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The BurmaNet News: September 25-27,



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 "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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The BurmaNet News: September 25-27, 1998
Issue #1104

Special Issue: The Ceasefire Groups

HEADLINES:
==========
BURMANET: THE ROLE OF ETHNIC RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS 
SHAN/NORTH(5): STATEMENT ON NLD CALL FOR THE HLUTTAW 
KACHIN (1): STATEMENT ON NLD CALL FOR THE HLUTTAW 
EASTERN SHAN STATE (4): STATEMENT ON THE NLD 
NCUB: CEASEFIRE GROUPS URGE DIALOGUE 
CNF: STATEMENT ON THE REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE 
KNU: STATEMENT REGARDING REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE 
SHAN: SSA CALLS FOR DIALOGUE 
****************************************************************

BURMANET: THE ROLE OF THE ETHNIC RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CURRENT
POWER STRUGGLE 
27 September, 1998 

As the political tension in Burma continues to intensify, the question of
popular support for the NLD's call to convene Parliament becomes an
important issue of debate.  How do various sectors of society line up in
this power struggle?  "If you could just walk up to people on the street in
Rangoon and ask them, most would tell you they support the NLD and want to
take some action.  They just don't know what to do," remarked a local
businessman from Rangoon. Many Burma-watchers believe that most Burmese
strongly support the NLD, eight years after its overwhelming victory in the
general elections and with the continued economic crisis throughout the
country, for which they hold the SPDC responsible.

Less known is how much support exists in other sectors of society,
particularly the military and the ceasefire groups.  The newly formed
Committee Representing the People's Parliament, with a mandate from the
elected MP's to act on their behalf, highlighted the importance of these
two sectors by addressing them in its first statement on 16 September.  On
the role of the military, the statement said, "Defence forces are
indispensable for any country ... . (They) must be great in stature, but
one with the people, and always mindful of the will of the people." The NLD
also issued a letter to the Tatmadaw, calling on the armed forces to
support the convening of Parliament.  Clearly threatened by this olive
branch, the SPDC threatened to arrest U Tin Oo, accusing him of
masterminding the letter. 

The NLD also reached out to the ceasefire groups in its fourth resolution
of the 16 September statement.  The committee "warmly welcomed" the
ceasefire groups who had responded positively to the move to convene the
Parliament.  As an "unknown factor," the importance of ceasefire support
for the NLD is on par with the (latent and overt) level of support within
the military.  Amid the numerous armed resistance groups, the most
significant groups in terms of size and influence include the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and the
United Wa State Army (UWSA) among the ceasefire groups, and the Karen
National Union (KNU) among those engaged in armed struggle.

Areas in which armed ethnic resistance forces operate have faced the most
abuses from the military, and therefore the distrust of the military
government runs deep.  In a report released in August of this year, the
International Labour Organization found the Government of Burma (Myanmar)
guilty of widespread and systematic use of forced labor, a slavery-like
practice, with more forced labor used in ethnic minority areas (see The
BurmaNet News: Special Posting, September 20, 1998).  Also this year,
EarthRights International issued a report, "School for Rape" on the common
practice of rape by the Burmese military (Tatmadaw) in areas of continued
armed resistance (see The BurmaNet News, Issue #1016, June 1, 1998).  The
report suggests that rape is being used as a means of ethnic cleansing.  A
recent report by the Karen Human Rights Group (The BurmaNet News, Issue
#1102, September 23, 1998) explains that the recent flight of a number of
Karens from their local villages is due to landmines, looting and
extortion, forced relocation exacted on them by the Tatmadaw.  Similar
abuses are taking place throughout Shan State (see The BurmaNet News: Shan
Human Rights Group August, September 17, 1998).  While the armed ethnic
resistance organizations vary in their political ideologies and means of
supporting themselves, they share a profound sense of frustration and
distrust toward the military regime.

The ceasefire groups entered their agreements with the SLORC/SPDC with the
understanding that it was a first step, to be followed by a peace
agreement, development, and a political settlement to their demands.
Beyond the ceasefire agreements, no progress has been made.  Most
portering, torture, and rape have stopped, but crop development has not
come to most ceasefire areas and guarantees of rice and other financial
support have been reneged on.  Frustrated with the empty promises, these
groups could throw their support to the NLD.  Indeed, that is what four
groups have dared to declare publicly.

On 11 August, 1998 the Karenni National Peoples' Liberation Front (KNPLF),
the Shan National Peoples' Liberation Organization  (SNPLO), and the Kayan
Newland Party (KNLP) -- all ceasefire groups -- issued a joint letter
calling on the SPDC to enter into tripartite dialogue with NLD and the
representatives of the ethnic groups.  The letter also stated support for
Aung San Suu Kyi's call to convene Parliament.  All three groups are
notable for not having strong nationalist agendas; rather, their party
structures and their ideologies tend toward the egalitarian, e.g. they have
members of various ethnic groups in their central executive committees. 

On 18 August, 1998, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) issued a statement
calling for dialogue and for respect for the results of the 1990 elections.
 The party's history dates back to 1958, with its precursor Mon People's
Front dating back to 1952.  It entered a ceasefire agreement with the
(then) SLORC in 1996.

The Shan States' Army (SSA), a coalition of the Shan State Army (North)
(SSA-North), Shan State National Army (SSNA), and the Shan United
Revolutionary Army (SURA -- recently renamed Shan State Army-Southern)
issued an even stronger statement on September 15, calling for tripartite
dialogue and for a transfer of power to the MP's elected in 1990.  In this
coalition, the first two groups have entered ceasefire agreements with the
SLORC/SPDC.  The SURA (SSA-Southern) has not.

At least two groups who are still engaged in armed struggle against the
regime, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Chin National Front (CNF)
have issued statements supporting the NLD move to convene Parliament. 

The SPDC, as expected, does not take kindly to such actions.  After
rounding up the MP's-elect and other key NLD members, they also ordered
representatives of six ceasefire groups to come to Rangoon for a meeting.
Included were the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Kachin Independence
Organization (KIO), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National
Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA -- a Kokang [ethnic Chinese] group), the
Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), and the Shan Special Region #4.

Placing Aung San Suu Kyi in the same camp as other "enemies of the state"
such as western countries, the Democratic Alliance of Burma, and the
National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), Col. Than Aye told those
gathered that as a result of signing ceasefire agreements, they were allied
with the SPDC.  "As the NLD is the enemy of the Tatmadaw," he continued,
"any group that supports the NLD becomes our enemy."

Of the six groups that gathered, only the NMSP had made a public statement
about the NLD's call to convene Parliament.  Their statement on 18 August,
1998 urged the recognition of the 1990 election results and called for
dialogue.  Col. Than Aye told the NMSP representative to withdraw this
statement.

In addition, the SPDC recently sent a representative to Loikano to put
pressure on the KNPLF, KNLP, and the SNPLO to retract their joint statement
or deny having written it.  It would not be surprising if they are forced
into a retraction, in some form or another.  The larger groups pose a
greater challenge to the SPDC and can afford a certain amount of resistance
in this power play.  Under strong pressure from the junta, it is difficult
for the smaller ceasefire groups to stand up to them.  Also last week, an
SPDC representative went to the KNU to once again initiate ceasefire talks,
and he suggested that the NLD was no friend of the KNU.  But the KNU argued
to the contrary and the representative left disappointed.

Recent news from the state-controlled press indicates that the SPDC has met
with some success in pressuring ceasefire groups to line up -- publicly, at
least -- on the military's side of the power play.  The Kachin Special
Region (1) (formerly the Kachin New Democratic Party, headed by Za Khun
Ting Ring), and the Shan State (North) Special Region #5 (headed by U Mahtu
Naw) both issued statements earlier this month.  The Shan State Special
Region #4, one of the groups summoned to Rangoon by Col. Than Aye, also
recently issued a statement soon after that meeting.  All three groups
declared non-support for the NLD and defended their positions by stating
that they were concerned with the economic development in their regions,
and the convening of Parliament will prompt confrontation, with adverse
affects on development.  All these groups are located in highland areas of
Northern Burma and have been involved in the drug trade.  They may actually
support the SPDC, have given into pressure, or they might see the NLD and
democracy as a potential threat to their business interests.

The case of the New Mon State Party is particularly interesting. The NMSP
has not been consistent in its position toward the NLD.  Earlier this year,
the chairman, Nai Shwe Kyin, accused Aung San Suu Kyi of being a tool of
imperialists and the CIA, but more recently shifted to voicing support for
the NLD. Over the last several months, the NMSP sent three letters to the
SPDC.  The first objected to the use of the phrase "exchanging arms for
peace," used frequently in the state-controlled press in reference to the
ceasefire agreements.  This term, according to the NMSP, sounds a little
too much like "surrendered."  The second letter urged respect for the 1990
election results and called for dialogue.  This is the letter that Col.
Than Aye took issue with during the six-group meeting.  The third letter
objected to the closing of the Mon schools, which had been permitted as a
condition of the ceasefire agreement. 

The pre-ceasefire period was difficult on Mon villagers.  Accused of
supporting the armed rebels, they were continuously subject to killings and
torture.  Though human rights abuses have been reduced, limited forced
portering, forced labor, and extortion have continued, and the NMSP's
protests have been ignored.  The socio-economic situation has remained
dismal.  Education occurs in spite of the SPDC rather than with its
support.  Small armed Mon groups have continued to operate, unsatisfied
with the ceasefire agreement.

It was in this context that the NMSP's representative returned from the
meeting with Col. Than Aye and relayed his message to the NMSP Central
Executive Committee.  The CEC stood by its statement.

The SPDC often states that the people of Burma simply want to live their
lives in the quiet peacefulness that is emerging as the Tatmadaw continues
to bring armed insurgents into the legal fold -- a theory based on the
presumption that the "peace-loving people of Burma" are not concerned with
politics.  Perhaps the presumption on which this theory is based is true
(though it is debatable).  Even so, the non-politically active -- the
farmers, factory workers, street vendors -- believe that with the NLD in
charge, at least they will be left alone.  Those in the border areas
believe there will be no more forced labor, portering, torture, and forced
relocation. The more optimistic believe that the NLD can bring in competent
people to address the many problems facing the country.  They hope that
some semblance of equality will emerge, with people enjoying their basic
rights, trusting that their children can have an education, and that they
will be able to work a job and earn a living.  They also know that the SPDC
has driven the country to pariah status in the international community, and
foreign investment will provide some help once democracy is restored. 

In mid-September, a Lt. Col. from a Moulemein navy base was arrested after
going to the home of a Mon MP.  The purpose of the meeting and what was
discussed is anyone's guess, but the military apparently suspected politics
was on the agenda.  The hidden support for the NLD within the military and
among the ceasefire groups is still an unknown factor, although most
military voted for the NLD in the 1990 election.  The SPDC's swift and
decisive response to signs of dissent in these sectors indicates that it
knows where it is vulnerable.

Shows of support from the military and ethnic organizations have the
potential to give the NLD confidence of public support throughout Burma as
well as opening the door for international support. In a 24 September
broadcast on BBC, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said she had received many letters
of support from all over Burma, but the groups did not want to state their
support publicly, for fear of SPDC's response.  While the public support is
crucial in the current power struggle, the fact that the NLD still
maintains a broad base of hidden and quiet support surely bolsters their
resolve and gives them confidence.  There is a big difference between a
statement made under coercion that denounces the NLD and actually not
having that support.

But if people are ultimately afraid to stand up in support of the
Parliament, the NLD will not be able to push its demands forward.  At the
same time, if the ceasefire groups and segments in the army place
themselves squarely behind the NLD and Parliament, the military junta will
be quite vulnerable.  Although the current battle appears to only involve
the junta, the NLD, and ethnic leaders, in fact the actions or lack thereof
of the people and ethnic organizations will be decisive. 

****************************************************************

SHAN/NORTH SPECIAL REGION (5): STATEMENT ON NLD CALL FOR CONVENING THE HLUTTAW
18 September, 1998 

The Central Military Commission
Shan/North Special Region No 5, KDA
Kaungkha Myothit

Subject: Attitude of the Shan/North Special Region No 5 in connection with
the NLD (National League for Democracy)'s call for convening of the Hluttaw

1. The Shan/North Special Region No 5 does not accept the NLD (National
League for Democracy)'s call for convening of the Hluttaw. The reasons for
not accepting the call are,

(a) NLD (National League for Democracy)'s call for convening of the Hluttaw
before drafting of the constitution is completed is illegal,

(b) the NLD (National League for Democracy)'s withdrawal from the National
Convention being organized with the leadership of the government
constitutes hindering the process for drafting an enduring constitution,

(c) NLD (National League for Democracy) is a political party that opposes
the government and as such Shan/North Special Region No 5, KDA, does not
accept the call of the National League for Democracy to convene the Hluttaw.

2. The Shan/North Special Region No 5, KDA, took up arms as KIA and rose
against the government for 30 years. Though it engaged in armed conflicts
it did not accomplish regional development tasks which it had aspired for
but it witnessed only the severe losses on both sides such as separation of
families, tragedies and bloodshed.

3. Therefore, the Shan/North Special Region No 5, KDA, made peace with the
government in response to the magnanimity and goodwill of the dignitaries,
and it has been able to carry out the following development projects:

(a) in education, a high school has been opened in Kaungkha Myothit, a high
school in Mongsi, a middle school in Hokho Village in Lwekhaung region and
primary schools in many villages;

(b) in health, dispensaries have been opened in Kaungkha Myothit and
villages in other regions;

(c) in transport and communications, new motor roads have been built in
areas where there were no such roads in the past. A tar road has been built
up to Kaungkha Myothit.

4. Confrontation will occur in the country if the NLD (National League for
Democracy) convenes the Hluttaw. Confrontation will not produce any
positive results. The nation will suffer losses and regional development
being achieved in Shan/North Special Region No 5, KDA, with added momentum,
could also be hampered and then brought to a standstill. So, it hereby
declares that it will not support the NLD (National League for Democracy)'s
call for convening of the Hluttaw and it will not accept it.

U Mahtu Naw
Chairman
Central Military Commission
Shan/North Special Region No 5
KDA 

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KACHIN SPECIAL REGION (1): STATEMENT ON NLD CALL FOR CONVENING THE HLUTTAW 
5 September, 1998 

Kachin Special Region (1)
Letter No 027/98/Kachin Special Region(1)

Subject: Attitude of the Kachin Special Region (1) in connection with the NLD 
(National League for Democracy)'s call for convening of the Hluttaw

1. Kachin Special Region (1), NDA, Kachin organization, has already laid
down democracy programme.

We have laid down the democracy programme based on the five points. They are:
(1) to ensure durable peace,
(2) to provide equality,
(3) to foster unity,
(4) to provide freedom; freedom of expression, freedom of faith, freedom of
invention, freedom of trade and commerce and freedom shall be enjoyed
according to law or freedom shall be enjoyed without infringing others'
interests,
(5) among the different national races, the majority national race is to
safeguard the rights of minority national races.

2. Our democracy programme is totally different from the activities of the
National League for Democracy.

(a) The National League for Democracy is carrying out activities alone in
the forefront.

(b) It has left the National Convention.

(c) It is carrying out activities to seize power by means of opposing the
government.

(d) There exists dangerous foreign interference behind it.

(e) Their activities adversely affect the stability and peace and are
harmful to the economic, social, education and cultural development of the
State and progress made in national consolidation.

3. We cannot allow in anyway national development projects being
implemented with added momentum within the framework of law in the region
which lagged behind in development to be hindered and will oppose all
attempts to hinder them.

4. We are on alert to see that losses are not to be suffered once more due
to interferences of those possessed by external politics and those
attempting to disunite the national races.

Za Khun Ting Ring
Chairman
Kachin Special Region (1) 

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EASTERN SHAN STATE SPECIAL REGION (4): STATEMENT ON THE NLD 
19 September, 1998 

Eastern Shan State Special Region (4)
Headquarters, Mongla

Declaration on the Attitude of the Eastern Shan State Special Region (4) in
connection with the Acts of the National League for Democracy

Rumours about the political situation are spreading in the country.  We are
worried about them.  We are particularly worried about the news that
Parliament will be called replacing the drafting of the constitution
through the Government's National Convention.  Hence, the declaration on
the attitude of the Eastern Shan State Special Region (4)   is as follows:

1.  National solidarity disintegrated in our country in the past due to
armed conflicts among the national races.  Considering that disintegration
of national solidarity could harm national independence and sovereignty,
successive governments tried to secure national reconsolidation employing
all possible means.  However, they did not realize the objective for
various reasons.  Now only, national solidarity has been established due to
the Tatmadaw Government's efforts.  Peace has also been restored.  As much
as peace has been restored progress is made in economy, transport and
communications and education in the border areas where different national
races reside.  Their standard of living has also improved.  The Tatmadaw
government and we, the national races, have not made peace easily.  We have
achieved it only after confronting hitches and overcoming numerous
difficulties.

2.  The National League for Democracy is reported to be organizing to
convene the Parliament.  This act can create misunderstanding between the
Tatmadaw Government and nationalities groups and undermine the peace which
they have achieved out of much difficulty.  Moreover, it can destabilize
the nation and then cause disintegration of the Union.  Our organization
will not support in any way the acts of that party.

3.  Our organization believes that the Tatmadaw Government has already
established national solidarity and at present it is heading for the
discipline flourishing democracy.  We also believe that in so doing it is
following the correct path.  So, our organization declares that it will
continue to cooperate only with the Tatmadaw Government.

Sai Lin
Military Local Administration Committee
Eastern Shan State Special Region (4)
Union of Myanmar

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NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF BURMA: CEASEFIRE GROUPS URGE DIALOGUE 
4 September, 1998 

Media Release

ETHNIC CEASEFIRE GROUPS URGE BURMESE MILITARY TO ENTER DIALOGUE

Three ceasefire groups based in Kayah and Shan States in eastern Burma have
called on Burma's military authorities to enter into a dialogue with
opposition groups.

The call was made in a letter to the Chairman of the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), Senior General Than Shwe, by the Karenni
Nationalities Peoples' Liberation Front (KNPLF), the Kayan Newland Party
(KNP) and the Shan Nationalities Peoples' Liberation Organization (SNPLO).

The letter was signed by chairmen of the three groups, all of which signed
ceasefire agreements with the military in 1994. The letter was sent to the
SPDC on August 11, 1998, and it supported moves by the National League for
Democracy (NLD) to convene parliament. In the letter the three groups state
that they "sincerely believe that the NLD's call to convene Parliament is
just and in accordance with the law, and that there is already a provision
which empowers the Pyithu Hluttaw (Parliament) to draw up a Constitution."

Presidium member of the National Council of the Union of Burma NCUB, U Tin
Maung Win, says the letter is an encouraging sign for the peaceful
settlement of Burma's political crisis.

"We understand that this is the first time any ceasefire group has called
for a dialogue with pro-democracy and ethnic organisations.  The military
should now take this opportunity to gather the country's leaders together
in a tripartite dialogue and solve Burma's problems peacefully. We know
that on September 1 representatives of the military regime met with leaders
of the three groups in the Shan State capital, Taunggyi, however details of
the meeting are not known," U Tin Maung Win said.

The letter from the three groups also states that the National Convention,
set up in 1993 by the military to draft a Constitution, is no longer
relevant to the current political climate in Burma. The groups go on to
state that they believe now is an opportune time to build a new Union of
Burma where all nationalities enjoy equal rights and equal representation.

The NCUB is an umbrella organisation representing some 19 ethnic and
pro-democracy groups.

National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB)
For more information please call 01 828 3741, 01 253 9082.

****************************************************************

CHIN NATIONAL FRONT: STATEMENT ON THE FORMATION OF REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE 
19 September, 1998 

1. The National League for Democracy Party won 392 seats out of 485 seats
in the 1990 General Elections held by the SLORC (now SPDC). The SLORC
itself and international community recognised the elections as free and fair.

2. The SLORC, breaking its promise, refused to allow the parliament to sit
and has been convening a sham National Convention with hand-picked
representatives since February 9, 1993. The convention has been drafting a
constitution which would legalize the military's role in the politics of
future Burma. This act is totally against the will of the people and is a
mere activity for the interest of a group of military dictators.

3. The NLD, in accordance with the mandate rendered to it by the people,
demanded the regime, in its statement issued in the party General
Conference which was held on the 8th anniversary day of the elections, 27
May 1998, to convene National Assembly within 60 days.. The SPDC, however,
not only denied the demand of NLD but blocked the movement of the party by
disturbing, detaining and arresting its key members.

4. Thus, 10-member Representative Committee for People's Assembly, which
has a mandate from the elected representatives in 1990 poll, was formed on
September 16, 1998.

5. As the formation of the Representative Committee for People's Assembly
is the act of fulfilling the will of the people and is for the interest of
the people, the Chin National Front fully support it.

6. The Chin National Front strongly demands the SPDC to :
- legally recognise the Representative Committee for People's Assembly and
- immediately release all the people's representatives and political
prisoners.

Central Committee
Chin National Front

****************************************************************

KAREN NATIONAL UNION: STATEMENT REGARDING THE FORMATION OF REPRESENTATIVE
COMMITTEE 

24 September, 1998 

 KNU Statement regarding Formation of Representative Committee for Parliament

1. Formation of Representative Committee for Parliament on 16-9-98, on the
basis of the mandate given by members of Parliament, after the meeting of
representatives of 4 ethnic nationality organizations and the NLD, was in
consonant with the will of the people and in compliance with the Election Law.

2. After the formation, the Committee performed necessary and appropriate
tasks on behalf of the Parliament. The action of the Committee is a
suitable move and we, the KNU, fully support the decision that the
'Committee shall act on behalf of the Parliament' as long as the Parliament
cannot be convened.

3. As the move to convene Parliament was obstructed by the SPDC, the NLD
has to form the Committee to act on its behalf. This is not something
conventional. Therefore, we demand the SPDC to withdraw its obstructions,
and earnestly urge members of the armed forces to help and support the NLD,
the Representative Committee for Parliament and the members of Parliament,
in order that the members of Parliament may perform their duties, normally.

(The KNU is the political wing of the Karen people's resistance for freedom
and democracy. It has been leading the struggle since 1949, a year after
the independence of Burma from the British. The resistance began in
response to atrocities against the Karen populations in the Irrawaddy Delta
and the Tanessarim Division, perpetrated by troops of the pocket army of
Gen. Ne Win. In January 1999, the KNU will celebrate half a century of
resistance.)

****************************************************************

SHAN: SSA CALLS FOR DIALOGUE 
18 September, 1998 

The Shan States Army has issued an announcement, dated 15 September,
calling for the materialization of the Tripartite Dialogue.

The statement, signed by Yordserk, its commander, also called for transfer
of power to the representatives elected in 1990.

In addition, it also asked the ceasefire groups to take stock of their
ten-year experience with the military junta, whether things have gone for
the better or worse with the people and urged them not to lose sight of
their original aims and objectives.

The message ended with a call to the Tatmadawmen i-e. Burmese soldiers to
support the NLD's efforts to call the long awaited parliament.

The Shan States Army is a combined force of the Shan State Army, Shan State
National Army and the Shan United Revolutionary Army, which united in 1996.
It is believed to be as strong if not stronger than the United Wa State
Army in the whole Shan States.

S.H.A.N. (Shan Herald Agency for News) 

****************************************************************