, according to the
separation
>of powers, must be separate bodies[5].
>
>In Burma in this interim period, the elected parliament can function as
a
>simplest form of Legislature. Much smaller committees, consisting of
>representative-elects, professionals from various civil services, the
>deputies of ministers and, possibly, the advisory group from SPDC, may
be
>formed to function in drafting various laws. The elected
representatives
>should take charge of the duty to communicate these laws and policy
>proposals to their own constituent. The draft laws and policy decisions
>should be approved/disapproved by parliamentary majority vote.
Following
>is not a complete list but possible areas on which the legislative body
>can focus its actions:
>
>(i) To repeal various laws (i.e. decrees and orders) by SLORC that
render
>violation of human rights legitimate; to promulgate laws that safeguard
>human rights of citizens, such as legislations against unacceptable
forced
>labour, forced procurement etc;
>
>(ii) To review and rewrite (to legalise) various business contracts
signed
>by companies (note: business contracts that are believed to be directly
>linked with drug trafficking or money laundering should be left
>untouched.);
>
>(iii) To make legislation regarding allocation of government revenues,
and
>when the time is appropriate, to seek loans from IFI; to promote
policies
>and enact new laws, with the advice of competent agencies, that may
>encourage investments and lay foundation for a sound economic
transition
>in the future;
>
>(iv) The Legislature (elected parliament), in addition, must also write
a
>democratic federal constitution.
>
>These measures are relatively simple in comparison to the activities of
>modern democratic governments. However, it must be noted that the
Burmese
>population in general does not have much experience of democracy and
>democratic government. Common practices in democratic societies, such
as
>public consultation on law-making and collective decision-making, are
to
>be exercised and must be made to become routine. In other words,
Burmese
>people must institutionalise democracy and democratic practices. The
above
>measures, therefore, are to be considered as useful initiatives to gain
>momentum for future democratic administrations.
>
>V. Dialogue and drafting federal constitution
>---------------------------------------------
>Easing tensions between the military authorities and elected
>representatives with regard to control over state power will likely
lead
>to a tripartite dialogue between ethnic nationalities, military
>authorities and elected representatives. A democratic federal
constitution
>that is acceptable to all parties to the conflict should be drafted at
the
>National Convention. A few points remain, at this stage, for a
successful
>dialogue:
>
>(A) One ethnic minority rebel group, Karen National Union, still needs
to
>enter cease-fire agreement with the Burmese military (note: the KNU so
far
>did not sign the cease-fire agreement because of the lack of political
>dialogue in Burma);
>
>(B) The group representing ethnic nationalities, National Democratic
>Front, may wish to have a mediator or the presence of outside observers
>during the drafting of the constitution[6];
>
>(C) Ethnic nationalities as well as elected representatives need more
>education about a federal system of government and how we may integrate
25
>percent of military representatives into that federal system (my
personal
>preference is an Australian or American style federal system of
>government. There are, however, many more types of federal system,
>including quasi-federal systems, that we could choose from.).
>
>VI. The Accountability of Executive
>-----------------------------------
>Since the Executive in the interim period will not be selected by the
>Parliament, there is a potential for the Executive to become
unaccountable
>to the Parliament (Legislature). The Executive may, for example, refuse
to
>implement measures initiated by the Legislature. On the other hand,
>disputes can occur between the Executive and Legislature about the
>priority of issues. There is also the possibility of the Executive
>(military authorities) trying to maintain its former administrative
>structure, i.e. various levels of Law and Order Restoration Council
>(LORC), and its civilian support base, the Union Solidarity and
>Development Association. In order to avoid potential conflicts,
following
>facts may be useful:
>
>(A) The importance of cooperation between the Executive (military
>authorities) and Legislature (civilian opposition) in the operation of
>interim administration must be given emphasis. The representatives of
>ministers (the deputies, perhaps) should be allowed to participate in
the
>committees for drafting laws and to enable the Executive to communicate
>with the Legislature;
>
>(B) SLORC formed the civilian political wing, Union Solidarity
Development
>Association, because the Burmese military is anxious to maintain its
>political role in the future. The allocation of 25 percent for the
>military representatives in future parliament may ease such anxiety;
>
>(C) The conciliation at grassroots level may need extra efforts in
order
>to occur. The District, Township and Ward level of Law and Order
>Restoration Councils (LORC) may, for example, resist the changes.
>
>The roles of the democracy movement and international community will be
>important to bring the Executive under control of the authority of
>Legislature in the current situation.
>
>VII. Enforcing Agreement:
>------------------------
>Roles of the Democracy Movement and International Community
>-----------------------------------------------------------
>Although there are some possibilities of SPDC/SLORC agreeing to the
>interim proposal, the rejection by the military cannot be ruled out. On
>the other hand, if the proposal is accepted by military authorities,
the
>Executive must in some ways be made accountable to the Legislature. In
>both scenarios, the Burma democracy movement together with the
>international community can pressure/enforce the the military
authorities
>to conform with the agreement.
>
>In case SPDC/SLORC accepts this proposal, the international community
>may take the following measures:
>
>(i) As a recognition of SPDC/SLORC making progress towards dialogue
>and transfer of power, the European Union may allow Burma to
participate
>in EU-ASEAN talks;\\
>
>(ii) The President of the United States of America may ease
restriction
>about United States Agencies cooperating with Burmese military in
>illicit-drug eradication program;\\
>
>(iii) The international community, {\em including the business
community},
>have a certain role to play in the elected representatives reclaiming
>and consolidating power. The international community can conduct with
>Burma's interim administration in a way that enhances the legitimacy of
>the democratically elected Legislature (For example, the businesses
>which entered or are trying to enter Burma may also seek the approval
>of a responsible committee of the elected Legislature. Such initiative
>was made last year with the Unocal Oil company. My hope is that
>the rest of the business community may follow the same procedure
>as Unocal.). The National League for Democracy may creatively
coordinate
>its activities with the international community in this regard;\\
>
>(iv) When the diplomats, especially from ASEAN countries, conduct
>diplomatic affairs with Burma, they should show a greater tendency to
>take into account the views of the elected Legislature.
>
>In case SPDC/SLORC rejects this proposal, the international
>community can take the following measures:
>
>(i) The Government of Japan cancels its debt relief program to Burma,
>worth about USD 17 million a year. Measures should also be taken by
>the Government of Japan to prevent Japanese private companies giving
>loans to the Burmese military government (for example, last July, the
>Mitsui company of Japan gave USD 150 million private loan to the
>Burmese Government.);\\
>
>(ii) The European Union should take a firm stand not to allow the
>Burmese Government participating in EU-ASEAN talks;\\
>
>(iii) According to the UN General Assembly's resolution 52/137 of 12
>December 1997, the State Law and Order Restoration Council as well as
>the new State Peace and Development Council are not legitimate
>governments of Burma. Sustained attack on this point should be made
>by international media, especially through the Burmese language radio
>program of BBC, VOA, RFA and DVB;\\
>
>(iv) The United Nations should prepare to expel the representative of
>SPDC/SLORC at the UN and formally introduce the representative of
>National League for Democracy in UN forums. A series of diplomatic
>attacks should be made through the United Nations by the international
>community;\\
>
>(v) The United States, European Union Countries, Canada, Australia and
>United Kingdom should give formal diplomatic recognition to the
>representatives of the National League for Democracy in their own
>countries;\\
>
>(vi) The international ban on new investments should be introduced.
>The possible revenue flows from the Yadana project, for example,
>should be seized by the United Nations or Burma's creditors to recover
>the debt.
>
>VIII. Non-partisan Statement
>----------------------------
>Although it is somewhat superfluous, I should like to restate that the
>advocacy activity that has been made here does not seek to represent in
>favour of any particular political grouping. The suggestions here are
>non-partisan in nature, and are made with the beliefs that proposed
action
>may bring peace and reconciliation to Burma---which is a vital
requirement
>for solving Burma's refugee problem.
>
>
>Footnote
>********
>[1] Before its name change on 15th November 1997, it was known as the
>State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Hereafter it will be
>referred to as SPDC/SLORC.},
>
>[2] In many democratic countries, the governmental power is separated
into
>three legal powers: (1) the rule-making power ({\ legislature}), (2)
the
>power to apply rules and policies ({\ executive}) and (3) the power to
>try alleged offenders against these rules ({\ judiciary}). These three
>powers are exercised, at least in theory, by three independent bodies:
>{\ The Legislature, The Executive and The Judiciary.}}.
>
>[5]Though most democratic systems, in practice, do allow the executive
to
>give input to law-making; the concept of separation of executive and
>legislative powers in these governments seems to be introduced by
having
>another legislative chamber within the system, such as Senate (USA,
>Australia) or House of Lords (UK). In addition, there are other
>check-and-balance mechanisms between the three powers, such as
>constitutional courts (Supreme Court in USA, High Court in Australia),
in
>order to curb the excess of power of the executive.}.
>
>[6] According to reports received, the National League for Democracy do
>not wish to have mediator in negotiation with military authorities.
>The ethnic freedom fighters, however, may wish to have some mediator
>and observers on their part in dialogue (i.e. National Convention).};
>
>/* Endreport */
>
>
>
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