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The BurmaNet News: October 2, 1998



------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------
 "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
----------------------------------------------------------

The BurmaNet News: October 2, 1998
Issue #1109

HEADLINES:
==========
NLD: ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 71 (INTERROGATION)
KHRG: INFORMATION UPDATE #98-U4 (NORTHERN PA'AN)
SAIN: EXCERPTS FROM OUT OF CONTROL 2 
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NLD: ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 71 
23 September, 1998 

The authorities, in violation of their own slogan "the rule of law", have
illegally arrested the following National League for Democracy [NLD]
members since 27 May 1998:
  People's Assembly members  --   200 
  Organizing Committee members  --  710

The authorities' claim that the purpose of such arrests for the "goodwill
view exchanges" is for them to look favorable in the eyes of the people and
the international community. Their claim is absolutely false.  The
following bears evidence to this fact.  The arrested members were
interrogated and many questions were asked.  Some of these questions were:

(1)  What is your attitude toward the present political direction being
taken by the NLD?

(2)  What are your views regarding the NLD's call for convening parliament?

(3)  What are your predictions about the political consequences if
parliament is not convened?

(4)  If parliament is convened, what will be your views regarding the
future of politics, economics, education, and social welfare of the country?

(5)  What is your attitude towards Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Aung Shwe, U Tin
Oo, and other Central Executive Committee members?

(6)  What is your attitude toward the State Peace and Development Council?

(7)  What is your attitude toward the authorities regarding your arrest? 

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KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP: INFORMATION UPDATE #98-U4
1 October, 1998 from <khrg@xxxxxxxxx> 

An Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group

[Information Update is periodically produced by KHRG in order to provide
timely reporting of specific developments, particularly when urgent action
may be required.  It is produced primarily for Internet distribution.
Topics covered will generally be reported in more detail in upcoming KHRG
reports.] 

Destruction of Villages in Northern Pa'an District

An SPDC campaign to destroy Karen villages in northern Pa'an District has
already led to the displacement of several thousand villagers, and over
3,000 of these villagers have crossed the border into Thailand.  The area
they are fleeing is on the eastern slopes of the Dawna Range close to the
Thai border, part of Dta Greh township (Dta Greh is called Pain Kyone in
Burmese, and the SPDC considers it part of Hlaing Bwe township).

Sixty to one hundred kilometres (40-60 miles) further south in Myawaddy and
Kawkareik townships, many villagers have been fleeing their villages
because of forced labour as human mine detonators and a threat to relocate
their villages at harvest time in late 1998 (see KHRG Information Update
#98-U2, "Displacement of Villagers in Southern Pa'an District"). However,
in Dta Greh township the campaign to forcibly relocate or destroy the
villages already began in August and is now in full swing. There has been
sporadic fighting between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and
SPDC units in the area, and more intense fighting around the KNLA 7th
Brigade headquarters further south, and it appears that the SPDC has now
resorted to its standard military strategy of destroying all villages in
areas of perceived resistance.

In August approximately 1,500 villagers from the affected area fled across
the border to Noh Bo in Thailand, and in September another 1,665 refugees
have crossed into Thailand in the Mae U-Su area.  The September refugees
come from the villages of Tee Gker Haw, Wah Mi Klah, B'Nweh Pu, Po Paw Lay,
Meh Lah Ah Hta, Meh Lah Ah Kee, Meh Keh, and Klay Po Kloh.  Refugees are
also reported to have come from Po Ti Pwa, Ma Oh Pu, and Tha Pwih Hser
villages.  As yet the total number of villages affected by the campaign is
unclear.

In September SPDC troops, reportedly from Light Infantry Division #44,
formed three columns of approximately 100 soldiers each and went separate
ways to destroy villages.  Villagers from Meh Keh testify that the SPDC
column positioned itself on a hill outside the village and fired several
mortar shells into the village without warning, causing all the villagers
to flee.  The troops then entered the village, looted the houses, killed
and ate the livestock, and burned down the houses and paddy storage barns.
Testimony from other villages agrees that this is the pattern being used by
the SPDC troops.  Villagers confirm that at least 4 villages have been
completely destroyed in this way: in Meh Keh 27 houses were burned down, in
Meh La Ah Hta 24 houses were burned, and the villages of Tha Pwih Hser and
Bo Toh Pwah were also completely destroyed.  One house from B'Nweh Pu
village was destroyed, as well as varying numbers of houses in other villages.

The intent appears to be to drive the entire civilian population out of the
area with little care for where they go.  An SPDC written order received by
at least one village in the area translates as follows:

Front Line Light Infantry Battalion No. (104)
Pakalu village
Ref. No.  104 / 02 / Oo 1
Date. 1998 August 

To:	Chairman, xxxx   village
Subject:  Order to vacate issued to the villages.

1. Order has been issued to    xxxx    village to vacate the place and move
to Kwih Lay village or to any other place where the villagers have
relatives, at the latest by 10th September 1998.

2. After the date of issue of this order, it is warned that the Army will
go around clearing the area and should any village or small huts in the
paddy fields be found still standing, they will all be dismantled and
destroyed.

[Sd.]
(for) Battalion Commander
Front line Light Infantry Battalion No.104

[Above order reproduced courtesy of the Health Workers' Union (Pa'an
District) from their 19 September report on the situation in this area.]

However, most villagers who have fled the area say that their villages
never received any such order, they were simply attacked without warning.
The only news they had heard was word from local KNLA troops that SPDC
columns were heading for their villages and may make trouble.  In Tee Gker
Haw village, soldiers of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA, a Karen
group allied with the SPDC) came to the village first and told the
villagers, "Just stay here and don't run away".  The villagers stayed, but
when the SPDC column arrived they immediately began looting houses and
shooting livestock.  Most of the villagers ran, and those who were caught
by the SPDC column were taken away as porters.  The village was thoroughly
looted but was not burned.  The villagers report that there are 10 or more
DKBA soldiers with each of the SPDC columns, probably fulfilling their
usual role as guides and giving information about hidden food supplies and
likely hiding places of the villagers.

Those who have fled report that most of the villages in the area are now
abandoned; even those which have not yet been attacked have been abandoned
out of fear.  Only a few people remain in some of the villages which have
not been destroyed, mainly the elderly or others physically incapable of
fleeing to the hills.  Many villagers remain internally displaced high in
the hills.  There are many landmines in the area which have been laid by
all sides - the KNLA, DKBA and SPDC.  Several villagers have already been
seriously wounded by these mines while fleeing.  One woman who had her leg
blown off has been evacuated to Mae Sot hospital in Thailand.

KNLA units are active as guerrillas in the area, but there is not regular
or heavy fighting.  The villagers report that the SPDC columns are still
around their villages, and believe that they are planning to establish a
new Army camp in the area.  There are already two existing SPDC Army camps
near Meh Lah Ah, at Kyih Lay Kyo and Wah Bway Kyo.  The villagers say that
in the past, SPDC troops at these camps have not tried to destroy their
villages but have regularly raided villages to capture porters and loot
food.  This time, most villagers fled their villages to avoid being
captured as porters, not realising their villages were to be destroyed. The
villagers say they have no idea why the SPDC has suddenly decided to
destroy their villages.

According to a report by the Health Workers' Union (Pa'an District), dated
19 September and already released over the Burma news services of the
Internet, the operation is code-named "Aung Moe Haing" and is currently
employing SPDC Light Infantry Battalions #3, 9, and 118, and Infantry
Battalion #81.

Further details and interviews with villagers affected by this campaign
will be presented in an upcoming KHRG report.

****************************************************************

SOUTHEAST ASIAN INFORMATION NETWORK (SAIN): OUT OF CONTROL 2 
1 October, 1998 

[BurmaNet is presenting excerpts from the recently-released SAIN report,
"Out of Control 2."  This report is available in its original form which
includes graphics, maps and tables on the web at:
http://sunsite.unc.edu/freeburma/drugs/ooc2. You can read the report on
line or download as a word97 or wp5 file.  The excerpts included here cover
the introduction, methodology, policy options, and conclusions.]

THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC IN BURMA

A Report on the Current Status of the HIV/AIDS and Heroin Epidemics, Policy
Options, and Policy implications

SOUTHEAST ASIAN INFORMATION NETWORK  (SAIN)

About this Report:

SAIN released the first version of "Out of Control" in December, 1995, at
the first International Congress on the Restoration of Democracy in Burma,
in New Delhi, India.  Since then, Burmese citizens have suffered worsening
repression, further declines in health status and economic well-being, and
have continued to live under the SLORC regime and its deepening attacks on
the democracy movement, including the National League for Democracy, and
its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Opium production has more than doubled since
1988, when SLORC seized state power, and this trend has continued through
1998.  A deadly interaction of worsening state repression, increasing
heroin availability, and a growing commercial sex industry have made the
people of Burma increasingly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS.  The HIV epidemic in
1998 remains out of control.

Our goal in publishing a second, updated version of Out of Control is to
report on the continuing interaction of HIV/AIDS and injecting drug use
under the Burmese military dictatorship. The evidence suggests that the
regime continues to be what the U.S. State Department has termed "a
narco-dictatorship," and that the health of the Burmese people continues to
deteriorate.  New evidence from China and India suggests that Burmese
heroin exports to those countries now pose similar risks to their peoples,
and the evidence suggests high-level junta involvement with the export of
these narcotics.

We do not wish to compromise those already working to slow the spread of
HIV/AIDS in Burma, but rather to move the debate on international
involvement forward such that HIV/AIDS programs of real benefit to the
people of Burma can be mounted.  It is in this spirit that we sincerely
apologize for any and all negative repercussions this report may have on
people inside Burma.

SAIN affirms that no medical personnel or staff of any official agency in
Burma shared the information in this report with us; the data were provided
by sources which cannot be named.

SAIN would like to thank the many people responsible for this report. It is
dedicated to those now in prison for their support for non-violent social
change in Burma.

Contents							
About this report					
Contents
Methodology						
Introduction					
Current Status of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic	
	Injecting drug users				
	Blood and Blood products			
	Heterosexual transmission			
	Homo/bisexual transmission			
	Ethnic Minorities, Border States, and Migrant labor
	Prison Populations				
	The Military Population				
	Perinatal Transmission				
	AIDS Care						
	Involvement of the SLORC in the Narcotics Industry
Policy Implications				
The Democracy Movement			
Policy Options					
Conclusions
Maps					
Tables											

METHODOLOGY

Molecular methods for HIV subtyping:

The HIV virus has two distinct variants, HIV-1 and HIV-2.  HIV-2 is much
less common and found only in some parts of West Africa, and recently in
India.  HIV-1, the virus that has caused the global AIDS epidemic, has
several distinct subtypes.  These are generally named HIV-1 subtypes A, B,
C, D, E, F, G, H, and O.  These subtypes differ from each other in genetic
make-up (genotype) and also in their protein structures (phenotype.)
However, from an infectious and clinical perspective they are all basically
quite similar.  All are spread through the same routes; all cause HIV
infection, lead to AIDS, and kill infected persons.

Because the subtypes differ genetically, genetic testing of these subtypes
allows us to map routes of HIV spread, establish links between cases, and
study the introduction of new subtypes into countries or regions.  For
example:

Subtype B is the dominant virus in all of Western Europe, Australia, North
America, the Caribbean, Haiti, and Brazil.  All of these epidemics of HIV
were linked by sexual networks of gay men, and drug using networks of
injectors.

Subtype E is the dominant virus in Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Outbreaks of subtype E have appeared in Texas, Jakarta, and Uruguay, and
all 3 of these diverse epidemics have been genetically linked to HIV
infections acquired by UN soldiers serving in Cambodia.

The subtype C virus identified on the Burma-China has been found and
genetically typed along a highway leading from Burma to northwest China--a
major trafficking route for heroin.  By tracking viruses with subtyping, it
is possible to map HIV spread, and chains of transmission.

I.	Introduction

 ...communities, like individuals, cannot respond to the challenges of HIV
unless they can express the basic right to be involved in decisions that
affect them. --Jonathan Mann

The HIV/AIDS epidemic in South and Southeast began later than in Africa and
the West.  Since the introduction of the HIV virus into this densely
populated region, however, the spread of the epidemic has been explosive,
and public health and community responses have varied widely. The UNAIDS
Program has identified the four hardest hit countries in the Asian region,
they are, in order of HIV prevalence; India, Thailand, Burma (Myanmar), and
Cambodia.1 While information on HIV/AIDS in Burma is fragmentary and
incomplete, there is increasing awareness in the public health community
that the Burmese epidemic is one of Asia's fastest growing and most
pervasive.  Prof. John Dwyer, Founding President of the AIDS Society of
Asia and the Pacific, stated in June, 1997, that "Burma is the epicenter of
the epidemic in Asia."2 An International expert panel convened in Manila,
in 1997, rated the Burma as having "High and rising HIV prevalence, and
high and rising HIV incidence."3

Estimates of the HIV burden in Burma are crude and based on data known to
be problematic, and hence vary considerably, but 400,000 to 600,000 persons
infected as of 1997 is probably reasonable, though this is currently lower
than the estimate of 350,000 in 1997 used by the Myanmar National AIDS
Program (NAP).4  Their figure (350,000) is somewhat lower than might have
been expected, given the rapid spread of HIV in the country.  However,
there is some evidence that survival among People with AIDS (PWAs) is
limited and life after infection markedly shorter than in countries where
treatment is available and nutrition adequate. Thus, while new HIV
infection rates remain high, AIDS death rates are high as well, giving the
impression of stable or slowly rising population burden of HIV infection
when the situation is actually much more dynamic.  Much more accurate data
would be needed than is available to investigate this possibility.  Enough
is known, however, to confirm a severe epidemic.

HIV/AIDS education, prevention, and care programs remain inadequate in
Burma, and more are urgently needed.  Medical supplies are in short supply,
and their distribution is markedly uneven, making blood and blood products
transfusion unsafe, especially in rural areas, and even minor procedures
pose HIV transmission risks.  Burma has another epidemic--injecting drug
use, which preceded the HIV explosion in the country, and which will make
control difficult to achieve.  Condoms were illegal in Burma until 1992,
are scarce, little used, and expensive, making sexual transmission of HIV a
major, and equally difficult to control transmission route.  Perinatal
spread, from infected mothers to infants, is rapidly increasing as a result
of sexual transmission to women in Burma.

International organizations, several UN agencies, donor governments,
private foundations, NGOs, and research groups are already playing key
roles in attempts to control the HIV epidemics in Thailand and India.  A
number of these organizations including UNAIDS, UNICEF, Medecins Sans
Frontiers, Medecins Du Monde, and NGOs such as The International Red Cross,
CARE, World Vision and World Concern already have programs underway in
Burma, and others are currently considering such involvement.
Collaborative research projects with at least one American University have
been established, and others are proposed.  While these efforts are
laudable, and are clearly necessary, there are crucial political and social
realities in Burma, which make a careful examination of such involvement
essential.

Burma is controlled by a military government known as the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC), in power for nine years, until late
1997.  SLORC refused to honor the results of Burma's democratic election in
1990, and has killed, jailed or driven into exile virtually all the
country's elected leaders.  Human rights groups estimate that up to 1,000
political prisoners are currently imprisoned in 1998.  Recognizing both The
Regimes increasing involvement with the drug industry, and their sharply
increased repression of elected leaders and the democracy movement; the
United States imposed stiff sanctions5 against the regime in mid-1997.

The regions most important political and trade body, The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has taken a different approach, and
admitted Burma and Laos as its eighth and ninth members in July, 1997
(Cambodia was to have been admitted as well, but this was delayed due to
the violent coup d'etat of Hun Sen.) At this writing, only one ethnic
national organization has held out against the cease-fire agreements of the
SLORC; the Karen National Union.  SLORC's Border Area Development (BAD)
Programs, which were to offer those nationalities which have signed
cease-fires economic and development packages, have failed to materialize,
particularly in the areas of health and education.

On 15th November 15th, 1997, a statement was released from Rangoon
announcing that the SLORC had been dissolved, and would be replaced by a
new regime called the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC.6
Whatever the implications of this change in the military structure,
totalitarian repression and violence remain rife and the human rights
situation, according to Amnesty International, and other organizations,
continues to deteriorate in 1998.  Information remains tightly controlled,
and there is heavy censorship of all media.  Freedom of speech, assembly,
and of the press, are denied to Burmese citizens.  Any organization
attempting to assist in HIV/AIDS programs in Burma must consider these
realities.

[ ... ]

VI	Policy Options

Despite the fact that the HIV epidemic is a clear public health emergency,
implementing an effective HIV/AIDS control program, and providing care for
people with HIV infection, will be greatly complicated by the political and
social realities of  Burma under The Regime.  While international
cooperative input will certainly be necessary to contain the crisis,
questions and concerns about collaboration with the Junta must be raised,
researched, and addressed.

It is now well accepted in public health circles that the Burmese HIV
epidemic is one of the world's fastest growing.  It is also well known that
the resources and political will which would be necessary to combat this
explosive epidemic are limited.  The political and economic isolation of
the country is perhaps the key factor which has limited resources.  Another
has been the resistance of The Regime to collaborate openly with
international organizations and with indigenous NGOs.

A third, and controversial limitation, has been the role of the Burmese
opposition and their international supporters, who have been seen as
limiting any international aid to Burma in their attempts to further
isolate The Regime.

There is an emerging consensus that further restrictions on donor support
to the Junta for AIDS control will only punish the people of Burma, and
further the spread of HIV/AIDS.  While donor agencies and NGOs may not be
eager to work with a regime which has perpetrated ongoing and well
documented human rights abuses on a national scale, the situation is seen
as a public health emergency.  One position recently put forward at the
Third International Conference on HIV/AIDS in the Asia Pacific Region, has
been to "de-politicize AIDS."  In effect, to say that HIV control should be
above, or outside, political considerations.  How realistic is this as a
strategy to combat HIV in Burma?  Should all parties, the opposition and
ethnic nationalities included, join hands in an effort to control what is
already a national tragedy?

The clear and obvious first answer is yes.  But the current situation in
Burma is, unfortunately, considerably more complex.  There are a number of
important reasons why the HIV epidemic is inherently political, and why it
may be naive and counterproductive to imagine that a "de-politicization" of
the Burmese epidemic is likely or even possible.

The following are policy options which were approved by the National Health
and Education Committee of the National Coalition Government of the Union
of Burma, in August, 1996.

1.	The full participation of the elected leadership, including Aung San Suu
Kyi and her party, in the national HIV/AIDS control programme, and in any
international collaborations.

2.	The full participation of the indigenous leaders of the ethnic
nationalities in HIV control programs in their regions.

3.	A commitment on the part of the donors and on the part of the SLORC to
an open accounting of the use of funds and resources.  Such an accounting
could be made to a neutral international body, and would include clauses
for the cessation of aid if resources were not reaching the target
populations.

4.	An agreement by all parties involved in HIV prevention, care, and
research, to fully abide by the Geneva accords on the rights of research
subjects.  Again, such agreements would include mechanisms of observation,
and mandatory of cessation of funds if rights violations were identified.

5.	The participation of people with AIDS, and of people from groups at risk
(sex workers, addicts, and others) in the design and implementation of HIV
programs.  These would include assurances of their protection, and again,
cessation of such projects if the rights of community members were violated.

Policy Issues for India and China

Burma has two out of control epidemics; domestic heroin use and HIV. Cross
border spread of both heroin and HIV has led to an epidemic in northeast
India, and Burmese heroin is increasingly available in mainland India.
SLORC has proven itself unable and/or unwilling to control either HIV or
the heroin industry.  Bilateral cooperation will be essential to
controlling both situations for India but is unlikely under SLORC.  India
must lend her support  for democratic reform in Burma, the only solution
for long-term control of heroin availability and HIV spread.

The chronic insurgencies of northeast India and western Burma are linked in
cycles of under--development, human rights abuses, and narcotics
trafficking.  Economic stability and political resolution for the seven
States of Northeast India hinge on a resolution of the linked Burmese civil
war, simmering since 1947.  India must push for: 1) a political solution to
Burma's civil war through Tri-partite dialogue with SLORC, the Ethnic
nationalities, and the NLD, 2) full participation of the elected
leadership, including Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, in Burma's social
programmes, and in international collaborations, and 3) full participation
of the indigenous leaders of the ethnic nationalities in drug and HIV
control program in their regions.

Conclusions

The people of Burma have endured a long repressive period of military
government.  This has resulted in the impoverishment of what had been a
country of promising resources and wealth, in international isolation, and
chronic ethnic conflict and strife, and in the frustration the intellectual
and social life of a highly cultured and literate people. In 1990 the
Burmese people voted for democracy, only to have their aspirations, once
again, postponed by the military leadership.  The introduction of the HIV
virus into this resource and information poor country has led to a new, and
pervasive threat to the people of Burma; an HIV/AIDS situation that is out
of control, has spread throughout the country, and is poised to devastate
the development potential of the country for years to come.

It may be possible to slow, and even contain, the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in
Burma, and it is the responsibility of those who care for Burma to attempt
this.  To implement programs without accepting the political reality of
Burma, however, is both bad public health practice and bad scientific
ethics.  AIDS cannot be de-politicized in a totalitarian regime, but the
impact of the regime on the epidemic may be lessened by enlightened public
health policy.

Perhaps the position of Archbishop Desmond Tutu during the Apartheid
struggle best illustrates where AIDS researchers and organizations eager to
help the Burmese people find themselves.  Tutu opposed the immunization
programs UNICEF wanted to mount in the old South Africa. UNICEF's position
was that "children are above politics."  Tutu's was that the Apartheid
system, not lack of vaccines, was at the root of the disproportionate
mortality among black children.  Since UNICEF's involvement would give
legitimacy to the Apartheid government's claims to be "helping" blacks, it
had to be resisted.  The tragedy of Burma may be that without a political
solution to the countries' current crisis, HIV will be impossible to
control.  Unless the generals step aside soon, Burma will be devastated by
AIDS.

We must conclude, based on the evidence presented here, that control of the
HIV epidemic, as with so many other critical issues facing Burma, will not
be achieved until a real and lasting political resolution, acceptable to
all parties, is achieved.

There are two epidemics from Burma, injecting drug use of #4 heroin and
HIV/AIDS. New information shows that  due to the growing amount of #4 being
distributed  from Burma both China and Kazahkstan are finding they are
facing a crisis of injecting drug use and HIV/AIDS.

****************************************************************