ILO REPORT ON FL IN BURMA: SLICE 12

[darnott@xxxxxxxxxxx]

[ILO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA, SLICE
12]
 
(b) Oral testimony 
 
334. Over 186 witnesses stated that they had had experience of
portering, either because they themselves were forced to
transport food, equipment and ammunitions for the military or
because members of their family -- wives, husbands or parents
-- had been forced to do so. Testimonies gathered by the
Commission tell of events that occurred in Chin, Kayah, Kayin,
Mon, Rakhine and Shan States and in Magway, Sagaing,
Tanintharyi and Yangon Divisions. They provide ample coverage
of the years from 1993 to the present, though a number of
witnesses also referred to events which occurred prior to this
period.
 
335. Portering is clearly a common form of forced labour,
experienced by most of the witnesses who provided testimony to
the Commission. It is also the most arduous and the most
degrading. Several witnesses made the point that portering is
a further task added to the other forms of labour or services
already imposed by the military; consequently, very little
time is left to the workers to provide for their own personal
and economic needs.(423)
 
336. In order to clarify the variations of the practice of
portering in the different regions of Myanmar, the Commission
has grouped together the relevant evidence according to the
place where events took place. The Commission in setting out
its findings has emphasized the similarities which exist in
regions. The Commission will therefore present, in this
section, the evidence concerning the practice of portering as
carried out in the eastern and central regions of Myanmar, on
the one hand, and the evidence concerning the western region,
on the other. Because of the nature of the evidence gathered
by the Commission, the section on the western region will
focus principally on the Rohingya population located mainly in
northern Rakhine State.
 
337. The evidence concerning portering in the eastern and
central parts of Myanmar, covers Kayah, Kayin, Mon and Shan
States, and the Bago, Tanintharyi and Yangon Divisions. More
specifically, for Kayah State, the evidence refers primarily
to events during the period between 1990 and 1993, which is
directly prior to the mass relocation of a large number of
villages to the Mawchi, Ywathit and Shadaw sites. In fact, for
reasons of survival, the witnesses very soon left these
relocation sites. However, two witnesses, including one
deserter from the "Tatmadaw" who had been stationed in Demawso
between 1990 and 1996, stated that the system of portering in
that State had not been altered in any way in subsequent
months or years.(424) 
 
338. Portering as carried out in the western part of Myanmar
covers Chin and Rakhine States as well as Sagaing Division. In
the specific instance of Rakhine State, most of the evidence
before the Commission refers to the situation of the
Rohingyas, although at least one witness of Rakhine origin
claimed to have had to perform portering once or twice a year
between 1992 and 1993. On these occasions, he was neither paid
nor fed and had to carry his own food with him.(425)
 
339. The portering required of the Rohingyas must be placed in
the general context of their situation. The Rohingya witnesses
claimed to have left Myanmar because of the burden of forced
labour imposed upon them, which prevented them from providing
for their own basic needs.(426) Many Rohingya witnesses were
requisitioned to do portering more than ten days per month or
so many times that they could no longer estimate the exact
number.(427) Portering is just one other of the many exactions
to which the Rohingyas are subjected, along with, among other
things, arbitrary taxation, confiscation or seizure of their
possessions and land, the result of which is to deprive them
of all means of livelihood.
 
340. Witnesses gave evidence of two methods used by the
military across Myanmar to recruit porters. They may either
use the services of the local village head or act on their
own. In the former case, the orders are transmitted to the
village head(428) with instructions to provide a given number
of porters within an often very short time-limit.(429) Village
and section heads who were questioned said that they were
absolutely obliged to comply with the orders of the military
under pain of physical punishment;(430) these threats are
sometimes expressed by the attachment of a bullet, a piece of
charcoal or a chilli(431) to the order, meaning that violent
reprisals may be taken against the village head or his village
in the event of non-compliance. One person per family is
generally requisitioned. It appears from the evidence that the
pressure subsequently put on villagers to meet the
requirements of successive requisitions is such that many of
them prefer to run away, rather than have to accompany
military units on their patrols or operations.(432)
 
341. The second method for recruiting porters consists of the
military forcibly apprehending or seizing the persons they
need.(433) They intervene thus as their needs arise, and
especially when the order transmitted to the local authority
has not been carried out properly, such as when the village
head has not provided a sufficient number of porters within
the imposed time-limits. The situation of the Rohingyas in the
north of Rakhine State is exacerbated by the fact that their
services may be required, in an uncoordinated manner, by
different authorities, such as the "Tatmadaw", the NaSaKa or
the police.(434)
 
342. Men, women and children, some of them only ten or so
years old, stated that they have been forced to do portering
for the military.(435) Only Rohingya witnesses from the
northern Rakhine State stated that portering was done
exclusively by males.
 
343. While men are generally preferred for portering, they
sometimes run away and thus avoid having to accompany the
military, in which case the troops then take women and
children. The evidence further shows that the women are even
more vulnerable than the men in this context because, in
addition to the portering work, they are subjected to sexual
abuse by the military.(436) A refusal to do the portering
required is absolutely inconceivable as it is systematically
met with physical punishment(437) or fines.(438)
 
344. The porters have to transport ammunition, equipment and
food, making up, in the case of the men, a load weighing over
30 kilos.(439) According to the evidence heard, portering may
take various forms. The porters may have to accompany the
military when they move from one camp to another, on regular
patrols or during military operations. It appears that
witnesses were forced to perform all of these forms of
portering in eastern Myanmar, especially in Shan, Mon, Kayah
and Kayin States. Witnesses heard from northern Rakhine State
had mostly to transport ammunition, equipment and rations for
the military from one village or camp to another or on
patrols.(440) The evidence suggests that in this part of
Myanmar territory offensive military operations are
significantly fewer in number than in the eastern region of
the country, where confrontations were numerous in recent
years against Karen, Karenni, Mon(441) and Shan opposition
groups.(442) In addition to the portering required for
specific troop movements, witnesses have stated that they had
to remain on hand with other villagers during a given period
to cater for the needs of the military units whose camps were
located near their village.(443)
 
345. In all portering, the porters are forced to march from
morning to evening, often not being allowed a moment's
rest.(444) One deserter estimated that 20 to 30 porters were
required for 30 soldiers on a routine journey.(445) However,
the number of porters increases with the scale of the military
operation in which the division, battalion or company is
taking part.(446)
 
346. While portering between camps or on military operations
or patrols, the porters are often placed ahead of the column,
since they act as guides;(447) by putting them in front, the
military also use them to detect mines which might explode as
they pass.(448) During armed conflict, the porters are used as
human shields,(449) many of them getting killed in the
process.(450) When caught up in such a confrontation, the
porters have to stay with the soldiers to keep them supplied
with ammunition, on pain of being shot if they try to
escape.(451)
 
347. The length of time of a portering journey in the eastern
part of the country varies and can stretch over several
months(452) whereas portering assignments described by
Rohingyas generally last less than a week but may be repeated
several times a month.(453) The time span which may be
indicated at the start is, in fact, of little importance, as
the porters are never released until the operation for which
they have been requisitioned or arrested is completed, or
until replacements have been obtained or apprehended by the
military.(454)  Moreover, it is common for a porter who has
completed a portering assignment to be seized on his way home
by another military unit to carry their equipment.(455)
 
348. There is ample evidence before the Commission concerning
the general conditions in which portering from one camp to
another or during military operations or patrols is carried
out and the ill-treatment to which the porters are
systematically subjected. The persons requisitioned are not
paid,(456) and if they are fed, the food is insufficient and
of poor quality.(457) The witnesses often mentioned a portion
of rotten rice so tiny that it could be held in the hollow of
one hand. To prevent the porters from fleeing, they are
sometimes chained up and closely guarded.(458) When injured or
ill, all the porters questioned claimed never to have been
given the necessary medical attention, some of them having
even been left behind alone in the jungle.(459)
 
349. If the porters cannot keep up with the column, or if they
show any sign of weakness, the military do not hesitate to
beat or violently punch them, causing injuries which can have
serious if not fatal consequences.(460) On other occasions,
the military did not hesitate to shoot porters(461) because
they were too weak, had tried to escape or simply with a view
to inspiring fear and terror in the other porters.(462)
 
350. Several witnesses stated that it was often possible to
avoid portering in so far as a certain sum of money was paid
to the military or to the authorities. The amounts indicated
to the Commission in this respect varied considerably.(463)
For example, one witness paid 600 kyat monthly over a period
of nearly 15 years so as to avoid having to do portering for
the military.(464) Others indicated that it was possible to
send a substitute to do the portering in their place.(465)
 
 
(2) Military camp work
 
(a) Documentary material
 
351. Nature and conditions of work. The Commission received
detailed information on various aspects of forced labour
related to military camps. The information indicated that when
a new military camp was established, the land would often be
confiscated from local villages. No compensation would be
paid.
 
352. All the villages in the area would then be required to
send at least one person per household to construct the camp.
They would have to start by clearing and levelling the land,
and would then have to construct camp buildings to the
required specifications. They would also have to dig trenches
and bunkers and build other fortifications such as fences and
defensive bamboo spikes. They would normally have to continue
working every day until the construction of the camp was
complete. In addition, the villages would usually have to
provide all the necessary building materials, including wood,
bamboo and sheets of thatch.(466) Following the construction
of the camp, these villages would also have to complete repair
work at regular intervals, at least once a year (usually after
the rainy season when most of the damage occurred).
 
353. In addition to constructing and repairing the camps, the
villages would also have to provide a number of workers on a
permanent basis to carry out a number of services at the
camps, such as cleaning and maintenance, cooking, collecting
water or firewood, washing clothes and acting as messengers.
It was these messengers who would normally deliver written
orders or summonses from the camp to village heads, in
addition to carrying out a variety of other tasks for the army
camp or its officers.(467) These workers were often women,
sometimes because the camp specifically demanded women, but
often because this was generally a less arduous form of forced
labour than others such as portering, for which men from the
household tended to go. Army camp workers might be able to
return home at night, but in certain circumstances this might
not be possible, either because they were not permitted to do
so, or because of the distance of the village from the army
camp. In such cases these workers had to stay at the army camp
for a number of days, until replacements arrived from their
village, in accordance with the schedule arranged by the
village head. In such circumstances, women were particularly
at risk of abuse and rape. This did not appear to be uncommon.
However, abuses other than sexual abuse of women appeared to
be less common than with portering and some other forms of
forced labour.(468)
 
354. Specific examples. The information before the Commission
contained details of forced labour being used for the
construction, repair and servicing of military camps and other
facilities in most parts of the country, particularly border
areas and other places with active insurgencies. The
Commission received specific information from Chin, Kachin,
Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan States and Ayeyarwady,
Bago, Sagaing and Tanintharyi Divisions.
 
355. The use of forced labour for the construction, repair and
servicing of military installations in the eastern parts of
Myanmar was very common, particularly in those areas near the
eastern border with Thailand. This region, covering Shan,
Kayah, Kayin and Mon States and Bago and Tanintharyi
Divisions, will be discussed first in the paragraphs which
follow.
 
356. In Shan State, forced labour was used for the
construction, repair and servicing of a number of camps in
several different townships,(469) including camps at
relocation sites.(470) The information covered a period from
1992 to 1998.(471) 
 
357. A considerable amount of information was provided to the
Commission relating to construction, repair and servicing of
military camps in Kayah State.(472) Populations which had been
forcibly relocated to sites under military control were often
used for this work. The information covered the construction
and renovation of a number of camps in 1996 and 1997.(473)
Other villagers were forced to work at camps as messengers or
for carrying out other servicing work.(474)
 
358. A large volume of information was provided relating to
Kayin State and neighbouring parts of Bago Division.(475)
Civilians were forced to build, repair or service a large
number of military installations over the period from 1992 to
1997.(476) The information included copies of several orders
from the authorities requiring villages to provide labour for
this work.(477)
 
359. In Mon State, civilians were forced to carry out work on
the construction, repair and servicing of several camps from
1994 to 1997.(478) The information included copies of orders
from the authorities requiring labour to be provided for this
work.(479)
 
360. Considerable information was provided relating to
military installations in Tanintharyi Division indicated that
forced labour was used for the construction, repair and
servicing of a large number of these installations(480) in
several townships(481) covering a large part of the
Division.(482) There appeared to be a particularly large
demand for forced labour for these purposes in Yebyu township.
The information included a number of copies of orders from the
authorities requiring the provision of labour for this work.
 
361. The Commission received somewhat less information from
the western part of Myanmar. It did, however, receive some
relevant information, particularly from Rakhine State and Chin
State.
 
362. In Rakhine State, forced labour was used for the
construction, repair and servicing of barracks and camps for
the NaSaKa in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, as well as
camps for various battalions(483) in Sittway (Akyab).(484) In
various areas including Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Mrauk-U
townships the Muslim population was forced by the military to
various work for Rakhine and Burmese villagers, including
doing cultivation work(485) and constructing houses (so-called
"model villages").(486)
 
363. Forced labour was used on the construction of military
camps and other installations in Chin State. These included a
police station in April 1996 and sentry posts in June
1996,(487) as well as an army camp in Thantlang. The
information included copies of a number of orders from the
authorities in 1996 which requested villages in Thantlang
township to cut wood and bamboo, and make roofing thatch, for
the construction of the army camp.(488)
 
364. In addition, the Commission received relevant information
from a number of other areas. Land was confiscated from
villagers in Kachin State for the construction of a military
installation.(489) In Ayeyarwady Division, people were forced
to construct military camps, including the building of
barracks for troops supervising the construction of a road in
1995-96.(490) Forced labour was also used for the construction
and servicing of camps in Sagaing Division, including the
construction of a camp for a battalion(491) in Monywa township
in 1995, as well as continued servicing of the camp until at
least 1997, and construction and repair of camps for a number
of battalions in Kalaymyo town and other parts of Kalaymyo
township over the last few years.(492)
 
 
________________________
 
NOTES
 
423. See statements of Witnesses 151, 168, 175 and 200.
Witness 175 claimed that, during certain months of the year,
neither she nor her husband had a single moment to attend to
their own activities. 
 
424. See statements of Witnesses 93 and 98. 
 
425. See statement of Witness 8. 
 
426. See statements of Witnesses 29, 31, 33, 39, 48, 59, 63
and 85. 
 
427. See statements of Witnesses 18, 20, 48, 63, 66, 72, 121
and 171. 
 
428. See statements of Witnesses 93, 98, 100, 101, 108, 109,
112, 113, 121, 132, 163, 174, 177, 187, 210 and 216. 
 
429. The time-limit may be very short; some witnesses stated
that the village head had to find the necessary porters on
that very day: see statements of Witnesses 155 and 180. 
 
430. See statements of Witnesses 113, 173 and 175. 
 
431. See statement of Witness 166. Some village or section
heads are said to have been tortured for not having carried
out the orders properly. In this regard, see statements of
witnesses 220-228. 
 
432. See statements of Witnesses 113, 120, 153, 164 and
220-228. 
 
433. See statements of Witnesses 93, 94, 98, 112, 125, 132,
135, 155, 169, 178, 179, 188, 201, 210 and 216. Direct arrests
have even been carried out in Yangon: see statement of Witness
170. 
 
434. See, in particular, statements of Witnesses 49 and 59. 
 
435. For the eastern part, see statements of Witnesses 5, 102,
106-108, 112, 113 and 166. Even pregnant or elderly women may
be requisitioned. See statements of Witnesses 174 and 176. For
Chin State, testimonies cover the regions near Thantlang and
Paletwa as well as Arakan hills (Arakan Yoma). 
 
436. See statements of Witnesses 119, 125, 169, 176 and 200. 
 
437. On two occasions, Witness 119 saw individuals shot dead
for having refused to do the required portering. 
 
438. Witness 109 stated that a refusal could result in a fine
of 3,000 kyat. 
 
439. See statements of Witnesses 93, 98, 100, 102, 105, 106,
108, 109, 112-114, 119, 131, 132, 135, 145, 160, 165, 169,
175, 176, 184, 187, 192, 193, 195, 204, 206, 210 and 245. 
 
440. See statements of Witnesses 9, 10, 19, 44 and 52. 
 
441. There have been no major hostilities in Mon State since
the New Mon State Party (NMSP) signed a cease-fire with the
Government of Myanmar in June 1995. 
 
442. It is not unusual for porters to have to accompany the
military on armed offensives: see statement of Witness 32 who
accompanied soldiers on a military operation in 1991, and
statement of Witness 43 who was a porter on the Thai border
during an operation against the Karen National Union (KNU).
Finally Witness 33 claimed to have accompanied the military in
an operation against the Rohingya Solidarity Organization
(RSO) in April 1997. 
 
443. See statement of Witness 6, and statement of Witness 208
about a village where, from March 1997, three porters had to
be permanently available for the military. 
 
444. See statement of Witness 201. 
 
445. See statement of Witness 93. 
 
446. See statement of Witness 5 for the extensive military
operation in Shan State. 
 
447. See statement of Witness 118. 
 
448. See statements of Witnesses 5, 93, 116, 124 and 151. The
villagers may also be called up to detect mines in the
vicinity of the villages or military camps: see statement of
Witness 183. 
 
449. See statements of Witnesses 93, 105, 132, 204 and 210.
Witness 155 has explained that the entire village, including
the children, is sometimes used as a shield. 
 
450. Notably in Chin and Karen States. See, in particular, the
statement of Witness 125. 
 
451. The testimonies concern armed conflicts with the Karen,
Mon and Shan forces. See, in particular, statements of
Witnesses 108, 112, 184 and 245. 
 
452. See statements of Witnesses 98, 105, 106, 112, 114, 117,
119, 121, 131 and 135. Consult the statement of Witness
132, whose assignment lasted for 94 days and was immediately
followed by another assignment of 2 months. 
 
453. See statements of Witnesses 19, 20, 26, 31, 44 and 48. 
 
454. See statements of Witnesses 93, 113 and 168. 
 
455. See statement of Witness 168. 
 
456. See statements of Witnesses 26, 44, 48, 63, 80, 98, 100,
102, 105, 107, 113, 117, 119, 121, 132, 160, 162, 168 and
184. Witness 31 claimed to have received 15 kyat per portering
assignment. 
 
457. See statements of Witnesses 6, 7, 46, 48, 102, 106-108,
117-119, 121, 132, 153, 154, 160, 165 and 171. 
 
458. See statement of Witness 193. 
 
459. See statements of Witnesses 98, 117 and 168. Witness 241
claimed that his brother had died while portering as a result
of complications caused by an infectious disease. 
 
460. When questioned on this subject, all the witnesses said
that they had had direct experience of such acts, perpetrated
by the military for no apparent reason: see statements of
Witnesses 6, 7, 19, 21, 26, 48, 63, 66, 80, 93, 98, 100, 102,
105-107, 112-114, 117, 118, 121, 124-126, 131, 132, 135, 137,
138, 146, 151, 155, 160, 168, 171-173, 176, 181, 194, 200,
204-207, 210 and 245. One deserter claimed to have personally
beaten porters on the orders of his superior. Witness 44
mentioned a practice involving use of a red-hot iron. 
 
461. See statement of Witness 236, who claimed to have seen
about sixty porters shot dead by the military because they
were exhausted, to week to continue, or simply wanted to rest
for a moment. See also the statements of Witnesses 169, 200,
222 and 225. The situation of prisoners who have to do
portering work is even more disgraceful in this respect: see
statement of Witness 96. 
 
462. See statements of Witnesses 108, 109, 118, 145, 168, 185
and 236. 
 
463. The amounts mentioned vary from 300 to 10,000 kyat. See
statements of Witnesses 96, 112 (3,000 kyat), 119 (5,000
kyat), 121 (400 to 500 kyat), 125 (5,000 kyat), 138 (3,000
kyat), 154 (2,000 kyat), 158 (450 kyat), 169 (200 kyat), 171
(500 kyat), 180 (1,300 kyat for one week), 184 (500 kyat), 187
(200 to 300 kyat), 209 (2,000 kyat for three days' portering),
229 (5,000 to 10,000 kyat) and 236. 
 
464. Witness 236 had in fact been subjected to beatings during
a portering assignment in 1985 at Three Pagodas Pass (Kayin
State) and did not wish to repeat this traumatic experience. 
 
465. See statements of Witnesses 100, 113, 159, 200 and 210. 
 
466. Karen Human Rights Group, 032-2423; Lin, VII/42-43. 
 
467. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0027, 032-2423; Human
Rights Watch/Asia, 065-2978; Min Lwin, VI/14; Ka Hsaw
Wa, X/9. 
 
468. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-1462, 016-2147, 032-2423. 
 
469. The following camps were mentioned: a camp for LIB 360 in
Mongping township in 1992; for Battalion 64 in Mongkaing
township in 1994; for Battalion 518 in Kunhing township in
1996 and other new bases at Kunhing in 1997; a military camp
in Namhsam township in 1997; and a military camp in Laikha
town in 1997 and 1998. 
 
470. For example, digging bunkers for a military camp at Wan
Lao relocation site in Kunhing township. 
 
471. Shan Human Rights Foundation, 001-0334, 001-0383,
143-4533, 145-4579, 147-4621, M34-6964; Karen Human Rights
Group, 001-0665; Amnesty International, 168-8399 to 8400. 
 
472. Amnesty International, 099-3895 to 3896; Karen Human
Rights Group, 154-5083, 154-5089 to 5092, 154-5095. 
 
473. The following camps were specifically mentioned: an army
camp at Shadaw, a camp for Battalion 429 at Tee Po Klo in
Demawso township, an army camp at Daw Tama Gyi in Demawso
township, an army camp at the Mawchi relocation site in Mawchi
township, an army camp at Mar Kraw She relocation site in
Pruso township, and an army camp at Ywathit relocation site. 
 
474. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0586, 001-0592, 154-5083,
154-5090, 154-5095; Human Rights Watch/Asia, 065-2978. 
 
475. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0181, 001-0189 to 0197,
001-0302, 001-0307, 001-0310, 001-0318 to 0319, 001-0364,
001-0480, 001-0488, 001-0586, 001-0593, 001-0603, 001-0632,
001-0637, 001-0763 to 0764, 001-0904, 001-1922 to 1926,
001-1988 to 1990, 031-2393, 031-2395 to 2396, 154-5190,
154-5226, 154-5254 to 5260, 154-5268, H23-6394, M50-7360;
Human Rights Watch/Asia, 065-2978; Amnesty International,
093-3748, 099-3896; Images Asia, 001-0209, 001-0220, 125-4024,
125-4036, 125-4038; Min Lwin, H06-5777 to 5782, H06-5785 to
5790. 
 
476. The following military installations were specifically
mentioned. In Kayin State: a camp for 99 Division in Hpa-an
township in 1993; a camp for LIB 9 near the Thai border in
1994; an LIB 12 camp in Hpa-an district in 1997; a camp at
Kadaingti in Papun district in 1995 and 1996; a camp for LIB
547 in Nabu village in Kawkareik township in 1995 and again
in 1997; a camp for Battalion 104 at Maw Kee in Dooplaya
district in 1995; Paw Yin Pyu army camp in Hlaingbwe township
in 1995; a camp near Painkyone used by Battalion 339,
Battalion 338 and 99 Division; a camp for LIB 310 in Kawkareik
township in 1996; IB 231's Ta Mine Gone camp in Kawkareik
township in 1996; a camp for IB 62 in Kawkareik township in
1996; a camp for LIB 549 in Kawkareik township in 1997; camps
for Battalion 36 in the Painkyone area of Hlaingbwe township
from 1993 to 1997; a camp for LIB 340 near Dee Taw Kee in
Papun district in 1995 and 1996; a camp at Tee Per near
Painkyone in Hlaingbwe township in 1996; a camp for a company
of Battalion 310 in Kya-in village in Kawkareik township in
1995; bunkers for "Tatmadaw" and DKBA units in Kyat Kwa
village in Kawkareik township; a camp of the 202 Tactical
Operational Command in the Kyeikdon area of Kya In Seik Gyi
township in 1997; bunkers for troops in Paglawni village near
Kyeikdon in Kya In Seik Gyi township; outposts at Azin (Saw
Hta) and MaeTha Raw Hta in Dooplaya district in 1996 and 1997;
an army camp near Kyunchaung village in southern Dooplaya
district in 1997; an army camp in Kyone Yaw village in
southern Dooplaya district in 1997; a DKBA camp at Myaing Gyi
Ngu (Khaw Taw) in 1995 and 1996; a DKBA camp in the Painkyone
area of Hlaingbwe township in 1997; and several other army
camps between Papun and Kyauknyat over the period 1992 to
1995. In Bago Division: in Busakee township, for IB 57 in
Shwegyin township, for IB 26 in Tantabin township and for IB
60 in Kyaukkyi township. Villagers were also forced to do
construction and other work for an army camp at Ye Tho Gyi in
Toungoo district for IB 48 and LIB 354, and to dig an
eight-mile ditch at Yan Myo Aung army compound in Kyaukkyi
township in 1994.  
 
477. Villagers in Papun district in 1996 were also forced to
build houses for the families of soldiers who had died. See
Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0480. 
 
478. Specific mention was made of the following camps: a camp
for Battalion 108 in Ye township in 1994, a camp for IB 93
in Bilin township in 1995, a camp near Yah Pu village in Ye
township in 1996, and a camp for IB 31 in Thanbyuzayat
township in 1997. 
 
479. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0176, 001-0394, 001-1341. 
 
480. The following military installations were specifically
mentioned: military barracks and stores on Heinzebok Island
since 1994; for LIB 267 in Yebyu township in 1994 and 1995;
for LIBs 406, 407 and 408 in Yebyu township; a military
training ground and other construction work for LIBs 403, 404
and 405 in Thayetchaung township in 1995; for Battalion 103 in
Palaw township in 1995; for Battalion 101 and Battalion 280 in
Palaw township in 1997; for Battalion 280 in Palaw township in
1997; houses for soldiers from Battalion 404 and military
buildings near Ohnbinkwin and Kadaik in Yebyu township in
1995; for Battalions 408, 409 and 410 in Yebyu township; for
LIBs 273 and 405 in Yebyu township; work camps on the
Eindayaza to Natkyizin section of the Ye-Dawei (Tavoy) railway
in Yebyu township in 1996; two buildings for LIB 407 in Yebyu
township in 1997; for LIBs 17 and 25 in Dawei (Tavoy) township
in 1996; and for three army camps near Yebone village in Yebyu
township since 1988. 
 
481. Including Yebyu, Dawei (Tavoy), Thayetchaung and Palaw
townships.  
 
482. HRDU, 001-0149; Amnesty International, 001-0793; Karen
Human Rights Group, 001-1034, 001-1055, 001-1117 to 1118,
001-1128, 001-1348, 001-1368 to 1369, 001-1373, 018-2167,
018-2169, H24-6423, H24-6469, H24-6478, H24-6480, H24-6484;
Mon Information Service, 001-1280, 001-1386, 001-1388,
042-2621, 043-2651, M56-7428; Human Rights Watch/Asia,
065-2969, 150-4690; FTUB, 164-7766 to 7767; H20-6294,
H20-6296. 
 
483. IB 263 and IB 264 were specifically mentioned. 
 
484. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0445, 001-0557 to 0559,
001-0565 to 0566; Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0711, 118-3995;
Amnesty International, 064-2962. 
 
485. See para. 397 below. 
 
486. Amnesty International, 089-3605; Human Rights Watch/Asia,
154-4926; Human Rights Watch/ Refugees International,
154-5404. 
 
487. Villagers from Matupi township were ordered to construct
a police station in Lailenpi; villagers from Thantlang
township were ordered to construct six sentry posts for LIB
266 in Thantlang. 
 
488. Karen Human Rights Group, 028-2343, 154-5138 to 5140;
Images Asia, 167-8308. 
 
489. The land was confiscated by LIB 384 from villagers in
Momauk township. See Mirante, I/51. 
 
490. The road was being constructed from Talakwa, near
Pathein, to Nga Saw beach (30 km north of Chaungtha); there is
information that forced labour was also used for the
construction of this road (see para. 422 below). See Karen
Human Rights Group, 001-0652, 001-0692. 
 
491. Artillery Battalion 20. 
 
492. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0563, 154-5148; Images
Asia, 167-8337. 
 
[END OF SLICE 12]