KHRG #98-04 Part 2/7 (Camp attacks)

[khrg@xxxxxxxxx]

                    ATTACKS ON KAREN REFUGEE CAMPS: 1998

           An Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group
                     May 29, 1998     /     KHRG #98-04

  *** PART 2 OF 7; SEE OTHER POSTINGS FOR OTHER PARTS OF THIS REPORT ***


                                 Maw Ker

The night of the 22nd of March, a combined DKBA/SPDC force crossed the
border and attacked 
Maw Ker refugee camp, 49 km. south of Mae Sot and home to about 8,400 Karen
refugees.  The 
attack force first positioned itself at the main Karen Buddhist monastery
in the camp, Wah Lay 
monastery.  One group remained at the monastery and fired 2 1/2-inch
mortars and M79 grenades 
into the camp while at least 2 other small groups of four to eight
attackers headed into sections 6 
and 7, firing small arms and setting houses alight.  It is not known how
many attackers stayed 
beside the monastery, but most of the refugees believe they were SPDC
troops while the groups 
burning the houses were Karen DKBA troops.  Several witnesses saw the Karen
troops cursing 
the Burmese, shouting "Motherfuckers!  We are in front of you, why are you
shelling us?"  The 
attackers burning the houses appeared quite disorganised, arguing with each
other over whether 
or not to shoot and whether or not to burn the houses, and asking each
other for lighters to start 
the fires.  On encountering refugees, the attackers didn't hurt them but
usually asked "Where are 
the Muslims?"  There is a sizable Muslim population in Maw Ker, but the
attackers never 
reached that part of the camp.  Some witnesses say that some of the
attackers were young boys in 
uniform, and most of the refugees who encountered them say the attackers
were confused and 
afraid.  It appears they were too afraid to stay long in the camp, as they
left within an hour having 
burned only 50 houses (45 in Section 6 and 5 in Section 7), the small
Burman Buddhist 
monastery, and a community hall (the camp's main Karen Buddhist monastery
was not burned).  
No houses were burned in other sections of the camp, though some refugees
were wounded in 
Sections 1 and 3.


"They came into the camp at half past one.  They came on foot, by the path
beside the 
monastery.  First four soldiers came and they spoke Karen, they said, 'Taw,
taw, taw!' ['Go on, 
go on, go on!' in Karen].  After that Burmese soldiers came also; they
said, 'Dteh! Dteh! 
Dteh!!'  ['Go on! Go on! Go on!!' in Burmese].  They shot at us with 79's
[M79 grenades] and 
2 1/2-inch [mortars].  They shot with heavy weapons and they fired small
guns. ? An M79 
shell landed near us.  It didn't hit me but my friend Kyaw Wah got injured.
? I ran back 
home and I called out to everyone, but I couldn't call all the people and I
ran into a bunker.  
When I reached the bunker, the soldiers were also arriving and they were
burning the houses.  
They shot their guns and burned the houses at the same time.  They shot for
nearly one 
hour." - "Saw Kaser Doh" (M, 40+) from Maw Ker camp (Interview #M1)

"I was not sleeping when I heard the heavy weapon, I was  breastfeeding my
child.  I went 
down to the ground and my husband told me, 'Don't run, they are firing big
weapons and a lot 
of shells  are landing'.  I dared not stay so I took my child and I ran
outside the house.  My 
sarong was falling down so I told my husband, 'Carry the baby'. ? A lot of
bullets landed in 
front of me. I covered myself like this [with her hands] and when they
started firing I was 
wounded in my hand." - "Daw Sein" (F, 25) from Maw Ker camp; doctors later
had to amputate 
one of her fingers (Interview #M3)

"Women and children were hiding in the bunkers.  I saw the fire and the
soldiers calling, 'Go 
on, go on, go on!'  I heard one soldier who was holding a walkie-talkie. 
He said in Karen 
language, 'Don't fire the gun, don't fire the gun', but his friends fired. 
One soldier was 
shouting in Burmese, 'Nga lo ma tha!!  We are in front of you, why are you
firing the gun at 
us?' ['Nga lo ma tha' is Burmese for 'Motherfucker'.] ? When they burned
the houses they 
were shivering.  They were shaking, their legs were also shaking.  Maybe
they were afraid.  
When they heard the bombs they sat down on the ground.  What were they
afraid of?  The 
KNU is not in the camp!" - "U Than Myint" (M, 47) from Maw Ker camp
(Interview #M9)


An estimated 291 refugees were left homeless.  14 refugees were injured,
including 4 who were 
seriously wounded.  One 7-day-old baby named Tha Tha had both of his legs
broken, and his 
mother (Nha Ma Chan, age 25, Muslim) and father were also hit by shrapnel. 
Moo Rah Paw, a 
2-year-old girl, was hit in the lower jaw by mortar shrapnel.  "Daw Sein"
(not her real name), 25, 
was shot in her hand while trying to carry her baby away from her house,
and had to have a finger 
amputated.  No one was killed.  Fortunately, most of the refugees had
already dug small bunkers 
behind their houses in fear of such attacks, so most people ran into their
bunkers and sheltered 
there rather than trying to flee the camp.  On seeing people in their
bunkers, the attackers usually 
just asked them where the Muslims were or what village they were from, and
then left them 
alone.  Some people were even told to get back in their bunkers.

"My daughter was wounded last night ? Her name is Moo Rah Paw.  She is two
years and 
two months old.  She got injured in her lower jaw by a big shell. ? There
were casualties in 
section one and also in section three. In section one there were my
daughter and two others 
who got just a few fragments.  The other two are in the beds over there. 
One is injured on her 
hip and the other in her leg.  The one who got injured in the leg is Than
Than Yi, she is 28 
years old - the pieces entered her thigh. ? The baby there is only seven
days old, he got 
injured and his father, his mother and his whole family got injured. Now
there is no one to 
take care of him so I help him.  His mother is in very bad condition, the
shell fragments 
penetrated her lungs, all over her back and in her buttocks." - "Saw Say
Po" (M, 30+) from 
Maw Ker camp; when interviewed he was in hospital by his daughter's bedside
(Interview #M4)


Thai soldiers supposed to protect the camp were nowhere to be seen, and had
apparently 
withdrawn several hours prior to the attack.  Karen refugees acting as camp
sentries raised the 
alarm, but they are unarmed so they could do little more.  Up until this
attack, Maw Ker camp 
leaders had always had an arrangement with the DKBA unit across the border
to prevent the 
camp being attacked.  Refugees heard from contacts across the border that
when the SPDC 
ordered this attack, the DKBA unit refused to carry it out so the SPDC had
to bring in a special 
unit of DKBA based 100 kilometres to the north in Pa'an District, led by
commander Maung Chit 
Thu.  He is a well-known DKBA commander in Pa'an District, and was the main
DKBA 
commander in the previous week's attempted attack on Beh Klaw camp. 
Despite the fact that 
Thai soldiers provided no resistance to the attack, on their way to or from
the camp the attackers 
captured 4 Thai soldiers and took them back to Burma.  Thai Army sources
later confirmed that 
these Thai soldiers were executed in Burma.  This may have occurred in
retaliation for the Thai 
Army's part in preventing Beh Klaw camp from being destroyed the week
before.



                            Fears at Noh Po

Noh Po refugee camp lies west of the Thai town of Umphang, about 200 km.
south of Mae Sot.  
It was created in early 1997 to shelter new refugees fleeing the SLORC
offensive and subsequent 
occupation of Dooplaya District.  It currently has a population of
approximately 10,000.  The 
camp has not yet been attacked, but after attacks on the other camps
tensions were very high.  
Villagers from just across the border had been told by SPDC troops that if
the KNLA attacked 
the SPDC anywhere in the region, the SPDC would retaliate by destroying Noh
Po camp.  In the 
area around the camp in the week leading up to 27 March, Thai soldiers
reported that SPDC 
troops were entering Thailand every day to look for weaknesses in the
border defences; each 
time, the SPDC patrols would continue into Thailand until they were seen by
Thai soldiers, then 
withdraw.  The SPDC has ordered the DKBA out of the area across the border
from Noh Po, 
replacing them with a new 'proxy army', the Karen Peace Army (KPA), which
the SPDC created 
in 1997 under the command of defected KNLA officer Thu Mu Heh.  Therefore,
if an attack 
comes it will have to be conducted by SPDC troops, KPA, or possibly a DKBA
group brought in 
from elsewhere, as was the case in the attack on Maw Ker camp.

Thai soldiers in the area have admitted that they cannot effectively defend
Noh Po camp, yet the 
refugees continue to be held in this fenced camp like prisoners, with no
permission to leave or 
reenter.  Thai authorities told the refugees in the camp to dig bunkers,
and they have done so.  
Since the end of March, tensions have lessened somewhat as no attack has
been forthcoming.  
However, the camp could still be attacked at any time, and it is important
to note that many of the 
past camp attacks have come just when tensions are at their lowest and
people are not expecting 
them.


                             SPDC Involvement

In all of the attacks documented in this report, refugees claim that there
were SPDC troops 
among the attack force.  In Huay Kaloke people claim to have encountered
Burmese troops 
among those who were shooting up the camp; in Maw Ker they claim that the
troops hiding 
behind the monastery were Burmese; at Beh Klaw, Karen camp security people
claim to have 
encountered SPDC troops inside Thailand; and at Noh Po, Thai soldiers have
reported encounters 
with SPDC units entering Thailand on a daily basis to seek a way to attack
Noh Po camp.  In 
spite of this, the fact remains that when the camp attacks have occurred,
the majority of the 
attackers have been Karen DKBA troops. Given the availability of DKBA
troops and the SPDC's 
control over them, it would be foolish for the SPDC to arrange the attacks
in any other way.


"I saw all of them.  About twenty or thirty came. I saw Burmese soldiers
and DKBA, I saw all 
of them. I don't know what they were wearing, it looked like Burmese
soldiers' uniforms. I 
dared not look anymore, I ran." - "Saw Tha Muh" (M, 20+), Maw Ker camp
(Interview #M5)

"There were also some plain green uniforms.  I saw badges on their
uniforms, we call it the 
Bandoola badge [the standard red-and-white Burmese Army badge].  But I
couldn't see their 
[Battalion] numbers, because when they saw me they said to me, 'I will kill
you'.  They wore 
baseball-style caps and some wore Burmese military hats. ? Some had a
yellow scarf around 
their necks.  The others didn't have yellow scarves because they were not
DKBA.  I could 
recognise that.  I'm sure that they were Burmese soldiers.  The Burmese
were wearing 
Burmese military hats." - "Saw Hsah Hay Mu" (M, 33), Huay Kaloke camp
(Interview #H9)


Regardless of whether or not its troops entered the camps, the SPDC has
definitely been 
involved in organising and supporting these attacks.  The DKBA is totally
reliant on the 
SPDC for all of its supplies, weapons and ammunition, and freedom to move
within Burma 
[Most DKBA soldiers carry AK47 and M16 rifles, which are typical KNLA
weapons, rather than 
Burmese Army G3 or G4; SPDC supplies them with these from stockpiles
captured from the KNLA 
or from other international arms sources.  On special missions even SPDC
soldiers sometimes 
carry AK47's and other non-issue weapons].  There is no way 
they could carry out such attacks without at least tacit SPDC support. 
Furthermore, DKBA units 
along the border exist as small local groups attached to SPDC Battalions
and under the direct 
control of those Battalions.  They are even used to loot chickens from
Karen villages, as 
messengers, and to round up and supervise forced labour on SPDC road
projects.  They have no 
opportunity to assemble for large-scale cross-border attacks unless this
can be arranged by the 
SPDC.  The SPDC has never trusted the DKBA; this is why it has replaced
them with the KPA in 
most of Dooplaya District, and why DKBA soldiers regularly complain that
the SPDC keeps 
them on tight ammunition rations of a few bullets each.  There is no way
the SPDC would allow 
100 or more DKBA troops to assemble for operations which are not under its
control.  Nor does 
the DKBA have a strong enough command structure to prepare such an
operation.  When DKBA 
units do act on their own, it is in groups of 4 or 5, demanding petty
extortion from local villages 
or crossing into Thailand to loot a Thai shop.  In contrast, the attacks on
refugee camps of this 
year and previous years have involved DKBA troops being transported several
hundred 
kilometres through SPDC territory by truck, mortar barrages on Thailand
from SPDC-held 
positions, and other similar support measures which require time and skill
to organise effectively, 
as any experienced Army officer can testify.  When SPDC leaders claim they
have no 
involvement in the attacks and no control over the DKBA, this is beyond
belief.  When leaders of 
the Thai Government and the Thai Army pretend to believe it, they are most
likely doing so to 
protect their close relationship with the SPDC and their economic interests
in Burma.


                        Thai Policy and Response

On Sunday March 15th, Thai troops at Maw Ker camp issued an order that all
refugees must be 
inside the camp by 4 p.m. instead of the previous curfew of 6 p.m.  Maung
Nyat Thein, a Karen 
refugee aged 31 with a wife and one child, didn't know and returned about 6
p.m.  For this 
violation he was grabbed by Thai troops at the camp, tied up at the
checkpoint, interrogated and 
tortured.  He died of beatings during the night.  Unfortunately, this is
not an isolated incident.  
Over the past 2 years there have been many cases of beatings and torture of
refugees by the Thai 
troops who are supposed to 'protect' them; these troops have also looted
refugees' houses, 
regularly extorted money out of them, used them as forced labour servants,
and attempted to rape 
them.  All of these acts are carried out with impunity because they fit
into the current Thai policy 
of 'encouraging' refugees to return to Burma by making their lives
miserable.  It has been called 
'humane deterrence' but there is nothing humane about it.  The refugees are
forced to fence 
themselves in, then prohibited from doing anything to augment their basic
food supply, which the 
Thai Army sometimes blocks from arriving at the camp.  Refugees in some new
camps have 
been forbidden from building houses and have been living under plastic
sheets for over a year, 
also forbidden to build schools.  Camps are consolidated into larger and
larger camps because 
Thai authorities know that with every move, some refugees disappear back
into Burma or into the 
illegal labour market, where they can then be arrested and deported.  The
refugees at Huay 
Kaloke have now been living on the ground among the ashes of their camp for
over 2 months, in 
the blazing heat and now in the rain, not because there is nowhere to move
them but because the 
Thai authorities hope that this will 'encourage' them to return to Burma.


"We are afraid and we go and sleep outside [the camp] every night.  We are
afraid of Thais, 
Burmese, and DKBA; everybody. ? The Thai soldiers said, 'Don't stay here. 
Gawlawa [white 
foreigners] won't look after you.  Go back to Burma.'  We are afraid.  The
Thai soldier who 
talked to us was the one who stays at the checkpoint.  He told us, 'I told
you to go back to 
Burma and you haven't gone.  Why do you trust the Gawlawa?  We are bigger
than the 
Gawlawa.  If we block the road then the Gawlawa's rice won't be able to
come.  If we send 
you, you must go back.  You have a country.  Why don't you go back?" - "Naw
Eh" (F, 38), 
Huay Kaloke camp (Interview #H3)


To further encourage the refugees to return, the Thai Army has also been
complicit in almost 
every major refugee camp attack.  Usually this complicity took the form of
withdrawing from the 
camps several hours before they were to be attacked, and in some cases
(such as Baw Noh camp 
in 1995) deliberately disarming the Karen camp security force before the
attack occurred.  Only 
the refugees themselves make any effort to protect their camps, and their
security forces are often 
armed with nothing more than slingshots.  In this year's attack on Huay
Kaloke, some refugees 
claim that the Thai Army even helped to transport the attackers to the
camp, and that they 
brought some of them back to the camp 3 days later to inspect the result. 
Whether this is true or 
not, they certainly did nothing to prevent the attack, and their brutality
to the refugees sheltering 
in the fields afterwards, beating several of them and kicking a 70-year-old
woman, is 
inexcusable.  


"?they didn't do anything.  Sometimes they provide security but not
regularly.  That night we 
had only villagers as sentries and they were holding nothing but
slingshots, so they dared not 
shoot.  From looking at their behaviour, I think the Thai, the Burmese and
the DKBA have 
joined hands and are working together." - "Saw Eh Kler" (M, 23), Maw Ker
camp, talking 
about Thai security at Maw Ker (Interview #M12)

"I wanted to walk quickly but I couldn't.  I fell down and after I stood up
a Thai soldier talked 
to me in Thai.  I didn't understand and the Thai soldier kicked my back
once and I fell down 
to the ground.  It was very painful and I was crying, and my stomach was in
pain.  I cried in 
the dark." - "Pi Ber Tha" (F, 70), Huay Kaloke camp, describing what
happened after she fled 
the burning camp into the surrounding fields (Interview #H13)


In Maw Ker there was also no attempt to defend the camp, yet at Beh Klaw
and Noh Po the Thai 
Army actually seemed sincere about preventing the attacks.  There are
several possible reasons 
for this.  Even before the attacks Thai authorities had made clear that
both Huay Kaloke and 
Maw Ker camps were to be closed and moved at some point in the near future,
but they may have 
feared difficulties from the refugees; in February, Karen refugees further
north in Mae Sariang 
had refused to be moved during a camp consolidation and had given the Thai
Army a great deal 
of trouble and embarrassment.  Thai authorities may have feared similar
problems from the Huay 
Kaloke refugees, who had already held demonstration marches in 1997 against
mistreatment by 
the Thai Army.  In contrast, Beh Klaw and Noh Po are supposed to be
maintained, and the Thai 
authorities had hoped to move Huay Kaloke and Maw Ker to these locations. 
It was clearly not 
in the interest of the Thai authorities to have these two camps destroyed. 
In addition, after Huay 
Kaloke was destroyed there was a great deal of international pressure on
the Thai Government 
and Army to protect Beh Klaw.  It is no secret that the Thai Army and the
new Chuan Leekpai 
government do not get along, and the Army leadership may have felt that if
it failed to protect 
Beh Klaw the Government could use this as an excuse for a shakeup within
the Army; Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai had already made clear his intention of reigning in
the Army by making 
himself Thailand's first ever civilian defense minister.


"We can't trust in Thai soldiers.  They do not dare to shoot.  They will
never shoot, even when 
their duty is to shoot." - Thai Karen villager near Noh Po refugee camp,
discussing whether he 
believes the Thai Army will defend the border (full interview not in this
report)


In the rainy season of 1997, a Thai military helicopter patrolling the
border near Maw Ker 
crashed in Burma, apparently after being shot down by SLORC troops.  SLORC
refused the Thai 
request to send a team to search for the wreckage until weeks later, and
then restricted them to 
only searching a certain area.  No wreckage was found, but no international
incident was made of 
it.  Similarly, Thai relations with the SPDC do not seem to have suffered
at all over the refugee 
camp attacks.  Publicly, the Thai Government and Army say they accept the
SPDC's claim to 
having no control over the DKBA, though at the same time the Government has
asked the SPDC 
to step in and restrain the DKBA.  There seems to be much more interest
among the leadership of 
the Thai Government and Army in keeping good economic relations with the
SPDC than there is 
in protecting Thai sovereignty and the lives of Thai citizens.  On March
23rd, the day after Maw 
Ker was attacked and 4 Thai soldiers were taken back to Burma to be
executed, the Commander 
in Chief of the Thai Army, Gen. Chettha Thanajaro, was in Rangoon.  He was
opening the Nikko 
Royal Lake Hotel, a luxury hotel built entirely with US$38 million of Thai
money.


"Now we have to be afraid of the SPDC Army and the Thai Army as well.  The
Thai soldiers 
are not kind to us, because the Thai Government wants to drive us back to
forced labour, 
portering and hunger in Burma.  I believe we need a safer place for
refugees. ? Then we 
need a UN Army to provide security for us because we cannot trust the
Thais.  I have many 
Thai soldier friends, and they've told me that they really won't protect
us.  They don't want to 
kill the SPDC Army.  They are not brave in battle, they are only cruel to
refugee people.  I 
have been in Thailand for 14 years, and I know very well about the Thai
spirit.  They love only 
money.  If we can pay money to them then they pretend to care for us, but
when they finish 
spending the money they no longer pretend to care.  Their faces and mouths
show their 
hearts." - "Naw Eh Moo" (F, 24), Huay Kaloke camp (Interview #H1)


                          Current Status of the Camps

For some time after the attacks, the atmosphere in all of the camps
remained extremely tense.  
Now with the initial onset of the rains tensions have relaxed somewhat,
although Thai soldiers 
based at Huay Kaloke have told refugees there to dig bunkers in case of
further attack and most 
refugees have done so.  Most refugees in Beh Klaw, Maw Ker and Noh Po have
also made 
bunkers near their houses, and many refugees in Huay Kaloke still leave the
camp every night at 
sundown to sleep in the nearby Thai village.  The main concern in the minds
of the refugees now, 
particularly in Huay Kaloke, is wondering what is to happen next to their
camps.

In Maw Ker, refugees whose houses were destroyed have been trying to
rebuild them.  After the 
attack there was further discussion about moving the camp, but this appears
to have been 
postponed for the time being.  At Huay Kaloke it was made clear shortly
after the attack that the 
camp would be moved but the Thai authorities have been acting extremely
slowly, possibly in the 
hope that some refugees would get tired of living in tiny shelters among
the ashes and return to 
Burma.  As a result, they have now been living in those shelters for over 2
months.  Entire 
families are crammed into lean-to's with roofs of straw or plastic sheeting
and nothing but 
sleeping mats for a floor.  This was unbearable enough under the sun of the
hot season, but now 
that the rains have arrived it is completely unlivable.  Under
international pressure, the Thai 
authorities have finally located a new site for the Huay Kaloke refugees,
but their move there is 
currently being delayed by policy disagreements between different
departments of the Thai 
Government.  As a result, at the time of printing it appears that the Huay
Kaloke refugees may be 
'temporarily' moved to Beh Klaw in the first half of June until the Thai
authorities can make a 
final decision on the new site.  Moving and building houses in rainy
season, which will continue 
until October, would be very difficult for the refugees and could lead to
problems of illness.  
There is also disagreement among the NGOs who care for the refugees over
the wisdom of 
moving the refugees to the new site, which is over 60 kilometres from the
Burma border.  Some 
argue that this is the best way to prevent further attacks, while others
argue that it would be 
impossible for new refugees to make it there without being arrested and
deported on the way, and 
that the Thai authorities would seal off the camp and make it like an
internment camp in order to 
prevent the refugees from 'escaping' into central Thailand.  However, it is
generally agreed that 
some sort of new site is urgently required for the Huay Kaloke refugees.


"I dare not go back to Burma.  I will say no, and I won't go to Beh Klaw. 
We need and want 
to stay in a new place where our lives will be safe and where we will also
have good security." 
- "Saw Eh Doh Htoo" (M, 30), Huay Kaloke camp (Interview #H10)


Since the latest attacks, it appears that the Thai Government is finally
prepared to allow the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) a role in the camps,
though it is 
unclear what that role will be and the UNHCR has thus far been very
secretive about its 
negotiations with the Thai authorities.  It appears that the NGOs will
continue to provide the 
relief aid for the refugees, while UNHCR may focus on protection and
screening of refugees.  
Many observers are worried about the result of this, because UNHCR's past
involvement in the 
region indicates that they favour early repatriation, voluntary or
otherwise, followed by 
negotiating a UNHCR presence in the country of origin, where UNHCR
officials believe they 
can prevent or at least minimise the human rights abuses against returning
refugees.  This has 
been their behaviour in dealing with refugees from Burma in Bangladesh, as
well as with the 
recent influx of Cambodian refugees to Thailand.  In the latter case, they
have also shown that 
where they 'screen' refugees they tend to screen the vast majority 'out' so
that they can be 
repatriated; in other words, they declare that the vast majority of refugee
claimants have no valid 
reason to fear persecution at home.  If the UNHCR is indeed allowed the
role of providing 
protection and screening in the camps, it will be very important for the
international community 
to watch their activities closely and critically in order to ensure the
safety of the refugees; 
because as many of them state clearly in this report, it is not safe for
them to return to Burma yet.


"[I have been here] not even one year. ? We couldn't stay in our village,
because we were 
afraid of Burmese soldiers and sometimes of DKBA too.  I had to go
portering and sometimes 
I had to go as forced labour. ? I had to build the road all the time.  We
had to build the road 
very far from my village in Pa'an district, in Zar Tha Bhin. ? The DKBA
forced us to work 
for the Burmese.  The Burmese commanded the DKBA to do it, and then the
DKBA forced us 
to work.  When we stay in our village the Burmese and the DKBA force us to
work.  Now 
when we stay in the camp, they burn my house.  Will our lives always be
like this?  I don't 
know." - "U Than Myint" (M, 47), Maw Ker camp (Interview #M9)

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