[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

U.S. ANALYSIS OF BURMA IN DRUG TRAF



Subject: U.S. ANALYSIS OF BURMA IN DRUG TRAFFICKING [PART 2]

 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998
Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC, February 1999  
PART 2

BURMA
Agreements and Treaties. Burma is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention,
the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 UN Drug
Convention. The Rangoon regime, however, has always refused to extradite
Burmese citizens to other countries. The United States does not have a
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with Burma. The USG believes that a
U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty, which was accepted by the post-independence
Burmese government in 1948, remains in force and is applicable to U.S.
requests for extradition of drug fugitives from Burma. The GOB continues to
refuse to recognize the applicability of this treaty. 

The GOB is a member of a six-nation (Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand,
Vietnam) Memorandum of Understanding, which includes the UNDCP, on a
sub-regional action plan aimed at controlling precursor chemicals and
reducing illicit drug use in the highlands of Southeast Asia. At a meeting
in Hanoi in mid-May, the six Mekong Region Countries signed three more
agreements for projects on demand reduction, improving drug abuse
statistics, and enhancing cross-border cooperation to reduce opium
cultivation. The GOB signed bilateral drug control agreements with India in
1993, with Bangladesh in 1994, with Vietnam in 1995, and with the Russian
Federation, Laos, and The Philippines in 1997. 

Cultivation and Production. Burma remains the world's largest producer of
opium. Potential production decreased sharply from 1997 levels, however,
marking the second straight year of decline after a decade of high and
steady production. Opium cultivation declined an estimated 16 percent and
production declined an estimated 26 percent to 1750 metric tons. Since the
early 1990s the areas of most intense cultivation have gradually shifted
from southern to northern Shan State. The bulk of the opium crop has been in
areas controlled by ethnic minority groups such as the United Wa State Army,
the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Chinese), the Mongko
Defense Army (Kachin), the Kachin Defense Army, and the Palaung National
Organization, with which the Burmese military junta has sought cease-fires
since 1989. In the last two years, however, the GOB has begun to increase
its presence in areas previously under ethnic control, with the notable
exception of the Wa region. Government eradication efforts increased during
1998 with the launching of a campaign in northern Shan State. These efforts,
along with a drought in southern Shan State, were responsible for the sharp
decline in potential opium production in 1998. The GOB conducted a baseline
survey of opium cultivation from January to June 1998 aimed at determining
actual opium production (as opposed to potential production that the USG
measures) throughout the country. According to Burmese figures there were
151,201 acres of poppy crops yielding 665.28 tons. The methodology used to
arrive at these figures is unknown, and the U.S. must rely on the higher
figures resulting from the joint opium yield survey. 

Drug Flow/Transit. Most heroin in Burma is produced in small, mobile labs
located near the borders with Thailand and China in Shan State in areas
controlled by ethnic narco-insurgencies. As a result of increased deployment
of troops in northern Shan State and more aggressive law-enforcement
efforts, the GOB was on pace to match last year's record destruction of
refineries. A growing amount of methamphetamine is reportedly produced in
labs co-located with heroin refineries in the Wa region and the former Shan
United Army Territory in southern Shan State. Seizures of amphetamine labs
trebled in 1998, reflecting the growing popularity of methamphetamine
production among traffickers. Heroin and methamphetamine produced by Burma's
ethnic groups are trafficked largely through unmarked transit routes
crossing the porous Chinese and Thai borders; to a lesser extent over the
Indian, Bangladeshi, and Lao borders; and through Rangoon onward by ship to
other countries in the region. Although Thailand remains an important route
for Burmese heroin to exit Southeast Asia, trafficking through China is on
the increase. 

Acetic anhydride, an essential chemical in the production of heroin, and
ephedrine, the principal chemical ingredient of methamphetamine, are
imported primarily from China. Traffickers continued moving heroin through
central Burma, often from Lashio, through Mandalay to Rangoon or other
seaports, such as Moulmein, for shipment to Singapore or Malaysia.
Trafficking routes leading through Kachin and Chin States and Sagaing
Division in northern Burma to India continued to operate as secondary routes. 

Demand Reduction. Drug abuse is a growing problem in Burma. Official
estimates put the drug-addicted population at approximately 66,463, but
UNDCP and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in the health sector
estimate the actual number is significantly higher, totaling about
400-500,000. Heroin is cheap in Burma, and intravenous use of heroin
contributed to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in the Kachin and
Shan States. According to the GOB's "Rapid Assessment Study of Drug Abuse in
Myanmar" sponsored by the Ministry of Health and UNDCP in 1995, drug
treatment services are not reaching most drug users because of a lack of
facilities, lack of properly trained personnel, and inadequate treatment
methods. A $300,000 UNDCP-funded demand-reduction project is being
implemented by the NGO, "World Concern", in Kachin State. 

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives 

Direct material USG counternarcotics aid to Burma has remained suspended
since 1988, when the Burmese military brutally repressed the pro-democracy
movement. In September, the GOB refused to renew a crop substitution
project, Project Old Soldier, being carried out by the U.S. NGO "101
Veterans, Inc." in the Kutkai area of northern Shan State. The project,
which had been in operation for two years with USG funding approved by
Congress, had assisted 25 villages with cultivation of corn and other crops
as viable, economic alternatives to opium cultivation. The project more than
doubled the yield of corn compared with local varieties as a result of
improved seeds, use of fertilizers, and application of herbicides. The GOB's
decision to end the project was based on bilateral political frictions with
the U.S. and undermined farmers' hopes to develop alternative income sources
to opium. 

Currently, the USG engages the Burmese government on counternarcotics on a
very limited level. DEA, through the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, shares
drug-related intelligence with the GOB and conducts joint drug-enforcement
investigations with Burmese counternarcotics authorities. Various U.S.
agencies have conducted opium yield surveys in the mountainous regions of
the Shan State in 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1998, with essential assistance
provided by Burmese counterparts. In cooperation with Burmese
counternarcotics personnel, the USG plans to conduct another survey in early
1999. Results from the surveys give both governments a much more accurate
understanding of the scope, magnitude, and changing geographic distribution
of Burma's opium crop. 

The U.S. Government continues frequently to urge the Burmese government to
take serious steps to curb Burma's large-scale opium production and heroin
trafficking. Specifically, the Rangoon Regime has been encouraged to: 

Prosecute drug-trafficking organizations and their leaders, such as Wei
Xuekang, and deprive them of assets derived from the drug trade; 

Take action against drug-related corruption, including prosecution and
appropriate punishment of corrupt officials and money launderers; 

Take action against fugitive drug-traffickers and turn them over to third
countries; 

Undertake opium poppy eradication on a wide scale in areas under its direct
control or immediate influence; 

Press ethnic groups, such as the Wa, the Kokang, and the Kachin, who have
pledged to create opium-free zones in their regions, to make good on their
commitments; 

Enforce existing anti-drug, conspiracy, and anti-money laundering
legislation; 

Provide strong support to multilateral drug-control projects in the Shan
State. 

Bilateral Cooperation. USG counternarcotics cooperation with the Burmese
regime is restricted to basic law-enforcement operations and involves no
bilateral material or training assistance from the U.S. due to U.S. concerns
over Burma's commitment to effective counternarcotics measures, human
rights, and political reform. DEA's liaison with Burmese policymakers and
military officials-conducted mainly through DEA's office in Rangoon-will
continue and will focus on providing intelligence on enforcement targets and
coordinating investigations of international drug- trafficking groups.
During the year, the USG encouraged contacts between Burmese and Thai
law-enforcement agencies and facilitated joint anti-drug operations. 

The Road Ahead. Based on experience in dealing with significant
narcotics-trafficking problems elsewhere around the world, the USG
recognizes that ultimately large-scale and long-term international aid,
including development assistance and law-enforcement aid, will be needed to
curb fundamentally and irreversibly drug production and trafficking. The USG
is prepared to consider resuming appropriate assistance contingent upon the
GOB's unambiguous demonstration of a strong commitment to counternarcotics,
the rule of law, punishment of traffickers and major trafficking
organizations (including asset forfeiture and seizure), anti-corruption,
enforcement of anti-money laundering legislation, continued eradication of
opium cultivation and destruction of drug-processing laboratories, and
greater respect for human rights.