ASIAWEEK: DEALING WITH GEN. NE WIN

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Asiaweek, Dec. 11, 1998

                DEALING WITH GEN. NE WIN

          In contacts, he ruled out talks with Aung San Suu Kyi

                                       By MYINT THEIN,
                               senior adviser to the Burmese Resistance.
                                    He is based in Dallas, Texas


A RECENT REPORT BY UNICEF said that only 27% of Burmese complete primary
school compared with 81% in Vietnam. The U.N. Children's Fund observed
that "Myanmar right after Independence did a very good job in its
education and . . . this deterioration worries us greatly." Couple this
with the closing of all colleges and universities for eight of the past 10
years and you have the material for a documentary, "Burma - Death of a
Nation," starring the ruling generals of the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC). The generals do not seem to realize that they have
destroyed a generation of Burmese. Worse, they do not seem to care. 

The Army is the most hated organization in Burma, but there are good and
decent army officers. Almost two years ago, two general officers
separately contacted me. They had seen my letters in Asiaweek and the
Bangkok Post and said Gen. Ne Win had read them. I was told that in 1988
when I suggested in Asiaweek that Burma needed elder statesmen to guide a
transition to multi-party democracy, Ne Win invited former prime minister
U Nu to join him in talks. U Nu had replied that he would, but only if Ne
Win apologized to him for staging the 1962 coup. That ended the dialogue
between them. 

The two officers contacted me because they were offended by the bulldozing
of Yangon's Kyandaw Cemetery for property development by corrupt officers
working with ASEAN investors.  Like Arlington Cemetery in Washington D.C.,
Kyandaw is where the nation's heroes and leaders are buried. The officers
told me that Secretary One of the ruling council, Khin Nyunt, had no
control over these corrupt officers and that I should write directly to Ne
Win. They gave me his address and said that he received regular reports
from Khin Nyunt.

My letter to Ne Win was respectful and polite. I told him that it was
normal for people to have differences of opinion on politics and
economics. However, we should not disagree about what had happened to
Kyandaw Cemetery. Asian values are inconsistent with bulldozing a national
cemetery. The Chinese engage in ancestor worship; it is against Muslim
beliefs to destroy cemeteries. I complained bitterly that his "boys" had
engaged in shameful activity by bulldozing the cemetery. 

In May 1997, Ne Win brought out of retirement former military intelligence
chief Gen. Tin Oo and former auditor-general U Tin Aung Hein to
investigate charges of corruption in the cabinet. At one time U Tin Aung
Hein had rank equivalent to prime minister. He is respected by the
Resistance because it was his investigation in 1988 that uncovered the
deaths of 40 students who suffocated in a police van. (I have heard that
his son, a doctor, had to ride the bus because U Tin Aung Hein would not
permit him to use the official government car.) The investigation
documented extensive corruption and Ne Win forced the resignation of 14
lieutenant-generals, a vice-admiral, major-general, brigadier-general and
two civilian ministers. 

Last March, I received two telephone calls from Asia in two weeks. A
trusted intermediary told me that a representative of Ne Win was willing
to meet with me anywhere except the United States to explore ways to
resolve Burma's political problems. I replied that such negotiations
should be conducted directly with Aung San Suu Kyi and it would not be
appropriate for me to be involved. I was told in no uncertain terms that
Ne Win would not negotiate with Aung San Suu Kyi because he was offended
by a comment she had made in 1989.

In the second call, I said that I was willing to help secure Aung San Suu
Kyi's approval if the SPDC accepted the following four-point "Settlement
Agreement": A 1958-type caretaker government be formed with 15 cabinet
ministers, the National League for Democracy (NLD), the Army and the
Resistance each nominating five ministers; Aung San Suu Kyi be permitted
to play a role in Burmese politics, which could be Speaker of Parliament
or an important position in governing the country; the release of all
political prisoners; and restoration of the free press.

Ne Win has neither accepted nor rejected my proposal. Instead he sent
Brig. Maung Maung and Brig. Aung Gyi to the U.S. and they met three times
with us. Unfortunately Ne Win's stroke in July suspended our informal
dialogue. If he accepts the "Settlement Agreement," the Resistance will
help secure $200 million in development assistance to rebuild our colleges
and universities. Out first priority will be to pay professors a decent
wage in hard currency. 

Aged 87 and not in good health, Ne Win alone can order the military to
return to the barracks. That is the hard reality.  Yet Burma cannot afford
another 10 years of political stalemate. We must, and we will, settle this
matter in the very near future. There are only two realistic solutions: a
negotiated settlement with Ne Win or a coup led by young officers. The
generation of 1962, when universities were closed for the first time, was
responsible for a coup attempt in 1976 led by young officers who gained
the support of two regional commanders. The 1988 generation will also
produce young army officers who will try to restore freedom and democracy.