Burma Future!

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The Future Course of Burma


The NLD, the victorious party in the 1990 election, and the Burmese
military regime, Burma's de facto rulers, are heading to a showdown on
August 21, 1998, the date that the NLD has given as an ultimatum for
convening the parliament.

As August 8th approached, the regime grew very worried about the tenth
anniversary of the nationwide demonstration now known as "four eights"
(8-8-88).  To avoid a repeat of such large-scale uprisings, the SPDC
suddenly called a meeting with NLD Chairman U Aung Swe on August 6, a mere
two days before the momentous anniversary.  This was a trick typical of the
Burmese military, who are trying to buy time and give false hope to those
who are preparing to strike.

When we look more closely at the meeting called for by the SPDC, it becomes
clear that they are still excluding not only Daw Aung San Suu Kyi but also
U Tin Oo from these talks.  It was not by any means a sincere attempt at
dialogue, since neither of the opposition parties have any right to choose
whom they wish to send to the meeting.  Instead, the military is reserving
the right to dictate with whom it will speak.  Even though NLD had not
mentioned whom they wish to send to talk to the SPDC, the SPDC has always
recognized U Aung Shwe and deliberately rejected Aung San Suu Kyi as the
voice of the NLD.  This time the NLD outright rejected this offer of talks
because its members do not believe that the regime has any intention of
coming to a lasting agreement with them.  Furthermore, the fact that the
SPDC has called for talks so soon before the tenth anniversary of
nationwide protests against military rule betrays its underhanded strategy;
they are not beneath using overtures for peace as a tactic for holding on
to their power.

More crucially, both sides have been waiting for August 21st with
anxiousness and fear.  The SPDC of course fears that Burma will once again
be swept by nationwide demonstrations; as for the NLD, it is worried that
there will be no large-scale protests on that day and on the days following.

Case 1
If, on August 21st, there are no demonstrations as the NLD fears, the NLD
must then do something out of the fact that it has set down an ultimatum
for convening the parliament.  As Aung San Suu Kyi and U Aung Shwe are
legally authorized to do so by the NLD's elected representatives, they have
the right to form a cabinet if necessary.  In the absence of large-scale
protests, the NLD might give a formal announcement of who the cabinet
members are after the targeted date.  Were they to make such an
annoucement, the NLD cabinet would then become the legitimate government
because they have received the mandate from the people.  As a result, there
would then be two governmental bodies in Burma: the democratically-elected
government headed by the ASSK and the de facto government of the military
junta.  The NCGUB, which was formed in the jungle and has recently moved to
Australia, will dissolve because it would not be necessary for it to exist
once the NLD had formed its cabinet.  Such an act would boost the
activities of the Burmese communities abroad because the NCGUB has been
acting as a toll-keeper for democracy, which has been hindering the
establishment of a true democratic political order rather than promoting it.

In 1988, former Prime Minister U Nu formed a parallel government, but the
students and other politicians refused give it their formal recognition.
By contrast, the NLD has much more of a chance than U Nu's effort; it has a
popular mandate and plays an active, leading role in Burmese politics, its
leader ASSK is a Nobel laureate who enjoys the respect and esteem of world
leaders and international organizations.  If, in this scenario, ASSK were
not to take a position in the cabinet but were to continue acting as the
NLD's party chief, the SPDC would find itself in a sticky predicament.  It
would then be tremendously difficult for the SPDC to continue to paint her
as a power-hungry politician.  ASSK will have shown that she cares foremost
for the well-being of the people, and not for any personal gain.  In
abiding by her disbarrment from running in the 1990 elections, ASSK will
only strengthen her cause as one who seeks to better Burma and not her own
interests.  The 1988 democratic revolution has turned out many positive
results for the people of Burma as well as for the NLD in 1998.  Within ten
years, the Burmese struggle for democracy has become well known throughout
the world and has received the support of international organizations and
activists from other countries.  The arrest of eighteen international
activists in Burma this month has proven that the problem of freedom for
Burma is not an issue isolated from the international community.  Unlike in
1988, Burmese students and activists are forming their own organizations in
Japan,Thailand, Canada, Australia, Norway, Germany, and the United States.
They have all been instrumental in rallying support for a democratic Burma.

If the NLD formed its own cabinet, the West and the United States would
likely give their support, but authoritarian states such as China and North
Korea and semi-democratic countries might wait and see if it will stay in
power before giving their recognition.  It is possible that China, North
Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore will support the SPDC in secret
during this critical period.  When the democratic government collides with
the military regime, the ones to suffer the most will be the Burmese
people.  Blood will flow on Burmese soil, many will lose their lives.  If
the SPDC were to arrest the NLD cabinet members, international
organizations will come out strongly against the regime, perhaps leading to
tough sanctions against Burma.  Also, ASEAN will have to respond to this
outbreak of political chaos.  The SPDC has not strengthened Burma's
economy, and Burma's currency remains in free-fall.

Today, the morale of the people and the nation's economic plight are in far
worse condition than in 1988.  A monk, taking a rest on an automobile trip
from Mandalay to Kyauk Sae, relates how he was approached by hungry
children who offered to give him and his companions massages in exchange
for money.  The monk was shocked by the the desperateness in the children's
eyes, who were forced to go around begging.  A businessman, exporting soy
and other beans from Burma, relates how his supplier, responding to the
demand for fresh green beans, will dye other kinds of beans green for
export to various countries.  Another common trick of the suppliers is to
spray the beans with water and cover them with a layer of dry beans.  The
wet beans weigh more than dry ones, but they become rotten when they arrive
at their destination.  The supplies will even place set stones in the
middle of sacks in order to make them weigh more.  Now, no one wants to
order materials and products from Burma.  The morale of the people has
reached a breaking point.  Few have adequate knowledge of business.  In
most countries, ordering products in greater quantities will drive down the
price.  In Burma, it is the opposite.  If the buyer orders more of
something, the seller will try to make a greater profit by raising prices.
It is a mentality that causes many in Burma to suffer.  Even though the
SPDC remains stubbornly attached to its power, economic collapse will bring
them down in the near future.

Economic failure and political oppression leads to social unrest.  If many
lose their lives in the struggle, the responsibility lies at the door not
just of the SPDC and the NLD, but also with the United Nations.  The UN has
been very passive on the Burma issue and also legally recognizes the SPDC
as a legitimate government.  Recent overtures by the UN Secretary General
to send his representative to Burma was turned down by the SPDC.  It shows
that the UN needs to take a firmer stance against the SPDC's
authoritarianism.  It is proven that merely issuing a letter of concern is
not enough to solve Burma's core problems.  The UN must demonstrate its
effectiveness in resolving such crises, including that of Burma's political
order.

Case B 
On August 21st, if there are nationwide demonstrations, as the SPDC fears,
the military regime will once again kill unarmed demonstrators like it did
in 1988.  But whether the army will carry out its orders this time is
placed in doubt by the fact that most soldiers below the rank of major are
now suffering the problems faced by most of the people of Burma.  They know
now that the only people benefiting from the regime's corruption are above
the rank of colonel.  They realize that the country's interests are being
blatantly ignored, and that the future of Burma remains quite bleak.  They
cannot deny any longer that their leadership is corrupt and that the army
has been manipulated and misused since 1962.  U Aung Gyi, who was close to
the military, declared last month that the army is a divided entity.  In
1988, we witnessed some units of the army joining the demonstrations.
Recent years have seen SLORC's generals Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba, Myint Aung, and
Maung Hla sacked from the army and detained.  Their supporters remain in
the military and are ready to join the opposition when the opportunity
arises.  The loyalty of the army to its leaders is uncertain.  The SPDC is
quite reluctant to put it to the test.  Followers of the sacked generals
might join the demonstrators for various reasons, whether out of hatred for
the regime or the desire for revenge.  On this score, the emergence of a
Burmese Ramos is possible.  Of the 400,000 SPDC troops, if 20,000 were to
join the people, then this faction of soldiers backing the "Burmese Ramos"
will be supported by people who are fed up with the regime.   Rangoon and
Mandalay alone will those soldiers have a chance for recruiting hundreds of
thousands of civilian supporters.  Furthermore, it is likely that more SPDC
will defect to the side of the opposition.  A full-scale civil war might
erupt.  To avoid such an awful occurrence, both the NLD and the SPDC need
to engage in serious talks about the fate of the country.  The UN needs to
encourage the SPDC to negotiate, but also put pressure on them to work out
an acceptable political solution.  If the UN enters as a mediator, the NLD
will accept its participation, but the SPDC will only cooperate if it sees
a carrot on the end of the international stick.  The only way to resolve
the Burmese crisis is to initiate talks between the SPDC and the NLD.
Otherwise, the country will slip into the appalling destruction of civil war.