THE QUESTION ON POWER BUILDING

[uneoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

POSTED 9:00AM, 19-DEC-98

THE QUESTION ON POWER-BUILDING

Recently, there has been a question on  power-building process at the
local level by democracy movement in Burma.  In particular, the question
is put on whether the mass mobilization of  South Africa's anti
apartheid movement can be translated to Burma situation. Most important
factor, I believe, against such process taking place in Burma is the
political oppression. The oppression by SPDC/SLORC seem  too pervasive
to make counter-measures. On the other hand, we may have some reason to
hope that the local level power building is not so crucial as in other
movements, for example South Africa's anti apartheid movement. In
addition, the considerations for alternative power centers at local
level in the anti apartheid movement of South Africa are not directly
applicable to the democracy movement in Burma.

As for the South Africa's movement, there are factors conducive to
mobilise the masses in setting-up of alternative power centres. Firstly,
the white minority inflicting social and political injustice on the
majority black population are easily observable. Therefore one can
mobilize the masses along the ethnic-racial lines. There is also an
obvious need by the movement to provide the oppressed with social
services and amenities that had been prohibited by the white government.
Therefore, for  majority  black population,  the enjoyment of social
services -- such as school, clinics etc --provided by the movement can
represent an achievement of solidarity and an advancement to the black
power. Historically, this kind of mass mobilization in Burma, known as
the "Wun-Tha-Nu Spirit", was carried out  in our struggle against
British during the colonial period (not surprisingly, the origin of
these movements can be traced back to Gandhi).

Burma nowadays, however, some of the considerations in South Africa's
anti apartheid movement cannot be applied. The majority of population
in Burma are not being prohibited to enjoy any of social services or
amenities by the authorities. These services are just simply
unavailable. Both the oppressors and oppressed are the Burmese. In
minority areas, it can be different, of course. The struggle to achieve
democracy is more abstract  in comparison to the struggle for redressing
racial injustices. Consequently, the military government's infliction of
social and political injustices, though undoubtedly being felt by the
greater majority of masses, are not generally easily comprehensible
(though the population will certainly be disturbed by the violent
government crackdowns on NLD). Adding to this situation was the
government censorship on the freedom of speech that limiting
articulation of those injustices to the masses.

Although people by themselves are unable to articulate those injustices,
there is no doubt about  Burmese people's disenchantment of the military
government. Since the authorities' oppressions are not  targeted to any
particular section of population, it is not quite possible to make clear
distinction between the oppressed and oppressors as in South Africa.
[One might suggest the military/army personnel as a class of oppressors.
On the surface, it seems possible to some degree. However, the military
rank-and-file in Burma usually are  closely connected with the larger
Burmese population. On the other hand, public mobilisation against the
army may not be considered as a non-violent strategy.] Therefore, the
South African model of mobilising the local public in the context of
"services to the oppressed by the movement" cannot be  readily
translated to the Burma situation. Whilst the humanitarian need of
population in Burma is evident, alternative considerations will be
required to initiate actions towards that end.

SOCIAL SERVICES TO THE POPULATION

By studying the anti apartheid movement's experience for building  the
local level alternative power centres,  it may be more instructive to
consider providing social services  by the movement as the two different
objectives: (1) to provide humanitarian assistance to the population and
(2) to build the democratic institutions at the grass-roots level. Based
on these two objectives, there can be two schools of thought for
providing social services (humanitarian assistance) to the Burmese
population.

One method may be to arrange such assistance through existing
infrastructure with an  independent authority, such as international
humanitarian organizations. Some of  the campaign on refugees in early
years, i.e. until mid-1997, were based on this thinking. Though, in
current circumstances, it continue to be the Burmese people's misfortune
that we do not get the same UN Security Council's attention as in
Cambodia or Haiti.

The other method may be to mix the two objectives at the policy level
and try to broker dialogue between disputing parties in Burma. In this
particular case, the National League for Democracy (& CRPP) should be
given greater legitimacy. The reconciliation and dialogues may in turn
give some space for humanitarian activities in Burma. In the last two
years, the campaigns were directed towards this end. And as we all know,
we are hitting a brick-wall at the UNGA in this regards, too.

LESS  URGENCY FOR PARALLEL PROCESS

I think the democratic power consolidation at the local level can be
important factor for the political stability after the change of
government. Without  such mobilization, or parallel process at the local
level, the democratisation cannot generally be sustained. I however
think the need for local mobilisation is not urgent in Burma as it does
in other situation for following reason.

The Burma's rural communities, which made up of  80% of  total
population, have a strong social bond which preventing the direct
influence of the governments. If we look at a village or a
village-tract, we may generally find three community leaders: the
Village Head, the Monk/Priest and the Teacher. A typical village head in
rural Burma is not a small tyrant, but more like head of family and a
community leader. That village head is likely to cooperate any entity
that perceived to have the governmental authority. As for the
SPDC/SLORC, the village head may still have to obey somewhat grudgingly.
If there is a democratic government, the village head will certainly
cooperate. In other words, the political change or instability can not
directly effect the rural community because of  the influence of  these
local community leaders.

The "war of position" between government and opposition, therefore, is
not likely to be fought at the local level. It will have to be fought at
regional (township/division) level and at the national level.
Internationally enhancing legitimacy for the opposition is certainly
important at the national level "war of position". The external support,
such as international human rights monitors, on the one hand, can  help
the democracy struggle at the regional level. As for the movement, it
therefore seems adequate that if the NLD party, and ethnic minority
leaders, can keep moving forward on their agendas and can maintain 
their organisations and solidarity.

With best regards, U Ne Oo.

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