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Bangkok Post April 19, 1998 :Breaki
- Subject: Bangkok Post April 19, 1998 :Breaki
- From: suriya@xxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 22 Apr 1998 08:05:00
Bangkok Post April 19, 1998
Breaking the
vicious cycle
ILLEGAL LOGGING: The axe has
fallen on civil servants blamed for the
rape of Salween forest. But will this be
the end of the problem?
SONGPOL KAOPATUMTIP
Corrupt government officials on the Thai-Burmese border
continue to allow illegal logging in Thailand by Thai logging firms
holding concessions to operate in Burma.
"With the help of provincial forestry, customs, administration and
police officials, illegally cut Thai logs are transported to sawmills
in the country under the guise of Burmese logs. Depending on the
area, soldiers are also paid off."
Mae Hong Son in 1998? No, that was Kanchanaburi in July
1990 - just 18 months after the Chatichai government imposed a
nationwide logging ban. The logging scandal was an
embarrassment to the government, which previously received
worldwide praise for its tough anti-logging policy.
But the publicity back then did not stir as much interest as the
current debate over the rape of Mae Hong Son's Salween forest
has. Yet in retrospect it looks shameful.
The Chatichai policy was compelled by devastating mudslides
and floods that killed more than 100 people in the Phipun District
of Nakhon Si Thammarat in November 1988. The tragedy, the
government said, was caused by widespread logging in the area.
The Kanchanaburi scandal exposed publicly the disastrous
consequences of illegal logging. But concerned officials were
quick to apportion blame. Excuses were made.
"It is not only the Forestry Department's responsibility to oversee
logging, as many other government agencies should monitor the
performance of their subordinates if they want this illegal activity
to stop," department chief Phairote Suwannakorn told the
Bangkok Post on July 28, 1990.
"The Army's role in the Thai-Burmese Border Coordinating
Committee is basically to oversee security matters and it is not
involved in the logging business," Armed Forces spokesman
Lt-Gen Naruedol Dejpradiyuth told the Post the same day. "This
is a matter for the Forestry Department, police and other
agencies to handle."
And Interior Ministry permanent secretary Anant Anantakul had
this to say: "If any of our officials are involved in turning a blind
eye, whether directly or indirectly, they will be punished."
That has been something of a pattern in Thailand's logging history
over the past three decades or so. An unexpected scandal sets
off profound anxiety that national forests are under threat, and
public concern is manifested in what seems to be a national
consensus: no more illegal logging. Then, within three or four
years, the same rituals return.
What should be done to solve the problem once and for all?
The answers are complex, but unravelling them may point the
way for us to manage our natural resources effectively and
wisely.
Who is in charge? To understand what went wrong in the
Salween forest, let us look at the key government players.
* The commander of Army Region 3: He is the director of the
Centre for the Prevention and Suppression of Illegal Logging,
Region 3, which covers all 17 northern provinces, including Mae
Hong Son.
Set up on December 21, 1993, the centre is responsible for
mapping out plans and mobilising personnel for the purpose of
preventing and suppressing illegal logging in the northern region.
It can order all relevant government agencies to act according to
its directives.
In short, the centre has wide-ranging powers to prevent and
suppress illegal logging.
* The governor of Mae Hong Son: He is the chairman of a
sub-committee set up on December 21, 1993, to prevent and
suppress illegal logging in the province.
* The Mae Sariang district officer: He is the chairman of a
sub-committee set up on December 21, 1993, to prevent and
suppress illegal logging in Mae Sariang district, where Salween
National Park is located.
* The director of the Special Task Force to Prevent and
Suppress Illegal Logging (STF): The task force, currently headed
by Deputy Police Chief Salang Bunnag, was set up on March 5,
1996. It reports directly to the Agriculture Minister.
* The director-general of the Royal Forestry Department (RFD):
The RFD is in charge of all national forests. In Mae Hong Son,
its jurisdiction covers the Salween Forest Reserve, the Salween
Wildlife Sanctuary and Salween National Park, which have a
combined area of more than two million rai.
* The Forestry Police Division (FPD): Operating under the
Central Investigation Bureau (CIB), the FPD is in charge of
preventing and suppressing illegal logging nationwide. It does not
report to the Royal Forestry Department director-general,
however.
* Customs officials: They inspect logs hauled from Burma, check
relevant documents, and assess the tax before allowing the logs
to pass through border checkpoints.
* Provincial forestry officials: They stamp logs which are
imported from Burma, stamp tax documents to allow logs to be
transported to sawmills, and issue transport permits specifying
details (see copy of a transport permit on Page 6).
* Mae Hong Son provincial police and Highway Police: They
are authorised to check cargo trucks travelling in the province
and on national highways.
* Border Patrol Police: Along with soldiers, they are in charge of
security along the border.
* The heads of the RFD's Wildlife Conservation and National
Park divisions: They must monitor all activities in Salween
National Park and the Salween Wildlife Sanctuary.
It must also be noted that all districts in Mae Hong Son have
been under martial law since May 3, 1991. With the
responsibility of the region's security in his hands, could the
commander of Army Region 3 possibly be unaware of the illegal
logging activity along the Salween River - the natural boundary?
Government and forestry officials have admitted on many
occasions that loggers have smuggled Thai logs across the
Salween River, had them "taxed" by renegade members of the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and then slipped
them across the border to sawmills under the guise of Burmese
logs.
The bribery: Unlike the 1990 incidents (which took place while
Thai companies still held logging concessions in Burma), the
illegal activity in the Salween forest began in real earnest after the
Burmese government revoked the logging concessions in
1992-93.
During this time and up until 1995, border passes were opened
from time to time to allow Thai logging companies to take
"leftover logs" out of Burma. There is nothing improper with this,
provided that each company has the official (and authentic)
documents to prove the origin of the logs to be brought into the
country.
The company's request is subject to strict formalities involving
the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Burmese Embassy
in Bangkok, the National Security Council, the Cabinet and the
Customs Department (see chart, Chain of Formalities, on
Page 6).
But getting timber out of Burma became too expensive. Cutting
down Thai trees and passing them off as Burmese logs was more
profitable. For this reason Thai logs began to be sent across the
river to be stamped by Burmese officials and then sent back to
Thailand as "Burmese logs", or else they were cut and labelled
Burmese without ever leaving Thai soil.
Who was involved in such activities?
Two traders who held logging concessions in Burma told
Sunday Per spective that the illegal logging was carried out
mainly by people under the pay of an influential logging tycoon
identified as "Mr S". Another influential logging firm was also
involved, but not on a large scale, they said.
Ruthless and wily, Mr S set up a powerful network of hired
gunmen, renegade Karen soldiers and local civil servants to
control the "laundering" of illegally cut logs.
The operation was born partly out of Mr S's anger at not being
granted any logging concessions by the Burmese government,
which resented his ties with the anti-Rangoon Karen National
Union. Mr S even turned on Thai concessionaires who refused
to cooperate with him.
"His gunmen attacked our trucks several times to prevent us
from bringing logs out of Burma," said one of the traders, who
quit the business after two years of heavy financial losses.
To obtain transport permits allowing them to bring logs to
sawmills, monthly payments were made to senior provincial
administration officials, senior police officials and various police
units, as well as forestry officials, the trader said. His account
was confirmed by a senior police officer who agreed to talk to
Sunday Perspective on the condition that his name not be
revealed.
"The cash was paid regularly to some top men as well as to
junior officials who manned checkpoints," the officer noted.
It would be foolish not to know how tens of thousands of illegal
logs were moved out of the forest to sawmills outside Mae Hong
Son, he added.
"The only transport route is from Mae Sariang to Hod District in
Chiang Mai, and onto Ban Tak District in Tak," he said (see
map of Teak Trail).
"If the authorities were honest, they could have stopped it by
setting up road blocks along the 103-km route from Mae
Sariang to Hod," he said. "But they let them go. I don't have to
tell you why, do I?"
The punishment: Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai in March
ordered four ministries to find out if any of their staff were linked
to the Salween scandal. A number of police officers and forestry
officials were later transferred out of Mae Hong Son to facilitate
investigations into their conduct.
Then on April 7, Royal Forestry Department director-general
Sathit Sawintara was transferred to an inactive post for
"negligence resulting in damage to Salween National Park and
Wildlife Sanctuary."
Sathit's transfer did not come as a surprise; there were both
"political" and "genuine" reasons for it. Appointed to the post
during the Chavalit administration, Sathit had always been seen
as "Chavalit's man". His days were numbered as soon as Chuan
and his Democrat Party came into power late last year,
according to sources in the department.
On the other hand, Sathit could not escape the blame because he
was in charge of national forests. His deputy, Prawat Thanatkha,
was earlier accused of taking a five-million-baht bribe from a log
trader whose business is linked to the Salween case. Prawat was
transferred to an inactive post in March.
The axe also fell on Mae Hong Son governor Pakdi
Chompuming, who was transferred to an inactive post in the
Permanent Secretary's Office, and Tak governor Phongpayom
Wasapooti, who was made Narathiwat governor in a reshuffle
announced early this month. Both Pakdi and Phongpayom had
been investigated in connection with the Salween logging
scandal.
Also found to be "negligent" was Army Region 3 commander
Lt-Gen Thanom Watcharaput, who was made an Army expert in
a reshuffle announced on April 8.
Understandably, critics wonder whether these transfers are truly
an indication of the government's determination to punish
wrongdoers.
"I don't think Lt-Gen Thanom's transfer is punitive because the
new post makes him a four-star general," an army officer told
Sunday Perspec tive. "To me, this is a promotion."
The moral malaise: A log trader was not being sarcastic when
he told Sun day Perspective, "Thailand has enough trees for
everyone's need, but not for everyone's greed."
But for many Thai academics and social commentators, the
Salween logging scandal reflects a deeper social malady
characterised by three notable symptoms: a lack of conscience
when it comes to corruption, a lack of a sense of public spirit
and the worship of money.
Mr S is a wealthy man whose colourful, "rags to riches" life was
chronicled - some say "extolled" - by a mass-circulation
Thai-language daily in March. Acting behind the scenes, his
social status had remained intact - he still met with powerful
politicians during the height of the Salween scandal. And he
talked openly about his financial contributions to political groups
and figures.
"I have no political party, but I have a lot of friends," he told a
Thai-language weekly in February.
Apparently Mr S won a lot of friends by greasing their palms.
And the long chain of bribery - from those at the top to the "little
people" - is testimony of this social malady.
In a survey conducted by Suan Dusit Poll in February, 42
percent of respondents said serious crackdowns and heavy
punishment were needed to prevent and suppress illegal logging.
Fifty-eight percent said they were "very upset" by the news
about the Salween logging scandal.
But the sentiment was not translated into real action by the
people in Mae Hong Son, or environmental groups that are
traditionally at the forefront of anti-logging campaigns.
"I find it strange that there has been no widespread public
condemnation of the plunder of Salween," a foreign diplomat
observed. "This is a far more serious problem than laying a gas
pipeline through a forest in Kanchanaburi. But there have been
no street protests in Mae Hong Son, no rallies by
conservationists."
On the other side of the coin, we have wealthy and influential
people like Mr S and his business associates who seem to be out
of reach of the long arm of the law.
An addiction: Why can't they wash their hands of this illegal
activity?
"The best way to explain it is by comparing logging to drug
addiction," a log trader told Sunday Per spective. "Once you
are in it, you are hooked. The colour of money is irresistible."
Although logs brought in from Burma are taxed by both
Rangoon, minority groups and Thai customs officials, Thai
logging firms still make money after paying bribes. The profit is
greater if logs are cut in Thailand and sent directly to sawmills
without passing any inspection, the trader said.
Quoting figures from 1995, he said an illegal logger can earn a
net profit of 10,000 baht from a cubic metre of teak (equal to
one medium-sized log) if it is sold to a sawmill without paying
tax.
"If he sells, say, 50,000 logs a year, he will net 500 million baht,"
said the trader.
Part of that sum of money should have gone into state coffers.
But wealthy people are not necessarily honest tax-payers. That's
why the government is losing millions of baht in tax revenue to
wealthy politicians, businessmen and civil servants who use
smuggled luxury cars. And that might explain why the political
and administrative machine has functioned so poorly in the face
of the onslaught by the greedy loggers of Salween.
What should be done? Problems affecting the work of existing
anti-logging agencies are a lack of coordination, manpower,
funds and commitment on the part of higher authorities.
"It's like an engine that has no lubricants," a forestry police officer
told Sunday Perspective.
The Forestry Police Division (FPD), for example, is under the
Central Investigation Bureau (CIB). But the CIB is under the
Police Department, whose deputy director-general is head of the
Special Task Force to Prevent and Suppress Illegal Logging
(STF).
The STF, by the way, reports directly to the Agriculture
Minister. Then there are a centre headed by the commander of
Army Region 3 and sub-committees under the governor of Mae
Hong Son and Mae Sariang district officer, not to mention patrol
units under the Forestry Department, Border Patrol Police and
rangers.
"Instead of coordinating with each other, some of these agencies
have conflicting interests," the officer noted.
To overcome this problem, a big bureaucratic shake-up is
required. The Forestry Department should concentrate on what
it can do best - which is reforestation - and leave the suppression
work in the hands of a new agency, which should comprise the
brightest and most dedicated personnel already well-versed in
anti-logging operations. The CIB's current structure makes it
well-equipped for the task (see chart on New Duties for CIB).
"With a single agency in charge, you know where to place the
blame if things go wrong," the officer said.
Closing the Salween forest, as proposed by some academics
and forestry officials, is not a long-term measure, he added. As
long as there is a demand for wood - either to supply villagers'
needs, urban construction work or wood industries - a total
closure of national forests is bound to create consternation and
chaos among the rural population and wood industrialists. The
result is illegal logging.
"The 1989 logging ban proved this," the officer noted.
The latest forest cover survey by the Forestry Department (in
1995) showed the remaining forest cover was only 25.62
percent of the country's total land area - down from 28.03
percent in 1988.
The officer's idea is based on the principle that the forest
produces wood for people's use, protects watersheds for
agriculture, provides recreational areas for the public and
conserves natural habitats for wildlife.
"If the government insists on maintaining the logging ban, it must
ensure that there is enough wood for local consumption," he said.
"Is importing wood the answer?"
Then there is the issue of public conscience and the need to instil
a love for Thailand's natural heritage into the population.
If local people are to be allowed to exploit the forests, they must
be educated about reforestation as well. Permits or short-term
felling licences will have to be issued more discreetly and
systematically, and this must be supplemented by closer and
stricter supervision over work in the forests, the officer said. This
is where the community forest scheme can play a significant role,
he added. Openness and rewards for good deeds should help
prevent corruption.
It would be hard for the government to make such changes
quickly, but unless it makes some attempt to break the backs of
powerful illegal loggers and stir public awareness of the problem,
then the "moral malaise" will continue. Sooner or later, that will
mean further depletion of the remaining forests.
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