Burma receives advances from its si

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Subject: Burma receives advances from its silent suitors in Singapore

Burma receives advances from its silent suitors in Singapore

                                                   By William Ashton 

                          (Jane's Intelligence Review. March 1,1998.
ASIA: Vol 10, No3. Pg. 3298.)

While China may be the most obvious country trying to win over Burma's
affections, Rangoon has, in fact, received
significant advances from an altogether more subtle suitor, as William
Ashton reports.

EVER since the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) almost 10 years ago, there have
been persistent claims that Burma's military government has been
secretly supported by Singapore. Rumours of a close
strategic relationship continue to circulate under the SLORC's
successor, the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), the formation of which seems to have been prompted by
representations made to General Ne Win during his
recent Southeast Asian tour. While Singapore's motives clearly include a
wish to take advantage of the commercial
opportunities flowing from Rangoon's new 'open door' economic policies,
wider strategic factors are just as important.

Following the massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators and creation of
the SLORC in September 1988, Burma was
severely criticised by most of the international community. Aid and
financial flows critical to the survival of the military regime
were suspended. In addition, Burma's traditional arms suppliers
announced that they would not sell it any new weapons or
military equipment. Even West Germany, until then the main source of
Burma's military technology, suspended co-operation
on indigenous arms production. The SLORC, faced with the country's
economic collapse and fearful of a link-up between
ethnic insurgents in the countryside and urban-based dissidents, was
desperate to restock its depleted armouries. China
and Thailand were quick to step in with offers of support, but the first
country to come to the regime's rescue was in fact
Singapore. 

Traces of a relationship:

DETAILS are hard to come by but, according to one regional journal, in
October 1988 hundreds of boxes marked 'Allied
Ordnance, Singapore' were unloaded from two vessels of Burma's Five Star
Shipping Line in Rangoon's port. These

shipments reportedly included mortars, ammunition and raw materials for
Burma's arms factories. The consignment also
contained 84 mm rockets for the Burmese army's Carl Gustav recoilless
guns, which were made by Chartered Industries of
Singapore under licence from Forenade Fabriksverken in Sweden. The
shipment thus violated an agreement under which
the original export licence had been negotiated, requiring that any
re-exports only be made with the permission of the
Swedish Government. No such clearance was granted.

In August 1989 Singapore was again accused of providing arms to the
SLORC when weapons and ammunition originating
in Belgium and Israel were trans-shipped to Burma, apparently with the
assistance of SKS Marketing, a newly formed
Singapore-based joint venture with the Burmese military regime. There
have been reports that these latter shipments
included second-hand 40 mm RPG-2 grenade launchers and 57 mm anti-tank
guns of Eastern Bloc origin. One
well-informed Burma-watcher has suggested that this equipment may have
come from Palestinian stocks captured in
southern Lebanon by Israel in 1982 and re-sold to Burma.

It is highly unlikely that any of these arms shipments to Burma could
have been made without the knowledge and support of
the Singapore government.

Winning friends:

THESE gestures of practical assistance to the SLORC, at a time when it
felt most vulnerable, won Singapore some
powerful friends in the military regime. Largely because of this
high-level support, the bilateral relationship has blossomed.
Since 1988 there have been frequent exchanges of senior visitors,
including the heads of state of both countries. Economic
ties have also greatly expanded. Singapore is now Burma's largest
foreign investor, with over US$1 billion committed to
nearly 50 different projects (mainly in hotels, property development and
tourism). Both governments appear to be prepared
to overlook the fact that some of these investment dollars have been
generated by narcotics production in the Golden
Triangle. Notorious traffickers like Lo Hsing-han are thought to control
a number of companies in Singapore that are
investing heavily in Burma. The flow of illicit funds can also go in the
opposite direction. For example, it has been suggested
that in 1991 foreign currency generated by narcotics sales was used by
the SLORC to pay for a large shipment of arms
from China, with the money being passed through a bank in Singapore.

The close political and economic ties that now exist between Singapore
and Burma are well known, but much less publicity
has surrounded the bilateral co-operation that is occurring in a number
of more controversial areas. Burma's armed forces,
for instance have apparently continued to order arms and ammunition from
Singaporean companies. They also seem to
have turned to Singapore for military training, intelligence advice and
defence technology. This has placed Singapore in a
category reserved for Burma's special friends, a category currently
shared only by the Burmese junta's main financial backer
and strategically: China.



Bolstering the friendship:

SINCE those early consignments, a wide variety of additional arms and
ammunition has reportedly been shipped to Burma
from firms based in Singapore, and Singaporean brokers appear to have
facilitated the sale of munitions to Burma from
other suppliers. The details of these deals are not always clear, but
they are believed to have included M16A1 automatic
rifles and 5.56 mm ammunition (apparently in violation of another export
agreement attached to their licensed production in
Singapore), 7.62 mm assault rifles and ammunition, communications
equipment of various kinds and at least one (but
possibly more) British Aerospace Bloodhound Mk 2 surface-to-air missile
systems with Scorpion target illuminating radars. If
this latter report is true, then Singapore would be responsible for
providing the Burmese armed forces with their first guided
missile system.

Bilateral links:

THE close bilateral relationship is also reflected in links between the
armed forces of both countries. For example, the
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have provided training in Singapore to
specialist units like the Burmese army's parachute
team, and there have been persistent rumours in Rangoon that the SAF are
providing the Burmese army with artillery
training in Burma. Another version of this story has it that the SAF
are, in fact, undertaking artillery training on Burmese
ranges. This is one explanation given to account for the occasional
visits to Rangoon of Republic of Singapore Air Force
(RSAF) Fokker F-50 and Lockheed C-130 transports. In fact, RSAF aircraft
regularly stage through Rangoon on their way to
Bangladesh, reportedly on 'navigational training' flights. While some of
these reports are difficult to prove, the relationship
between the armed forces of the two countries is clearly much closer
than publicly acknowledged.

Singapore is also believed to be the main source of information
technology being obtained by Burma's military regime. For
example, a Singaporean firm, or group of firms, has apparently installed
computers throughout Burma's Defence Ministry
and helped to upgrade its communications links with the 10 Regional
Military Commands.

Singapore is probably also the source of the equipment installed in the
ministry's ' cyber war centre' (created a few years
ago under a new Directorate of Defence Services Computers). This centre
is reported to be closely involved in the
monitoring and recording of foreign and domestic telecommunications,
including the satellite telephone conversations of
Burmese opposition groups. A recent study has also suggested that
Singapore may have provided the Burmese armed
forces with modern frequency-hopping radios and encryption devices to
protect their own signals from interception.

Bilateral co-operation may have also been extended to other intelligence
areas. One Australian analyst has recently cited a
claim that Singapore is providing intelligence training to Burma's
'secret police' in central Singapore. Hundreds of Burmese
officers are reported to be involved. There has also been at least one
credible press report that Singaporean intelligence

officers have been observed in Burma near the Thai- Burma border. The
current Singaporean ambassador to Burma is a
former senior SAF officer and a past director of Singapore's
defence-oriented Joint Intelligence Directorate. This
appointment may simply be a coincidence, but it is curious that
Singapore has chosen to assign someone with a military
background to this new member of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and not one of its many capable
professional diplomats.

There have also been repeated, if still unconfirmed, reports that a
Singaporean company, or group of companies, has
stepped in to help modernise and expand Burma's arms industries, drawing
on Singapore's well-developed expertise in this
field. Singaporean technicians, for example, have apparently replaced
the German technicians formerly based at Padaung,
across the Irrawaddy River from Prome and close to one of the regime's
well-guarded defence industrial complexes. Once
again, these claims are difficult to verify, but Singaporean involvement
in these factories would be consistent with the
SLORC's (and now the SPDC's) aim of making Burma more self-sufficient in
arms production. Singapore is less likely to
face the kinds of domestic pressures which in 1988 forced Germany to
reconsider its support for Burma's arms industries.

Singaporean denials:

EVER since they began to surface, these rumours and news media reports
have been consistently denied by the
Singaporean government. Indeed, Singapore has shown considerable
sensitivity to any suggestion that it is secretly
supporting the military regime in Rangoon or turning a blind eye to
Burmese money-laundering operations. Some of the
reasons for this sensitivity are obvious. Despite ASEAN's ambivalent
attitude toward Burma since 1988, there would be
considerable diplomatic embarrassment to Singapore if it was known to be
actively supporting an international pariah like
the SPDC in such a fashion. Singapore can hardly accuse Western
countries of interfering in Burma's internal affairs (by
condemning the military regime's repressive policies) when it is helping
to provide the same regime with the means to retain
its iron grip on power. Nor does Singapore wish to lose its reputation
as an honest dealer in regional affairs and a staunch
opponent of narcotics trafficking.

There is another explanation for Singapore's sensitivity on this issue,
however, and that is its wish to avoid any potential
difficulties in its developing relationship with China. Despite
statements to the contrary from elder statesmen like former
prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore is acutely conscious of China's
growing economic strength and strategic influence.
It has watched China's behaviour in the region, including its rapidly
growing links with the military regime in Burma, with
some concern. In order to avoid pushing the SPDC further into the arms
of the Chinese, Singapore and the other ASEAN
states have refused to join in the widespread condemnation of the
Burmese junta for its abuses of human rights and have
undertaken instead to 'constructively engage' the Rangoon regime.


These countries have included in their efforts the pursuit of
commercial opportunities in Burma and in some cases modest
defence ties, but in Singapore's case a close (and hidden) strategic
partnership appears to be a very high priority.

Well-placed to gain:

OF all the ASEAN countries, Singapore is perhaps best placed to pursue
this particular aim. It is not one of Burma's
immediate neighbours and therefore does not have to cope with the
territorial disputes and refugee outflows which tend to
characterise Burma's relations with Thailand. Similarly, Singapore cares
little about human rights, in particular the plight of
the ethnic and religious minorities in Burma, which occasionally
troubles Muslim states like Indonesia and Malaysia.

Also, having developed one of the region's most advanced armed forces
and defence industrial support bases, Singapore is
in a good position to offer Burma a number of inducements which other
ASEAN countries would find hard to match.

Singapore seems to have decided that, in a number of ways, close links
with the military regime in Rangoon serves its
long-term national security interests. Having apparently assessed that
Aung San Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy forces
were unlikely to win power for the foreseeable future, Singapore has
deliberately set out to forge closer ties with the real
centre of power in Burma: namely the armed forces.

By assisting with arms sales, defence technology transfers, military
training and intelligence co-operation, Singapore has
been able to win a sympathetic hearing at the very heart of Burma's
official councils. From there, it is in a good position not
only to encourage its own commercial interests but also to pursue wider
strategic aims. These relate in part to Burma's own
growing military capabilities, but also to China's future role in the
Asia-Pacific region.

Singapore has recognised, perhaps more readily than most countries,
that Burma has the potential to become a more
influential factor in the region's changing strategic environment. As
part of an ambitious expansion and modernisation plan,
for example, the Burmese armed forces have grown from around 186,000 in
1988 to more than 400,000 - and at a time
when all other regional countries are reducing the size of their armed
forces. In addition, since 1988 the SLORC has
acquired around 130 new combat aircraft, nearly 30 new naval vessels and
large numbers of AFVs, multiple rocket
launchers and artillery pieces. The Rangoon regime has also improved its
command and control systems, and upgraded its
military infrastructure. With one of the largest armed forces in
Southeast Asia, newly equipped with a wide range of more
modern weapons, Burma now has the potential to play a far greater
conventional defence role than at any other time in its
history.

The Chinese factor:

MORE importantly, most of the new arms and equipment facilitating this
massive military expansion programme have come
from China, assisted by the provision of generous loans and special
'friendship' prices.

In addition, hundreds of Burmese servicemen have undertaken training
courses in China, and up to 100 People's Liberation

Army instructors have been posted to Burma at different times to teach
Burmese personnel how to use their new weapons.
China seems to have negotiated a comprehensive intelligence co-operation
arrangement with Burma, which may even
extend to the operation of joint signals intelligence posts scattered
around Burma's long coastline. Since 1988 China has
also played a major role in the development of Burma's civil and
military infrastructure.

This dramatic departure from Burma's traditional neutrality in
international affairs, along with its new strategic partnership
with a major power like China, has sent ripples of concern around the
region. There are fears that Burma may eventually
become a 'client state' of China, provide support to Chinese naval
deployments to the Indian Ocean or act as a stalking
horse for Chinese interests in regional councils such as ASEAN. At
times, these fears appear rather exaggerated and fail to
take into account Burma's passionate nationalism and deep-seated
suspicions of Chinese intentions. Some of these fears
may in fact be politically inspired by countries like India in an effort
to discredit China and garner favour with the ASEAN
members. Even so, real concerns remain - including in Singapore - that
China is developing such a hold on Burma's
economy and armed forces that it will constrain the Rangoon regime's
ability to act independently in the future.

Singapore's motives:

THUS, Singapore has a number of immediate and obvious reasons for
wanting to develop a close working relationship with
Burma. These relate mainly to Singapore's own perceived commercial and
political interests. Less obvious, perhaps, is
Singapore's desire to cultivate better links with a regional country
that is expanding its military capabilities and external
contacts after decades of self-imposed isolation. In the final analysis,
however, China's shadow falls constantly across
Singapore's relationship with Burma, and it is concern about China's
future role in the region that has prompted many of the
steps taken by Singapore in recent years to consolidate its special
relationship with the military regime in Rangoon.

While this remains the case, Singapore will continue to be very
sensitive about any publicity which may complicate its
long-term plans. These include a two-track approach of cultivating close
relations with China while hedging its bets by
supporting an independent Burma within ASEAN. In these circumstances,
any prospect of Singapore's hidden partnership
with Burma being re-examined as a result of international pressure seems
remote.

* William Ashton is a freelance journalist based in Canberra, Australia.

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