The Nation

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Editorial & Opinion 

      OPINION: An Asean
      policy to end soon

      Asean is grappling with the dilemma of
      whether to adopt a new policy for one that
      is seeing the end of its days in the context
      of the changing situation in the region. Troy
      Etulain writes. 

      IN the aftermath of the dozens upon dozens
      of press releases distributed at the 31st
      annual Asean Ministerial Meeting, the 9th
      annual Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and
      Asean Post-Ministerial Conferences, one
      sticks out in particular: The ARF chairman's
      statement containing Asean's
      weakly-worded criticism of the nuclear tests
      in India and Pakistan. 

      Despite having its original language
      watered down (the following ''strongly
      deplore'' was originally ''condemn'') and
      failing to mention the two nations by name,
      the statement did manage to proclaim,
      ''The ministers ... expressed grave concern
      over and strongly deplored the recent tests
      in South Asia...'' This statement presented
      a glaring contradiction related to the most
      hotly-debated topic of the last
      year-and-a-half: Asean's policy of
      non-intervention. 

      Although Asean nations once again
      endorsed their traditional policy of
      non-intervention -- not criticising each other,
      even when domestic events swell into
      international concerns -- this has not
      stopped the ARF, where ''Asean is the
      driving force'', led by ''Asian values'', guided
      by the ''Asian way of doing things'' from
      criticising two other nations, both whom are
      found in Asia, one who is an ARF member. 

      In this case, Asean was caught in a bind, it
      couldn't ignore the tests -- the group has
      long advocated a forceful anti-nuclear
      stance -- nor could it speak about them
      positively. Yet with the issues of
      interference and criticism themselves so
      much at stake in Asean discussions, and
      with Asean having reacted so strongly to
      outside criticism of its decisions like last
      year's admission of Burma into the group,
      the regional organisation's reaction is
      self-contradictory. Asean thus chose to be
      softly critical, as though vague wording
      would eliminate the inherent hypocrisy. 

      Even though the statement deals with a
      supra-Asean affair, it came at a time when
      non-intervention within Asean itself has
      come under greater criticism. Two nations
      and a potential third have stepped out in
      favour of modifying non-intervention to allow
      at least a formal dialogue. As Asean
      nations independently face their own
      particular economic difficulties, the case for
      non-intervention has grown weaker and we
      now see that its days are numbered. This
      has been brought about by a culmination of
      recent events with the economic crisis at
      the centre, and by the continuation of de
      facto engagement practices: Despite a
      policy which gives both a facade of group
      unity and purportedly preserves group
      wholeness, Southeast Asian nations have
      long criticised each other within bilateral
      disputes. Their long debate in Manila
      concerning the formal terms of their
      interaction represents a diplomatic game of
      words. 

      Even Thailand's proposal to move formally
      from non-intervention to ''flexible
      engagement'' (Foreign Minister Surin
      Pitsuwan originally wanted it termed the
      radical-sounding ''constructive
      intervention'') falls short of accurately
      describing the heated bilateral disputes
      that flare up regardless of what Asean
      foreign ministers might tell themselves. In
      fact, in the days following the
      Post-Ministerial Conferences, Malaysia
      and Singapore, two of the most outspoken
      proponents of non-intervention, have been
      squabbling over the placement of a railway
      post within Malaysia's borders. Malaysia's
      inflexibility in this case is viewed by many
      as a retaliation for Singapore's
      exclusionary shipping practices. The acrid
      exchange seen here is a far cry from
      Asean's espoused diplomatic ideal. 

      Most Progressive 

      Surin, the most progressive and impressive
      minister present in Manila, did not succeed
      in convincing the ministers to abandon
      non-intervention, but this was a carefully
      calculated failure. His proposal honestly
      intended, yet doomed from the start,
      nonetheless served the purposes of
      highlighting Thailand's position as the most
      progressive democracy in the region. And
      according to Surin, his efforts did indeed
      have a slightly influential effect. At the
      post-PMC press conference on July 29,
      Surin explained, despite his formal
      re-affirmation of the principle of
      non-interference, ''I think we have begun a
      process... I think from now on, I can raise
      issues without being afraid of being
      misunderstood... from now on, we will try to
      enhance our interaction in response to
      various challenges, situations and the
      changing times.'' He again used the
      expression ''enhanced interaction'', in the
      conference, suggesting some sort of
      compromise. Asean watchers should watch
      out for a re-occurrence of this terminology. 

      What can be said about future
      non-intervention? The policy is adhered to
      member nations who claim that with its
      absence, the coalition would fall apart. But
      is this thinking counter-intuitive? With no
      means of constructive engagement, nations
      are left with the option of taking tit-for-tat
      diplomatic counter-measures as the only
      means of response to another's actions.
      Without a dialogue mechanism for
      resolving bilateral disputes, the region
      greatly risks the escalation of tensions and
      worsening of relations. Frustrations could
      explode if not dealt with openly -- explosion
      coming from non-governmental sources. 

      Asean ministers like to point out that war
      has yet to break out amongst member
      nations. it has yet to be seen, however,
      what sort of crisis-management capabilities
      the group possesses. Any violent dispute
      cold create intra-regional divisions making
      non-intervention irrelevant. 

      There are, in fact, several ways winch could
      bring an end to Asean's formal policy of
      non-intervention. One possibility deals with
      the specific circumstances surrounding the
      tragic case of Burma. In fact, Burma has
      already been the target of what foreign
      ministers have independently and informally
      described as ''constructive engagement'',
      but the policy has been unsuccessful. Its
      1997 admission into Asean has, in fact,
      brought down the association's
      international standing. As one senior Thai
      official explained, quoted in the Far Eastern
      Economic Review, ''We hoped we could
      'Aseanise' Burma and bring it more into the
      region, but instead we find the military
      leaders there just as arrogant and brittle.'' If
      other Southeast Asian governments decide
      that they have effectively shot themselves in
      the foot by having not given themselves a
      structural vehicle for criticising Burma -- one
      in which decision-making is not-consensus
      based -- they might opt to modify their
      official policy and move towards a more
      constructive formality. Further, if
      governments within the region continue to
      be concerned enough to level criticism on
      an issue-by-issue basis, then continue be
      concerned enough to level criticism on an
      issue-by-issue basis, then there's a greater
      chance this practice will become
      established policy. 

      There's also the question of whether the
      Thai government is now in a position to
      break with the group for individual gains at
      the cost of group benefits. If Thailand
      breaks with the policy of non-intervention,
      formally claiming its right to express its
      concern over the spillover effects of another
      nation's domestic actions, then the policy
      could be considered dismantled
      group-wide. It could lead to a disintegration
      of Asean or its weakening greatly --
      something not entirely in Thailand's best
      interest. 

      Let us not forget that Malaysian Deputy
      Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim started this
      debate in a Newsweek editorial over a year
      ago wherein he called for an end to
      Asean's policy of non-intervention. Ibrahim
      is a powerful and brilliant political figure in
      Malaysia; he is the person most likely to
      become the next Malaysian leader. In
      Asean terms, an Ibrahim ascent to power
      would create a Bangkok-Manila-Kuala
      Lumpur consensus triangle and greatly
      change the dynamics of the
      non-intervention debate. 

      Domino Effect 

      Further, the economic crisis has gone far in
      demonstrating how intertwined and
      interdependent the regional economies
      have become. With the aim of avoiding
      such a disastrous domino effect in the
      future, as well as the highly controversial
      austerity programmes demanded by such
      organisations as the IMF and World Bank,
      the main idea of the Manila Framework --
      the sharing of vital economic information --
      is pushing Asean away from
      non-intervention. This is because with
      greater fiscal transparency, other nations
      are more likely to demand changes in
      neighbours' economic policies. Despite the
      Framework's recently having been brought
      to a standstill by the objections of the
      Vietnamese among others, its eventual
      success is expected. 

      Lastly, this most recent ARF meeting has
      focussed the debate on increasing bilateral
      connections between individual Asean
      nations and ARF members. These linkages
      have the potential to fracture the alliance
      and therefore, endanger the longevity of
      non-intervention from without. China has a
      deal to supply Burma with arms and military
      assistance. Russia has sold Indonesia a
      batch of Sukhoi 30 fighter aircraft. Thailand
      has bought a helicopter aircraft carrier from
      Europe. The Philippines' Visiting Forces
      Agreement with the US promises to
      increase the superpower's military
      presence in the area. And in the
      not-so-distant future, ties with a China rising
      in political and military strength could lead
      to differing alignments within the region. 

      Advocates of a change in the
      non-intervention credo hope that such a
      move would bring progress in such areas
      as Burma and East Timor, where
      governments have gotten away with gross
      violations of human rights because of their
      formal immunity from criticism. A more
      open and critical standard of dialogue
      would lead to engagement of the region's
      most dire issues, and move the region's
      peoples towards a stability free from such
      abuses. 

      Non-intervention's life span is likely to be
      linked directly to the length of time Asean
      members continue to fool themselves into
      believing that critical engagement doesn't
      exist and isn't useful. 

      ............. 

      Troy Etulain is a freelance journalist who
      covered the 1998 Asean Conference in
      Manila.