The BurmaNet News: April 16, 1998

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"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"   
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The BurmaNet News: April 16, 1998
Issue #984

HEADLINES:
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BKK POST: REQUEST TO BURMA ON KAREN RAIDS
BKK POST: UN DETAILS LABOUR, RAPE ACCUSATIONS
BKK POST: UN, JUNTA COOPERATING IN DRUGS WAR
BKK POST: DRUG TRADED FOR STOLEN CARS
BURMA ISSUES (ANALYSIS):  OLD FLAMES
IRRAWADDY (EDITORIAL): GENERALS' NEW CLOTHES
AI:  SUMMARY OF SHAN STATE REPORT
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BANGKOK POST: REQUEST TO BURMA ON KAREN RAIDS
16 April, 1998
By Wassana Nanuam

The Burmese army will be asked next month to prevent Democratic Karen
Buddhist Army raids on Karen refugees in Thailand.

The Thai military will make the request at the regional border committee
meeting in Kawthaung, Burma, on May 22.

The move came after Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, secretary 1 of the State Peace and
Development Council, suggested last month in talks with Gen Chettha
Thanajaro, the army chief, that Thailand execute renegade intruders.

Border problems along the Moei River and at Doi Lang in Chiang Mai as well
as drug smuggling across the border will also be discussed at the meeting,
a source added.

Present at the talks will be the newly-appointed commanders of the Third
Army and of Burma's southeast command.

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BANGKOK POST: UN DETAILS LABOUR, RAPE ACCUSATIONS
16 April 1998

[BurmaNet Editor's Note:  The full text of the UNHRC report will appear in
an upcoming 3-part special issue of The BurmaNet News.]

Work-gang miseries for women of all ages

London, AFP

Pregnant women are forced to work on heavy infrastructure projects in Burma
and sometimes even murdered or raped, a United Nations Human Rights
Commission report said on Tuesday.

Describing the people of Burma as living in a climate of fear, the document
identifies numerous human rights violations including forced labour and
arbitrary executions.

On abuse of women, it said: "Increasing numbers of women, including young
girls and the elderly, have been forced to work on infrastructure projects
and to act as porters in war zones.

"In these projects women are not spared forced recruitment, even when they
are pregnant or nursing their infants," it said.

On the work site, women, like men, risked exhaustion, accidents and lack of
medical treatment, the report said, adding: "They are also victims of many
other serious human rights violations such as beatings, rape and murder."

The rapporteur said he continued to receive "numerous allegations of acts
of torture committed by soldiers of the Tatmadaw [Burmese army]."

"Well-documented reports, photographs and testimonies received by the
Special Rapporteur lead him to conclude that extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, the practice of torture, portering and forced labour
continue to occur in Burma, particularly in the context of the development
programmes and of counter-insurgency operations in minority-dominated
regions," it said.

However, Rapporteur Rajsoomer Lallah of Mauritius noted a positive attitude
in the easing of restrictions on political parties in Burma.

But it appeared this change was "of a purely formal and limited nature,
given the virtually complete control which the authorities seem to exercise
on the freedoms of association, assembly and expression," he said.

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BKK POST: UN, JUNTA COOPERATING IN DRUGS WAR
16 April, 1998
By Nusara Thaitawat

Ten-year plan would erase poppy by 2008

Burma and the United Nations' drug agency are drafting a drugs control
programme aimed at total eradication of opium poppy cultivation within a
decade.

The Burmese government has agreed to full representation by the UN Drug
Control Programme (UNDCP) in Rangoon for the first time since the 1980s.

Richard Dickins, who served as law enforcement adviser with the UNDCP
regional office in Bangkok took up his post earlier this month.

In an interview with the Bangkok Post, Mr Dickins said the programme would
be comprehensive -- alternative crop development, health care, education --
and cover the whole country, not just Shan State where most of Burma's
opium is grown.

A rough draft is expected to be completed no later than mid-May for the
Burmese government to study, and a final draft within six months.

The programme could supplement Rangoon's "master plan for the development
of border areas and national races" launched in 1990.

That plan calls for integrated development combined with law enforcement,
with the aim to provide alternative source of income for ethnic minorities
in border areas.

There is no budget yet, but Mr Dickens is hopeful that donor countries,
which had been cautious about helping Burma because of the political
situation, would relax their funding when they see the programme is logical
and feasible.

Mr Dickins, formerly with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, is upbeat
about the prospects for work with Rangoon.

Even though the United States' annual narcotics report, released in March,
said Burma remained the world's largest supplier of opium and heroin and
has done little about it, Mr Dickins insisted the political situation was
ripe for international cooperation.

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BANGKOK POST: DRUG TRADED FOR STOLEN CARS
16 April, 1998
By Cheewin Sattha  in Mae Hong Son

Amphetamines are being traded for stolen vehicles instead of cash along the
border with Burma.

Pick-up trucks and four-wheel drive cars are among the favourites worth
between 600,000-800,000 baht apiece, according to officials.

Topping the order lists are Toyota four-wheel drive cars known in Burma as
"Toyota Four Wheel".

Such vehicles are in high demand because they work well on poor roads in
Burma and spare parts can be easily found in Thailand.

Some car thieves also accept speed pills instead of cash and sell the drugs
in the local market, officials said.

According to officials, car smuggling has increased ahead of a regulation
to come into force this year requiring that all vehicles to be registered
must be imported from China.

Most stolen cars are smuggled via several passes including Ban Sao Hin in
Mae Sariang, the officials added.

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BURMA ISSUES: OLD FLAMES
March 1998
By Chris Cusano

Around 1 a.m. on March 11, Hway Ka Loke (a.k.a. Wangka) refugee camp in
western Thailand was attacked using light and heavy weapons, then set
ablaze. According to estimates, as much as 90% of the camp, which houses
9,000 Karen and other Burmese refugees, was destroyed by fire. Roughly
1,500 homes, the majority of personal belongings, and most public buildings
such as schools and clinics were consumed by fire. At least 30 people were
injured, several seriously, threatening to raise the death toll above the
three confirmed fatalities. Within 24 hours, two other major refugee camps
in the same province were under alert, anticipating attacks from across the
border.

This event was in fact a better organized repeat of a similar incursion on
January 27, 1997, over one year ago. Like last year, a well-armed
contingent of the Democratic Kayin/Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) entered the
camp unimpeded. Splitting into three groups, they took advantage of the
confusion created by mortar fire to set the camp alight.  There are many
reports of random shooting at the fleeing population. This year's attack
differs significantly in that people were targeted, not just the physical
structures of the camp itself.

The attack on Hway Ka Loke marks a further deterioration of the political
situation on both sides of the border, particularly in Karen-held territory
north of Three Pagodas Pass. It seems to be rooted in a tense and serious
power struggle between the DKBA and the Karen National Union (KNU), locked
in a struggle to establish greater power vis-a-vis the Burma Army. Clearly,
the DKBA is responsible for this attack. The origins of the current
conflict, however, seem to have less to do with refugee issues as such than
military events across the border in the regions commonly called (KNU) 7th
and northern 6th brigades, where the KNU and DKBA are vying for control of
the civilian population.

In the last three years, the DKBA has grown from a SLORC-sponsored puppet
militia to a large, if poorly organized and ill-disciplined, collection of
nationalist Karen field commanders operating throughout the northern Karen
border areas. Under the symbolic and political leadership of U Thuzana, the
Myaing Kyi Ngu Sayadaw (meaning abbot of Myaing Kyi Ngu), the DKBA claims
its identity as a representative of the Karen Buddhist majority which
failed to share a voice in the KNU.  The DKBA headquarters at Myaing Kyi
Ngu has become both a political and military center and a religious colony,
styled loosely after the famous Pa-an forest monastery at Thammanya, whose
abbot is one of the most revered monks in Burma.

The growth of the DKBA has presented a particularly acute dilemma to the
KNU, which has faced a serious decline in economic, political and symbolic
power in the last several years. Fighting its traditional enemy, the Burma
Army, had always strengthened the KNU's symbolic position regardless of its
results. Putting up a fight was good enough to reinforce the belief that
Karen people were struggling for something better. To many Karens, the KNU,
despite its faults, still represents Karen people resisting oppression by
their traditional enemy. They identify it as a struggle to establish
"Kawthoolei", a Karen homeland which would fulfill the mythological destiny
of the Karen people, who describe themselves as forsaken, misunderstood and
perpetually vulnerable to subjugation by alien races. An essential part of
the Karen resistance to this oppression is a conviction that the Karen
people are in fact united against a common enemy, either the Burma Army or
the Burman people, depending on who one asks. The idea of a Karen enemy,
embodied in the DKBA, destroys both the belief in a united nationality as
well as the familiarity of fighting a traditional enemy.

But for many Karens, the DKBA offered a Karen alternative to the KNU. For
some, the DKBA redressed the exploitation of Karen by their own people,
challenging a flawed KNU military-administrative machine. This sense was
heightened when the SLORC granted the DKBA at least limited autonomy in
Karen-populated territories in eastern Burma, making a nominal reality the
Karen homeland which figures so heavily in nationalist propaganda.
Regardless of the Burmese military's role in starting up the DKBA, by 1998
it had become a nationalist Karen movement in its own right, relatively
well-armed under the auspices of a watchful Burma Army, relying on an
extensive network throughout the border regions.

For the last year, the KNU has been taking increasingly desperate measures
to fight off the DKBA's influence in the Karen state. The landmine problem
has been increasing throughout the contested border regions along the Dawna
mountain rage. Mines, an under-gunned KNU's weapon of choice for holding
territory, have been the cause of so many civilian and military casualties
that for the first time in the last five years people are expressing fear
of returning to their villages because of them. With the DKBA, KNU, and
Burma Army all mining roads and fields and then eventually withdrawing from
the area, the civilian population is the only sure target. In addition to
extensive mining, the KNU has been using very unpopular hit-and-run tactics
against the DKBA, including on February 19, an attack on a village Buddhist
festival at Ker Gho, a DKBA-held area, in which civilian revelers as well
as DKBA soldiers were killed. According to local sources, KNU units near
Myaing Kyi Ngu have been kidnapping villagers to extort money, a common
practice in Burmese insurgent movements, but one which has created immense
animosity among people in the area.

The rise of the DKBA's influence throughout Karen State and the heightened
tensions in the civil war zones have intensified rivalries with the KNU.
The Thai refugee camps are still seen as safe havens for KNU supporters;
and indeed they do provide food security, education and shelter for people
regardless of political affiliation. Nevertheless, they have always served
as logistics, recruitment and economic centers for the KNU. The DKBA,
wishing to even the playing field, plans to destroy all the camps and force
the people back to Burma in order to destroy the KNU's popular support and
force it to abandon its own counter-insurgency programs in DKBA-contested
areas.

This analysis raises the question of the Burma Army's involvement in the
refugee camp attack. The general consensus is that regardless of who else
may have been in cooperation, this was a DKBA operation. Of course, the
arming and transport of DKBA soldiers past the garrison and trade town of
Myawaddy necessitated Burma Army cooperation. Refugee camp residents,
clinging to the belief that only the traditional enemy, not other Karen,
would be capable of such brutality, cite several clues to a Burmese
conspiracy, such as that some of the attackers spoke in Burmese, not Karen.
Nevertheless, the DKBA has its own agenda in relation to the KNU, its own
arms and a strong feeling of independence.

Reliable first-hand reports from DKBA headquarters at Myaing Kyi Ngu
further indicate that not only was Wednesday's attack a DKBA plan, but that
it is the first in a series of attacks to be expected this season. As early
as the first week of March, people in Myaing Kyi Ngu were aware of the
DKBA's intentions to attack Hway Ka Loke. On March 11 and 12, truckloads of
well-armed DKBA soldiers were spotted heading north of the road to Bae Klaw
(a.k.a. Mae La) refugee camp, on their way to begin an operation against
the camp, under command of Maung Chit Thoo. Beginning on March 12, Bae Klaw
camp and the surrounding hillsides have been subject to mortar shelling as
KNU, DKBA, and Thai military forces all jockey for advantage.

This background serves to provide some frame of reference for Wednesday's
events, but it also suggests what the future holds for the refugees.
Clearly, there will be no security for them in Thailand, no matter what
demands are made, and whether or not the U.N. attempts to intervene. The
Thai military is neither prepared nor is disposed to provide long-term
security for anyone, Thai or Karen, along this border. Indeed, these
large-scale attacks merely serve as reminders of the overall collapse of
security in the border districts, where armed bandits terrorize not only
refugee camps but Thai villages and highways as well. Unless Thai and
international policies towards Burmese refugees change, the refugees will
face two clearly troubling options: living in increasing insecurity along
the border or going back to Burma.

This ultimatum is a hitter reality for many people. Some have lived in Thai
refugee camps for over a decade, cut off from Burma, addicted to
humanitarian aid and waiting on some kind of useful leadership. The
universal response from refugees up and down the border to questions about
the future is that they simply don't know. They wish for protection and aid
from the U.N. or the Thai government, yet neither has the will nor the
power to intervene meaningfully at this late stage of the crisis. Those
refugees who support the KNU hold a similar wish for external salvation:
aid from the U.N., arms from America, succor and unconditional support from
the outside. The prospect of returning to Burma is, perhaps ironically, the
only option with a glimmer of hope at all. For many, the struggle for peace
and human dignity was knocked off course as soon as they began to see
themselves as refugees and define their problems as such. The long-held
refrain that the refugees would go back to Burma once peace and democracy
reigned was not hope at all, but the antithesis of hope, a resignation that
to build a better future was out of one's hands. Attacks on the refugees
provide another powerful jolt - a shocking realization for the people about
how off-course they have wandered, from people struggling for dignity
within their own country to unwanted exiles divorced from it.

In the final analysis, the peace and justice they yearn for can only be
achieved from within Burma, by their own effort and responsibility. But
going back to Burma in itself is not the answer, for it is a dangerous and
insecure process. If people will return, they must do so with the support
and observation of a world community that understands that their struggle
continues to be on the other side of the border. Building peace inside
Burma is a daunting task, but one more hopeful and worthy of support than
the road which brought them here.

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THE IRRAWADDY: GENERALS' NEW CLOTHS STAINED WITH BLOOD
15 April, 1998
Vol 6 No 2

Editorial

As part of their latest PR campaign to improve the image of their regime,
Burma's generals recently organised a tour of Rangoon and Mandalay for a
group of foreign journalists.  

The generals have spent much of the past year trying to spruce up their
image, following up on earlier efforts to exploit the beauty of their
country. 

In 1996 the junta launched its ambitious "Visit Myanmar Year" and last year
it once again invited selected US congressmen and officials to see the
country for themselves.

But the greatest PR victory of the past year for the generals, who seem to
be dying for international recognition despite their professed indifference
to the opinions or influence of foreigners, was Burma's admission to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations [Asean] last summer. 

Shortly after this the State Law and Order Restoration Council [Slorc]
finally came to the realization that the very name of its regime seemed to
conjure up visions of evil. Advised by an American public relations firm,
Slorc became the State Peace and Development Council [SPDC]. 

But it doesn't take much to see through the emperors' new clothes: under
the flimsy negligée of lies, we can still see the hideous figure of tyranny.

In Rangoon, military intelligence recently arrested dozens of activists and
veteran politicians without warrants. The opposition National League for
Democracy [NLD] continues to face harassment, arbitrary arrests and
persecution. 

Last month, political prisoner U Thein Tin passed away shortly after being
taken to the hospital, following a protracted period of incarceration at
the infamous Insein prison.

The authorities also apprehended Aung San Suu Kyi's adviser U Ohn Myint,
who is in his 80s.

In the past two months, lawyers, monks and students have also been arrested. 

Aung San Suu Kyi's recent address to the UN Commission on Human Rights
stated, "We are restricted in every way, we are not even allowed to hold
meetings in our own offices. And there is a terrible campaign on to shut
down our offices all over the country."

One may wonder if this is what the generals mean by exercising "disciplined
democracy."  

Burma remains largely a pariah state nearly 10 years after the military's
bloody crackdown on pro-democracy protesters. Ever since it seized power in
1988, the Rangoon regime has served as the region's worst example of
misrule and political irresponsibility.

Once again, the recent border violence has shown that the Rangoon regime
has no respect for its neighbors. 

Karen troops entering Thai soil and attacking unarmed refugees are the
latest stunts engineered by Rangoon leaders.

The junta has raised and trained the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army [DKBA]. 

It has used the DKBA to penetrate Thai territory, and to kill and terrorize
Thai villagers and Karen refugees including children. In two weeks three
refugee camps were attacked by the DKBA troops. One of the camps, Huay
Kalok, was burnt  to the ground, leaving thousands of  refugees  homeless.

Back in Rangoon, powerful general Khin Nyunt denied that the junta has any
control over the DKBA. He told his Thai counterpart Gen. Chetta Tanajaroj
to take actions against the DKBA troops if any incursions occur in the future.

However, there is evidence that Rangoon was involved in the recent
cross-border attacks.

The Irrawaddy editorial staff went to the border recently and met with some
SPDC soldiers who defected to the KNU-controlled area. Zaw Min Min Latt,
who defected to the KNU in late March, admitted that government and DKBA
troops work together. "At least 10 DKBA members are with us all the time,"
he said. 

The renegades are few in number and would be militarily insignificant and
far less bold if they did not enjoy support and sustenance from the
generals in Rangoon. 

The silver lining which may emerge from the flames and smoke of the
refugees'  torched homes is that the Democrat-led government of Thailand
seems ready to take a bold step. 

Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai proposed more involvement of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the handling of refugee
camps along the Thai-Burmese border. 

The Thai prime minister also ordered Thai troops to take all-out
retaliatory action against the DKBA if they attack refugee camps again.

The UNHCR, which had worked successfully with Thai authorities in caring
for 300,000 Cambodians until the last Cambodian refugee camp was emptied
last year, currently has only limited access to the Burmese refugee camps. 

Thai military leaders later said they have no objection to the UNHCR's role
in the camps.

Without proper protection refugees on the border continue to feel at the
mercy of one of the cruelest regimes in Asia . They must feel safe and
secure before returning to their homes.

Indeed, the Thai government's decision is laudable. With the eyes of the
world watching, the current government's more compassionate stance is
proving a worthy example to its neighbor, which continues to regard
cosmetic changes as a substitute for the sort of substantial political
reform that would genuinely benefit the people of Burma.

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AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL:  MYANMAR:  ATROCITIES IN THE SHAN STATE (SUMMARY)
15 April, 1998

AI INDEX: ASA 16/05/98 

The last two years have seen a profound deterioration in the human rights
situation throughout the central Shan State in Myanmar. Hundreds of Shan
civilians caught in the midst of counter-insurgency activities have been
killed or tortured by the Burmese army. These abuses, occurring in a
country which is closed to independent monitors, are largely unknown to the
outside world.  Denial of access for human rights monitors and journalists
means that the full scale of the tragedy can not be accurately calculated.
Therefore the information presented below represents only a part of the story.
    
In January and February 1998, Amnesty International traveled to Thailand to
interview Shan refugees who had fled widespread human rights violations in
Myanmar.  In the course of the interviews Amnesty International collected
testimony describing the killings of 42 people in the last 13 months alone.
The organization also gathered evidence of beatings and rape of Shan
civilians in the context of forcible relocations and forced labour. All of
those interviewed had  suffered at the hands of the tatmadaw as they were
ejected from their homes, forced into sites far away from their farms, and
seized for porter and forced labour duties. 
  
Although Khun Sa, commander of the Shan Mong Tai Army (MTA) surrendered to
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, Myanmar's military
authorities) on  4 January 1996,  thousands of Shan troops have continued
to fight for greater autonomy against the central Burman authorities.
During counter-insurgency activities against these groups, Burmese troops
have subjected Shan villagers to a variety of human rights violations,
including forcible relocation and extrajudicial executions. The
long-standing practice of forced labour and portering by the Burmese armed
forces in many parts of the country is also prevalent in the Shan State.
  
In March 1996 the SLORC began a massive forcible relocation program of Shan
civilians, in order to break up any alleged links or support for armed
opposition groups. To date almost 1400 villages have been relocated; a
conservative estimate of the numbers of people in these villages is about
300,000.  As a result of the relocations and the attendant human rights
violations by the military against Shan villagers, some 80,000 of them have
fled to neighbouring Thailand.  The overwhelming reason they gave for
fleeing to Thailand was their inability to survive in the face of continual
demands for forced labour and the lack of resources or work at the
relocation sites.
  
Hundreds of Shan civilians have been killed by SLORC troops during and
after the relocation process; from mid June to mid July 1997 alone reliable
reports indicate that some 300 people were killed in a series of massacres.
Areas outside relocation sites were considered to be free fire zones by the
Burmese military, who ordered villagers not to return to their former
homes. In most cases SLORC troops shot civilians dead after they had
returned from relocation sites to their deserted villages in order to
gather food which had been left behind.
  
The impact of the critical human rights situation in the central Shan State
has already had been felt elsewhere in the region.  Refugees continue to
flee to Thailand, currently facing its largest economic downturn in
decades.  Shan refugees are finding it increasingly difficult to work in
Thailand, but have no other way to survive after their homes and fields
have been confiscated by the SPDC. Such refugee outflows and the consequent
regional impact makes it even more crucial for the international community
to urge the SPDC to improve their human rights record. Amnesty
International believes this is particularly the case for the security
interests of ASEAN members, who should encourage the SPDC to respect human
rights. 
  
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which is currently meeting
in Geneva, should renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, and press
the Government of Myanmar to allow him complete and unrestricted access to
the country and to civilians of all ethnicities. 

This report summarizes a 18 page document (8010 words)  MYANMAR: ATROCITIES
IN THE SHAN STATE (AI Index: ASA 16/05/98)  issued by Amnesty International
in APRIL 1998. Anyone wishing further details or to take action on this
issue should consult the full document.
  
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 8DJ, UNITED KINGDOM

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