ILO: FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA-23

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[ILO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA, SLICE
23]


B. FORCED LABOUR FOR PRIVATE BENEFIT


1. The Government of Myanmar uses 
   forced labour to promote private 
   benefit in joint venture developments,
   including the country's oil and natural 
   gas reserves

The Government of Myanmar has sought to attract foreign
investment to develop what are thought to be substantial
natural gas and oil reserves in the country. Since 1992,
reports from various sources consistently corroborate the
Government's use of forced labour on a massive scale in parts
of Myanmar where exploration of oil and gas resources, and
associated works to build necessary infrastructure, are
occurring.(90) The projects for development of oil and gas
reserves include the Yadana gas pipeline project offshore from
Mon State, and the Sagaing division test drilling project.

The Yadana gas pipeline represents the most advanced project
for the development and exploitation of Myanmar's natural gas
and oil reserves, and is operated as a joint venture between
TOTAL, a French oil company, Unocal, a US oil company, and
MOGE (Myanmar Oi1 and Gas Enterprises), a company wholly owned
by the SLORC.(91) Widespread and persistent reports confirm
that people living in the vicinity of the pipeline route are
regularly forced to work construction of the pipeline route
itself, and on related infrastructure.(92) Reliable reports of
human rights abuses, including torture, rape, summary and
arbitrary executions, and forced relocations as a result of
forced labour have been documented and recently confirmed as
to 11 villages in the region.(93) These reports are denied by
both the Government of Myanmar,(94) and by the oil companies
involved in the project.(95)

Construction of the 100-mile Ye-Tavoy railroad, thought to be
associated with the development of the gas reserves and the
installation of the pipeline, has resulted in relocation of
ethnic Mon and Karen, fleeing forced labour duties.(96) To
this extent at least, then, the railway appears to be
connected with the construction of the pipeline, and its
construction is of benefit to the private oil companies
participating in the joint venture.

In addition, a Korean company, Yukong Oil Company, had a test
well in Htaw Tha village in the Sagaing division. People who
were forced to work on the construction of a road between
Manywa and Khamti reported that a police post had been set up
in the area to which men, women and children labouring in the
area brought supplies night and day for police guards and for
workers. (97) 

2. Forced labour is used for the benefit
   of private investors in development,
   public works and tourism projects

As noted above, widespread use of forced labour on a
significant scale supports the development of tourist
infrastructure.(98) In addition, the Government recently has
adopted a practice of inviting local investors to participate
in the construction of highways and railroads with the
incentive of return on their investments through the eventual
establishment of toll gates to collect fees for the use of the
roads.(99) The Government has announced that the privatization
of infrastructure development is "part and parcel of plans to
create more job opportunities for the people",(100) a strategy
which appears to involve the implementation of development
projects "by the Government, counting on the participation of
the local people in the contribution of labour ...".(101) In
Myanmar, most of the money made in the tourist industry is
made in the airline and hotel industries, owned in part by
foreign companies from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand.(102) These companies have reported benefits from the
increased profits during 1996 Visit Myanmar Year, attributable
in part to work of forced labourers on tourist attraction
projects.(103)

3. The Government of Myanmar uses forced labour
   for the private commercial interests
   of military members

The commanding officers within the Tatmadaw are regularly
reported to be involved in a variety of their own commercial
ventures in the country, including shrimp cultivation, paddy
and fishpond operations, tree-planting and timber cultivation.
Following the pattern of forced labour that is evident in
public projects, the military regularly forces the civilian
population into service to suit their own commercial
interests. For example, in Mergui-Tavoy district reports
indicated that Karen people have been forced to work without
pay on a large rubber plantation, and also in the construction
of a dike for shrimp farming operations; it was reported that
as many as 13,000 people were compelled to work on these
projects.(104)



C. THE LAW OF FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA

1. Myanmar law provides for forced or
   compulsory labour to be exacted from
   the people on pain of penalties

Two laws in effect in Myanmar, the Villages Act 1908 and the
Towns Act 1907, authorize forced or compulsory labour to be
exacted from the people on pain of penalties. The laws
authorize portering, transport and other services to be
exacted for government troops, police and officers "in the
execution of their public duties", and provide for fines and,
in the case of the Villages Act 1908, imprisonment of up to
one month, for failure to comply. The laws also authorize a
class-based discrimination in the selection of "the labouring
class" for such work. Unlike the English version quoted below,
the Burmese explanatory version of the laws reportedly allows
for no "reasonable excuse" or "reasonable cause" to exempt one
from penalty.(105)

The English version of the relevant sections of the Villages
Act 1908 provides as follows:

8(1) Every headman shall be bound to perform the following
public duties, namely: 

 ...

(g) to collect and furnish, upon receipt of payment for the
same at such rates as the Deputy Commissioner may fix, guides,
messengers, porters, supplies of food, carriage and means of
transport for any troops or police posted in or near or
marching through the village tract or for any servant of the
Government travelling on duty; provided that no headman shall
requisition for personal service any resident of such village
tract who is not of the labouring class and accustomed to do
such work as may be required;

 ...

(n) generally to assist all officers of the Government in the
execution of their public duties; and 

(o) generally to adopt such measures and do such acts as the
exigency of the village may require. 

 ...

10. If a headman or a rural policeman neglects to perform any
of the public duties imposed upon him by this Act or a rule
thereunder, or abuses any of the powers conferred upon him by
this Act or any such rule, he shall be liable, by order of the
Deputy Commissioner, to pay a fine not exceeding 50 rupees.

11. Every person residing in a village tract shall be bound to
perform any of the public duties, namely:

 ...

(d) on the requisition of the headman or of a rural policeman,
to assist him in the execution of his duties prescribed in
sections 7 and 8 of the Act and the rules made under the Act.

Explanation: A requisition under clause (d) may be either
general or addressed to an individual.

12. If a person residing in a village tract refuse or neglects
to perform any of the public duties imposed upon him by this
Act or by any rule thereunder, he shall, in the absence of
reasonable excuse, the burden of proving which shall lie upon
him, be
liable:

(i) by order of the headman, to fine not exceeding five
rupees, or 

(ii) by order of the village committee, on the case being
referred to it by the headman, to fine not exceeding ten
rupees, or to confinement for a term not exceeding 48 hours in
such place as the Deputy Commissioner may appoint in this
behalf, or to both, or

(iii) on conviction by a magistrate, to fine not exceeding 50
rupees, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month,
or to both.(106)

The English version of the relevant sections of the Towns Act
1907 provides as follows: 

7(1) The headman of a ward shall be bound to perform the
following public duties, namely:

 ...

(1) to collect and furnish, upon receipt of payment for the
same in advance at such rates as the Deputy Commissioner, with
the sanction of the Commissioner, may from time to time fix,
guides, supplies of food, carriage, and means of transport for
any troops or police posted in or near or marching through or
near the town;

Provided that no headman shall be bound to collect supplies
beyond the limits of the ward of which he is headman, or to
furnish carriage or means of transport for more than 12 hours'
journey from such town unless the Deputy Commissioner
certifies in writing that it is necessary in the public
interests that carriage or means of transport should be
supplied for a longer period, in which case the Deputy
Commissioner shall fix higher rates of payment than the rates
of payment for journeys of 12 hours or less;

Provided also that no headman shall requisition for personal
service any resident of such ward who is not of the labouring
class and accustomed to do such work as may be required; and

(m) generally to assist all officers of the government and
municipal officers in the execution of their public duties.

 ...

9. Persons residing in a ward shall be bound to perform the
following public duties, namely:

 ...

(b) on a general or individual requisition of the headman to
assist him in the execution of his public duties.

9A. If any person residing in a ward refuses or neglects to
perform any of the public duties imposed upon him by this Act
or any rule thereunder, he shall, in the absence of reasonable
cause, the burden of proving which shall lie upon him, be
liable, on conviction by a magistrate, to a fine which may
extend to 50 rupees.

In 1995, the Government of Myanmar admitted that "the two laws
were no longer in conformity with the prevailing conditions
in the country, besides not being in line with the provisions
of the ILO Convention of 1930 (No. 29)".(107) The statement
appeared to be an acceptance of the ILO's conclusions and
recommendations for repeal of the laws upon review of the
situation for some 34 years.(108) Despite repeal of some 150
laws in the past several years,(109) the Government of Myanmar
has not yet repealed the two laws authorizing forced
labour.(110)


2. The Government of Myanmar has issued
   directives that legitimize the practice of
   forced labour on development projects

Two recent government directives acknowledge the extent of the
practice of forced labour on development projects, and seek
to maintain the practice under specific circumstances.(111)
Directive No. 125, dated 2 June 1995, purports to be an
instruction from the Chairman of the SLORC, the military junta
in control of the country, to all State/Division Law and Order
Restoration Councils. The directive thus was intended for
national distribution. Under the directive as reported by the
Special Rapporteur, the SLORC prohibits unpaid labour
contributions in national development projects and requires
that "in obtaining the necessary labour from the local people,
they must be paid their due share". In addition, the directive
instructs the authorities concerned to "avoid undesirable
incidents", a reference that appears in context to relate to
"causing misery and suffering to the people in rural
areas ...".

The other directive, No. 82, is purportedly of more narrow
application, dated 27 April 1995, and sent from the SLORC
Chairman to the Yangon Division Law and Order Chairmen and the
Ministry of Agriculture. The directive instructs the
recipients "to stop the practice of obtaining labour from the
local people without monetary compensation" as applied to the
construction of dams in Yangon division.

Neither directive contains language abrogating any of the
terms of the Villages Act 1908 and Towns Act 1907 authorizing
forced labour, and indeed the directives serve to legitimize
the practice of forced labour by authorizing it to proceed
with compensation and without "undesirable incidents". Neither
directive contains any penalties for breaches of the
directives themselves. In addition, as noted by the Special
Rapporteur several months after their publication, the
directives were "still not public and therefore not accessible
to those to whom they would apply and to those protecting the
rights of persons accused of breaking the laws".(112)


3. The laws authorizing forced labour in Myanmar fall
   outside the scope of a criminal law punishing the
   "unlawful" exaction of forced or compulsory labour

A criminal law may be in effect in Myanmar making the
"unlawful" exaction of forced or compulsory labour punishable
as a criminal offence. Section 374 of the Penal Code provides:

"374. Whoever unlawfully compels any person to labour against
the will of that person shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both."(113)

The terms of the Villages Act 1908 and the Towns Act 1907 can
be read as lawful authorization to compel labour and thus are
outside the scope of the criminal statute.



                      IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


A. THE PRACTICE OF FORCED LABOUR IN MYANMAR 
   IS A BREACH OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
   UNDER CONVENTION No. 29

1. Myanmar's practice of forced labour breaches
   its obligations under Convention No. 29

The facts demonstrate that "work and services" are being
exacted from people in Myanmar "under the menace of penalty",
as prohibited by Convention No. 29. Penalty should be taken to
include both penalties as a matter of law, and those effective
in fact. The term should include any real threat or imposition
of actual personal, physical, or financial loss, harm or
hardship, whether by administrative or judicial proceeding, of
by any other exercise of ostensible governmental power.
Penalty is not limited to penal sanctions: it includes any
loss of rights or privileges.(114) This indicates that a broad
and purposive interpretation is appropriate, so as best to
achieve the Convention's object of the suppression of forced
and compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest
possible period.(115)

The practices in Myanmar described above are all conducted
under the "menace of penalty" within the meaning of the
Convention. By the Government's own admission, portering
services are exacted pursuant to the Villages Act 1908 and the
Towns Act 1907, which provide criminal penalties for failure
to supply labour in accordance with their terms.(116) In
addition, work and services other than portering are exacted
by force, threat of force, including work on development
projects, tourist projects, sexual services and labour for
private benefit. The evidence demonstrates that much of the
labour is performed subject to detention, beating, torture and
other physical harm. Sexual services exacted from Burmese
women by way of rape are conducted by force or by threat of
force.(117) Moreover, labour performed in circumstances where
the only alternatives to its performance are payment of fees,
or expenditure to hire a substitute labourer, is performed
under the menace of a penalty.

The facts further demonstrate that, in the incidents at issue,
the persons performing the work and services did not offer
themselves voluntarily. As a matter of law, labour obtained
through legal compulsion cannot be taken to have been offered
voluntarily. Sexual services exacted from Burmese women by way
of rape that result in actual physical loss, harm and hardship
are, ex hypothesi, not offered voluntarily. Nor can labour by
prisoners, or children (in particular the more exploitative
form of labour by children)(118) be considered to be performed
voluntarily.

Any payment received by the people who perform the work and
services described is irrelevant to a determination of the
question whether the work and services were offered
voluntarily. Indeed, the Convention appears to contemplate
that payment and compulsion can occur simultamously. In
setting guarantees and terms for forced labour practices under
the now-lapsed transitional regime,(119) the Convention
prescribes rates and methods for strict cash remuneration
under Article 14, except where the labour is being exacted as
a tax under the now-lapsed terms of Article 10.(120)

Contrary to the assertions of the Government of Myanmar,
labour is not contributed voluntarily by the people pursuant
to Buddhist cultural tradition. The facts demonstrate that
people are compelled to work, under the menace of penalties,
and that they are commonly seized to perform work. The facts
also demonstrate that Rohingya Muslims, Karen Christians and
other predominantly non-Buddhist ethnic groups are called upon
to perform forced labour.(121) The military junta's extension
of the colonial practice has eroded the social and economic
fabric of village life, thereby harming cultural tradition.

The Government of Myanmar recently stated to the Conference
Committee that, having reached cease-fires with 15 of 16
insurgent groups, only members of the armed forces would be
used henceforth on "major development projects".(122) However,
that statement fails to demonstrate compliance with Convention
No. 29. The limiting word "major" before "community
development projects" implies that forced labour will still be
used on other projects. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates
that, where military services are supplied, the people's
forced labour is still used for construction of military
barracks as well as for services such as portering, supply of
food, and messengering.(123) In addition, the Tatmadaw, which
is to retain its military duties along with the new
development tasks,(124) does not have the human resources to
provide labour on the scale that apparently is required by the
SLORC for its development projects; the record demonstrates
that the supply of forced labour used thus far exceeds 800,000
people.(125) Finally, the Government's position provides no
lasting guarantee of compliance with Convention No. 29 and
freedom from forced labour for the people of Myanmar. The laws
and directives authorizing forced labour remain in effect, and
sliders may be called back to combat or other duties at any
time.

Whether or not the Villages Act 1908 or the Towns Act 1907 are
expressly relied upon, the fact of their continued operation
of itself makes it difficult to be confident that any
contributions of labour are, in fact, voluntary.(126) Indeed,
the, Article 24 Committee noted in this respect that "the
blurring of the borderline between compulsory and voluntary
labour [was] recurrent throughout the Government's statements
to the Committee, is all the more likely to occur in actual
recruitment by local or military officials".(127) The texts of
the secret directives issued during 1995(128) admit and
continue to authorize forced labour in Myanmar. The Government
of Myanmar's own published budget and economic figures reflect
the significant and increasing role of "people's
contributions" in its plans for development.(129) In the
absence of any convincing evidence that the "people's
contributions" are in fact labour which is voluntarily
donated, or properly remunerated, these figures, should be
taken as an admission that forced labour occurs in Myanmar on
a massive scale.


2. Myanmar's failure to completely suppress 
   forced labour for private benefit violates 
   Convention No. 29

The facts demonstrate that Myanmar has blatantly violated its
immediate obligation to completely suppress forced labour for
private benefit. It is exacting forced labour from the people
in its joint venture development projects in the oil and gas
sector,(130) infrastructure development (railroads and
highways),(131) and the tourism industry.(132) Further
evidence reveals that members of the military practice forced
labour for their own private commercial benefit, with
impunity.(133) Where the practice of forced or compulsory
labour for the benefit of private associations, companies and
individuals exists, it should be "completely" suppressed from
the date of Convention No. 29 coming into force,(134) and it
should not be permitted thereafter.(135)


3. Myanmar's failure in practice to pursue 
   and to punish those who exact forced labour 
   breaches its obligations under Convention No. 29

There is no credible evidence of any active steps by the
Government of Myanmar to bring about an end to the practice of
forced labour. Prosecution under the Penal Code by its terms
would fail to cover forced labour conducted pursuant to the
Villages Act 1908 and the Towns Act 1907. The issuance of the
secret directives, rather than purporting to end the practice,
further legitimizes the practice by addressing circumstances
under which forced labour can be imposed.(136) No report has
become available of any attempt to pursue prosecution of any
person or organization responsible for the exaction of forced
labour.


B. MYANMAR'S LAWS DO NOT COMPLY WITH CONVENTION No. 29


1. The Government of Myanmar has breached its
   duty under Convention No. 29 because it has
   failed to repeal or amend its laws that permit
   the exaction of forced labour

The Government of Myanmar has admitted that the Villages Act
1908 and the Towns Act 1907(137) are "not ... in line with the
provisions of the ILO Convention,(138) and yet has failed to
repeal or amend those laws. There are no indications that this
situation has changed since a Government's statement to that
effect was issued in a Memorandum of Observations addressed
to the United Nations in March 1996.(139)

Since 1967 the Government of Myanmar has indicated in its
reports under article 22 of the ILO Constitution that those
laws have fallen into disuse and are to be repealed. More
lately, however, the Government has indicated that it relies
on the laws as authorization at least for the practice of
portering.(140) In so doing, it purports to rely on
legislation which the ILO has repeatedly indicated does not
comply with Myanmar's obligations under Convention No.
29,(141) and should be brought into line with Convention No.
29, as well as followed by action "to ensure that the formal
repeal of the power to impose compulsory labour was followed
up in actual practice and that those resorting to coercion in
the recruitment of labour were punished.(142) 


2. The Government of Myanmar has failed to meet
   its duty under Convention No. 29 because it has
   not fully complied with Article 25

The Government of Myanmar has failed to adequately criminalize
and enforce penalties against forced labour practices, as
required by the Convention. Article 25 requires that a State
party make the exaction of forced or compulsory labour
punishable as a criminal offence, that "really adequate
penalties" be available, and that the State party make efforts
to ensure that the laws are enforced. The Committee of Experts
has made clear that compliance with Article 25 of Convention
No. 29 requires that laws must be publicized,(143) as part of
a systematic approach,(144) which has clear goals, a
well-defined strategy, and takes place within a comprehensive
legal framework.(145) Enforcement of the laws contemplated by
Article 25 must cover all sectors of economic production and
industrial activity.(146) 

The secret directives issued by SLORC during 1995(147)
concerning the use of compulsory labour do not amount to
compliance with its Article 25 obligation. On their face the
secret directives do not criminalize the exaction of portering
or any other form of forced or compulsory labour, nor do they
purport to repeal either the Villages Act 1908 or the Towns
Act 1907. The secret directives merely seek to legitimize the
practice of forced or compulsory labour by directing the terms
under which it can be imposed. None of those terms satisfy an
exception found in the Convention, Article 2.(148) Directive
No. 82(149) only covers irrigation and apparently only applies
in the Yangon division. Finally, the secret directives fail to
specify any penalty for non-compliance with their terms and,
in any event, purport to be secret; so that they are unlikely
to be known to the people they are apparently intended to
protect.

Section 347 of the Penal Code, which appears to be repealed,
does not amount to compliance with Article 25 of Convention
No. 29 because it expressly limits the offence that it creates
to the unlawful exaction of forced labour. Accordingly, action
taken under the Villages Act 1908 and the Towns Act 1907 and,
arguably, under the recent secret directives or other such
orders, would fall outside the scope of the section.

___________________________

NOTES


90.  See, e.g., "Ethnic groups", note 27 supra at 89 (since
1992 over 30,000 people reportedly have been forced to work on
the Ye-Tavoy railway). 

91.  "Paradise lost?", note 57 supra at 16-20. A pipeline is
to be constructed from a point in the Andaman Sea past Heinze
Island, then across approximately 65 miles of the Tenasserim
division and into Thailand, where the gas will ultimately be
consumed. See, e.g., "Total denial", note 88 supra at 1. 

92.  Work on the pipeline route has mainly consisted of
clearing the jungle by hand. Related infrastructure work has
included construction of barracks in the area to house SLORC
battalions moved into the region to provide security for the
pipeline. idem. 

93.  See, e.g., "John Doe I., etc. et. al. v. Unocal Corp. et.
al"., docket No. 96-6959 LGB (C.D. Cal.), complaint filed in
US Federal Court, 3 Oct. 1996, paras. 37-182; National
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Federation
of Trade Unions of Burma v. Unocal. Inc. (suits prepared in
anticipation of showing proof on a preponderance of the
evidence). See also letter from Beth Stephen, Center for
Constitutional Rights, dated 21 March 1995 to Mr. Roger Beach,
CEO, Unocal Corporation, p. 2. 

94.  Memorandum of Observations, note 57 supra. at 20, 21
(there is no forced labour in Myanmar; the people contribute
their labour voluntarily). 

95.  See, e.g., "Total denial", note 88 supra at 9. 

96.  "Paradise lost?", note 57 supra at 19; there has been
"considerable disagreement" between the various groups
reporting on alleged forced labour practices in the region,
and the oil companies involved in the work, as to the
relationship between the railway and the pipeline. At the very
least, however, the completion of the railway will facilitate
transport of SLORC troops and their supplies into the area,
and the portion completed already has been used for this
purpose; "Total denial", note 88 supra at 14. 

97.  "Ethnic groups", note 27 supra at 88-89. 

98.  See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text. 

99.  Memorandum of Observations, note 57 supra at 16; "More
information construction of Yangon-Mandalay Union Highway",
Myanmar News Agency, 23 Jan. 1996. 

100.  Memorandum of Observations, note 57 supra at 16. 

101.  idem, at 20 (section entitled "Traditional contribution
of labour" referring to attaining merit through the practice
of "contributions of labour"); used in reference to what the
ILO has considered forced 1abour. Notes 12-26 supra and
accompanying text. 

102.  "Paradise lost?", note 57 supra at 24. As of 15 July
1995, registered foreign investment in Myanmar's hotel and
tourism sector rated second in worth only to the oil and gas
sector; Jeremy Mark, "Western firms remain hesitant about
investing in Burma in contrast to Asians' enthusiasm", "Asian
Wall Street Journal", week of 4 Sep. 1995, pp. 1, 8. 

103.  See, e.g., Burma Action Group: "Burma. The alternative
guide" (Jan. 1996), p. 21, referring to Appendices III and IV. 

104.  N. Chan: "A culture of coercion", "Burma Issues", Jan.
1995, pp. 2, 3. 

105.  Cf. Villages Act 1908, s. 12 (chapeau) and Towns Act
1907, s. 9A, notes 106-110 infra and accompanying text.
Complainants rely on an extremely reliable source and will
provide copies of the said laws as soon as available. 

106.  Villages Act 1908, printed in Burma Code, Vol. VI (1979)
(in pertinent part) (emphasis supplied). 

107.  Memorandum of Observations, note 57 supra at 22. 

108.  See notes 12-26 supra and accompanying text. 

109.  On 19 February 1992 the SLORC announced in the "New
light of Myanmar" that a large number of laws were to be
repealed, having been found to be "no longer in conformity
with the changing circumstances, [or] not been in use for a
very long time [or] laws for which there are no reasons for
use in future ...". State Law and Order Restoration Council,
Law No. 1/92, "The Working People's Daily", 20 Feb. 1992, pp.
1, 7 and 8. A list of some 137 laws was appended. State Law
and Order Restoration Council Law No 4/93 similarly announced
the repeal of another 14 laws, "The Working People's Daily", 1
Apr. 1993, pp. 1, 6. As of March 1996, the SLORC announced
that 151 laws had been repealed, 35 "old" laws and 78
"subsidiary" laws were also said to have been repealed and
replaced by new laws, Memorandum of observations, note 57
supra at 18. 

110.  In 1996, the Government stated that it "had started the
process of amending these two laws ...", Memorandum of
Observations, note 57 supra at 22; this statement was further
explained by a Government representative to the Conference
Committee in June, who indicated that a board formed to
monitor the progress of the review of the Villages Act 1908
and the Towns Act 1907 had met three times in the previous
year, as a result of which the draft of a new unified law had
been submitted to the Laws Scrutiny Central Body for approval,
International Labour Conference, 83rd Session, Provisional
Record (Geneva, 1996), p. 14/56, and see the discussion of the
proceedings of the Conference Committee notes 13-15
supra and accompanying text. The content of the draft law was
not revealed. Cf. the Government's statement made to the
Committee of Experts in 1968, note 4 supra and accompanying
text. 

111.  The UN Special Rapporteur in Myanmar was provided with
copies of certain secret directives concerning the practice
of forced labour, during the course of his visit to Myanmar in
1995, Report of the Special Rapporteur, 1996, note 32 supra
add. 2, 3. 

112.  idem, at para. 141. 

113.  Burma Code, Vol. VIII (1979) (in pertinent part)
(emphasis supplied). 

114.  International Labour Conference, Record of Proceedings,
14th Session (Geneva, 1930), p. 61, referred to in
International Labour Conference, 65th Session, Report III
(Part 4A), Report of the Committee of Experts, General Survey
of the Reports relating to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930
(No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
(No. 105), 1979 (Geneva, 1979) ("1979 General Survey"), para.
21, n. 3; and in International Labour Conference, 52nd
Session, Report III (Part 4), Report of the Committee of
Experts, General Survey on the Reports concerning the Forced
Labour Convention 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), 1968 (Geneva, 1968)
("1968 General Survey"), para. 27, n. 3. 

115.  As provided for by Article 1(1) of the Convention.
Further, "penalty" should be construed together with, and in
light of the other limb of the definition of "forced or
compulsory labour" that the person performing the work or
services did not offer themselves voluntarily, cfr. Article
2(1) of the Convention.  

116.  Villages Act 1908, s. 12, Towns Act 1907, s. 9A. The
relevant provisions are set out in full, section III.C.1
supra. The Committee of Experts and the Conference Committee
have both determined that the existence and the operation of
these laws are inconsistent with Myanmar's obligations under
Convention No. 29. Notes 5-15 supra and accompanying text. 

117.  Cf. RCE, 1996, note 11 supra at 85 (case concerning
Japan: the conditions in which Korean "comfort women" were
forced to provide sexual services during World War II amounted
to "sexual slavery" that would have been contemplated by
Convention No. 29; the women would have been entitled to wages
and other benefits of employment). 

118.  See, e.g., "Child labour", ILO doc. GB.265/2 (Geneva,
Mar. 1996), para. 32 (Convention No. 29 "enables the ILO to
examine practices with regard to child labour which amount to
forced labour within the meaning of the Convention"; this has
been done for "some ten years"). 

119.  See the discussion in section IV. D.4 infra. 

120.  For a discussion of the effect of payment on the
exceptions of Article 2(2), see note 150 infra and
accompanying text. 

121.  US Committee for Refugees, USCR site visit to Bangladesh
(20 June-1 July 1996) (Washington, D.C., 1996) (recent
arrivals in Bangladesh from Arakan State report Rohingyas are
disproportionately subject to forced labour and that forced
labour periods extended to several weeks each month, reducing
time available to farm); Beyond the law, note 51 supra at
46-49; Amnesty International: Myanmar: Human rights still
denied, AI: ASA 16/8/94 (Nov. 1994), pp. 15-17. 

122.  International Labour Conference, 83rd Session,
Provisional Record, Report of the Committee on the Application
of Standards (Geneva, 1996), pp. 14/56-14/58. 

123.  See the discussion at notes 88, 89 supra and
accompanying text. 

124.  International Labour Conference, 83rd Session,
Provisional Record, Report of the Committee on the Application
of Standards (Geneva, 1996), pp. 14/56-14/58. 

125.  Between 800,000 (statement of the Workers' delegation to
the Conference Committee, 1996, idem, at 14/57) and 2
million (estimate of Human Rights Watch/Asia: Entrenchment,
note 48 supra at 14) people have been used to date. 

126.  RCE, 1993, note 7 supra, case of Myanmar, at para. 3;
RCE, 1996, note 11 supra at para. 3; see also note 9 supra
and accompanying text. 

127.  Article 24 Report, note 17 supra at para. 52. 

128.  See notes 11, 12 supra and accompanying text. 

129.  See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text. 

130.  See notes 90-97 supra and accompanying text. 

131.  See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 

132.  See note 58 supra and accompanying text. 

133.  See note 104 supra and accompanying text. 

134.  Article 4(2). 

135.  Article 4(1). 

136.  The text of the secret directives is discussed at notes
111, 112 supra and accompanying text. 

137.  See notes 105-110 supra and accompanying text. 

138.  Memorandum of Observations, note 57 supra at 22. 

139.  idem; for a discussion of the difficulty in researching
the current law of Myanmar, see Beyond the law, note 51 supra
at 3-4. 

140.  See, e.g., Memorandum of Observations, note 57 supra at
20-23; submissions of the Government of Myanmar to the
Article 24 Committee, note 17 supra at para. 24; note verbale
dated 4 Nov. 1994 of the Permanent Mission of the Union of
Myanmar to the United Nations Office at Geneva, containing the
response to the Report of the Special Rapporteur, 1994
(note 43 supra), reproduced in the Interim Report of the
Special Rapporteur in UN doc. A/49/594/Add.1 (28 Oct. 1994),
para. 3 (paras. 24-28 of the note verbale reiterate the
position that recruitment of porters is in accordance with the
law, that they are well treated and that there are regulations
to this effect). 

141.  See the discussion in section III supra. 

142.  See generally ILO, Governing Body, minutes of the 261st
Session, ILO doc. GB.261/PV(Rev.) (Geneva, Nov. 1994),
para. 61. 

143.  International Labour Conference, 75th Session, Report
III (Part 4A), Report of the Committee of Experts (Geneva,
1988) ("RCE, 1988"), p. 75 (case concerning Burundi: Measures
must be taken to make the public aware of the repeal of
legislation which formerly permitted the exaction of forced
labour). Cf. RCE, 1993, note 7 supra at 109 (case concerning
Liberia: The continued practice of forced labour after the
repeal of laws which formerly authorized it demonstrated the
need for publicity). 

144.  RCE, 1993, note 7 supra at 93 (case concerning Brazil:
The Government must take "systematic action commensurate
with the dimensions and gravity of the problem ..."). 

145.  International Labour Conference, Report III (Part 4A),
Report of the Committee of Experts (Geneva, 1994, p. 140
(case concerning Thailand: The Government should formulate
legislative responses to widespread child labour as part of "a
comprehensive legal framework"). 

146.  idem, at 112, case concerning Liberia (the Government
should facilitate strict observance of the prohibition on
forced labour by ensuring adequate labour inspection,
particularly in those sectors thought to be affected by the
problem).  

147.  See notes 111, 112 supra and accompanying text. 

148.  See notes 150-165 infra and accompanying text. 

149.  See note 112 supra and accompanying text. 

[END OF SLICE 23]